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ABSTRACT 
This  thesis  is  an  investigation  of  Karl  Barth’s  theology  in  the  turbulent  and 
dynamic years of his nascent career: 1915 – 1922, with a special focus on the 
manner in which he construed Christian and ecclesial existence. The thesis argues 
that  Karl  Barth  developed  his  theology  with  an  explicit  ecclesial  and  ethical 
motive, that is, he developed his theology as a deliberate attempt to shape the 
ethical life of the church  in the context within  which he lived and worked. It 
contends  that  criticisms  suggesting  that  Barth  does  not  have  an  ethics  are 
inaccurate assessments of his work, and in fact, that although it is evident that his 
ethical thought continued to develop throughout his career, major trajectories of 
Barth’s development are present in germinal form even at this early stage. 
Following  the  lead  and  suggestion  of  John  Webster,  the  thesis  adopts  a 
chronological and exegetical reading of Barth’s work from his initial dispute with 
his liberal heritage circa 1915 until the publication of the second edition of his 
commentary on Romans. Materials examined from this period include sermons, 
lectures, book reviews, personal correspondence and biblical commentaries, with 
particular care being taken to identify the occasion and historical context within 
which Barth presented his thought. This reading seeks to uncover and present the 
development, structure, content and logic of Barth’s own thought, in hope that the 
central concerns of this thesis will be validated. Examination of these materials 
has  indeed  shown  that  Barth  developed  his  theology  with  an  ecclesio-ethical 
motive.  
The  significance  of  this  thesis  is  twofold.  First,  it  contributes  to  broader 
understanding of Barth’s theology both in its early development, and with regard 
to his ecclesiology and ethics. Second, it provides a significant framework and 
material for contemporary ecclesial reflection on its own identity and mission.  
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INTRODUCTION 
To the very day of judgment we shall wait in vain for an Evangelical church 
which takes itself seriously unless we are prepared to attempt in all modesty 
to take the risk of being such a Church in our own situation and to the best of 
our  ability.…I  am  firmly  convinced  that,  especially  in the  broad  field  of 
politics, we cannot reach the clarifications which are necessary today, and on 
which theology might have a word to say, as indeed it ought to have, without 
first reaching the comprehensive clarifications in and about theology which 
are our present concern. I believe that it is expected of the Church and its 
theology…that it should keep precisely to the rhythm of its own relevant 
concerns.
1 
 
These  words,  taken  from  the  preface  to  the  first  part-volume  of  the  Church 
Dogmatics,  indicate  that  Karl  Barth’s  motivation  for  writing  the  Church 
Dogmatics was driven, at least in part, by a concern for the very existence of the 
church as church. Barth was alarmed by the ready accommodation, indeed the 
captivity, of modern Protestantism to the political and cultural currents of the day. 
He was dismayed that so many of its preachers and adherents seemed to discover 
deep  religious  significance  in  their  national  and  ethnic  identity,  and  in  their 
political Führer.
2 Already in August 1932 then, Barth was deeply concerned for 
the fate of the church in Germany. Less than two years later Barth found himself a 
leader  of  the  fledgling  Confessing  Church,  and  had  drafted  the  Theological 
Declaration of Barmen which included among its theses potent assertions of the 
utter  freedom  of  the  church  to  live  in  accordance  with  its  own  identity  and 
integrity as it derives from Jesus Christ.
3  
                                                
1 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I/1: The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans. G. W. Bromiley, 2nd 
ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), xv-xvi. 
2 Barth, Church Dogmatics I/1, xiv. 
3 For a discussion of the historical background and theological significance of the Barmen Synod 
and Declaration see Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical 
Texts, trans. J. Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 216-248; Timothy J. Gorringe, Karl Barth: 
Against Hegemony (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 117-133; Frank Jehle, Ever Against the Stream: The 
Politics of Karl Barth, 1906-1968, trans. R. & M. Burnett (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 46-56; 
Robin W. Lovin, Christian Faith and Public Choices: The Social Ethics of Barth, Brunner and 
Bonhoeffer (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 101-125.   2 
Stanley  Hauerwas  has  rightly observed that Barth thought  that  he  was  simply 
doing what he had to do. He also acknowledges that most theologians in Germany 
did not think that they had to oppose Hitler or that they had to write the Barmen 
Declaration.  That  Barth  did both  of  these things  cannot, insists  Hauerwas, be 
incidental  to  any  account  of  his  theology.
4  Hauerwas  recognises  that  Barth’s 
opposition to Hitler was ‘of a piece’ with his denial of natural theology as well as 
the discovery of the christological centre in theology.
5 Contra Reinhold Niebuhr, 
who concluded from Barth’s refusal to condemn communism in the 1950s, that 
his resistance to Nazism was dictated by personal experience of tyranny rather 
than by the  frame or content of  his theology,
6 Hauerwas indicates that it was 
precisely the frame of his theology that led Barth to take his stand in the 1930s. 
In reality, Barth had been deeply concerned for the church in Germany for almost 
twenty  years,  and  his  stand  with  the  Confessing  Church  was  the  fruit  of  a 
theological pilgrimage that had commenced much earlier. This thesis will argue 
that  Karl  Barth’s  early  work  demonstrates  that  an  underlying  concern  of  his 
theological  activity  was  ethical—indeed  ecclesial—and  that  he  developed  his 
theology with an explicit intention to shape and guide the way in which the church 
actually lived in the context within which he lived and worked. A careful reading 
of Barth’s works is particularly relevant with regard to this topic, for as Joseph 
Mangina has noted, Barth has not developed a separate treatment of this topic, but 
allows it to unfold within the larger fabric of dogmatics. Mangina suggests that 
the absence of a separate account does not indicate Barth’s lack of interest in these 
                                                
4 Stanley Hauerwas, With the Grain of the Universe: The Church’s Witness and Natural Theology 
(Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2001), 147. 
5 Hauerwas, With the Grain, 170. 
6 Reinhold Niebuhr, Essays in Applied Christianity (New York: Meridian, 1959), 184.   3 
themes.  Rather,  because  the  practical  enactment  of  the  Christian  life  is  so 
important to Barth he does not restrict treatment of it to a single place.
7  
The methodology adopted in this thesis is an exegetical reading of Barth’s early 
works  that  seeks  to  uncover  and  present  the  development,  structure,  content, 
parameters,  trajectories  and  logic  of  his  thought  in  order  to  then  explore  the 
central concerns of this thesis. To this end I have intentionally included a great 
many citations from Barth himself, in order that his distinctive voice is heard as 
accurately as possible. The thesis also adopts a chronological reading of Barth’s 
work  from  his  initial  break  with  his  liberal  heritage  circa  1915  until  the 
publication of the second edition of his commentary on Romans in 1922. The 
value of limiting the study to the period 1915-22 is that this period has often been 
only slightly treated in much of the scholarly literature, which has understandably, 
devoted the majority of its attention to exposition and analysis of the  Church 
Dogmatics. Even amongst those studies which are closely focussed on this period 
of  Barth’s  career,  none  are  similarly  focussed on  the  particular  aspect  of  his 
thought being investigated in this thesis, or follow the specific methodology being 
adopted here.
8 In this respect, the specific focus and methodology of this thesis 
provide a unique contribution to Barth studies.  
                                                
7 Joseph L. Mangina, Karl Barth on the Christian Life: The Practical Knowledge of God (New 
York: Peter Lang, 2001), 4. 
8 Perhaps the study with the closest affinity to that undertaken here is David Clough, Ethics in 
Crisis:  Interpreting  Barth’s  Ethics  (Aldershot:  Ashgate,  2005),  which  presents  a  significant 
reading  of  Barth’s ethics in  the  second  edition  of  his  Romans  commentary  and  compares his 
treatment of particular themes found there with his treatment of the same themes in the Church 
Dogmatics. Clough’s main concern though, is not so much the content of Christian ethics, but 
Barth’s development, and continuities in his ethical thought over the course of his career. Other 
treatments of Barth’s ethics, such as those by Willis, Biggar and Spencer give the bulk of their 
attention to Barth’s mature thought rather than to his early career (see Robert E. Willis, The Ethics 
of Karl Barth (Leiden: Brill, 1971), Nigel Biggar, The Hastening That Waits: Karl Barth’s Ethics, 
Revised  ed.  (Oxford:  Clarendon,  1993),  and  Archibald  James  Spencer,  Clearing  a  Space  for 
Human Action: Ethical Ontology in the Theology of Karl Barth (New York: Peter Lang, 2003)).    4 
Second,  by  focussing  on  this  formative  period  in  Barth’s  career,  later 
developments,  as  well  as  formal  continuity  of  thought  can  more  readily  be 
identified.  In  fact,  although  it  is  evident  that  his  ethical  thought  developed 
throughout  his  career,  it  will  be  seen  that  major  trajectories  of  Barth’s 
development are present in germinal form even at this early stage. 
Materials examined  from  this  period  include  sermons,  lectures,  book  reviews, 
personal correspondence  and biblical  commentaries, with  particular  care being 
taken to situate Barth in the historical context within which he was working. This 
method has the advantage of allowing Barth’s development to become evident in 
this  nascent  period  of  his  career.  When  I  began  working  through  the  various 
documents deriving from this period, I was unsure whether I would, in fact, find 
that Barth had a vision of Christian and ecclesial existence, most particularly so 
when commencing examination of the second commentary on Romans. Thus the 
thesis progresses more as a hypothesis being tested than as an argument with a 
foregone conclusion.  
This methodology arises from my persuasion that Barth’s theology, if it is to be 
rightly interpreted, must be read in accordance with the particular, and at times, 
quite idiosyncratic convictions that he brought to his theological reflection. While 
it  may  appear  that  this  assertion  is  self-evident,  the  history  of  Barth  studies 
indicates  that, in fact,  Barth  has often  been  misinterpreted  and misunderstood 
precisely because of a failure to read him on his own terms. The first chapter of 
the thesis attempts to justify this methodology by providing examples of several 
interpretations  of  Barth’s  ethics  which  fail  to  convince  precisely  because  of 
problems arising at this methodological level. The first chapter also provides an   5 
orientation to Barth’s treatment of ecclesial existence by examining criticisms that 
have arisen in recent discussions of his ecclesiology.  
The second chapter of the thesis begins by examining the reasons for Barth’s 
break  with  the  liberal  theology  of his training,  as  well as  a  discussion  of  his 
relationship  with  socialism  in  this  period.  These  two  sections  of  the  chapter 
provide  a  contextual  orientation  to  Barth’s  work  in  this  period,  while  the 
following sections proceed to detailed examination of two sermons and a review, 
each developed between late 1915 and early 1917. Each of these works exhibits 
evidence  of  Barth’s  sheer  thrill  of  theological discovery, as  well  as providing 
substantial verification of the present thesis. In this brief period Barth is laying 
foundations which will support his work for the entirety of his career.  
During  this  period  also,  Barth  began  writing  his  first  commentary  on  Paul’s 
epistle to the Romans which was published in December 1918, immediately after 
the end of World War I. It was this work which fell like a bomb in the playground 
of the theologians, bringing the Swiss country parson a degree of notoriety as well 
as  an  invitation  to  serve  as  professor  of  a  newly  funded  chair  in  Reformed 
Theology  at  the  University  of  Göttingen.  In  this  commentary  Barth’s  new 
theology comes to expression for the first time in a full-bodied manner. The third 
chapter takes up examination of the major themes and contours of this work in 
order  to  expose  and  explore  his  understanding  of  the  nature  and  life  of  the 
Christian community. 
That Barth’s theology was in a phase of rapid evolution and development in this 
period becomes evident in the fourth chapter where a further two articles, two 
lectures,  and  a  series  of  sermons,  all  deriving  from  1919-1920  are  closely   6 
examined. During these years a discernible shift in Barth’s thought occurred as a 
result  of  his  continued  theological  reflection  and  interaction  with  others.  The 
nature of this shift had to do with a change in the model in which he explicated his 
primary  theological concerns rather  than a  shift  in these  concerns  themselves. 
Nevertheless, a new and far more sober or even sombre note began to characterise 
his theology, with important implications for his vision of Christian and ecclesial 
existence. As was the case with the first edition of his commentary, so now these 
newer developments came to full-bodied expression in the second—and in some 
ways,  quite  remarkably  different—edition  of  his  commentary  on  Romans. 
Examination of this edition of the commentary is undertaken in the fifth chapter, 
together with an analysis of another lecture given in 1922, included here because 
of its chronological and material proximity to Barth’s Romans.  
The conclusion of the thesis presents the findings of this study, which indicate that 
Barth’s vision of Christian and ecclesial existence revolves around six primary 
ideas. That is, his ethics are an eschatological ethics of response to divine grace, 
which are necessarily ecclesial and thus a particular ethics, but which are also 
normative or universal in nature because they depict and bear witness to the true 
nature  of  reality  and  the  manner  of  life  which  corresponds  to  the  being  and 
activity of God. Further, Barth’s ethics are necessarily an ecclesial ethics because 
of the manner in which he grounds Christian activity in the crucial and prevenient 
activity of the Holy Spirit. In addition, as a pastor in a local church context, I also 
offer  some  concluding  reflections  regarding  the  practical  utility  of  Barth’s 
ecclesial ethics. To do so, of course, is slightly hazardous especially considering 
the vastly different context I inhabit as a pastor. Nonetheless, this is a venture that 
must be risked if the thesis itself is to have integrity, that is, that Barth developed   7 
his  theology  with  an  explicit  intent  to  guide  and  shape  actual  Christian 
communities in their this-worldly attempts to hear and proclaim the gospel, and to 
enact its implications in their daily lives and contexts.  
Finally, a brief word regarding some stylistic matters. As already indicated, I have 
included extensive citations as part of this thesis to enable Barth’s own voice to be 
heard, as well as those of his expositors and critics. Such citations are reproduced 
faithfully unless otherwise noted. Thus, emphasis in a citation may be understood 
as  being  original  unless  accompanied  by  the  note  ‘emphasis  added.’  In  like 
manner, gendered language in citations is original, while more inclusive language 
is adopted in the body of the work in accordance with contemporary convention. 
This is not to dismiss the inherent weakness of gendered language, nor to ignore 
real issues of concern that have arisen around Barth’s work with respect to these 
matters.
9  
A different problem arises when speaking of God.  My concern here issues neither 
from empty traditionalism nor from arrogant bloody-mindedness.  Rather, I have a 
theological conviction that the biblical appellation ‘Father’ as given in Scripture 
serves to identify and describe the God of Jesus Christ, and as a result, I retain the 
traditional form of referring to God.
10  
                                                
9  For  a  further  discussion  of  these  issues  see  Katherine  Sonderegger,  “Barth  and  Feminism,”  in  The 
Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed. John Webster (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). 
10 For further helpful discussion see Donald G. Bloesch, A Theology of Word and Spirit: Authority and 
Method in Theology (Downers Grove: IVP, 1991), especially pages 81-94 where Bloesch interacts with 
Rosemary Ruether and Susanne Heine.  Wolfhart Pannenberg also argues that although human religions use a 
great many words and symbols to speak of the divine reality, all of them are extrinsic to the divine reality 
itself, and are therefore exchangeable. An exception to this, however, is to be noted in Jesus’ way of relating 
to God as Father, for Jesus was not external to the divine reality itself, and this accounts for the finality of 
this  appellation.  See  Wolfhart  Pannenberg,  An  Introduction  to  Systematic  Theology  (Grand  Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1991), 31-32. The use of this term, of course, in no way implies that God is understood as male.   8 
     9 
CHAPTER ONE 
READING BARTH’S ETHICS  
Close  study  of  Barth’s  ethical  writings  is  still  in  its  infancy.…[The] 
conventional treatment of Barth often revolved around an anxiety that the 
sheer abundance of Barth’s depiction of the saving work of God in Christ 
tends to identify real  action  with divine action, and leave little room  for 
lengthy exploration of human moral thought and activity.…A great deal of 
work  remains  to  be  done.  What  is  required  more  than  anything  else  is 
detailed study of Barth’s writings which, by close reading, tries to display 
the  structure  and  logic  of  his  concerns  without  moving  prematurely  into 
making  judgments  or  pressing too  early  the usefulness  (or  lack  of  it)  of 
Barth’s  work  for  contemporary  moral  theology.…For  Barth,  ethical 
questions are not tacked on to dogmatics as something supplementary, a way 
of exploring the ‘consequences’ of doctrinal proposals or demonstrating their 
‘relevance.’ Dogmatics, precisely because its theme is the encounter of God 
and humanity, is from the beginning moral theology. An inadequate grasp of 
this  point  often  lies  behind  much  misunderstanding,  not  only  of  Barth’s 
ethics but of his dogmatics as a whole.
1 
On Approaching the Study of Barth’s Ethics 
In the beginning of his excellent treatment of Barth’s ethics, Nigel Biggar notes 
that the English-speaking world has not been generous with the attention it has 
paid  to the ethical  thought of  Karl  Barth,  and suggests  that  the  cause  of  this 
neglect lies partly in the reputation that Barth acquired during the early period of 
his  thinking,  when  the  stress  on divine  judgement  seemed  entirely  to devalue 
human  activity  and  ethical  reflection  upon  it.
2  This  thesis  will  argue  to  the 
contrary, that even in this period Barth wrote in order to provide resources for the 
Christian  community  for  the  ordering  of  their  ethical  existence.  Nevertheless, 
responsibility  for  the  reputation  Barth  gained,  must  at  least  in  part,  lie  with 
himself and his strident use of language. For example, in the first edition of Der 
Römerbrief he bluntly asserts, ‘from the point of view…we must take in Christ, 
                                                
1  John  Webster,  Barth’s  Moral  Theology:  Human  Action  in  Barth’s  Thought  (Grand  Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1998), 1, 8. 
2 Nigel Biggar, The Hastening That Waits: Karl Barth’s Ethics, Revised ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1993), 1.      10 
there is no ethics. There is only the movement of God.’
3 In 1933, in face of the 
growing threat of National Socialism, Barth insisted that he would ‘endeavour to 
carry on theology, and only theology, now as previously, and as though nothing 
had happened.’ Indeed, he had ‘ample reasons for being content to keep within the 
limits of [his] vocation as a theological professor,’ and when pressed to speak “to 
the situation” asked, ‘would it not be better if one did not speak “to the situation,” 
but, each one within the limits of his vocation, if he spoke ad rem?’
4 Later, as he 
developed his doctrine of the divine command, Barth could write that, ‘Strange as 
it  may  seem,  [the]  general  conception  of  ethics  coincides  exactly  with  the 
conception of sin.’
5 Still later, Barth’s polemic is ferocious: ‘What the serpent had 
in mind [in the temptation in the Garden of Eden] is the establishment of ethics!’
6  
Such rhetoric, however, should be understood as hyperbole, particularly in light of 
the substantial amount of material that Barth has written on ethical method and 
issues.
7 What is also clear is that Barth’s motivation for the monumental Church 
Dogmatics was, at least in part, ethical, and lay in a desire for the renewal and the 
equipping  of  the  church.  At  stake  is  not  the  correct  delineation  of  particular 
doctrines, or the freedom of theology to continue on its esoteric way unhindered 
by the intellectual concerns of modernism or the practical concerns of  human 
existence  in  the  world.  At  stake,  as  we  saw  in  the  introduction,  is  the  very 
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4 Karl Barth, Theological Existence Today: A Plea for Theological Freedom, trans. R. B. Hoyle & 
C. Heath (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1933), 9-10.  
5 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2: The Doctrine of God, ed. G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance, 
trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 518. 
6 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/1: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, ed. G. W. Bromiley & T. F. 
Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 448. 
7 Thomas Oden estimates that Barth devotes no less than 2000 pages of the Church Dogmatics 
specifically  to  ethical  issues,  in addition  to  the  many  occasional  essays  which  address  ethical 
concerns. He wonders, therefore, ‘if those who dismiss Barth’s ethical thinking are actually aware 
of how extensively he has written in the area of ethics’ (Thomas C. Oden, The Promise of Barth: 
The Ethics of Freedom (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1969), 41-42).     11 
existence of the church as church, that is, its distinctive existence and way of 
being in the world as witness to the kingdom of God. This motive has not always 
been noticed, however, and a number of searching criticisms and questions have 
been raised against Barth’s ethics. For this reason I am going to present a brief 
survey and critique of the kinds of ways in which Barth’s ethics in general has 
been  read,  after  which  more  extensive  consideration  will  be  given  to  some 
representative readings of his ecclesial ethics specifically.  
Criticisms of Barth’s Ethics 
Reinhold Niebuhr, who like  Barth was a towering figure of twentieth century 
theology,  found  Barth’s  work  too  transcendental  to  be  ethically  relevant.  He 
claimed memorably that Barth’s theology was  
too eschatological and too transcendent…for the ‘nicely calculated less and 
more’ which must go into political decisions....I can only observe that if one 
reaches a very high altitude, in either an eschatological or a real airplane, all 
the distinctions which seem momentous on the ‘earthly’ level are dwarfed 
into insignificance.
8  
Niebuhr asserted that  Barth’s emphasis  on  the  divine  transcendence convicted 
humanity not of any particular breaches against human life and community, but 
more  radically  of  being  human  and  not  divine.
9  His  ethics  were  considered 
isolationist and sectarian, ‘designed for the church of the catacombs,’
10 and as 
such had become ‘irrelevant to all Christians in the Western world who believe in 
                                                
8 Reinhold Niebuhr, Essays in Applied Christianity (New York: Meridian, 1959), 186.  
9 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics, 1960 ed. 
(New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1932), 68-69. See also Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and 
Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation Volume 1 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1941), 
220. 
10 Niebuhr, Essays in Applied Christianity, 187.      12 
accepting  common  and  collective  responsibilities  without  illusion  and  without 
despair.’
11 
Niebuhr’s primary mode of interaction with Barth was by way of brief ad-hoc 
essays written over three decades. A far more intensive engagement with Barth is 
found in the extensive and erudite treatment by Robert Willis who asserts that the 
Church Dogmatics can be interpreted ‘as one long, sustained ethical treatise.’
12 He 
is  particularly  concerned,  however,  that  Barth’s  theological  method  serves  to 
marginalise, and indeed, vitiate  human  ethical identity, agency and continuity. 
Willis worries that the ontological convergence of God and humanity in Christ 
suggests or even entails an ‘absorption’ of humanity in that humanity becomes 
simply an extension of a mode of God’s own being.
13 Further, Barth’s actualistic 
construal of the divine command, says Willis, makes it unclear how Christian 
existence  is  restrained  from  collapsing  into  an  unending  series  of  individual 
responses or ‘hearings.’
14 Such a conception undercuts the possibility of an ethical 
life, and limits ethics to the realm of worship.
15 Willis asserts that ‘as Barth sets 
things  up…it  is  impossible  that  man  could  contribute  anything  to  the  ethical 
situation.’
16 
Helmut Thielicke is also scathing in his critique of Barth, concluding that Barth 
introduces  an  abstract  monism  into  theology,  which  generates  a  philosophical 
                                                
11 Cited in Robert E. Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 3. For a more recent 
exposition  of  Barth’s  ethics  that  has  certain  affinities  with  Niebuhr’s  position,  see  Robin  W. 
Lovin, Christian Faith and Public Choices: The Social Ethics of Barth, Brunner and Bonhoeffer 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), 11-13, 40-42.  
12 Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth, 4. 
13 Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth, 147, cf. 236-240. 
14 Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth, 201. 
15 Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth, 271. 
16 Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth, 183.     13 
world  view  and  leads  to  the  elimination  of  salvation  history.
17  Barth’s 
christological construction of the doctrine of election evacuates the incarnation of 
its  character  as  event,  and  results  in  the  dissolution  of  history  and  of 
eschatological expectation.
18 In this schema the reality of evil is denied, as is any 
tension that might characterise the history between God and humanity.
19 Thielicke 
contends that ‘to establish the event of salvation on a primal perfect is thereby to 
deprive the event of  historicity. Nothing  remains  but  a  play of  waves  over  a 
timeless  deep.  Gone  is  the  tension-packed  commerce  between  God  and  the 
world.…All that remains is a mere monologue of God with himself.’
20 
Noted American ethicist James Gustafson, has questioned the viability of Barth’s 
construal of the divine command, charging that his confidence that a particular 
divine command can be heard is overly-optimistic.
21 More significantly, Gustafson 
rejects  as  unwarranted  Barth’s  refusal  to  acknowledge  the  created  order  as  a 
source of moral norms. He is also critical of the interpersonal language used by 
Barth to structure the divine-human relation, and further, is unwilling to accept 
Barth’s  use  of  the  concept  of  covenant  as  the  organising  principle  of  his 
theology.
22 Gustafson claims that these methodological moves by Barth have a 
                                                
17 Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics Volume 1: Foundations (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 
100, 107. 
18 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 112, 114. 
19 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 113-114. 
20 Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 115. 
21 James M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective Volume Two: Ethics and Theology 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984), 33. It is noteworthy that Gustafson’s construal of the 
moral life as a ‘process of discernment’ bears a noteworthy resemblance to that posited by Barth 
(see  James  M.  Gustafson,  Ethics  from  a  Theocentric  Perspective  Volume  One:  Theology  and 
Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1981), 327-338 and Barth’s essay entitled “The Gift of 
Freedom” in Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. J. Weiser & J. N. Thomas (Louisville, Kn: 
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construal the action rendered by the moral agent is immediate obedience to God. In Gustafson’s 
construal the action rendered is a self-determined good and right, offered to God by the human 
agent. In this case, Barth’s criticism against ethics generally, that it is a human attempt at self-
justification, might well apply to Gustafson specifically.  
22 Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective II, 29-30.     14 
certain anthropocentricity since they privilege the human as the centre of value in 
moral discourse and limit the sources, and thus the material content, of moral 
norms. Because  
the focus is on God’s relation to man, who is then related to nature, and not 
on the  ordering  of the relationships in  nature and  man’s place in it…our 
understandings of the interdependencies and orderings of the natural world 
are not legitimate sources of ethical norms and values. We cannot ground 
patterns of obligation in those natural interdependencies.
23  
For Gustafson, therefore, Barth’s ethics are too narrow in their scope, discounting 
too large a field of human existence as a source of moral reflection and norms. 
Gustafson’s position is echoed in the more recent work of William Schweiker 
who argues that theological ethics ought not to be defined solely by the notion of 
divine commands.
24 He further argues that Barth’s understanding of responsibility 
(Verantwortung) in terms of an obedient answer (Antwort) to the command of 
God,  while  supported  by  the  call-response  structure  of  the  moral  life  in  the 
message of Jesus, fails at three crucial points.
25 First, it is practically inadequate 
because it is not sufficiently attentive to, or even aware of, the pluralistic nature of 
contemporary existence.
26 Next, as a moral theory it is reductionist because other 
important moral concepts such as virtue, and progress in the moral life, find no 
place  in  the  call-response  schema.
27  Finally,  it  is  too  narrow  to  address  the 
complexity of life in a late-modern technological world.
28 
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(Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim, 1998), 158. 
25 William Schweiker, Responsibility and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 43, 98. 
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This brief survey indicates the kinds of criticisms raised against Barth’s ethics. 
They are said to be too transcendental to be of practical use because they vitiate 
human volition and agency, they undermine any sense of moral deliberation, and 
provide  no  sense  of  continuity  and  growth  for  the  Christian  life.  It  is  also 
suggested  that  they  are  occasionalist,  insufficiently  attentive  to  non-biblical 
sources for ethical reflection, and inappropriately anthropocentric. Finally, it is 
claimed they are a sectarian ethics, and as such insufficient to provide guidance 
for the kind of complexities faced by people in the pluralist context of modern 
life. Were the validity of these criticisms by Niebuhr, Thielicke, Gustafson and 
Schweiker demonstrated, Barth’s ethics would have no future. 
The Criticisms Reviewed  
Of course, not all analyses of Barth’s ethics have had a predominantly negative 
tone. Thomas Oden, for example, suggests that ‘Barth holds special promise for 
us today precisely at the point at which he is most frequently dismissed, i.e., his 
ethics,  his  understanding  of  the  Christian  life,  Christian  freedom  and  ethical 
responsibility.’
29  So  too  New  Testament  theologian  Richard  Hays,  while 
continuing to express reservations regarding the effect of Barth’s hermeneutic on 
moral deliberation, nonetheless notes that 
[t]he Barmen Declaration stands as an emblem of the practical consequences 
of a community formed by a Barthian hermeneutic, witnessing prophetically 
in the name of Jesus Christ against all earthly pretensions to authority.…[I]n 
a  time  when  the  church  is  enervated  by  lukewarm  indifference  and 
conformity to the surrounding  culture, Barth’s theology offers it a potent 
shot of courage.
30  
                                                
29 Oden, The Promise of Barth, 109. 
30 Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation; A 
Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1996), 239, 
cf. 228-230.     16 
In recent years a surge of scholarship, much of it characterised by a prominent 
sense of re-evaluation, has borne a great deal of fruit in Barth studies. Particularly 
evident in this reappraisal is the conviction that in many cases, previous criticism 
of Barth has often been predicated on a misreading of his work. Although a full 
examination of the manner in which the authors cited above have read Barth is 
impossible here, it will be instructive in terms of this present thesis to note aspects 
of their method which have skewed their interpretation of Barth, and which have 
therefore,  led  to  inadequate  conclusions  regarding  his  work.  In  his  ad-hoc 
engagement with Barth, for example, Reinhold Niebuhr appears to have read the 
entirety  of  Barth’s  theology  and  ethics  through  the  single  lens  of  his  early 
eschatology,  and  thus  failed  to  take  note  of  the  substantial  developments  in 
Barth’s thought from the 1920s to the 1950s. 
Similarly, Thielicke’s discussion evidences a lack of chronological sensitivity. He 
argues, for example, that the ultimate basis for Barth’s easing of the Lutheran 
antithesis  of  law  and  gospel  is  to  be  found  in  the  principle  of  Christ’s  pre-
existence as developed in his doctrine of election. ‘This it is,’ says Thielicke, ‘that 
leads in the first place to the setting aside of the Law-Gospel dialectic.’
31 From a 
strictly historical perspective, Thielicke has misrepresented Barth’s development 
in this instance. Barth’s paper “Gospel and Law” was prepared for an address to 
be  delivered  at  Barmen  in  1935,  and  was  published  later  the  same  year.  By 
Barth’s own account the crucial stimulus for the christological formulation of his 
doctrine of election came in June 1936—well after the publication of “Gospel and 
Law.”
32 Further, in his address Barth does not ground his doctrine in the eternal 
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1960).  See  also  the  discussion  in  Bruce  L.  McCormack,  Karl  Barth’s  Critically  Realistic     17 
pre-existence  of  Christ,  but  in  the  historical  reality  of  the  incarnation.
33  It  is 
precisely the historicity of the incarnation that leads Barth to posit the eternality of 
the election of Jesus Christ that there be no change in the divine essence because 
of the ‘becoming’ inherent in the incarnation. Barth does not argue from God’s 
eternal being to his activity in time but from time to eternity, from revelation to 
ontology.
34 The concept of the eternal election of Jesus Christ is not mentioned in 
the  earlier  address  for  the  simple  reason  that  Barth  is  as  yet  unaware  of  it. 
Thielicke’s  lack of  chronological  sensitivity  has  led,  therefore,  to  a caricature 
Barth’s position.
35 
The analyses of Barth by Lovin, Willis, Gustafson and Schweiker seem to share a 
common fault: each of them critique Barth from a presuppositional stance that he 
does not share.
36 Lovin’s concern, for example, arises from his understanding of 
what ethics is, that is, a discipline of giving rational, public reasons for moral 
action which establish obligations that apply to persons generally.
37 He argues that 
Barth’s insistence that the divine freedom be preserved serves to undermine the 
rational basis of ethics, and that consequently, Barth’s position is ‘impossible for a 
                                                                                                                                 
Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: OUP, 1995), 397-399.  
33 Karl Barth, “Gospel and Law,” in God, Grace and Gospel, ed. J. S. McNab, Scottish Journal of 
Theology Occasional Papers (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1959), 4-8. 
34 Barth, Church Dogmatics II/2, 150-152. See also Michael D. O’Neil, “The Mission of the Spirit 
in  the  Election  of  God”  (Unpublished  Dissertation  for  the  Master  of  Theology  (Honours), 
Murdoch University, Western Australia, 2001), 9-10.  
35A further example of Thielicke’s chronological insensitivity is found on pages 106-108 where he 
cites isolated passages from works in the early 1920s to support his point, with the claim that the 
essential timelessness of Barth’s theology has remained constant throughout the duration of his 
career. It is noteworthy that his citations, rendered without appropriate comment regarding the 
context from which they are taken, do not do justice to Barth’s intended meaning in the passages. 
36  In  what  follows  I  shall  provide  only  a  brief  indication  of  the  problematic  aspect  of  each 
theologian’s  reading  of  Barth.  The  purpose  of  this  section  of  the  thesis  is  not  extensive 
engagement with each of these theologians but the establishment of a specific  methodological 
point,  namely,  that  correct  understanding  of  Barth’s  proposals  can  only  be  apprehended  by  a 
careful, indeed exegetical, reading of his work.  
37 Lovin, Christian Faith and Public Choices, 1-7.     18 
public ethics.’
38 By viewing ethics itself in terms that Barth categorically rejects, 
Lovin cannot help but misconstrue the nature of Barth’s project. 
Willis has a different concern. He seeks to guarantee the significance of human 
action  through  the  establishment  of  an  independent  existence  or  status  for 
humanity.
39 Yet it is precisely this focus on the independence of humanity that 
Barth opposed. Webster insists that one of Barth’s primary theological objectives 
is to resist modern anthropological assumptions that ‘being in Christ’ is simply 
one particular form of existence grounded in something more humanly basic, and 
that human history and activity can be comprehended without direct reference to 
the history and activity of Jesus Christ.
40 
Also in contrast to Willis, Wolf Krötke shows that in Barth’s view, creation itself 
and humanity as part of the whole exists, not independently of God, but precisely 
as the sphere called into existence by God as a space for the realisation of the 
covenant established between God and humanity in the eternal election of Jesus 
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39 Willis, The Ethics of Karl Barth, 36, 268, cf. 434. According to Paul Lehmann, ‘the problem 
common  to  Christian  and  philosophical  ethics  and  upon which  their  respective  methodologies 
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Lehmann, Ethics in a Christian Context (London: SCM, 1963), 274-276). Willis’ attempt to secure 
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of Barth. The same might be said of Niebuhr, Lovin, Gustafson and Schweiker. 
40 John Webster, “Rescuing the Subject: Barth and Postmodern Anthropology,” in Karl Barth: A 
Future  for  Postmodern  Theology?,  ed.  G.  Thompson  &  C.  Mostert  (Adelaide:  Australian 
Theological  Forum, 2000), 61. In his  appreciative review of Willis’ book, W. A. Whitehouse 
‘fears’ that Willis moves ‘off target’ at this point: ‘Willis is wholly seized of the truth that Barth’s 
shortcomings, if such they be, are linked with his decision to take with thorough seriousness the 
Christological affirmations made in Col. 1:15-20, and to interpret them with reference to the Son 
of God in his history, to Jesus, in whom there is for all things human a preceding “humanity of 
God”...Willis  suggests  (p.  328)  that  “Barth  never  quite  manages  to turn  sufficiently  from  his 
Christological  commitment  to  undertake  a  genuine  phenomenological  analysis.”  From  that 
commitment?’ (W. A. Whitehouse, “Review of The Ethics of Karl Barth by R. E. Willis,” Scottish 
Journal of Theology 29, no. 2 (1976): 177-182, (182)).     19 
Christ.
41  According  to  Krötke,  objections  that  Barth’s  ontology  functions  to 
eliminate  the  human,  misunderstand  God’s  election  ‘as  an  axiom  of  God’s 
authoritarian lordship over the human’ rather than as an act of grace by which 
humanity  is established as a reality distinct from, and  yet in relationship with 
God.
42  In  this  ontology  humanity  retains  a  form  of  independence,  but  it  is  a 
relative independence grounded not in the self as an autonomous subject, but in 
the grace given by God to one who is and always remains a dependent creature. 
Krötke  argues  that  Barth’s  is  a  practical  anthropology  which,  while  certainly 
applicable  to  all  humanity,  must  be  brought  to  particular  expression  ‘in  the 
Christian community and  in  the  lives  of  individual Christians  in the  midst  of 
society and in opposition to all the inhumanity that reigns there; it must be lived 
out in active service of a better human righteousness.’
43 
Krötke’s  incisive  perception  is  grounded  in  recognition  of  the  fundamentally 
relational  structure of Barth’s anthropology.  While Willis  provides  a thorough 
overview  of  Barth’s  discussion  of  ‘co-humanity’  as  the  basic  form  of  human 
existence, he fails to appreciate the ethical significance of Barth’s formulation at 
this point, more concerned as he is with the agential structure of the individual 
subject.
44 Or, to state the matter differently, Willis understands humanity in terms 
of  esse  whereas  for  Barth,  humanity  is  understood  not  in  terms  of  esse,  but 
existere.
45 In the end, therefore, Willis’ interpretation of Barth’s overall project is 
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not convincing because he has failed to read Barth according to his own terms, 
and  has  therefore  skewed  interpretation  of  the  manner  in  which  Barth  has 
developed his ethics. 
The  presuppositions  underlying  the  works  of  Gustafson  and  Schweiker  are 
similar, though not identical.
46 Both theologians endeavour to construct a rational 
and  universal  ethics  in  which  human  experience  is  accorded  epistemological 
primacy, and in both cases they reject the kind of theological realism adopted by 
Barth  in  his  understanding  of  ultimate  reality.  It  is  evident  that  these 
presuppositions  do  not  only  differ  from  those  of  Barth,  but  are,  in  fact, 
diametrically opposed to his position, and can finally only be addressed at the 
level of theological method. According to John Webster, 
[a]ll ethical reflection has implicit or explicit within it an anthropology and 
an ontology of history—a construal of the moral agent and of the field in 
which the moral agent acts. What is most striking about Barth’s account (as 
well  as  what  separates  it  from  nearly  all  contemporary  accounts)  is  its 
undeflected  attention  to  one  set  of  historical  incidents  as  ontologically, 
noetically, and morally fundamental.
47 
In  theological ethics  generally,  and  Christian  ethics particularly, this  construal 
necessarily involves the concept of God and the divine-human relation. Clearly, 
                                                                                                                                 
is to act in correspondence with the act of God toward us in the humanity of Jesus (144; cf. 157). 
Price further acknowledges that this ethic is universal: because Barth is describing the basic form 
of  human  nature  its  implications  cannot  be  limited  to  the  Christian  community  (154-155). 
Nonetheless,  like  Krötke  he also  acknowledges  that  the  Christian community  has  a  particular 
responsibility in light of the reality of the true humanity revealed in Jesus: ‘the dynamic trinitarian 
anthropology  that  Barth  develops  in  his  Dogmatics  should  encourage  the  church  to  shift  its 
perspectives regarding what it means to be fully human…that there is no authentic humanity apart 
from fellow humanity—to understand that the basis for Christian community is found right within 
the very nature of God himself.…We are called to become for others what God has become for us: 
a cleansing, healing, life-giving presence’ (307-308).  
46 Gustafson develops his ontology at length in the first volume of his project. Although the entire 
volume is significant, see especially Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective I, 82-99, 
204-251.  Schweiker’s  project  is  outlined  in  the  two  primary  works  cited  above,  namely,  his 
Responsibility and Christian Ethics and Power, Value and Conviction. Differences between the 
two  theologians  include  Gustafson’s  reliance  on  scientific  empiricism  in  addition  to  human 
experience as epistemologically primary, and Schweiker’s insistence that the ultimate power be 
construed in terms of personal agency in order to secure the ontic priority of value over power. 
47 John Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation (Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 98.     21 
this is of fundamental significance since one’s praxis is decisively shaped by the 
theological or metaphysical system underpinning it. 
Barth’s rejection of any form of natural theology is grounded in his conviction 
that God has revealed himself decisively and definitively in Jesus Christ, and in so 
doing, has shown that he is for humanity. God—the sovereign, living and personal 
God  portrayed  in  the  narratives  of  Scripture—may  be  truly  known,  although, 
because he remains ineffable, not wholly apprehended. What Barth refers to as 
revelation, however, Gustafson considers reflection on human experiences in the 
face of the ‘ultimate power and powers.’
48 Both Gustafson and Schweiker find it 
necessary  to  reject  Barth’s  theological  realism  in  order  to  overcome  the 
particularism inherent in the Christian tradition’s construal of God, and so secure 
a universal and normative ethics. The result is a truncated doctrine of God which 
utilises concepts drawn from biblical and Christian sources but which have been 
evacuated of their contextual referents.
49 
Gustafson  and  Schweiker  have  read  Barth  from  the  perspective  of  their  own 
theological ontology, which in turn, was developed to serve an ethics that is in 
principle rational and universal. They have criticised and rejected Barth’s ethics, 
therefore, because his ethics function to undermine the essential foundations of 
their own respective projects. It is evident that their theology functions for the 
sake of their ethics. This thesis argues that Barth’s theology  also functions  in 
service of ethics, with the difference, however, that for Barth dogmatics and ethics 
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cannot be separated, nor can the ordering of the two be reversed, for the ethics 
derive from and are determined by the theology. The ontology proposed by Barth 
is grounded, not anthropocentrically as is the case with them, but in a particular 
revelation. The ethics deriving from this, therefore, are perhaps better understood 
as particularist, finding expression amongst those to whom the revelation has been 
given and received.
50 
Just as my initial survey indicated the kinds of criticisms that have been raised by 
Niebuhr,  Willis, Lovin,  Thielicke,  Gustafson and Schweiker regarding Barth’s 
ethics, so this brief account of the manner in which these critics have read Barth 
has raised the question of the validity of their criticisms, based as they are on 
inadequate readings of his work. This suggests not that Barth is invulnerable to 
criticism, but rather that judgements pronounced on the viability of Barth’s ethics 
are premature if they are not predicated upon readings that seek to interpret him in 
accordance  with  his own  central  concerns. It  is  the  intention  of  this thesis  to 
provide a reading of Barth’s early works that attends, as Webster has suggested, to 
the  structure  and  logic  of  Barth’s  own  concerns,  in  order  to  provide  a  more 
adequate account and critique of his ethics. Webster’s call  for a more careful 
reading of Barth’s dogmatics raises the possibility that such a reading of Barth’s 
work may overturn judgements of the kind previously surveyed. That this has, in 
fact, occurred in recent re-evaluations of Barth’s work is unsurprising, as we shall 
observe in the next section. 
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Recent Re-evaluation of Barth’s Ethics 
The initial section of this chapter argued for the methodological necessity of a 
careful, exegetical reading of Barth by indicating the kinds of problems which 
may arise when this  hermeneutical task  is  not given  the  attention  it  deserves. 
Happily, there has been a significant re-engagement with Barth’s literary corpus 
since the mid-1980s, stimulated in no small part by the publication of his collected 
works,  including  a  number  of  previously  unpublished  materials.  This  re-
engagement  has  resulted  in  a  new  appreciation  and  deeper  understanding  of 
Barth’s  theology  and  ethics,  and  in  some  cases,  a  significant  reappraisal  of 
previously  held  convictions  regarding  his  work.  This  section  of  the  chapter 
examines the work of Nigel Biggar and John Webster, two scholars employed in 
this  re-engagement,  particularly  in  the  sphere  of  Barth’s  ethics,  in  order  to 
illustrate how a more adequate reading of Barth not only addresses criticisms of 
Barth’s ethics, but may also bear fruit in terms of the aims of this thesis, namely, 
that Barth developed his theology with an eye towards shaping the life of the 
concrete Christian community. 
Nigel Biggar 
Nigel Biggar has written an account of Barth’s ethics that gathers around three 
foci.  First,  he  is  concerned  to  provide  an  overview  of  the  structure  and 
development  of  Barth’s  ethical  thought;  second,  he  examines  the  sources  or 
authorities which  lie beneath Barth’s account; and, finally, Biggar responds to 
specific criticisms that have been raised against Barth’s ethics, particularly the     24 
accusations  that  Barth’s  construal of the divine command  is  occasionalist  and 
irrational, and that his account of moral agency is reductionist.
51 
Biggar begins by showing that Barth’s ethics seek to describe the context in which 
ethical decisions are taken, rather than attempt to describe the necessary content of 
those decisions, and that Barth’s pre-eminent concern was to ground ethics  in 
dogmatics  and  by  so  doing  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  human  ethical 
autonomy.
52 He argues that this approach does not require the forfeit of ethical 
rationality, but also suggests two corrections or re-interpretations of Barth in the 
interests of ethical rationality. 
First,  Biggar  argues  that  a  form  of  limited  casuistry  be  embraced,  in  which 
casuistry is viewed as a dialectical process in which rules provide moral guidance 
in familiar cases while being open to adaptation in the face of unfamiliar ones.
53 
He suggests that Barth, in typically Protestant fashion, understood casuistry as the 
epitome of  ethical  rationalism.  This, suggests  Biggar,  was  a  misunderstanding 
which  failed  to  take  account  of  the  dialectical  and  open  nature  of  traditional 
casuistry. He argues further that Barth’s ethics are themselves systematic, rational, 
and  even  casuistic.
54  Nonetheless,  Barth’s  suspicion  of  casuistry  hindered  his 
ability  to  provide  a  coherent  account  of  the  relationship  between  systematic 
ethical deliberation and the hearing of the command of God.
55 
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Second,  Biggar suggests  that  the  divine  command  be reconceived  in  terms  of 
personal  vocation.
56 Biggar  worries that Barth’s discussion of the ‘exceptional 
case’ of divine commanding subverts ethical rationality. According to Biggar, the 
problem is that systematic ethical reflection could be faced with a case that is 
simply  unintelligible,  with  the  result  that  the  process  of  moral  reason  is  not 
corrected  but  suspended.
57  By  reconceiving  the  divine  command  as  vocation 
Biggar seeks to retain Barth’s emphasis on immediate obedience as the character 
of human ethical activity, but with the additional benefit of not forfeiting ethical 
rationality. Although particularly useful in cases of irreducible moral dilemma, 
this description of the divine command also helpfully emphasises the ultimate 
uniqueness of every moral decision. 
Although Biggar’s suggestion has merit, it requires a careful qualification, for in 
places his critique of Barth betrays an abiding rationalism. Biggar is quite forward 
in his assertion that Barth ‘fails’ to provide a coherent account of human freedom, 
and that his notion of human freedom is more apparent than real.
58 He argues 
further that 
if  human  reasoning  about  moral  matters  is to  have  any  relative  validity, 
God’s command must be the expression of a divine will that is governed by 
the  divine  Ratio  or  Wisdom,  and  which  is  therefore  intelligible  in 
principle.…This concept of God’s command still permits it to contradict the 
moral assumptions and conclusions of human reason, but only in so far as 
their  actual  grasp  of  the  divine  Ratio  is  mistaken,  and  not  because  their 
attempt to grasp it is futile in principle.…A command of God must be the 
expression  of  a  divine  will  that  is  constant  and  therefore  in  principle 
intelligible to human moral reason.
59 
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It is evident that Biggar still conceives of moral reason as in some sense able to 
function independently of God,  and indeed,  to be a  higher  court of  appeal  to 
which the divine command is subject. As we shall see, this position would prove 
unacceptable to Barth. The required qualification of Biggar’s position is to allow 
the kind of dialectical casuistry he suggests as a means of preparation for hearing 
the divine command, but with an explicit recognition that God in his sovereign 
freedom may indeed command that which is inexplicable to reason, as the biblical 
narrative clearly portrays.
60 
Biggar also responds to concerns that Barth’s account of human moral agency is 
deficient,  neither  showing  how  a  person’s  character  is  formed  by  Christ,  nor 
specifying that character in detail. He again utilises the concept of vocation to 
address these concerns, arguing that moral formation occurs as agents engage with 
the particular moral tasks their vocation presents to them. According to Biggar, 
present character can never be more than provisional, first, because it is always 
subject to renewal and development as the command confronts us afresh in every 
new circumstance, and second, because the full appropriation of our character will 
only occur eschatologically.
61 
Thus,  while  Biggar’s  engagement  with  Barth  is  not  entirely  satisfactory,  his 
reading nevertheless indicates that Barth developed an ethic of Christian life, and 
he affirms Barth’s conviction that the essence of this life consists in responding to 
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the address of a reality beyond ourselves.
62 The value of his contribution lies in his 
insistence  on  the  validity  and  primacy  of  the  divine  command,  and  that  it  is 
precisely  through  repeated  obedience  to  the  command  that  moral  character  is 
formed and moral life is lived. 
John Webster 
Another recent interpreter of Barth’s ethics is John Webster, who takes with all 
seriousness Barth’s proposal that dogmatics ‘has the problem of ethics in view 
from the very first.’
63 With argument ranging over a number of volumes, Webster 
again and again asserts his primary thesis that the Church Dogmatics is a work of 
moral theology as well as systematic theology.
64 He seeks to show that Barth’s 
construal of the freedom of divine action is inseparable from what he says of the 
active  life  of  humanity  in  correspondence  to  God.
65  In  addition  to  substantial 
accounts of the ethics in both the early and late periods of Barth’s career, Webster 
has  also  provided  resources  for  fruitful  critical  engagement  with  Barth  by 
identifying the Church Dogmatics as a work of ‘moral ontology’ which he defines 
as an extensive account of the situation in which human agents act. According to 
Webster,  Barth’s  ethics  is  devoted  to  describing  the  ‘space’  in  which  human 
agents  have their existence, rather than to providing descriptions of  normative 
character or analysis of the ethical quandaries that agents find themselves in.
66 
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I have already noted Webster’s observation that for Barth, one set of historical 
incidents are ‘ontologically, noetically and morally fundamental.’
67 He argues that 
the  only  reason  ‘an  entire  ontology  of  created  being’  may  rest  upon  such  a 
seemingly precarious foundation is that it has an absoluteness which is proper to 
God  alone.
68  Although  this  principle  is  counter-intuitive  to  the  idealist 
metaphysics  and  philosophical,  moral  and  religious  notions  of  subjectivity 
characteristic of modernity, it is only as interpreters are willing to follow Barth at 
this point, suggests Webster, that they will find his ethics satisfactory.
69 
Webster resolutely resists interpretations that would suggest that Barth’s account 
serves to eradicate human agency, and insists that anthropology and ethics are 
ingredients within dogmatics, precisely because the theme of dogmatics concerns 
the ontic relation of God and humanity in Jesus Christ.
70 Thus, ethics does not 
comprise a separate theme from dogmatics, nor is  it added in order to supply 
application or relevance to theology. From the very beginning, avers Webster, 
Barth’s theme is God and humanity as agents in relation, constructed in such a 
way to call the presuppositions of modernity into question.
71 Neither divine nor 
human activity may be emphasised to the detriment of the other, but the carefully 
articulated  distinction  between  and  ordering  of  the  two  subjects  must  be 
rigorously adhered to.
72 Just as God is ontologically prior to humanity, so his 
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action is prior to, and forms the ground of that of humanity.
73 Webster contends 
that Barth adopted the model of summons and response in his ethics precisely to 
rule  out both  abstract  divine  monergism and pure  human  autonomy.
74 Barth’s 
adoption of invocation as the material concept of Christian existence is an effort 
to establish human moral existence in which ‘dependence is not diminishment and 
resolute action is not self-assertion.’
75 
In light of recent work such as that by Biggar and Webster, it is evident that some 
earlier interpretations of Barth’s ethics are flawed because he has not always been 
read in accordance with his own concerns.
76 George Hunsinger has suggested that 
although Barth is regularly acclaimed as a great theologian, he ‘has achieved the 
dubious distinction of being habitually honoured but not much read.’
77 Doubtless, 
this is in part the result of the voluminous and difficult, at times frustrating, nature 
of his work. Too often, however, it is also the result of an over-dependence upon 
secondary sources, with only cursory examinations of Barth himself. It is then 
assumed  that Barth  is  already understood,  that  his project is  known,  and  that 
further extensive engagement with his work is not required. 
A problem with such an approach is that caricatures abound. Berkouwer, recalling 
the early reception of Barth’s theology, writes, ‘we hastily contrived all sorts of 
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handy  characterisations  of  Barth.’
78  He  proceeds  to  list  a  large  and  varied 
catalogue of interpretations of Barth’s early work which demonstrates the kind of 
contrary  readings  of  Barth  that  can  and  do  arise  if  careful  descriptive  and 
analytical examination of his work is not carried out.
79 He similarly warns that 
criticism of Barth’s theology and the objections to it can have importance only if 
they  are  based  upon  a  legitimate  and  warranted  analysis  of  his  work.
80  He 
criticises one-sided approaches which fail to take the whole of Barth’s writing into 
account, and argues that those who would criticise Barth have ‘first of all the task 
of penetrating deeply into the elaborate explanations’ in which Barth develops his 
theological concepts.
81 In like manner William Werpehowski has warned that our 
responsibility in reading Barth’s ethics is first and always to try to make sense of 
the  manner  in  which  Barth  used  familiar  words  and  concepts  in  new  and 
idiosyncratic  ways.  He  regards  failure  to  perform  this  hermeneutic  task  as  a 
particular cause of misinterpretation of his work.
82 
This present thesis, then, is an attempt to engage in the kind of study advocated by 
Webster at the outset of this chapter: a ‘detailed study of Barth’s writings which, 
by careful reading, tries to display the structure and logic of his concerns without 
moving prematurely into making judgments or pressing too early the usefulness 
(or  lack  of  it)  of  Barth’s  work  for  contemporary  moral  theology.’
83  Before 
engaging directly  in this  task,  however,  and in  accordance  with the particular 
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focus of  this thesis, I  will  provide a brief  survey  of  how  various  interpreters, 
specifically  Stanley  Hauerwas,  Nicholas  Healy,  Reinhard  Hütter  and  Joseph 
Mangina have understood Barth in terms of his vision for Christian and ecclesial 
existence. 
Reading Barth’s Ecclesial Ethics 
It  is  noteworthy  that  several  of  Barth’s  interpreters  examined  above  have 
recognised  the  ecclesial  orientation  of  his  ethics,  although  they  have  not 
necessarily  appreciated  or  accepted  his  conclusions.  Niebuhr,  for  example, 
considers Barth’s ethics isolationist and sectarian, ‘designed for the church of the 
catacombs.’
84 Lovin, too, notes that Barth understood the church as the particular 
community of those attentive to the Word of God, whose moral task consists in 
being the church and refusing to be anything else.
85 He argues that, for Barth, the 
church is the true object of the command of God and the true locus of obedience, 
and that through its obedience the church exhibits a pattern of responsible living 
within the new order God is creating in the midst of humanity.
86 Further, we noted 
that the responses of Krötke and Price to Barth’s critics indicate that his theology 
must come to concrete expression in the life of the Christian community.
87  
Although these brief comments provide some indication that Barth develops his 
theology with an ecclesial motive, he has also been criticised for diminishing the 
place and role of the church in his theology. If this is the case, the claim of this 
thesis that Barth has an ecclesial motive in the development of his theology would 
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be  difficult  to  sustain.  Thus  the  sections  that  follow  examine  some  of  these 
criticisms in greater detail, beginning with the work of Stanley Hauerwas. 
Stanley Hauerwas 
One of the most prolific and widely discussed contemporary advocates for an 
ecclesial  ethics  has  also  engaged  extensively  with  Barth’s  theology.  Stanley 
Hauerwas, a prominent American voice in theological ethics, has, over the course 
of his career, engaged with Barth’s theology and ethics on a number of related 
fronts. In the essay “On Doctrine and Ethics” published in 1997, Hauerwas begins 
by citing Barth’s claim that the  general conception of ethics coincides exactly 
with the conception of sin.
88 Despite referring to Barth’s claim as an exaggerated 
assertion, Hauerwas is nonetheless in broad agreement with Barth’s intent, which 
constitutes  a  refusal  to  allow  something  called  ‘ethics’  to  exist  prior  to  or 
independently of  ‘doctrine.’
89  Hauerwas,  like Barth, is  opposed  to  accounts  of 
morality which endeavour to do ethics from the ‘bottom up’ because, in his view, 
they invariably confirm the modern presumption that God, if he is considered at 
all, is at best something added on to the moral life.
90 
Hauerwas argues that the quest for a universal ethics removed the subject of ethics 
from  the  realm  of  dogmatics  because  of  the  particularity  of  the  latter.  Ethics 
became a quest for rational foundations for morality in order to secure confidence 
that  moral  convictions  were  not  arbitrary.
91  The  rationalist  presuppositions 
underlying this  quest  were  imported into theological  reflection  particularly  by 
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Kant, and, under the influence of Schleiermacher, theological reflection became a 
civilisational project.
92 It is precisely here that Hauerwas approves Barth’s method 
for  Barth  refuses  to  make  the  church  a  servant  of  such  a  project  and  thus  a 
supplement for what is a prior conception of ethics.
93 Rather, theology, and thus 
theological ethics, is to serve the church in its distinctive calling to embody an 
alternative order in its corporate life, and so stand as a sign of God’s redemptive 
purposes in the world.
94 
Hauerwas,  therefore,  concurs  with  Barth  that  ethics  must  be  theologically 
established because theology, as reflection on the revelation of God in Christ, 
provides the  ground for all we know and do.
95 He also perceives an ecclesial 
motive in Barth’s theology and thus suggests that Barth’s proposition that ethics is 
equivalent to sin is an implicit claim about the church’s relation to the world that 
is  not immediately  apparent.
96  Hauerwas’ project,  then,  includes an attempt  to 
develop what he considers to be an implication of Barth’s theology, namely, to 
render this relation explicit. 
It  would  be premature,  however,  to  conclude  that  Hauerwas  finds  in  Barth  a 
satisfactory  ecclesial  ethic. Over the course of his  career Hauerwas has raised 
several pertinent criticisms of Barth’s work. In 1975 Hauerwas gave sustained 
attention to Barth’s ethics with a particular focus on the issue of character.
97 In this 
work he contends that by making decision the phenomenological centre of ethical 
behaviour and reflection, Barth’s ethics are unable to provide a comprehensive 
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account of the Christian life. He also suggests that in Barth the continuity of the 
human agent is marginalised, and that Barth’s ethics tend to be occasionalist with 
a  corresponding  anthropology  in  which  the  human  agent  is  passive  and 
atomistic.
98 Christian life in Barth’s theology is, therefore, a life that can only be 
constantly renewed in the ever new future of God’s command, and that to follow 
Jesus one must therefore take constantly take leave of all that they are.
99 
Hauerwas argues that Barth’s use of the divine command predisposes his ethics 
towards an ethics of ‘dialogue,’ in which the Christian is simply caught within the 
dialogue between the accusing voice of the law and the accepting voice of the 
gospel.
100 His christology, however, requires him to conceive of existence as a 
journey in a way that qualifies his constant use of the language of command.
101 
According to Hauerwas, this tension creates a space for an ethic of character in 
Barth’s work which he does not develop. He argues that an ethics of character 
would help preserve the central insights of Barth’s theology by providing a richer 
phenomenology of moral experience.
102 The real problem, says Hauerwas, is not 
that Barth has no place for character. Rather, it is that although Barth seems to 
imply the significance of character for Christian ethics, he has failed to integrate it 
into  the  main  images  he  uses  to  explicate  the  nature  of  the  Christian  life. 
Hauerwas asserts that 
[t]he agonising thing about Barth’s ethics, therefore, is not that he failed to 
appreciate the importance of the idea of character, but that he really does not 
integrate  it  into  the  main  images  he  uses  to  explicate  the  nature  of  the 
Christian  life.  By  describing  the  Christian  life  primarily  in  terms  of 
command and decision, Barth cannot fully account for the kind of growth 
and deepening that he thinks is essential to the Christian’s existence. In other 
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words, Barth’s exposition of the Christian life is not so much wrong for what 
he says, but for what he does not say. If Barth had used the idea of character 
he  would  have  been  able  to  explicate  in  a  much  fuller  way  the  growth 
characteristic of God’s sanctifying work.
103 
For Hauerwas, the journey metaphor is a superior means of depicting Christian 
life not only because its teleological conception of existence helps articulate a 
sense of  growth and duration in the  Christian life, but also because, once the 
centrality of character is acknowledged, provision is made for a thoroughgoing 
emphasis on the church as crucial for sustaining the Christian journey.
104 
In  1988  Hauerwas  sharpened  this  criticism  of  Barth  in  an  essay  marking  the 
centenary of Barth’s birth.
105 In this work he develops his concern that Barth’s 
ethics have a ‘peculiar abstractness’ that gives his account of the moral life an 
aura of unreality.
106 Hauerwas examines Barth’s treatment of honour and finds 
‘extraordinary insights,’ which, because they occur at a general or formal level, 
are nonetheless problematic. Hauerwas compares Barth’s treatment with that of 
Trollope  in  his  novel  Dr  Wortle’s  School,  in  which  he  characterises  honour 
through the dilemma faced by the protagonist in his relations with the antagonists. 
Hauerwas  suggests  that  Barth  fails  to  provide  an  account  of  how  honourable 
character emerges: 
Missing from Barth’s account of honour is the kind of societal ethos, the 
concrete  community, that is capable  of producing a  Wortle…What Barth 
fails to help us see is where such honesty comes and how it is sustained. And 
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note that this is not a psychological or biographical question, but rather a 
question of how Christian ethics is done.
107 
The  nub  of  Hauerwas’  argument  is  clear:  Christian  ethics  is  necessarily  an 
ecclesial  ethic,  because  the  kind  of  honour  advocated  by  Barth  requires,  in 
Hauerwas’ estimation, an account of the church.
108 Simply put, without a stronger 
theology of the church, Barth’s theology and ethics suffer from abstraction, with 
the result that his formal accounts risk the kind of individualistic interpretation 
that his theological programme is meant to counter.
109 
Thus, in the earlier period of his career Hauerwas found Barth’s ethics wanting for 
two reasons: first, the lack of focus on character rendered his ethics questionable 
because the continuity of human agency could not be adequately secured, and 
second, the formal nature of Barth’s ethical description threatened to undermine 
his project because it rendered his ethics subject to individualistic interpretation. 
In more recent years, however, Hauerwas has moderated his stance towards Barth. 
Discussion and critique of his own work by Werpehowski, Biggar, Webster and 
Mangina
110 has led Hauerwas to recognise that Barth’s ethics are perhaps, not as 
flawed  as  he  initially  thought.
111  In  2001  Hauerwas  delivered  the  prestigious 
Gifford Lectures in which Karl Barth emerges as the hero of his story of natural 
theology  in  the  twentieth  century.
112  His  thesis  in  the  lectures  was  typically 
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provocative: Karl Barth is the great ‘natural theologian’ of the Gifford lecturers.
113 
In the lectures Hauerwas sets Barth against other Gifford lecturers William James 
and Reinhold Niebuhr whom he assails mercilessly and critiques with devastating 
effect.  
In keeping with the purpose of the Giffords, Hauerwas addresses the question of 
natural theology. He argues that natural theology, at least as it was conceived by 
the  theological  milieu  in  which  Lord  Gifford  lived,  actually  represents  an 
epistemological  overcoming  of  theology  for  it  seeks  to  secure  the  truth  of 
Christian convictions in a manner that makes the content of those convictions 
secondary.
114 The problem arose when theology sought to secure the truthfulness 
of Christian convictions separate from and as a preamble for a comprehensive 
doctrine of God. In such a programme God is reduced to an abstract principle 
open  and  accessible  to  anyone  ‘without  moral  transformation  or  spiritual 
guidance,’  with  the  result  that  an  unacceptable  distance  is  opened  between 
theological assertion and actual life.
115 
Hauerwas rejects this approach root and branch. It is here that he finds Barth so 
helpful an instructor, for the Church Dogmatics are nothing less than a massive 
theological metaphysics that attempt to overturn epistemology and to overcome 
metaphysics. Barth has a single concern, says Hauerwas, which is to show that our 
existence and that of all things are unintelligible if the God revealed in Jesus 
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Christ  is  not  God.
116  Hauerwas  asserts  that  Barth  in  some  sense  intended  the 
Church Dogmatics to be a training manual to enable Christians to view the world 
as it is and not as it appears. Such training requires not only intellectual but also 
moral transformation.
117 He argues further that Barth himself understood that the 
vindication  of  such  a  theological  program  was  to  be  found  in  the  actual  life 
required of Christians, which he characterised simply as witness.
118 In fact, early in 
his  career  Hauerwas  recognised  the  importance  of  the  category  of  witness  in 
Barth’s work, noting that the motif of  witness functions in Barth’s work as  a 
summary  of  the  overall  direction  and  implications  of  his  thought  regarding 
Christian  life.
119  Somewhat  controversially  he  contends  that  any  account  of 
Barth’s understanding of the possibility of our knowledge of God must end by 
attending to his understanding of the church’s witness to God, as well as to his 
understanding of the moral life that the church makes possible.
120  
Hauerwas, though, worries whether Barth’s ecclesiology is sufficient to sustain 
the  witness  that  he  thought  was  intrinsic  to  Christianity.
121  He  finds  Barth’s 
affirmation that the world would be lost without Jesus Christ, but that it would not 
necessarily be lost without the church problematic,
122 and is thus concerned that 
Barth understates the role of the church in God’s redemptive purpose. Barth is 
                                                
116 Hauerwas, With the Grain, 190-191. See also, ibid., 39. 
117 Hauerwas, With the Grain, 179, 183. 
118 Hauerwas, With the Grain, 39. 
119 Hauerwas, Character and the Christian Life, 140.  
120 Hauerwas, With the Grain, 192. William Stacy Johnson makes a similar point when he says 
that, ‘even though Barth’s own preferred vineyard was that of conceptual, doctrinal analysis, the 
broad  trajectory  of  his  thought  suggests  that  ethics  becomes  the  primary  sphere  in  which  his 
theology should be validated. We must think of all the many pages of doctrinal analysis that make 
up the CD as a prelude to ethics.’ See William S. Johnson, The Mystery of God: Karl Barth and 
the Postmodern Foundations of Theology (Louisville, Kn.: Westminster John Knox, 1997), 8. 
121 Hauerwas, With the Grain, 39. 
122 Hauerwas, With the Grain, 193. For Barth’s comment that the world would not necessarily be 
lost without the church, see Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3.2: The Doctrine of Reconciliation, 
ed. G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1962), 
826.     39 
also  hesitant  to  acknowledge  that  the  church  itself  is  constitutive  of  gospel 
proclamation, and that through the Holy Spirit’s activity Christians are made part 
of  God’s  care  of  the  world  through  the  church.
123  What  is  needed,  Hauerwas 
suggests,  is  a  comprehensive  ecclesiology  under  the  aegis  of  a  robust 
pneumatology, whereby the church, in and by the presence of the Holy Spirit, is to 
exemplify  and  display  the  truthfulness  of  the  theological  claims  made  in  the 
gospel.
124 This cannot be reduced simply to an intellectual exercise, but must be 
shown forth in ethical life, an existence which portrays truthfully the reality of the 
world in which we live. For Hauerwas this means the adoption of practices which 
exhibit  the  content  of  Christian  convictions  and  make  ‘habitable’  the  world 
exemplified by the church in its proclamation and life.
125  
In his final lectures on dogmatics, Barth addressed this issue and ruled out two 
extremes in the response of the church to the ‘worldliness’ of the world. The first 
extreme is that negative appraisal of the world in which the church adopts either 
an isolationalist, or else conversely, a crusading posture towards the world. The 
second  extreme  is  the  positive  appraisal  of  the  world  on  the  basis  of  its 
reconciliation in Christ, in which the church assimilates itself to the secularity of 
the world. Instead, Christians are to maintain a middle course between the two 
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extremes leaning this way or that as the situation requires.
126 Hauerwas, however, 
is critical of Barth’s failure to 
specify  the  material  conditions  that  would  sustain  his  ‘middle  way.’  Of 
course,  Barth  intentionally  depicts  the  ‘middle  way’  as  unstable,  but 
instability  is  as  likely  to  lead  to  unfaithfulness  as  faithfulness.  Barth’s 
attempt  to  steer  a  middle  course’  between  monasticism  and  the  liberal 
embrace of the secular is but the other side of his overly cautious account of 
the role of the church in the economy of God’s salvation. Because the church 
cannot trust in its calling to be God’s witness, Barth seems far too willing to 
leave the world alone.
127 
In the end, Hauerwas wants to situate the Spirit-endued witness of the church in 
the place formerly occupied by a Giffordian natural theology.
128 He argues that 
Barth’s christological ordering of both pneumatology and ecclesiology serves to 
undermine his insistence that witness is the fundamental posture of the Christian 
life. Indeed, Hauerwas makes the astounding claim that ‘real reality’ can only be 
known in conjunction with the church, arguing that 
Christians  betray  themselves  as  well  as  their  non-Christian  brothers  and 
sisters when in the interest of apologetics we say and act as if the cross of 
Christ is incidental to God’s being. In  fact, the God we worship and the 
world God created cannot be truthfully known without the cross, which is 
why  the  knowledge  of  God  and  ecclesiology—or  the  politics  called 
church—are interdependent.
129 
Clearly, this argument advances beyond the bounds within which Barth himself 
worked. Nonetheless, Hauerwas’ concerns raise  fundamental questions for this 
thesis and especially with regard to the adequacy of Barth’s theology and ethics. 
He has argued that Barth’s understanding of the possibility of our knowledge of 
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God must end by attending to his understanding of the church’s witness to God, as 
well as to his understanding of the moral life that the church makes possible. He 
has further argued, however, that Barth’s refusal to allow any point of contact for 
the gospel functions to compromise his account of the church and the Christian 
life. Barth fails to elucidate the material conditions necessary to sustain the kind 
of witness he deems necessary for faithful obedience to God. 
It may be that Hauerwas has overstated his case. Biggar, for example, notes that 
Barth  affirms  the  importance  of  the  Christian  community  as  the  place  where 
Christians may expect to hear God’s command and as the school in which they are 
trained  to discern  his  voice.  He  continues,  however,  with  a  warning  that,  for 
Barth, the community  is  no more absolute than the  individual, and unless the 
training received in the church culminates in personal acts of response, it will all 
have  been  in  vain,  for  character  is  ultimately  formed,  not  by  the  training 
Christians receive in the Church but by their active response to God.
130 Biggar also 
rightly  reminds  us  that  at  times  the  divine  command  reaches  us  and  moral 
character is formed in spite of the prevailing ecclesial culture.
131 Nevertheless it 
remains the case that while human response to the divine command is thoroughly 
personal, it is never a solo effort. Rather, the command is mediated to us, and our 
response is enabled and supported, through the ‘community of character’ of which 
we are part.
132 
Barth  does,  then,  to  some  extent  at  least,  ‘specify  the  material  conditions  to 
sustain  his  “middle  way,”’  while  still  insisting  that  specific  obedience  to  the 
divine  command  is  the  final  criterion  of  faithfulness.  Barth’s  reason  for 
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prioritising the divine command was to avoid the possibility of treating either the 
human agent or the church independently of God, as though ethical life could be 
grounded anthropologically, and thus proceed as it were, under its own steam. 
This is in accord with his methodological principle that since Christian life has no 
independent existence it ought not to become an independent object of thought.
133 
Biggar  also  notes  an  important  methodological  distinction  between  Barth  and 
Hauerwas’ use of Scripture. For Barth, the primary contribution of the Bible is its 
revelation of the encompassing reality within which we are set, which is nothing 
other than the living God who has eternally elected humanity in Jesus Christ. For 
Hauerwas, the narrative of Israel and Jesus is the story of God’s self revelation in 
history, and as such is the constitutive narrative of the church into which we are 
called  and  according  to  which  we,  too,  are  to  live.  The  narrative,  therefore, 
functions normatively to form the identity of the Christian community and thereby 
provide the rationale for its morality. Thus, for Barth, the Bible ‘leads to an ethics 
at whose heart stand acts of prayer and worship,’ while for Hauerwas, ‘the Bible’s 
contribution  to  Christian  ethics  turns  out  to  be the  provision  of  a  theological 
vision of reality that legitimizes a distinctively Christian ethic in which acts of 
prayer and worship feature only incidentally.’
134  
David Fergusson also questions whether the category of narrative in Hauerwas’ 
ethics  functions  to  blur  the  relation  between  Christ  and  the  disciple.
135  For 
Fergusson, the true nature of discipleship cannot be grasped simply in terms of a 
moral  emulation  of  Jesus,  because  discipleship  involves  a  recognition  of  the 
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priority  of  Jesus,  and  our  dependence  upon  his  life  and  work  extra  nos.
136 
Hauerwas’  criticism  that  Barth  fails  to  specify  the  material  conditions  of 
sustaining his middle way, then, appears to overlook the degree to which Barth 
envisaged an informed community  gathered around Scripture in an attitude of 
worship and prayer as the place where the divine command is heard. That this was 
the case even in the early period of his career will become evident in this thesis. 
Fergusson also suggests that Hauerwas has over-determined his doctrine of the 
church, and that his work evidences ‘a slide from christology into ecclesiology.’
137 
Fergusson argues that Hauerwas’ emphasis on Jesus as the exemplar and initiator 
of  the  new  social order of  the  kingdom  tends  to mute  traditional  language  of 
incarnation and atonement.
138 He argues that because he has failed to adequately 
treat  dogmatic  issues  such  as  how  the  work  of  Christ  is  complete  in  the 
resurrection and ascension, and how he is present in the church through the Spirit, 
Hauerwas blurs the distinction between Christ and the church so that the church, 
as  the  linear  continuation  of  that  which  Christ  began,  functions  more  as  an 
extension of the incarnation than as existing to bear witness and to live faithfully 
in light of his unique and unrepeatable work.
139 
Fergusson’s suggestion that Hauerwas has over-determined his ecclesiology at the 
expense  of  christology  is  not universally  held. Indeed,  this raises  perhaps the 
central issue of contention in contemporary discussion of Barth’s ecclesiology. 
Hauerwas’ criticisms of Barth might be rephrased in the form of a question: does 
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the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost which issued in the creation of the 
church represent a distinct mission of the triune God in the economy of salvation? 
Hauerwas  accepts the  conclusion  suggested by  Mangina  that  his  criticisms of 
Barth would be better stated as a pneumatological worry regarding the role of the 
church in the economy of salvation.
140 Mangina, in contrast to Fergusson, asserts 
that Barth’s christocentrism serves to ‘short-circuit’ the work of the Spirit so that 
he appears only as a predicate of Christ’s reconciling work rather than as having 
an agency of his own. He asks whether the church is ‘merely a human echo or 
analogy of Christ’s completed work, as in Barth? Or is it also somehow the herald 
of new activity in which God is engaged between now and the eschaton?’
141 
Likewise, Robert Jenson suggests that 
the  final  reason  for  the  whole  web  of  Spirit-avoidance in  the Kirchliche 
Dogmatik is avoidance of the church. For if the Pentecostal creation of a 
structured continuing community were identified as the ‘objectivity’ of the 
gospel’s  truth  pro  nobis,  then  this  community  itself,  in  its  structured 
temporal  and  spatial  extension,  would  be  seen  as  the  Bedingung  der 
Möglichkeit of faith.
142 
Jenson goes on to remark that Barth’s ‘practiced binitarianism’ may in fact be his 
final  resistance  against  the  Roman  Catholic  insistence  that  the  church  be 
considered an active mediatrix of faith.
143 So, too, Rosato complains that Barth’s 
pneumatology is so constrained by his christology that the entire notion that the 
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Spirit is the generous outpouring of the love of the Father and the Son into the 
world is lost.
144 
The matters raised in this section by Hauerwas (and Mangina, Jenson and Rosato) 
pose serious questions for this thesis. To what degree is it possible to state that the 
motive underlying Barth’s theology is fundamentally ecclesial, if Barth fails to 
provide adequate dogmatic ‘space’ for the reality of the church and the extension 
of  Christian  life  and  character  in  and  across  time?  This  question  has  been 
sharpened recently by a number of theologians participating in a movement that 
has been labelled ‘the new ecclesiology,’ who argue for the instantiation of the 
economy of salvation in practices which are constitutive of the church, and who 
thus  also  criticise  Barth  for  diminishing  or  even  eradicating  the  church  as  a 
historical reality. 
The ‘New Ecclesiology’ 
Nicholas  Healy,  for  example,  argues  that  Barth,  in  concert  with  almost  all 
twentieth century ecclesiology, can be faulted methodologically for developing a 
conceptual model which seeks to identify the theoretical and essential nature of 
the church at the expense of its historical and concrete identity.
145 In addition, 
Barth’s  actualism  produces  a  bifurcation  between  the  visible  and  empirical 
church, so that the so-called ‘real church’ occurs only as the Holy Spirit acts upon 
the human church in the moment. Only in the event of divine action is the human 
and  sinful  church  actually  the  Body  of  Christ.
146  Healy  considers  that  such 
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bifurcation  between  the  theological  and  human  aspects  of  the  church  to  be 
irreconcilable with Scripture. In fact he suggests that to think of an ‘invisible-yet-
real’ Israel or the church as distinct from its socio-cultural identity is not only odd 
but quite unbiblical, and that neither the Old nor the New Testament makes a 
division between the empirical church and its essential reality.
147 
Healy proposes, therefore, an ‘ecclesiology from below,’ a narrative ecclesiology 
that begins with the concrete, human history that is constitutive of the church.
148 
For Healy, ecclesiology  is a practical discipline, oriented towards the concrete 
church. He suggests that theoretical ecclesiologies such as Barth’s which seek to 
discern the ‘essence’ of the church, function to remove focus from the historical 
identity of the church and provide idealistic definitions which deny its earthly and 
sinful  reality,  and  which  also  hinder  its  ability  to  form  authentic  lives  of 
discipleship which embody the truth of the gospel.
149 
According to Healy, Barth avoids the error of a one-sided sociological description 
of the church’s identity by presenting a one-sided doctrinal description.
150 This 
way of  construing  the  church  undermines  Barth’s theological  agenda,  because 
with the loss of the socio-cultural particularity of the church comes the risk that 
Christianity becomes a more or less dispensable part of an individual’s private 
worldview, an outcome clearly antithetical to Barth’s overall intention.
151 
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Similarly,  Reinhard  Hütter  is  convinced  that  Barth  has  developed  an  abstract 
ecclesiology.  He  argues  that  Barth  adopts  the  Word  of  God  as  a  critical 
ecclesiological principle (‘genuine Protestantism’) in order to steer a middle path 
between Neo-Protestantism on the one hand and Roman Catholicism on the other. 
Because the Word of God both addresses and stands over against the church, it 
defines  the  normative  nature of what constitutes  the  church as  church. Hütter 
regards  Barth’s  theological  principle  as  superior  to  those  of  both  Neo-
Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, yet it comes at a high price, namely the 
loss of the church’s concreteness. Because ‘genuine Protestantism’ serves as a 
critical theological concept to be employed over against all real existing churches 
it cannot really exist in an ecclesially embodied form.
152 Thus, Hütter characterises 
Barth’s critical ecclesiology as ‘transcendental,’ and as a recipe for a theology 
without  any  tangible  ecclesial  roots.
153  Like  Healy,  he  is  also  concerned  that 
Barth’s  actualistic  construal  of  the  church  results  in  a  loss  of  concreteness. 
Because the witness of the community is entirely dependent for its fulfilment on 
the  activity  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  church  itself  has  no  signifying  or 
communicative potency whatsoever.
154 
Thus,  both  Healy  and  Hütter  suggest  that  Barth  marginalises  the  embodied 
character of the human community. It is arguable, however, that Healy has erred 
by  identifying  the  narrative  of  human  history  as  constitutive  of  the  church. 
Although his insistence that the concrete realities of the church in history become 
part of theological reflection on the church is surely correct, his approach in this 
earlier essay  at least, seems to remove the church from the broader scriptural 
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narrative in which it finds its distinctly theological identity, that is, the church as a 
distinct mission of the triune God in the Holy Spirit.
155 
Hütter’s argument is more substantial. First, like Healy, Hütter also argues that the 
Church  is a way of life, a distinct  set of practices interwoven with  normative 
beliefs, concretely and distinctly embodied.
156 He asserts that as the work of the 
Holy  Spirit  the  church  is  also  characterized  by  duration,  concreteness,  and 
visibility, and as such ‘is identical with distinct practices or activities, institutions, 
offices  and  teachings.  In  this  way  the  work  of  the  Spirit  acquires  its  own, 
eschatological extension “in time.”’
157 Hütter argues that it is precisely through 
these practices that God’s saving economy instantiates itself and the Holy Spirit 
enacts his regenerating and sanctifying work.
158  
According to Hütter, it is this identification between the work of the Spirit and the 
practices of the church that Barth has failed to recognise. Rather, Barth, working 
with  a  ‘disembodied  pneumatology  and  critical  ecclesiology,’  not  only 
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misrepresents  the  concrete  ecclesiology  of  the  Reformation,  but  effectively 
bifurcates the church by positing a radical disjunction between the work of the 
Holy Spirit and the actual practices of the Christian community.
159 Hütter insists 
that theology think of the Spirit and the church in a way that avoids transcendental 
moves  by  giving  proper  emphasis to  both  the  Spirit’s  embodiment  in distinct 
practices  and  thereby  to  the  Church’s  concreteness,  and  also  the  Church’s 
brokenness.
160 
Hütter’s emphasis on the link between the Holy Spirit and the practices of the 
church is also prominent in the thought of Joseph Mangina, who, as we have seen, 
shares  concerns  regarding  Barth’s  christocentric  development  of  ecclesiology. 
Because the victory of God’s kingdom that effects salvation  has already been 
enacted in the life and death of Jesus Christ, it seems, says Mangina, that public 
history is irrelevant to the actual salvation of creatures, and that Barth has left 
little for the Holy Spirit to accomplish.
161 Mangina finds in Barth’s ecclesiology a 
peculiar gap between his theological description of the church and its ordinary 
empirical practices in history.
162 Because Barth’s understanding of the church is 
actualistic, it is not clear how the church ‘as a configuration of human practices’ 
makes much difference to its task of witnessing to the lordship of Christ.
163 It 
further  means  that  the  term  ‘church’  is  stripped  of  its  ordinary,  denotative 
reference, with a resulting loss of the perceptible community existing across time, 
the subject of its own actions. Mangina acknowledges Barth’s concern regarding 
triumphalism but insists that the best check on triumphalism in the church is the 
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discerning and forceful application of the doctrine of justification in its church-
critical use.
164 
Further, in Barth’s theology the nexus between gospel and church is said to be 
construed in a ‘weak’ sense, so that the community in God’s hands is no more 
than a sign or instrument of his grace.
165 Mangina, however, wants to assert not 
just that the church has a function of proclamation, but is itself a part of the very 
gospel  it  proclaims.  On  this  view,  the  church  is  actively  involved  in  the 
communication of saving  grace, set  in ‘cooperation’ with the triune God over 
against  the  individual believer,  so  that  faith  in  Jesus Christ  not only  involves 
acceptance of the church’s message, but acceptance of the church itself as the 
binding  medium  in  which  faith  takes  shape.
166  Mangina  states  the  matter  in 
sacramental terms: ‘On the strong view of mediation, the church is the signum of 
God’s action, as the Protestant view readily acknowledges; but it is signum in 
such a way that it also participates in the res. As with any sacramental reality, the 
church  conveys  the  very  thing  that  it  signifies.’
167  Thus,  for  Mangina,  the 
reclamation of the visible people of God as a theological category is a way of 
rescuing the church from its sociological captivity.
168 
It would be incorrect to suppose, however, that Mangina faults Barth for a failure 
to develop a theology of the Christian life. Indeed, in his book Karl Barth on the 
Christian Life, Mangina argues precisely the opposite, that throughout his career 
Barth’s theology includes significant insight and exposition on various aspects of 
the  Christian  life.  His  contention,  like  that  of  Hauerwas,  is  more  nuanced. 
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Specifically, although Barth can speak of the Christian life as having a distinct 
character,  it  remains  unclear  in  his  theology  just how  this character  comes  to 
expression  in  everyday  life.
169  Mangina,  therefore,  contends  for  an 
acknowledgement  of  the  Spirit  as  the  subject  of  a  distinct  salvific  economy, 
working through the practices and structures of the Christian community.
170 Such 
a theology will be one of discipleship, attentive to the specific means by which 
persons are drawn into the life of the triune God.
171 He argues that the church’s 
practices do not exist as ends in themselves, but as the means through which the 
Spirit forms believers so that they ‘bear the marks of Jesus.’
172 In this theology of 
discipleship the Christian community is the necessary matrix in which believers 
acquire the  habits, skills and requisite formation over time that allow them to 
locate their lives in God in accordance with the provisions of salvation.
173 
Mangina is aware that Barth would certainly be suspicious of an emphasis on 
habits and virtues in individual ethics, and of talk about the practices that build up 
and sustain the community. Nonetheless, he endeavours to show both that Barth’s 
construal of human agency does not exclude elaboration along these lines,
174 and 
also that framing ethics in concretely ecclesial terms actually helps to underscore 
the grounding of ethics in christology.
175 The fundamental problem arises from 
Barth’s refusal to grant the church ‘possession’ of revelation or of any form of 
mediatorial function with regard to grace. 
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Mangina considers Barth’s fear of a self-satisfied and complacent church justified, 
but that his proposed therapy was unnecessarily drastic. Rather than exclude the 
concept of ‘sacrament’ he prefers to develop a sacramentality oriented around the 
gospel story and the call to discipleship. Far from giving the church free rein to 
pursue its own course, these actions bind the community in memory and hope to 
the story of the crucified Saviour.
176 Arguing that the church is constituted by the 
Spirit’s work in and through Word and sacrament, Mangina suggests that ‘the turn 
to ecclesial practice as a locus for ethics need not mean a loss of the christological 
centre, but a situating of christology in a wider trinitarian context.’
177 
It is evident in each of the critiques by Healy, Hütter and Mangina, that Barth’s 
ordering of ecclesiology and pneumatology to christology is viewed as inadequate 
for the establishment of a viable sense of ecclesial and Christian existence. Also 
problematic for each of these theologians is the way in which Barth’s actualism 
impacts  his  ecclesiology  by  forcing  a  distinction  between  the  so-called  ‘real’ 
church, and its historical appearance. These two factors remove the possibility of 
the church acting as a mediator of divine  grace, or in Jenson’s phrase, as ‘an 
active mediatrix of faith.’
178 This, of course, was precisely Barth’s intent. But, is 
this criticism warranted? Do these dogmatic moves undertaken by Barth actually 
serve to render the formation of moral community technically impossible? 
Pneumatology and ecclesiology were, of course, precisely those aspects of Barth’s 
work  which  were  to  occupy  him  in  the  unfinished  volume  of  the  Church 
Dogmatics. In a sense it is unfair to register a full complaint against Barth for 
what he did not live to complete. Certainly there are many instances where Barth 
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indeed employs idioms which suggest a non-agential understanding of the Spirit. 
Hunsinger is almost certainly correct, however, in his astute observation that  
Barth’s chosen idiom is appropriate to the doctrine of reconciliation, where 
he  understands  the  accomplishment  of  reconciliation  in  a  thoroughly 
christocentric way. One would expect the other, more agential idiom (which 
recurs  throughout the  Dogmatics)  to  have  re-emerged  prominently in  the 
doctrine of redemption.
179 
Even Hunsinger, though, questions the adequacy of Barth’s account. In a brief 
essay, Hunsinger provides a succinct overview of the thoroughly christocentric 
nature of Barth’s ecclesiology. In the essay he notes that Barth prefers to speak 
about a correspondence between Christ and the church more often than about their 
coinherence: ‘as the church bears witness to Christ, he will typically say, Christ 
also bears witness to himself.’ This language, however, tends to emphasize the 
distinction between Christ and the church at the expense of their unity. Hunsinger 
would prefer to speak in terms of coinherence: 
If  we  say,  as  Barth  of  course  will  also sometimes say,  that Christ bears 
witness to  himself in  and through his community,  or  more strongly, that 
Christ takes form in and through his community, then the emphasis shifts to 
seeing  the  community  as  a  vessel  of  coinherence,  participation  and 
mediation.  In  Barth  this  emphasis  is  not  sustained.  This  is  precisely  an 
emphasis that ecumenical ecclesiology needs to sustain, however, if it is to 
reconcile  the  idea  of  the  church  as  witness  with  that  of  the  church  as 
sacrament.
180 
Hunsinger, then, like Mangina, wants to view the church in terms of mediation, 
although with a more obvious christocentric emphasis. Hunsinger follows Barth 
more closely with an insistence that neither the divine life, nor grace, nor the gift 
of the Holy Spirit reaches us apart from the self-mediation of Christ, for Christ is 
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himself  the  res  inclusive  of  all  other  relevant  designations.
181  Nonetheless,  he 
offers a possible correction of Barth’s theology  predicated on an analogy with 
Jesus Christ as the one true Word of God. Hunsinger appeals to Barth’s doctrine 
of the threefold form of the Word of God, and suggests that there is no compelling 
reason why Jesus Christ could not be the one true sacrament Barth insists upon 
while yet allowing also for secondary and dependent sacramental forms.
182 In this 
construal,  baptism  and  eucharist,  as  ‘visible  words,’  would  correspond  to  the 
Word  of  God  in  the  form  of  proclamation.  When  considering  which  form  of 
sacrament might correspond to Holy Scripture, Hunsinger suggests that the church 
as sacrament would seem the obvious candidate.
183 
Hunsinger argues further that witness and mediation are not, as Barth suggested, 
mutually exclusive concepts, but are in fact mutually complementary representing 
respectively  the  ‘upward’  and  the  ‘downward’  vectors  of  the  divine-human 
relation. The secondary forms of Word and sacrament witness to the primary form 
and provide the instrument by means of which the grace of the primary form is 
mediated and imparted to faith.
184 Of course, the secondary forms of Word and 
sacrament have no capacity in themselves to witness to and mediate the grace of 
the primary form, but do so only by virtue of grace alone. 
These moves by Hunsinger suggest that Barth’s theology may be amenable to a 
more  robust  and  concrete  ecclesiology  and  theology  of  discipleship  without 
compromising his christocentric commitment. Place is also reserved for the Holy 
Spirit  whose  work  it  is  to  mediate  ‘the  koinonia-relation  (mutual  indwelling) 
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between Christ and the sacramental element, who brings this visible Word to faith 
and faith to this visible Word, and who mediates the union and communion with 
Christ that thereby ensues.’
185 
Finally,  Hunsinger’s  proposal  allows  the  development  of  a  sacramental 
ecclesiology  in  which  the  church  and  its  ministry  are  granted  a  significant 
mediatorial  role  within  the  divine  economy  while also  avoiding two concerns 
recently raised by Healy. While he is appreciative of the renewed emphasis on 
practices, Healy is concerned that the ‘new ecclesiologies’ threaten to restrict the 
freedom of the Holy Spirit by tying his activity too closely to the practices of the 
church, and to confuse sanctification with performance of the practices themselves 
rather than with concrete obedience to Christ. In a remarkable echo of Biggar’s 
critique of Hauerwas, Healy  insists  that  ‘the  Spirit  not  only  works within the 
church’s traditions and practices, but also apart from them and even, at times, over 
against them,’ and that finally, ‘it is our obedience to Christ that trumps all other 
virtues, practices, precepts and principles.’
186 
Conclusion 
This  chapter  set  out  to  accomplish  two  objectives.  First,  it  has  sought  to 
demonstrate that study of Barth’s ethics must be predicated on a reading of his 
work  that  takes  seriously  his  own  concerns,  commitments  and  methodology. 
Failure to attend to this basic exegetical task will result in a misunderstanding of 
his rhetoric, and misrepresentation of his conclusions.  
Second, this chapter has sought to indicate the kinds of responses Barth’s work 
with respect to ecclesiology and Christian life has engendered. Serious questions 
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regarding the adequacy of Barth’s ecclesial vision have been raised by competent, 
sympathetic interpreters of his work. The primary questions concern the manner 
in  which  Barth  subsumes  pneumatology  and  ecclesiology  under  the  aegis  of 
christology, and the ecclesial implications of his actualistic doctrine of revelation, 
both  of  which,  charge  his  critics,  result  in  an  abstract  or  transcendental 
ecclesiology.  As  a  result  of  his  thoroughgoing  commitment  to  preserve  the 
sovereign  freedom  of  divine  grace,  Barth  has,  so  his  critics  allege,  failed  to 
provide a viable account of the church and Christian life. In his account the reality 
of  the  church  as  a  distinct  work  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  the  temporal  realm  is 
marginalised, with the corresponding loss of a concrete description and duration 
of Christian life and discipleship. 
Clearly,  and  not  unreasonably,  the  critiques  of  Barth  surveyed  above  have 
focussed predominantly on his theology as set forth in the Church Dogmatics. 
Nonetheless, I have pointed out that Barth’s motivation for writing the Dogmatics 
was driven, at least in part, by a concern for the very existence of the church as 
church. I have also suggested that this primary motive underlay the development 
and  structure  of  Barth’s  theology  from  the  earliest  days  of  his  career  after 
breaking with the liberal tradition. In the next chapter I take up this suggestion in 
earnest  by  focussing  on the reasons  for  Barth’s  dispute with  his  heritage,  his 
relationship  with  socialism  vis-à-vis  the  church,  and  by  undertaking  an 
examination of his initial theological explorations after he begins the reorientation 
of his theology.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
IN SEARCH OF A NEW WORLD 
How we cleared things away! And we did almost nothing but clear away! 
Everything  which  even  remotely  smacked  of  mysticism  and  morality,  of 
pietism and romanticism, or  even  of idealism, was suspected and sharply 
interdicted  or  bracketed  with  reservations  which  sounded  actually 
prohibitive!
1 
T.  F.  Torrance  labels  the  period  following  1915  as  one  of  great  importance, 
ferment and discovery for Karl Barth.
2 In this initial period of his career, Barth is 
not so much constructing a new theology as he is disentangling and reorienting his 
theology from that theology which had dominated European Protestantism since 
at least the time of Schleiermacher, and investigating the lines upon which a new 
theology might be developed. Driven by  his need to preach each week to his 
parishioners  in  Safenwil,  and  by  what  he  perceived  to be  the  failure  both  of 
liberalism  and  socialism,  Barth’s  intensive  biblical  and  theological  studies 
eventually issued in a renewed awareness of divine sovereignty over against all 
human existence and activity. 
This chapter explores Barth’s theological development in the period immediately 
following the outbreak of World War I up to early 1917. The first section provides 
an overview of Barth’s dispute with his liberal heritage and argues that it was the 
ethical failure of his theological mentors that sent him search of a new theology. 
The second section examines Barth’s relationship with Religious Socialism during 
this period, together with his somewhat ambivalent relationship with the church. 
This  section  shows  that  the  reason  for  this  ambivalence  was  the  political 
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indifference  which  was  generally  characteristic  of  the  church,  and  that  Barth 
found in socialism a prophetic challenge to the church, which demanded that the 
praxis of the church be reformulated to include a social and ethical dimension. 
These first two sections, then, provide a brief orientation to the historical context 
in  which  Barth’s  new  theology  was  taking  shape,  and  strongly  suggest  the 
prominence of ethical factors in his development. Following this orientation to the 
early Barth, three of his works are examined in detail, namely his two sermons on 
“The Righteousness of God” and “The Strange New World in the Bible,” as well 
as  a  short book review  entitled  “Auf das  Reich Gottes  warten.”  These  works 
clearly show that not only is the view that Barth did not give place for a valid 
ethics or ecclesiology in this period incorrect, but also that the major themes of his 
mature thought in these areas were already present in germinal form. 
Karl Barth’s Dispute with Liberalism 
On the Eve of War 
Bruce McCormack suggests that Barth’s turning point came sometime after April 
1915, and that during the course of the following summer, evidence emerged that 
Barth  had  now  adopted  a  new  Ansatz—a  new  starting-point  for  theological 
reflection.
3 In distinction to the theology he had been trained in, Barth began to 
conceive of God standing over against the ‘godless’ world as a reality complete in 
himself, radically calling all human existence and endeavour into question. This 
turning point, however, was not without ample preparation in preceding  years, 
most particularly  his  encounter with  the  misery  of  the  working  classes  which 
occurred  after  his  first  appointment  as  a  minister  to  Geneva  in  1909,  and 
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especially, his appointment to the Safenwil pastorate in 1911. McCormack notes 
that ‘if Barth’s disappointments over the ethical failure of his theological teachers 
was the impetus which sent him in search of a new theology, his search for a new 
world had been set in motion much earlier.’
4  
Already prior to the outbreak of the first world war Barth had become estranged 
from the ethos and liberal world of his theological instructors.
5 Reflecting on his 
own beginnings from the vantage of later years, Barth recalls that 
[a]lthough in Geneva I had still lived completely and utterly in the religious 
atmosphere which I brought with me from Marburg…when I moved to the 
industrial village of Safenwil, my interest in theology as such had to step 
back noticeably into second place.…Because of the situation I found in my 
community, I became passionately involved with socialism and especially 
with the trade union movement.
6
 
During  the  Safenwil  years  Barth  gave  no fewer than  forty-three addresses  on 
socialist themes, and in his early period there also drew the ire of members of his 
congregation on account of his ‘socialist sermons.’
7 His socialism, however, was 
clearly not Marxist, but rather emphasised the necessity of first creating new men 
                                                
4
 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 79.  
5 Christophe Chalamet has recently argued that it is inaccurate to portray Barth as a thorough-
going liberal, even in the period prior to  World War  I.  As a student of  Herrmann, Barth had 
learned well the methodological necessity of a dialectical theology if theology was to provide a 
faithful account of its subject matter. Chalamet presents several lines of evidence to demonstrate 
that even prior to World War I, Barth criticised and articulated perspectives from both the right 
and  the  left  of  the  theological  spectrum.  See  Christophe  Chalamet,  Dialectical  Theologians: 
Wilhelm Herrmann, Karl Barth and Rudolph Bultmann (Zürich:  Theologischer Verlag  Zürich, 
2005), 65, 70, 72, 74, 79-80. 
6
 See Barth’s ‘Concluding Unscientific Postscript on Schleiermacher,’ in Karl Barth, The Theology 
of Schleiermacher: Lectures at Göttingen  Winter Semester of 1923/24, trans. G. W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1982), 263. Also relevant here is Busch’s account of Barth’s time in 
Geneva (see Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life from Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. 
J. Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 52-59). Busch notes that Barth spent a great deal of time 
in pastoral visitation and relief work amongst the poor. Nonetheless, Busch also shows that Barth’s 
preaching at this time was thoroughly in accordance with the theology of Marburg, and especially 
Herrmann. See also McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 80.  
7
 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 86 n.23, 92.  
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and women in order then to create a new and just order. The new world would be 
the product of a new ethos.
8 
In a lecture delivered six months after his arrival in Safenwil, Karl Barth sought to 
show that Christian faith and a commitment to socialism were not incompatible.
9 
In the lecture, where Barth first uses the expression ‘the new world,’
10 he insists 
that the kingdom ‘is not of this world, but of God. It is in this world, however, for 
in this world God’s will is to be done.’
11 In a sermon given to his church Barth 
remonstrates: 
It is not only ‘we,’ that is to say, our souls, our inner and personal life which 
must  become  light.  Rather,  the  world  must  become  light.  We  must  not 
separate  the  two  from  one  another.  Unbelief  is  hidden  in  this 
separation.…Where do you get the right to set yourself apart in this way, as 
if God’s actions were directed to you alone?…We must acquire for ourselves 
that holy sense of solidarity which bears the suffering of the world in its 
heart, not in order to sigh and shake our heads over it, but rather to take it in 
hand so that it will be otherwise.
12
 
Already  in  this  sermon,  and  in  the  earlier  lecture  on  “Jesus  Christ  and  the 
Movement for Social Justice,” can be seen a departure from the interiority and 
individualism  that  characterised  his  earlier  sermons  at  Geneva.
13  In  these 
addresses Barth, in a conscious repudiation of Harnack’s view of the kingdom, 
                                                
8
 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 89. McCormack does concede, however, that 
although Barth differed from the Marxists in terms of tactics, ‘with regard to the goal, Barth was 
very close to the Marxists indeed.’ In a radio programme recorded shortly before his death Barth 
insisted that he ‘was never a doctrinaire socialist,’ and that his interest in socialism ‘was very 
limited and for the most part practical.’ See Karl Barth, Final Testimonies, trans. G. W. Bromiley 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 39. 
9
 Karl Barth, “Jesus Christ and the Movement  for Social Justice,” in Karl Barth and Radical 
Politics,  ed.  G.  Hunsinger  (Philadelphia:  Westminster,  1976)  The  lecture  was  delivered  on 
December 17, 1911.  
10 Barth, “Jesus Christ and the Movement for Social Justice,” 28.  
11
 Barth, “Jesus Christ and the Movement for Social Justice,” 27. 
12
  Cited  in  McCormack,  Karl  Barth’s  Dialectical  Theology,  96.  The  sermon  was  given  on 
February 23, 1913. 
13 For examples of the content of Barth’s addresses from his Geneva period see Busch, Karl Barth, 
53-54.  
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insists that the internal change effected by the presence of the kingdom of God in 
the human soul must seek expression in external relations.
14 
Other divergences from the theology of his instructors can also be detected in 
these years. In an examination of Barth’s sermons of 1913 McCormack highlights 
various themes which are often thought to have only arisen during the so-called 
‘dialectical phase’ of  his theology, but which  also demonstrate that  Barth  had 
already drifted considerably from the theology of his Marburg days. He includes 
Barth’s emphasis on the judgement and wrath of God, his criticism of religion, 
and the ‘wholly otherness’ of God.
15 Nonetheless, these various divergences and 
repudiations  do  not  indicate  Barth’s  break  with  liberal  theology.  Rather,  they 
constitute an  insider’s critique of liberalism. Methodologically, Barth was  still 
heavily indebted to Herrmann.
16 
Ethics in Crisis 
It was the outbreak of World War I, and particularly the religious justification for 
it, which led finally to Barth’s turn from the theology of his liberal forebears. In a 
letter to his lifelong friend and confidant Eduard Thurneysen, Barth’s dismay is 
almost palpable: 
The unconditional truths of the gospel are simply suspended for the time 
being and in the meantime a German war-theology is put to work.…Here is 
sufficient proof that the ‘truths’ were nothing more than a surface varnish 
and not an inmost possession of this Christian Welt Christianity. It is truly 
                                                
14
  McCormack,  Karl  Barth’s  Dialectical  Theology,  89-91.  Again,  Barth  himself  notes,  ‘The 
concept of “God’s kingdom” was portrayed in various ways…but certainly no longer in the form 
familiar to us from Ritschl and his followers’ (Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 263). For 
more on Harnack’s view, see the discussion that follows in the next section. 
15
 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 92-104.  
16
 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 91. McCormack cites Barth’s understanding of 
revelation, christology, anthropology and soteriology as thoroughly Herrmannian and Ritschlian at 
this point in time (103-104). See also Joseph L. Mangina, Karl Barth on the Christian Life: The 
Practical  Knowledge  of  God  (New  York:  Peter  Lang,  2001),  24,  and  Chalamet,  Dialectical 
Theologians, 73-79.  
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sad! Marburg and German civilization have lost something in my eyes by 
this breakdown, and indeed forever.
17
 
This sense of pathos continued with Barth throughout his life. Four decades later 
he reflects: 
At this point some of us were appalled after we, along with everyone else, 
had drained the different chalices of this theology to the last drop. We then 
concluded  (from  approximately  the  middle  of  the  second  decade  of  our 
century on) that we could not side with it any longer. Why?…Was it—this 
has played a decisive role for me personally—precisely the failure of the 
ethics of the modern theology of the time, with the outbreak of the First 
World War, which caused us to grow puzzled also about its exegesis, its 
treatment of history, and its dogmatics?
18
 
One day in early August 1914 stands out in my personal memory as a black 
day.  Ninety-three  German  intellectuals  impressed  public  opinion  by  their 
proclamation  in  support  of  the  war  policy  of  Wilhelm  II  and  his 
counsellors.…I suddenly realized that I could not any longer follow either 
their ethics and dogmatics or their understanding of the Bible and of history. 
For me at least, 19th-century theology no longer held any future.
19
 
These oft-cited recollections show the degree to which in his own mind Barth’s 
dispute with liberalism was finally occasioned because of both the ethical and the 
theological  failure  of  his  teachers;  indeed,  it  was  their  ethical  failure  which 
revealed their theological weakness. For Barth, his teachers had been hopelessly 
compromised by what he regarded as their failure in the face of the crisis and the 
ideology of war. Their ethical failure indicated that their exegetical and dogmatic 
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 John D. Smart, ed., Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth-Thurneysen Correspondence, 
1914-1925 (London: Epworth, 1964), 26. The letter is dated September 4, 1914.  
18
 Karl Barth, “The Humanity of  God,” in The Humanity of God (Louisville, Kn.: John Knox 
Press, 1956), 40, emphasis added. The statement was made in a lecture given September 25, 1956. 
19
  Karl  Barth,  “Evangelical  Theology  in  the  Nineteenth  Century,”  in  The  Humanity  of  God 
(Louisville, Kn.: John Knox Press, 1960), 14. From a lecture given January 8, 1957. See also 
Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 263-264: ‘An entire world of theological exegesis, ethics, 
dogmatics, and preaching, which up to that point I had accepted as basically credible, was thereby 
shaken to the foundations, and with it everything which flowed at that time from the pens of the 
German theologians.’ Note that the  public declaration of the German intellectuals occurred on 
October 3, 1914, and not early August, as Barth recalls (McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical 
Theology, 112).   
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presuppositions could not be in order.
20 If Barth’s later reflections are reliable, it 
indicates that the unity which he later developed in his thought between dogmatics 
and ethics was already at work in this early period. Gollwitzer suggests as much: 
The ‘unity of dogmatics and ethics’ is nothing but the theological program 
for  the  knowledge  practiced  in  Safenwil:  God  is  concerned  about  the 
kingdom of God; the kingdom of God is the true socialism; therefore, the 
socialist movement is a ‘reflection’  of God’s kingdom.…This he had  not 
heard from Wilhelm Herrmann; this was the deepest break with Marburg. 
The break with Marburg occurred not only because there Wilhelm II’s war 
was acclaimed and the treaty with the Armenian-murdering Turks defended, 
but even more because there the separation between dogmatics and ethics 
was ratified.
21
 
Only one of Barth’s former teachers had not signed the terrible manifesto: the 
‘honourable Martin Rade.’
22 Yet even Rade argued that God was the only possible 
ground and author of the heartfelt unity experienced by the German people during 
the first days of the war. He further argued that Barth, as a Swiss neutral, would 
have difficulty understanding the German people precisely because of his lack of 
‘the  experience  of  war.’
23  When  Barth  noted  Herrmann’s  signature  on  the 
document affirming Wilhelm II he wrote in dismay: 
Especially  with  you,  Herr  Professor…we  learned  to  acknowledge 
‘experience’  as  the  constitutive  principle  of  knowing  and  doing  in  the 
domain  of  religion.…Now,  however,  in  answer  to  our  doubts,  an 
‘experience’ which is completely new to us is held out to us by German 
Christians, an allegedly religious war ‘experience;’ i.e. the fact that German 
Christians ‘experience’ their war as a holy war is supposed to bring us to 
silence, if not demand reverence from us. Where do you stand in relation to 
this argument and to the war theology which lies behind it?
24
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 Busch, Karl Barth, 81. 
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 H. Gollwitzer, “Kingdom of God and Socialism in the Theology of Karl Barth,” in Karl Barth 
and Radical Politics, ed. G. Hunsinger (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976), 85. Gollwitzer affirms 
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 Busch, Karl Barth, 81. 
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  Rade  to  Barth  September  (Oct?)  5,  1914,  cited  in  McCormack,  Karl  Barth’s  Dialectical 
Theology, 113. 
24
 Barth to Herrmann November 4, 1914, cited in McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology,  
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Barth understood the war not as holy, but as wholly unholy, as the culmination of 
decades of armaments and fear, of immense ambition and jealousy and pride. ‘All 
of these things,’ he proclaimed, ‘are completely alien to the innermost being of 
God. And if they nevertheless take place, then there is only one explanation for it: 
the innermost being of God is also completely alien to humankind.’
25 
It is at this point, as Barth begins to question that which previously had been 
unquestioned—the role of religious experience in our knowledge of God—that his 
decisive  shift  commences.  Initially,  as  his  letter  to  Herrmann  shows,  he  was 
concerned with what he perceived to be the blatant manipulation of the concept of 
religious experience. If religious experience could be used as a foundation for the 
German  Kriegstheologie  it  was  no  longer  reliable  as  an  adequate  ground  and 
starting point for theology.
26 Over the next several months Barth’s reflections led 
him to the point where he could no longer align himself with the theology he had 
received.  On  June  19,  1915  Barth  wrote  a  letter  to  Rade  in  which  the  first 
evidence of his new theological starting point is discerned. Barth claimed that in 
Jesus  a  new  world  had  broken  into  this  one,  calling  into  question  everything 
human. The ethical response of Germany’s theological elite had precipitated for 
Barth a crisis of ethics. All at once, the central question of ethics—What should 
we do?—had become exceedingly problematic.
27  
This all-too-brief account of Barth’s dispute with theological liberalism is crucial, 
not only for this present thesis, but also if Barth’s theology as a whole is to be 
                                                                                                                                 
113.  Chalamet’s  note  that  ‘Herrmann’s  radical  distinction  between  God  and  the  world  was 
sometimes put into brackets when it came to the theme of religious experience’ is particularly apt 
in this instance. See Chalamet, Dialectical Theologians, 92. 
25
 Barth, Sermon, September 6, 1914, cited in McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 
115. 
26
 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 113.  
27
 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 124.   
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properly understood, particularly  in  view of the many criticisms of Barth that 
suggest that  his theology,  not only in this period but throughout his life, was 
constructed in such a way as to exclude the realm of the ethical. From the very 
beginning Barth’s theology is ethical, and conversely, his ethics are theological. 
As  Barth  continued  his  reflections  it  became  apparent  to  him  that  ‘the  entire 
theology  which  had  unmasked  itself  in  that  manifesto,  and  everything  which 
followed after it (even in the Christliche Welt), was grounded, determined, and 
influenced decisively by him [i.e. Schleiermacher].’
28 There could be no question 
of following that way and that theology any longer.
29 
The Young Socialist Pastor 
Barth’s  political  affinities  and  his  relationship  to  socialism  have  stimulated 
enormous  scholarly  interest,  especially  since  the  publication  of  Marquardt’s 
controversial Theologie und Sozialismus in 1972.
30 In the previous section I noted 
in passing that Barth had given a lecture in December 1911 on “Jesus and the 
Movement  for  Social  Justice,”  and  that  his  so-called  ‘socialist  sermons’  had 
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 Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 264. 
29 It is necessary to note that Barth’s dispute with the liberal theology of his mentors is not to be 
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Sauter,  “Shifts  in  Karl  Barth’s  Thought:  The  Current  Debate  between  Right-  and  Left-Wing 
Barthians,”  in  Eschatological Rationality:  Theological  Issues  in  Focus  (Grand  Rapids:  Baker, 
1996), 111-135. See additionally McCormack’s important discussion of the impact of political 
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created  a  level  of  controversy  in  his  pastorate.  In  this  section  I  will  examine 
Barth’s  relationship  to  socialism  during  this  turbulent  period  because  of  the 
important light it sheds on his developing ecclesial and ethical commitment and 
thought.  
A Matter of Praxis 
In late 1915 Barth delivered a lecture entitled “Religion and Socialism” in which 
the transition in his thinking becomes apparent.
31 His major concern in this lecture 
was the kingdom of God by which he meant simply that ‘God is living, that God 
rules  and  will  rule.’
32  Barth  insists  that  although  God’s  lordship  is  already 
established, it has yet to be universally acknowledged. Nonetheless, ‘everything 
made, artificial, untrue must give way to that which is original.’
33 Basic motifs of 
Barth’s later theology are present in the lecture, including his theological criticism 
of religion, and his celebrated phrase ‘The world is the world. But God is God.’
34 
The kingdom itself may not be identified with either religion or socialism, but 
these may  signify it. Both are reflections or symptoms of the  kingdom in the 
world, among many other such reflections in the realms of nature and history.
35 
Barth is careful to subordinate both religion and socialism to the kingdom of God 
because both are thoroughly human in their nature, and are therefore subject to 
human frailty and aberration, and as such, are also at best, ambiguous reflections 
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 The lecture was delivered in Baden on December 7, 1915 at a socialist gathering. I am indebted 
to McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 131-132, and especially to Jüngel, Karl Barth, 
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 Cited in McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 131.  
33 Cited in McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 131.  
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  Jüngel,  Karl  Barth,  31.  Note  that  McCormack’s  research,  already  mentioned,  shows  that 
Jüngel’s claim that this constitutes the first appearance of Barth’s theological criticism of religion 
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 Jüngel, Karl Barth, 90.  
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of the kingdom.
36 This distinction between the  kingdom of God and socialism 
constitutes a revision of the position expressed in December 1911 when Barth was 
able to affirm that 
Jesus is the movement for social justice, and the movement for social justice 
is Jesus in the present.…I really believe that the social justice movement…is 
not only the greatest and most urgent word of God to the present, but also in 
particular a quite direct continuation of the spiritual power which, as I said, 
entered into history and life with Jesus.
37
 
It is precisely the continuity between God and humanity implied in this assertion 
that Barth now wishes to oppose.
38 The reasons for Barth’s change of perspective 
lie close to hand. Not only did the support of his theological teachers for the war 
policies  of Wilhelm II  convince  him  of  the  inadequacy  of  their  theology  and 
ethics, but he was also disappointed, indeed ‘completely flabbergasted’ with the 
capitulation of the socialist movement in the face of the ideology of war: ‘From 
Sie Müssen we had more or less definitely expected that socialism would prove to 
be a kind of hammer of God, yet all along the national war fronts we saw it 
swinging into line.’
39 
Neither the failure of socialism, however, nor the impossibility of its identification 
with the kingdom of God, rendered it irrelevant to the progress of God’s kingdom. 
Rather, socialism remained a sign that God was still very much at work in the 
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 Jüngel, Karl Barth, 90. 
37
 Barth, “Jesus Christ and the Movement for Social Justice,” 19-20. 
38 Barth’s thought in 1911 maintained a Herrmannian orbit as the citation indicates. At that time 
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world; indeed, more so here than in the field of religion.
40 According to Jüngel, 
Barth’s ethical concern at this juncture is evident. While according equal status to 
both  religion  and  socialism  as  reflections  of  God’s  kingdom,  he  nevertheless 
assigns a certain preference to socialism. The great fault of religion is its political 
indifference, its failure to strive toward the kind of earth-shaking praxis in which 
human work corresponds to God’s work. Because socialism strives for this, at 
least in principle, it corresponds more closely to the kingdom and thus is preferred 
to religion. The fact that socialism was often hostile toward Christianity did not 
bother Barth:  he considers it safer and better to stand with God alongside the 
godless rather than to stand against them without God.
41 
Jüngel notes that in this lecture Barth is seeking a ‘worldly praxis,’ indeed an 
‘earth-shaking’ praxis. It is not sufficient to simply enter into discourse about God 
as  religion  is  wont  to  do.  Discourse  about  God  must  be  accompanied  by  an 
engagement in the worldly affairs of the common life if it is to be a genuine sign 
of the work and the rule of God’s kingdom.  
Barth’s  criticism  is  directed  against  forms  of  Christianity  which  conduct 
themselves in isolation to the realities of social existence. It is likely that Barth 
has  both  liberal  and  conservative  forms  of  Christianity  in  view  with  these 
criticisms. With regard to the former, Barth plainly rejects Harnack’s insistence 
that the gospel is above all questions of mundane development, concerned not 
with material things but with the souls of humanity. Commenting on Jesus’ words, 
‘My kingdom is not of this world,’ Harnack insists that ‘it is no earthly kingdom 
that  the  Gospel  establishes.  These  words…forbid  all  direct  and  formal 
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interference of religion in worldly affairs.’
42 With regard to the latter, Barth also 
rejects the kind of religion envisaged purely as a private or inward matter, and 
concerned with individualised experience, salvation and blessedness.
43  
For Barth, praxis is human work which corresponds in some measure to God’s 
work. In  his  lecture  Barth  speaks  of  religion  and socialism  as  symptoms  and 
indications (Anzeichen) of the  kingdom. Neither, as we have seen, may claim 
identity with the kingdom, but rather both function as witnesses to the kingdom. 
To the extent, therefore, that religion—whether liberal or conservative—fails in 
its  responsibility  to  bear witness to God’s  activity  in  the  world  its  witness  is 
compromised. 
It would appear, then, that in this lecture Barth marginalises the church. He looks 
for the work of God outside and beyond religion, and thus, by way of metonymy, 
outside and beyond the church. Again, however, this is not to suggest that the 
failure of the church renders it irrelevant to the progress of God’s kingdom, or that 
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for Barth, its marginalisation is absolute. Indeed, Barth commences the lecture 
with a joyful avowal: ‘I am glad to be a pastor.’ Barth’s sense of joy is derived 
from the ‘great cause’ he served, a cause which also allowed him to become a 
socialist, precisely because he saw that the kingdom of God was reflected in the 
world apart from religion.
44 
It seems likely, however, that Barth’s marginalising of the church was a deliberate 
rhetorical ploy employed in view of the audience he was addressing. In a letter to 
Thurneysen dated December 7, 1914, Barth writes that 
[o]ur difficulty in addressing the Social Democrats became clear to me once 
more:  either  one  strengthens  them  in  their  party  loyalty  by  providing  a 
religious  foundation  and  all  manner  of  Christian  aims  for  their  political 
ethos—or one tries to lead them out beyond themselves and thereby, as I had 
the impression yesterday, one lays upon them a burden which is too heavy 
for many of them to bear. In spite of everything, the latter is the right thing 
to do if one is  going  to give such  lectures at  all. Indeed  I  hold it  to be 
certainly the right one if the question is asked.
45
 
It is clear in this statement that Barth’s intent in providing lectures for socialists 
was to lead them beyond the pale of materialistic socialism into a broader reality 
in which their praxis was linked with the movement of God in history. Jüngel 
cites an unpublished sketch dated August 12, 1915, in which Barth argues that if 
socialism is to have a future, it must recognise the category of ‘spirit’ and recover 
its essence, which is the quest for justice for all people. Further, says Barth, it 
must not draw its strength from the struggle for political and economic power, but 
from an entirely different source.
46 In this paper Barth, unfortunately, does not 
specify what this source is. Nonetheless, the attitude reflected in the letter cited 
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above indicates that he is thinking of the way of ‘Jesus and his disciples.’ Thus, 
although Barth appears to marginalise the church in this lecture, it is likely that he 
seeks to lead his socialist listeners into a relation of faith in God without the loss 
their distinctive praxis. 
Nonetheless, a certain tension is apparent in Barth’s ecclesial thought at this point. 
On the one hand, Barth views religion in terms of Schleiermacher’s Gefühl, as 
bound to the human world, as a human response to God in the realm of piety 
rather than concrete praxis in service of the coming kingdom.
47 It is precisely this 
privatised form of piety which led the church to its inferior form of praxis. On the 
other hand, this is not the way things should be, and Barth reacts against this form 
of piety and praxis. It is  not that the  concept of religion (and thus church) is 
inherently wrong, but that the form of praxis is inadequate. Barth is convinced 
that  faithfulness  to  God  must  include  that  kind  of  ‘earth-shaking  praxis’  that 
corresponds to God’s own work. Thus, in a letter to Thurneysen  he  gives  his 
reason for joining the Social Democratic Party: 
Just because I set such emphasis Sunday by Sunday upon the last things, it 
was no longer possible for me personally to remain suspended in the clouds 
above the present evil world but rather it had to be demonstrated here and 
now that faith in the Greatest does not exclude but rather includes within it 
work and suffering in the realm of the imperfect…And I myself hope now to 
avoid becoming unfaithful to our ‘essential’ orientation as might very well 
have happened to me had I taken this step two years ago.
48
 
This  statement  indicates  that  Barth’s  political  engagements  issued  from  his 
conviction that faithfulness to God and correspondence to the movement of God 
in  history  demanded  such  engagement.  Precisely  because  of  his  pastoral  role 
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Barth felt constrained to model for his parishioners the unity of faith and praxis. 
The  statement  also  indicates  the  primacy  of  theology  over  politics  in  Barth’s 
thought—a disputed point in contemporary Barth studies.
49 Jüngel, for example, 
insists that ‘for Barth, the political is surely a predicate of theology, but theology 
is never a predicate of the political.’
50 Gorringe, however, protests that Jüngel 
inverts this formula too easily:  ‘It is true to say that Barth’s theology was never a 
predicate of his politics, but also true that politics is never simply a predicate of 
his theology. Either extreme misses the dialectical unity of theory and praxis at 
the heart of Barth’s whole theology.’
51  
That this dialectical unity of theory and praxis was a feature of Barth’s theology 
since his break with liberalism is affirmed by Thurneysen. In his introduction to a 
collection of early correspondence between himself and Barth, Thurneysen insists 
that  from  the  beginning  Barth’s  theology  was  directed  towards  the  life  of 
humanity understood 
in  distinction  from  and  in  antithesis  to  all  merely  pietistic  devotional 
thinking, not just the inner life but the inner life as the interior of an outer 
life, in short, man in the wholeness of his existence, man as he exists ever in 
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a certain given time and world.…Understood in this way, Karl Barth’s word 
from the beginning was a ‘political word.’
52
 
Into the Church 
Before bringing discussion of Barth’s relationship to socialism to a close it will be 
instructive in terms of this thesis briefly to examine Barth’s relationship with two 
primary leaders of Swiss Religious Socialism in this period: Herrmann Kutter and 
Leonhard Ragaz.
53 Although both theologians had had a formative influence on 
Barth since his earliest student years, and represented two options or directions 
that the Swiss Religious Socialist might take, Barth found it necessary  in this 
period to move beyond them. Of the two leaders Ragaz was the more militant, a 
committed political activist and a passionate critic of religion. In his estimation, 
Christ  did  not  want ‘a  religion, but  rather  a  kingdom,  a new  creation, a  new 
world.’
54 In contrast, Kutter was a more reflective personality, inclined to think in 
more explicitly theological or philosophical categories, more disposed towards 
spiritual formation, and to work primarily with pastors and ‘circles of friendship’ 
within the churches, while ‘waiting’ for the kingdom of God. During this period 
Barth began to wrestle with the relation between the church and socialism in an 
attempt to find a mediating position which affirmed and transcended the positions 
of both men. In a letter to Thurneysen he wrote, ‘Isn’t it better to strive for the 
point where Kutter’s “no” and Ragaz’s “yes,” Kutter’s radical tranquillity and 
Ragaz’s  energetic  tackling  of  problems…come  together?  I  believe  in  the 
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possibility  of  such  a  position,  even  if  I  cannot  describe  it  at  the  moment.’
55 
According to Busch, however, Barth’s struggle at this time led him to the very 
‘fringe  of  the  church,’  where  at  times  he  found  the  pastoral  role  ‘extremely 
questionable.’
56 
In an important letter to Thurneysen in September 1915, however, Barth outlines 
several differences between the two socialists which he had heard in a lecture by 
Zürich pastor and socialist leader Hans Bader. While especially appreciative of 
Ragaz’ concern to ‘put principles into practice,’ Barth feels ‘forced’ to express a 
preference for Kutter’s position. Especially significant is Bader’s conclusion to 
the discussion, with which Barth  appears to agree: ‘Conclusion: the religious-
socialist  “concern”  (Sache)  is  finished,  the  taking  of  God  in  earnest  is  at  its 
beginning.’
57 Barth continues the letter by expressing a desire to implement a plan 
suggested by Bader: that local pastors meet fortnightly to spend a morning  in 
Bible reading together.
58  
The  significance  of  this  correspondence  is  twofold.  First,  the  supplanting  of 
Religious-Socialism  by  God  as  die  Sache  (object,  subject  matter)  of  thought 
indicates that there could no longer be any identification or equality between these 
two  realities. Second, the correspondence shows Barth beginning  to decide  in 
favour of the church in his struggle to define the relationship between church and 
socialism.  This  provides  further  evidence  for  my  suggestion  that  Barth’s 
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marginalising of the church in “Religion and Socialism” is a rhetorical rather than 
substantive move. 
In 1932 Barth would reflect on these times and his eventual ‘falling out’ with 
Ragaz: 
If  we  grant  that  there  is  truth in  it,  that  the  modern  world, and perhaps 
Socialism in particular, has something decisive to say to the  church…the 
only result of the encounter must be that the Church, recognizing God’s 
voice in this alien voice from without, lets itself be called to itself thereby, 
lets itself be reminded of the burden of its particular ministry with all its 
promise.…Of Ragaz one may say…that he has never wrestled carefully or 
profoundly enough with the attempt to take seriously the Church’s encounter 
with Socialism along these lines.
 59 
Barth himself began to wrestle along these lines as early as 1911. In his lecture on 
“Jesus Christ and the Movement for Social Justice” Barth plainly declared that 
social democracy calls to and preaches to the church: 
Regarding the goal, social democracy is one with Jesus. It has taken up the 
conviction that social misery ought not to be with a vigor which has not been 
seen  since  the  time  of  Jesus.  It  calls  us  back  from  the  hypocritical  and 
slothful  veneration  of  the  Spirit  and  from  that  useless Christianity  which 
intends to come only “in heaven.” It tells us that we should really believe 
what we pray every day: “Thy Kingdom come!” With its “materialism” it 
preaches to us a word which stems not from Jesus himself, yet certainly from 
his  Spirit.  The  word  goes  like  this:  “The  end  of  the  way  of  God  is  the 
affirmation of the body.”
60 
Although  Barth  evidently  experienced  a  sometimes  quite  profound  degree  of 
ambivalence with regard to the church between 1911 and 1915, it seems likely 
that  by  this  time  he  was  becoming  more  settled on  the  notion  that  socialism 
functioned as a prophetic voice calling the church to the integrity of its own being 
and  mission.
61  By  the  end  of  1916  Ragaz  and  Barth  had  all  but  ceased  any 
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interaction. Barth remembers that ‘Ragaz and I roared past one another like two 
express trains: he went out of the church, I went in.’
62 This significant statement, 
together with Barth’s comments in 1932, indicate the importance of the church as 
a motive in his theological development. Thus, as the reality of God continued to 
break in upon Barth, it appears that a corresponding awareness of the special role 
of the church also developed, even though it remained a thoroughly human and 
imperfect witness to the reality of God and his kingdom, especially, it seems, in 
the weakness of its praxis.  
In  sum:  it  is  clear  that  in  his  engagements  with  socialism  and  in  his  lecture 
“Religion  and  Socialism,”  Barth  wanted  to  affirm  the  distinctive  praxis  of 
socialism as a form of praxis which accurately reflected the coming kingdom of 
God. He sought further, to bring the socialists to a conscious awareness of the 
connections  between  their  political  commitments  and  activities,  and  the 
movement of God’s kingdom in the world. In terms of this present thesis, Barth’s 
criticism  that  the  church was politically  indifferent,  that  it  lacked  the  kind of 
precise, earth-shaking praxis in which human work corresponds to God’s work, 
served not to dismiss the relevance of the church but to suggest that the praxis of 
the  church  itself  needed  to  be  reformulated  to  include  this  social  and  ethical 
dimension. Henceforth, this would be of a piece with Barth’s theological project. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
See Mark R. Lindsay, Covenanted Solidarity: The Theological Basis of Karl Barth’s Opposition to 
Nazi Antisemitism and the Holocaust (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 87-88. 
62 Cited in Busch, Karl Barth, 92.  
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“The Righteousness of God” 
Barth never published “Religion and Socialism.” The first publication reflecting 
his break with the prevailing theology was a sermon given just one month later 
entitled “The Righteousness of God.” In 1924 Barth chose this address to stand at 
the  head  of  his  first  collection  of  early  essays  and  addresses,  in  spite  of  the 
qualifications  he  then  made  regarding  it.
63  This  suggests,  perhaps,  the 
programmatic nature of this paper in his development. 
The Voice of Conscience and the Hearing of Faith 
Barth’s sermon progresses in three distinct movements. In the first, Barth asserts 
that the cry of human longing is answered by the trumpet blast of conscience. This 
longing arises from the oppression and suffering experienced in the world at the 
hands of a perverted and evil human will. In the blare of conscience the person is 
confronted by a will which is wholly other and which announces ‘the deepest, 
innermost, surest fact of life: God is righteous. Our only question is what attitude 
toward the fact we ought to take.’
64 The righteousness of God is the will of God, a 
will which 
is  above  this  warped  and  weakened  will  of  yours  and  mine,  above  this 
absurd and senseless will of the world, another which is straight and pure, 
and which, when it once prevails, must have other, wholly other, issues than 
these we see today. Out of this will, when it is recognised, another life must 
grow. Out of this will, when it emerges, a new world will arise. Our home is 
where this will prevails.
65
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It is immediately apparent that Barth’s sermon is not simply a meditation on an 
abstract notion of the divine will as opposed to the human will, but is oriented to 
the form of life which arises out of each of the ‘wills.’
66 Whereas the absurd and 
senseless will of the world results in oppression and suffering, God’s will heard 
and recognised will result in ‘another life,’ and the arising of ‘a new world.’ For 
this to occur, declares Barth, ‘we must let conscience speak for.…[I]t remains 
forever  the  place,  the  only  place  between  heaven  and  earth,  in  which  God’s 
righteousness is manifest.’
67 
Yet this is exactly what humanity fails to do. The theme of the second movement 
of Barth’s sermon is that although we are aroused by conscience, we fail to heed 
its message, we fail to allow conscience to ‘speak to the end.’
68 Rather, we make 
haste to establish our own righteousness in order to soothe and bring to silence the 
blare of conscience which confronts us and interrupts our whole existence. For 
Barth, this is 
the  most  fundamental  error  of  mankind.…We  arrogate  to  ourselves, 
unquestioningly, the right to take up the tumultuous question, What shall we 
do? as if that were in any case the first and most pressing problem.…And 
before we know it, the trumpet blast of conscience has lost its disturbing 
tone.…The righteousness of God itself has slowly changed from being the 
surest of facts into being the highest among various high ideals, and is now 
at all events our very own affair.
69
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Barth’s  protest  here  is  clearly  against  the  reductionist  ethical  idealism  of 
contemporary liberalism which posited God as the source of a humanly-derived 
moral imperative. Spencer rightly suggests that if we miss this aspect of Barth’s 
argument we miss the thrust of his whole ethical-theological enterprise.
70 In their 
haste to establish their own righteousness humans arrogate to themselves what is 
essentially, a divine task. God alone is righteous, and he alone can make humanity 
righteous. 
Humanity seeks to establish its own righteousness through a variety of vehicles: 
morality, state and culture, and above all, religion. The fault of these vehicles, 
however,  is  that  they  are  bound  to  the  world  of  the  human  will  and  human 
righteousness,  and  thus  are  actually  and  ultimately  oppression  and 
unrighteousness. Barth asks, ‘Is it not remarkable that the greatest atrocities of 
life—I think of the capitalistic order and of the war—can justify themselves on 
purely  moral principles?’
71 That  humans  would  attempt to  establish  their  own 
righteousness is indicative of their pride, and equally, of their despair in the face 
of the voice of conscience. 
In the third movement of the sermon, Barth labels the human realities of morality, 
culture and religion ‘towers of Babel’ and the ‘God’ to whom these towers are 
built, an ‘idol’ of our own making. ‘It becomes evident that we are looking for a 
righteousness without God, that we are looking, in truth, for a god without God 
and against God.…It is clear that such a god is not God.’
72 Barth insists that we 
only encounter the true and living God when we are brought to silence and listen 
to conscience. Such listening requires the lowliness of faith in the place of pride 
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and despair, a faith characterised by humility and joyful hope. In the quietness of 
faith we let God speak within—‘And then God works in us. Then begins in us, as 
from a seed, but an unfailing seed, the new basic something which overcomes 
unrighteousness.…[T]here is born a new spirit out of which grows a new world, 
the world of the righteousness of God.’
73 For Barth, this ‘inner way, the way of 
simple faith, is the way of Christ.…[T]his childlike and inadequate solution is the 
beginning of the vast plan of God.’
74 
In a marvellous rhetorical twist Barth sets his ‘childlike and inadequate solution’ 
over against the entirety of the Protestant ethical-idealist tradition deriving from 
Kant. The ‘beginning of the vast plan of God’ is not discovered in a rationally 
grounded moral imperative, but in the simplicity and humility of the hearing of 
faith. Barth resolutely insists that true righteousness does not begin with human 
action or doing, but with hearing.
75 It would be erroneous, however, to understand 
Barth’s rhetoric as reducing the human agent to an essential passivity. Certainly 
Barth’s construal portrays the emergence of the new world of God’s righteousness 
in terms which prioritise the divine action. Divine priority does not annihilate 
human agency, however, but rather indicates that human agency is derivative, that 
human work and activity can be righteous only as it follows the divine. 
For Barth, therefore, the first ethical duty is to listen to that which conscience 
speaks: 
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When we let conscience speak to the end, it tells us not only that there is 
something else, a righteousness above unrighteousness, but also—and more 
important—that this something else for which we long and which we need is 
God.…We  make  a  veritable  uproar  with  our  morality  and  culture  and 
religion.  But  we  may  presently be brought  to  silence,  and  with that  will 
begin our true redemption.
76
 
Barth is also quite clear that listening entails surrender, a recognition of God’s 
right and his rightness over against us and our wrongness, and a recognition that 
our  wrongness  is  not  simply  something  requiring  adjustment  or  repair,  but 
something far more radical: 
Here one must give himself up in order to give himself over to God that 
God’s will may be done. To do his will, however, means to begin with him 
anew. His will is not a corrected continuation of our own. It approaches ours 
as a Wholly Other. There is nothing for our will except a basic re-creation. 
Not a reformation but a re-creation and re-growth.
77
 
Lights of God in the Darkness 
The quietness of faith referred to by Barth does not imply a quietist ethic. Indeed, 
Christian existence is neither quietist nor activist, but responsive: ‘We ought to 
apply ourselves with all our strength to expect more from God, to let grow within 
us that which he will in fact cause to grow, to accept what indeed he constantly 
offers us, watching and praying that we may respond to his originative touch.’
78 In 
the one who will listen, God is constantly at work, ever anew, ever offering and 
originating new things. Christian existence is existence oriented to the new world 
of the righteousness of God even now at work and breaking into the old world. 
The new world is nothing other than the work of God in and through the people 
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who entrust their all to God in faith, and who wait on him in prayerfulness and 
joyful hope.
79 
Although Barth sets the church alongside morality and culture as belonging and 
bound to this world, his construal of the church is not entirely negative. As a 
human endeavour in pursuit of a good conscience, religion  and church are an 
illusion, an exercise in self-deception, which can never in and of themselves bring 
forth  the  kingdom  of  God.  Thus  Barth  assails  the  church  for  all  its  various 
attempts at righteousness and efforts towards relevance: 
What is the use of all the preaching, baptizing, confirming, bell-ringing, and 
organ-playing, of all the religious moods and modes, the counsels of ‘applied 
religion’…the efforts to enliven church singing, the unspeakably tame and 
stupid  monthly  church  papers,  and  whatever  else  may  belong  to  the 
equipment  of  modern  ecclesiasticism?  Will  something  different  eventuate 
from all this in our relation to the righteousness of God?…Are we not rather 
hoping by our very activity to conceal in the most subtle way the fact that the 
critical event that ought to happen has not yet done so and probably never 
will?
80
 
The  difference  for  which  Barth  longs  is,  of  course,  neither  an  increase  in 
religiosity,  nor  yet  cleverly  devised  programmes  by  which  the  relevance  of 
Christianity is set forth, but rather the birthing of a new world through the Spirit. 
It must be seen, however, that Barth’s criticism is not directed against the church 
per se, but against the kind of theological persuasion represented by Harnack, 
against the form of Christianity, whether liberal or conservative, which conducts 
itself in isolation from the realities of social existence: 
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There  seem  to  be  no  surer  means  of  rescuing  us  from  the  alarm  cry  of 
conscience  than  religion  and  Christianity.  Religion  gives  us  the  chance, 
beside and above the vexations of business, politics, and private and social 
life, to celebrate solemn hours of devotion—to take flight to Christianity as 
to an eternally green island in the gray sea of the everyday. There comes 
over us a wonderful sense of safety and security from the unrighteousness 
whose  might  we  everywhere  feel.  It  is  a  wonderful  illusion,  if  we  can 
comfort ourselves with it, that in our Europe—in the midst of capitalism, 
prostitution, the housing problem, alcoholism, tax evasion and militarism—
the church’s preaching, the church’s morality, and the ‘religious life’ go their 
uninterrupted  way.…A  wonderful  illusion,  but  an  illusion,  a  self-
deception!
81
 
It  is  seen  here  that  Barth  rejects  in  the  most  vigorous  terms  any  form  of 
Christianity which would isolate itself from the wider social context in which it is 
found.  Privatised  religion  is  escapist  and  self-indulgent  in  its  orientation,  and 
actually  suppresses  the  righteousness  of  God  which  confronts  humanity  in 
conscience. The true church, and therefore, true Christianity, is that which arises 
when the voice of conscience is allowed to speak, where God then ‘plants’ a new 
seed within the human person, and so occurs a new spirit and a new beginning, 
out of which is to grow a new world. This new world, however, is not that of the 
eschaton, but grows 
in the midst of the old world of war and money and death.…Lights of God 
rise in the darkness, and powers of God become real in weakness. Real love, 
real sincerity, real progress become possible; morality and culture, state and 
nation, even religion and the church now become possible—now for the first 
time! One is taken with the vision of an immortality or even of a future life 
here on earth in which the righteous will of God breaks forth, prevails, and is 
done as it is in heaven.
82
 
This  sermon,  then,  which  Barth  placed  at the  head of this  early collection  of 
addresses, clearly indicates the ecclesio-ethical orientation of his thought in this 
period. In it Barth betrays a clear concern for social issues. He speaks of ‘the 
fiendishness  of  business  competition and  the  world  war…antagonism  between 
                                                
81
 Barth, “The Righteousness of God,” 19-20. 
82
 Barth, “The Righteousness of God,” 25-26, emphasis added.  
 
  84 
classes and moral depravity within them, economic tyranny above and the slave 
spirit  below.’
83  He  decries  the  ‘capitalism,  prostitution,  the  housing  problem, 
alcoholism, tax evasion and militarism’ which are rampant in Europe, and scorns 
the so-called cultural ‘God’ who ‘is not even righteous. He cannot prevent his 
worshippers, all the distinguished European and American apostles of civilization, 
welfare, and progress, all zealous citizens and pious Christians, from falling upon 
one  another  with  fire  and  sword  to  the  amazement  and  derision  of  the  poor 
heathen in India and Africa.’
84 
In contrast, the character of the new world envisaged by Barth, and therefore also 
the content of Christian existence, is that of the will of God—‘purity, goodness, 
truth, and brotherhood.…[A] will with character, a will blessed and holy.’
85 That 
Barth so readily juxtaposes tragic realities of human existence with the will of 
God is suggestive that the church will be a moral community which stands in as 
stark contrast to ‘war and money and death’ as light does to darkness.
86 Barth 
envisages  this  community  as  a  community  of  prayer  and  faith,  joyfully  and 
watchfully gathered and listening to the voice of conscience, and waiting for the 
‘originative touch’ of God to which it might respond. His ecclesio-ethical vision 
is, therefore, neither activist (in the sense that the community is self-determining 
in its ethical activity and posture in the world), nor quietist (in the sense that the 
community is wholly passive as it awaits the divine establishment of the righteous 
Kingdom),  but  rather  responsive.  In  his  sermon  Barth  addresses  the  church, 
calling it to begin with God anew, to listen to the voice of conscience to the end, 
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and implicitly, to order its existence in accordance with the righteous will of God 
as it is made known in the voice of conscience. In this construal the community—
as a moral community—is active and energetic, but its activity is subordinate to 
and follows the prior activity of God. Barth’s hope is that the church will in reality 
experience a new beginning, the breaking forth of the new world in its midst. 
“Action in Waiting” 
The Influence of Blumhardt 
In  September 1916 Barth published  an  article  entitled  “Auf das  Reich Gottes 
warten,”
87  a  review  of  a  book  of  devotions  recently  published  by  Christoph 
Blumhardt. It had originally been intended for inclusion in Ragaz’ Neue Wege, but 
the latter had rejected it because of its ‘quietist’ emphasis.
88 Although only a short 
work, the review provides interesting and significant insight into Barth’s early 
development generally, including his vision of ecclesial and Christian existence. 
In addition to being a short work, the review consists largely of citations (almost 
60%) drawn  from  Blumhardt’s devotional.  An  important  methodological  point 
arises  here.  Barth’s  unambiguous  affirmation  of  Blumhardt’s  message  in  this 
article indicates his broad concurrence with the latter’s vision of Christian and 
ecclesial existence. I assume, therefore, that Barth’s selection of passages from 
Blumhardt’s  book  reflect  issues  which  Barth  himself  found  interesting  and 
penetrating.  
                                                
87 In Der Freie Schweizer Arbeiter, 15th and 22nd September, 1916. The translation used here is 
from Karl Barth, “Action in Waiting for the Kingdom of God,” in Action in Waiting, ed. Society of 
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  86 
The  importance  of  the  Blumhardts’  influence  on  Barth  should  not  be 
underestimated.
89 Indeed, Timothy  Gorringe  has  gone so far as to suggest that 
Christoph  Blumhardt  was  Barth’s  single  most  important  theological  teacher 
despite  the  fact  that  he  was  not  a  theologian!
90  Throughout  his  career  Barth 
continued to refer to the Blumhardts, including an important discussion of their 
influence in his final lectures on dogmatics where he declares that his theological 
understanding of the Kingdom of God ‘could not have been stated and developed 
as  it  has  without  the  impulse  they  gave  and  their  influence  through  other 
mediations and modifications.’
91 
Although Barth had visited Christoph Blumhardt on several occasions during his 
student  years, he was at that time dismissive of him on account of his pietist 
reputation.
92  In  April  1915,  however,  Barth  and  Thurneysen  spent  five  days 
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visiting Blumhardt, during which  it seems  likely  that  Barth began making the 
intellectual connections which led to his decisive break with liberalism.
93 Upon his 
return from Bad Boll Barth read Zündel’s biography of the elder Blumhardt and 
found himself stirred by what he read.
94 What Barth discovered in Bad Boll not 
only shaped his immediate theological reflections, but remained with him, at least 
in part, for the entirety of his life. 
Barth’s review of Blumhardt’s Hausandachten is perhaps better understood as an 
introduction. He provides not so much an analysis, or even a summary, of its 
contents and ideas, as a selection of passages gathered around what he regards as 
Blumhardt’s major themes. In fact, his initial description of the book is almost 
damning: 
Blumhardt puts forward no guiding principles. He produces no historical and 
psychological deductions. He neither reasons nor discusses; he talks neither 
politics  nor  philosophy.  There  is  no  probing  into  problems,  or  drawing 
conclusions, or building systems. He remains silent in the face of our urgent 
questions.…[H]e  passes  by  the  dogmatic  and  the  liberal,  the  ‘religious-
ethical’ and us socialist theologians. He refutes nobody, and nobody needs 
to feel refuted by him, but he does not concur with anybody else’s views 
either. He pins down neither himself nor anyone else with precise formulas. 
He has written a very inconsistent, indifferent book.
95 
In spite of all this, however, Barth calls it an ‘important and beautiful book,’ and 
says of it, ‘for me it is the most direct and penetrating Word from God into the 
need  of  the  world that  the  war  years  have  produced so far.’
96 Barth  found  in 
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Blumhardt one who could do what most others could not: ‘represent God’s cause 
in the world yet not wage war on the world, love the world and yet be completely 
faithful to God.’
97 
For Barth, one outstanding thing about the book was the fact that Blumhardt did 
not address himself to the situation confronting Germany and Europe at that time. 
The reason for his silence was not that he had nothing to say to the situation, but 
that  it  is  not  important  enough  for  him  to  say  it—other  things  were  more 
important!  According  to  Barth,  ‘he  evidently  expects  the  answer  on  different 
ground, and he is actively preparing that ground.’
98 What Blumhardt does do, and 
what Barth finds so powerful, is that ‘he lets us experience the echo which the 
Bible texts of the Moravian Brothers aroused within him from day to day. He does 
not want to say anything brilliant, let off any fireworks, or strike any blow: he 
simply tells us the divine truth in the world as it meets him.’
99 In a telling passage 
which  indicates  powerfully  his  growing  disenchantment  with  socialism,  Barth 
confesses  that  one  reason  for  his  appreciation  of  Blumhardt’s  book  ‘is  the 
conviction that our cause, our hope, is at the moment served better with prayers 
than with treatises. Our dialectics have come to a dead end, and if we want to 
become healthy and strong, we have to start from the beginning and become like 
children.’
100 
What, then, is this beginning? A close reading of this article shows that Barth 
identifies  several  key  features  of  Blumhardt’s  message,  the  first  and  most 
important of which is Blumhardt’s insistence to ‘always begin right away with 
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God’s presence, might and purpose: he starts out from God.’
101 For Blumhardt, the 
whole  of  existence  occurs  within  the  great  circle  of  divine  sovereignty.  This 
sovereignty is not understood as raw power, however, because God is gracious, 
‘always the life-bringing, wonderful God who touches us also so that we have 
hope for our own life.’
102 The same divine glory which orders the movement of the 
cosmos  is  also  palpably  near.  Second,  Blumhardt’s  thought  occurs  within  a 
thoroughly eschatological context. God’s sovereignty  is moving the world and 
history towards the goal of his purpose, which is the kingdom of God on earth.
103 
What presently hinders this movement is the human will which resists God’s will, 
and  which  is  itself  influenced by  forces  hostile  to  both God  and  humanity.
104 
Nevertheless, God has promised a restoration of justice and peace and will bring it 
to pass; ultimately, all resistance will be overcome. The consummation of this 
promise, however, is something that can only be achieved by God, although, as 
we shall see, humans may work with God, helping the coming of the Kingdom. 
The third feature Barth identifies as the key to all. He states that ‘here lies the key 
to everything—with Jesus the good actually began already, the good to which 
mankind and nature alike are called, which towers right into our own time also 
and goes forward toward a revelation and a consummation.’ In words which could 
apply to  his own project  in later  years, Barth continues, ‘Blumhardt takes  his 
bearings  untiringly  from  this  point  again  and  again,  using  it  as  his  point  of 
departure in ever new ways.’
105 For Blumhardt, the coming of Jesus introduced a 
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change into history, a movement of his presence and reign which will not cease 
until all is fulfilled.
106 
Barth  introduces  the  fourth  feature  by  asking  how  this  is  to  become  reality. 
Blumhardt’s  answer  is  that  ‘the  consummation  is  being  prepared  in  a  double 
movement in heaven and on earth,’ although the ‘actual decision lies not in the 
visible but in the invisible world.’
107 The actual fulfilment of the divine purpose 
can  belong  only  to  God.  His  people,  however,  may  pray,  and  in  praying 
participate in the new creation. According to Barth, with Blumhardt’s emphasis 
on prayer ‘we  are  face to face with the innermost of his thought…this living 
waiting on God for the world…constitutes the nerve center of this book.’
108 The 
intercessory nature of this ‘waiting’ leads directly to the fifth and final feature 
highlighted by Barth in this introduction, which concerns the concept of God’s 
‘little flock.’
109 Because of the specific relevance of this feature for my thesis I 
will  devote  a  little  more  space  to  outlining  aspects  of  Blumhardt’s  thought 
regarding this matter. 
The Living Church 
At the outset it is essential to recognise that for Blumhardt, the ‘little flock,’ the 
chosen people of God, is not a reference to the institutional church, or even to the 
revivalist fellowships and sects, but rather refers to those few who ‘wait’ for the 
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Lord Jesus. For Blumhardt, the kingdom of God functions to relativise the church 
and all the ‘traditional ways of Christianity.’ ‘The year of the churches is past!’ he 
used to say.
110 His own relation to the churches was characterised by tension, both 
on account of the extraordinary nature of his experiences, and especially by his 
commitment to the social movement, which he regarded as a sign of the kingdom, 
and a prophetic voice in the world and to the church.
111 When, in 1899, Blumhardt 
gave  public  support  to  the  Democratic  Socialists,  he  was  banished  by  large 
numbers of former supporters and required by the Royal Consistory to renounce 
the rank and title of pastor of the Church of Württemberg.
112 Blumhardt, then, 
expected little from the organised church. Neither church nor social democracy 
would be responsible for establishing the kingdom of God because both shared 
‘the doubtful nature inherent in all human undertakings and movements.’
113 
In place of the institutional church Blumhardt longed for the arising of a living 
church, a ‘community (Gemeinde) upon earth, a society of men in which peace 
and joy will reign…a community of men, a society in which people strengthen 
each other’ toward the goal of God’s kingdom on earth.
114 For Blumhardt, the 
kingdom  of  God  must  be  foreshadowed  in  a  human  society.  It  is  as  this 
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community lives in accordance with its belief that the kingdom of God is truly 
present in the world, albeit only in a proleptic sense:
115 
God always  wants to  have a place, a  community,  which belongs to Him 
really and truly, so that God’s being can dwell there. God needs such a place 
from where He can work for the rest of the world. There must be a place on 
the earth from where the sun of God’s kingdom shines forth.
116 
How is such a community to arise? In a sermon on Matthew 16:13-19 Blumhardt 
grounds  the  existence  of  the  living  community  in  the  event  of  revelation, 
specifically the recognition of Jesus as Christ, as divine representative, and thus, 
in the fullness of his humanity, as true humanity. As the light of the living God 
dawns in the life of a person they are bound to Jesus Christ, and so the church of 
God arises.
117 
The character of the Gemeinde is the character of the kingdom of God, which 
comes  not  in  destructive or punitive  judgement as though  God’s  intent  is the 
damnation  of  the  world and  humanity, but in  the  ‘unutterable  compassion’ of 
God’s triumphant grace revealed in the saving events of the gospel.
118 As Jesus 
entered into solidarity with the most wretched, so too those bound to him will 
hunger,  not  only  for  personal  grace  but  for  justice  and  equity  in  all  human 
affairs.
119 Blumhardt insists that Jesus is not to be worshipped ‘all by himself in 
his elevation’ but in the conspicuous company he himself adopted: 
Jesus sets his hopes on the poor, on the outcasts, on those who are rejected 
by kings and emperors.…Do we want to follow Jesus on this way? Then we 
must accept him in this company. Then the call comes to us to set to work 
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wholeheartedly, for here is Jesus.…Here must be your whole heart; here you 
must do the deeds of faith; for it is from here that the power comes which 
will overthrow the world.
120 
Blumhardt’s eschatological orientation to the kingdom of God establishes perhaps 
the most distinctive aspect of his ecclesial vision: the freedom and independence 
of the Christian community. Because the community is wholly oriented towards 
God and his action it is freed from all lesser worldly allegiances. Being bound to 
the lordship of Christ means it is no longer chained to the world. This is not to 
result, however, in pietistic sectarianism. Blumhardt rejects all forms of privatised 
piety: 
Neither in heaven nor on earth is it possible just to settle down comfortably 
in something through grace and do nothing and care for nobody else. If I am 
saved by grace, then I am a worker through grace. If I am justified by grace, 
then through grace I am a worker for justice. If through grace I am placed 
within the truth, then through grace I am a servant of truth. If through grace I 
have been placed within peace, then through grace I am a servant of peace 
for all men.
121 
So too Blumhardt resists the temptation towards monasticism. The community 
represents the kingdom of God in the world, and cannot cut itself off from it, 
adopting  a  posture  which  is  fundamentally  aloof  to  the  wider  affairs  of  the 
common life.
122 Rather ‘the church of Jesus Christ is to be the light of creation, of 
the  existing  world.…Jesus  is  truly  Lord  over  the  whole  creation,  and  God’s 
kingdom penetrates all that is created. His church is to have the width and breadth 
of Jesus, of God, of all creation.’
123 So too it must also become a community of 
virtue,  ‘of  sterling  quality  in  every  aspect,  not  only  communal  but  also 
truthful.…In the society of Jesus Christ it is a matter of virtues, God’s virtues, not 
                                                
120 Lejeune, Christoph Blumhardt, 192, 190. 
121 Blumhardt, “Joy in the Lord,” 66. 
122 Lejeune, Christoph Blumhardt, 163. 
123 Lejeune, Christoph Blumhardt, 163.  
 
  94 
human  ones.  Not  customs,  not people’s  views,  not  what  a  nation  happens  to 
believe is right.’
124 
Prophetic Existence 
It is evident from this overview how similar Barth’s thought in this period is to 
that of Blumhardt. We have already noted in the previous sections of this chapter 
a number of aspects in Barth’s ecclesial vision which echo emphases found in 
Blumhardt. Barth, like Blumhardt, views socialism as a sign of the kingdom of 
God, but looks to God for the ultimate establishing of the kingdom. He is critical 
of the church as a religious institution and seeks its renewal and re-establishing on 
a new basis in God. For both men a praxis that conforms to the kingdom of God 
revealed in Christ is a crucial element of the church’s true being. In terms of this 
thesis, however, the most pertinent aspects of Barth’s treatment of Blumhardt, are 
Barth’s reference to the Bible, which I have already mentioned, his sense that in 
Blumhardt the kingdom develops ‘organically,’ and his emphasis on ‘waiting,’ 
which echoes and extends his call in the previous sermon to ‘let conscience speak 
to the end.’ Barth was impressed by the ‘organic’ manner in which Blumhardt 
conceives of truth. Blumhardt allows no dualisms to exist in his message, either 
between God and the world, good and evil, or divine action and human action. In 
this context he says of Blumhardt that ‘he sees God creating light out of darkness, 
one taking shape out of the other and growing in the peace of God.’
125 
We have also noted Barth’s comment that ‘this living waiting on God for the 
world…constitutes the nerve center’ of Blumhardt’s book.
126 It is this ‘waiting and 
hastening’  (warten und  eilen)  which  Barth  wants  to  commend  to  his  readers: 
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‘…pleading unceasingly and unwaveringly before God and to God “Thy Kingdom 
come!” and waiting and hastening with men toward this coming. Is that not the 
highest and most promising thing a man can do at this moment?’
127 
It is evident, of course, that for both Barth and Blumhardt this waiting signifies 
not  inactivity,  but  is,  rather,  ‘in  its  essence,  revolutionary.’
128  First,  and  most 
significantly for Barth, waiting means invocation—calling on God.
129 The reason 
we call upon God is simply that the establishing of the kingdom is pre-eminently 
his concern. To cry out to God is to seek the divine establishing of his kingdom in 
the entire world. Prayer that cries for the action of God, however, finds itself 
caught  up  in  a  divine  movement  which  instigates  responsive  human  action. 
Prayer,  then,  is  neither  the  cessation,  nor  the  end  of,  human  action,  but  its 
beginning and proper foundation. Thus Barth says, ‘When we “hasten and wait” 
toward God like this, the consummation is prepared, coming from God himself. 
For Blumhardt, divine and human action are closely interlocked; again not in a 
mechanical but in an organic sense.’
130 Waiting for the kingdom of God, then, 
‘means just the opposite of sitting comfortably and going along with the old order 
of things.’
131 
Second, waiting is revolutionary because it functions to liberate a person from the 
powers of this world, from the trust in its strength and from the fear of its forces. 
In this freedom one is able to recognise God’s will, to take up his task, to do his 
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work, to fight his battle, to take his sacrifice upon himself.
132 Although this notion 
of the freedom and independence of the church will find its sharpest expression as 
a  critical  tool  during  the  Barmen  period,  Barth  is  already  moving  in  this 
direction.
133  Barth’s  emphasis  on  waiting  in  this  article  functions  in  a  similar 
manner  to  the  emphasis  on  conscience  in  “The  Righteousness  of  God.”  Both 
concepts serve to direct the Christian community to God as the primary focus of 
its  activity,  so  that  all  other  activity  in  which  it  engages  may  be  a  faithful 
expression of its own integrity and identity. In this way the church is freed from 
its  debilitating  enculturation  to  become  a  genuinely  prophetic  voice  of  an 
alternative way and an alternative world. This is what lies behind Barth’s approval 
of  Blumhardt’s  seeming  ‘irrelevance,’  and  his  refusal  to  address  the  current 
situation or grant it primary importance.
134 
Barth believes that the people of God are to ‘represent’ God and his goodness in 
this world, sowing justice, and crying out against sin and death, opposing self-
will, greed and all evil.
135 The people of God ‘gather round Christ not for their 
own blessedness but for the redemption of the world, comparable to the servant of 
God in Deutero-Isaiah. They are to represent God’s cause in a special way and in 
doing  this  they  are  encompassed  by  God’s  love  in  a  special  way  too.’
136 
Importantly, this shows that for Barth, Christian life, far from being an idealistic 
or amorphous entity, has a definite shape and tendency. He utilises the image of 
the  Isaianic  Servant  to  indicate  the  ‘special  way’  in  which  the  church  is  to 
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‘represent God’s cause.’ The church’s existence is not for itself, but it is in the 
world for the world. The posture of the church toward the world is that of the 
Servant. It is clear, of course, that redemption and blessing are not bestowed by 
the church, but rather, these gifts come through the church. Barth’s citation of 
Blumhardt  perhaps  indicates  the  role  he  sees  the  church  occupying  in  the 
economy of salvation: 
There needs to be a people of faith on which God can lean, so to speak, and 
to whom He can give the victory. When God can say, ‘These people are my 
children,’  then  comes  the  blessing,  and  the  blessing  comes  all  around  to 
those  who  have  contact  with  the  people  whom  God  has  in  mind.  It  all 
depends on this one thing alone, that the people whom God has chosen can 
remain quite firm.
137 
Finally,  it  is  arguable  that  Barth  sees  Blumhardt  himself  as  an  exemplar  of 
Christian life. The active waiting which is ‘the highest and most promising thing a 
man can do at this moment’ is a ‘living waiting on God for the world.’
138 And this 
last  phrase  is  significant,  of  course.  Christian  life  is  seen  as  an  intercessory 
existence. Barth speaks of Blumhardt as a ‘priestly person,’ one who is able to 
‘suffer with the world’ while speaking frankly to it about its need and redemption; 
able  to  ‘carry  the  world up  to  God  and  bring  God  into  the  world,’  to  be  an 
‘advocate for men before God and a messenger of God bringing peace to men.’
139  
Not only does Blumhardt exhibit the intercessory nature of Christian existence, he 
is also an example of the nature of Christian life as a kind of pilgrim existence. 
Shortly after the death of Blumhardt in 1919, Barth wrote another article which in 
some ways functioned as a eulogy for Blumhardt. In it he writes: 
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Blumhardt’s  secret  was  his  endless  movement  between  hurrying  and 
waiting, between lively participation in the fullness of what is and astonished 
inner  waiting  for  that  which  seeks  to  be  through  the  power  from  on 
high.…The unique element, and I say it quite deliberately, the prophetic, in 
Blumhardt’s message and mission consists in the way in which the hurrying 
and the  waiting, the worldly and the  divine, the present and the  coming, 
again  and again met,  were  united, supplemented one another, sought and 
found one another. It is no wonder that this man made a strange, forbidding, 
baffling impression on so many. He was of necessity a stranger among all 
those  who  were  willing  and  able  to  feel at  home  in present-day society, 
church and world.
140 
In  a  sense,  Christian  and  ecclesial  existence  is  a  prophetic  existence,  the 
experience of being caught between two worlds. One is in the world yet not able 
to feel entirely at home within it because of the impinging reality of the  new 
world  to  come.  Yet  it  is  neither  a  static  nor  a  predictable  existence.  It  is  an 
‘endless  movement’  between  a  series  of  poles,  a  dialectical  existence  which 
embodies the dialectical eschatological reality in which we find ourselves. Those 
who  live  in  accordance  with  this  reality  will  always,  Barth  suggests,  find 
themselves in the minority, necessarily strange and baffling to those around them. 
In  Blumhardt’s bold proclamation  of  Jesus  Christ as  universal Saviour,  in  his 
refusal to accommodate himself to the dictates of the prevailing culture (including 
religious  culture)  and  its  priorities  and  concerns,  in  his  solidarity  with  the 
oppressed masses and his political championing of their cause as a theological 
necessity, and, lastly, in his unwavering hope in the ultimate victory and fullness 
of the kingdom of God Barth saw an expression of the Christian life—not as an 
expression to be slavishly imitated, but as an example of the organic development 
of God’s kingdom in one who would ‘wait.’ 
In sum, Auf das Reich Gottes warten indicates clearly that, in this period at least, 
Barth had a definite vision of Christian and ecclesial existence. His emphasis on 
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waiting and prayer was not a capitulation to a pietistic quietism, but an attempt to 
establish the being and activity of the church on an entirely new foundation. By 
radically orienting the life of the church to its one Lord, Barth sought to enable it 
to  live  faithfully  and  prophetically  in  accordance  with  its  own  integrity  and 
identity as God’s people. Thus the (living) church is envisioned as a prayerful 
community of hope and liberty, actively reflecting the compassion and virtue of 
the  inbreaking  kingdom  in  its  communal  life.  It  is  neither  institutionalised, 
pietistic  nor monastic, but rather thoroughly engaged in works of witness and 
solidarity with the world at large, and especially with the oppressed and suffering. 
The church is against the world in that it refuses to capitulate to the alien lordship 
of worldly demands and priorities, but it is against the world in order that it might 
be more thoroughly and more deeply for the world. The posture of its existence in 
the midst of the world is one of intercession and servanthood, and the timbre of its 
proclamation is not ultimately judgement and rejection, but acceptance, solidarity 
and affirmation. 
Finding the New World 
Encountered by the Reality of God 
At  several  points  in  the  foregoing  sections  we  have  noted  in  passing  Barth’s 
relation to the Bible: in his weekly responsibility to preach the biblical text to his 
parishioners, his positive response to the suggestion made by Zürich pastor Hans 
Bader that local pastors meet regularly for a morning of Bible reading, and in the 
impact Blumhardt’s scriptural devotions made upon him. In early June 1916 Barth 
and Thurneysen had several days holiday together during which they determined  
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‘to go back to academic theology to clarify the situation’
141 and to find a ‘wholly 
other theological foundation’ for their preaching, instruction and pastoral care.
142 
After rejecting both Schleiermacher and Kutter, and canvassing Kant and Hegel, 
the pair found themselves ‘compelled to do something much more obvious. We 
tried  to  learn  our  theological  ABC  all  over  again,  beginning  by  reading  and 
interpreting the writing of the Old and New Testaments, more thoughtfully than 
before. And lo and behold, they began to speak to us.’
143 
It  is  evident  from  his  letters  that  Barth  did  not  cease  his  engagement  with 
academic theology and philosophy. On June 26, 1916 Barth writes with  some 
enthusiasm  of  his  renewed  systematic  engagement  with  Kant,  and  exhorts 
Thurneysen, ‘you must open fire at another point!’
144 This initial enthusiasm is 
short-lived, however, and within a month it is directed to an alternative object: 
Discovery of a gold mine: J. T. Beck!! As a biblical expositor he simply 
towers  far  above  the rest  of  the  company.…I  came  on  the track  of  him 
through my work on Romans…a copy book with ‘comments’ is coming into 
being in which I summarise everything in my own language. Also I give 
some attention to the different dismal Kantian tables, although with less joy 
and profit and more from a feeling of duty.
145 
Barth’s study of Romans with the aid of ‘a stack of commentaries’ apparently 
commenced  the  morning  after  his  early-June  conversation  with  Thurneysen.
146 
Initially Barth made good progress with Romans so that by the end of October he 
had  studied  through  to  the  end  of  chapter  three,  although  by  September  the 
                                                
141  Bernd  Jaspert,  ed.,  Karl  Barth~Rudolph  Bultmann  Letters  1922-1966  (Grand  Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1981), 154-155. 
142 Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 264. Barth recalls that it was Thurneysen who first 
used the phrase ‘wholly other.’ 
143 Barth, The Theology of Schleiermacher, 264.  
144 Smart, ed., Revolutionary Theology, 37-38. 
145 Smart, ed., Revolutionary Theology, 38. The letter is dated July 27, 1916. For comment on 
Beck’s influence on Barth in this period see Busch, Karl Barth and the Pietists, 30-35. See also 
Barth’s later treatment of Beck in Barth, Protestant Theology, 602-610. 
146 Jaspert, ed., Barth~Bultmann, 155.  
 
  101 
following year he was still working on chapter five of the epistle.
147 Nonetheless, 
it was the simple (and ‘more thoughtful’) reading of the Scriptures, and more 
particularly, the discovery that ‘lo and behold, they began to speak to us,’ which 
was ultimately responsible for Barth’s theological ‘conversion.’ In his outstanding 
study of Barth’s hermeneutics in the Römerbrief period, Richard Burnett claims 
that 
Barth did not come to an understanding of theology’s true subject matter as a 
result of abstract thinking or as a consequence of any philosophical inquiry. 
He  did  not  arrive  at  it  by  means  of  Idealism  nor  was  it  the  product  of 
anything he learned from neo-Kantianism. It came from reading the Bible. 
As important as Herrmann, neo-Kantianism, and other influences were in 
providing Barth critical tools to articulate the Sachlichkeit  of the biblical 
Sache,  none  of  these  were  ultimately  decisive.  What  was  decisive  was 
Barth’s discovery that God, that revelation, was the subject matter of the 
Bible.
148 
Barth provided his  first public account of this  decisive discovery  in a sermon 
delivered on February 6, 1917 at a study week in Thurneysen’s Leutwil parish.
149 
Originally Thurneysen, who organised the study week, had asked Emil Brunner to 
deliver  a  message  on  the  topic  “The  New  World  in  the  Bible,”  but  Brunner 
declined the topic on grounds that the theme did not appeal to him. Subsequently 
Barth agreed to deliver the topic for his friend.
150 
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Like the  sermon, “The Righteousness of God,” this sermon also progresses  in 
three movements, and addresses the question ‘What stands in the Bible?’. Barth 
begins by surveying the biblical narrative from the call of Abraham to the final 
cry of John the Divine, and concludes with an answer to his homiletical question: 
within the Bible is a new world, the world of God.
151 This introductory section, 
however, is far more than the fine homiletical rhetoric required to introduce the 
topic. Rather, it also reveals and restates a set of Barth’s presuppositions which 
are emerging in this period, and which were to have fundamental significance for 
the entire shape and direction of his theology, including his vision of Christian 
and ecclesial existence. 
One such presupposition—often overlooked precisely because it is so apparent—
is  Barth’s  discovery  that  the  whole  Bible  bears  a  unified  witness.
152  More 
important than this view about the Bible itself, however, is the question regarding 
what, or more correctly, who the Bible bears witness to. Barth’s answer to this 
question is that the Bible bears witness to God. The identification of God as the 
theme or the content (der Inhalt) of the Bible constitutes a significant aspect of 
Barth’s theological development.
153  In his examination of the early Barth’s view 
of Scripture, Burnett finds that as a young liberal, Barth believed that the Bible 
had primarily to do with religion, piety, and the pious thoughts and experiences of 
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those  who  had  been  filled,  more  or  less,  with  what  he  called  ‘Christian 
certainty’
154 
Barth’s  new  identification,  then,  reflects  already  a  decisive  shift  from  an 
anthropocentric theology. Later in the sermon Barth insists that ‘it is not the right 
human thoughts about God which form the content of the Bible, but the right 
divine  thoughts  about  men.…The  word  of  God  is  within  the  Bible.’
155  In  a 
somewhat autobiographical statement Barth continues with what is his first public 
criticism of Schleiermacher: 
Our grandfathers, after all, were right when they struggled so desperately in 
behalf of the truth that there is revelation in the Bible and not religion only, 
and when they would not allow facts to be turned upside down for them even 
by so pious and intelligent a man as Schleiermacher.
156 
Equally as important as his rejection of the presupposition that the Bible is about 
humanity  rather  than  God,  is  Barth’s  thoroughgoing  theological  realism.  In 
speaking of the  new world in the Bible Barth does not intend to construct an 
imaginary world, nor does he speak in idealist terms as though the new world 
were merely a new perspective or worldview. For Barth, as we shall see, the new 
world is nothing other than the reality of the living God breaking forth into this 
world which he has created and redeemed. 
Barth begins the second section of his sermon by asking once more, ‘What is 
there within the Bible?’
157 This time Barth surveys three answers commonly given 
in  Neo-Protestantism:  history,  morality,  religion.  In  a  move,  however,  which 
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displays  his  distance  from the anthropocentric  theology  of  his teachers, Barth 
employs  a  palpable  sense  of  theological  realism  to  subvert  a  liberal-
anthropological reading of Scripture.
158 In the case of history, for example, the 
Bible  is  problematic,  because  the  necessary  nexus  of  historical  causation 
continually breaks down. In its place, Barth says 
[t]he decisive cause is God.…When God enters, history for the while ceases 
to be, and there is nothing more to ask; for something wholly different and 
new  begins—a  history  with  its  own  distinct  grounds,  possibilities,  and 
hypotheses.…A new world projects itself into our old ordinary world.
159 
Such is  the  case  also  with morality,  for  the prime  consideration of the Bible 
according to Barth, 
is not the doings of man but the doings of God—not the various ways which 
we may take if we are men of good will, but the power out of which good 
will must first be created…not industry, honesty and helpfulness as we may 
practice them in our old ordinary world, but the establishment and growth of 
a new world, the world in which God and his morality reign.
160 
Finally, Barth also dispenses with religion, for as we have already seen, ‘the Bible 
tells us not how we should talk with God but what he says to us; not how we find 
the way to him, but how he has sought and found the way to us.’
161 
There are two particularly noticeable aspects of Barth’s treatment of these topics 
in this section of the sermon. First, as is evident in the citations above, Barth 
views the new world as the result of God’s action. His entry into history and his 
activity in the affairs of specific human beings transpires in a ‘new history,’ the 
‘establishment and growth of a new world,’ in the midst of the old and continuing 
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world. This metaphysic will become a primary aspect of Barth’s ontology as he 
develops it in the first edition of his Romans commentary. 
Also particularly noticeable is the way Barth closes the discussion of each topic 
with a challenge.
162 Admittedly, these are a suitable rhetorical form, pointing as 
they do towards the final challenge at the end of the sermon. Nonetheless, it is 
profitable, in terms of this thesis, to note the content of these challenges. In each 
case Barth confronts his hearers with a call to decision, a call to recognise the 
reality of God, and so respond to his sovereignty by allowing themselves to be led 
into this new world: 
It is certain that the Bible, if we read it carefully, makes straight for the point 
where one must decide to accept or to reject the sovereignty of God. This is 
the new world within the Bible. We are offered the magnificent, productive, 
hopeful life of a grain of seed, a new beginning, out of which all things shall 
be made new. One cannot learn or imitate this life of the divine seed in the 
new world. One can only let it live, grow, and ripen within him. One can 
only believe—can  only  hold the  ground  whither  he  has been led. Or not 
believe. There is no third way.
163 
In each challenge Barth refers to the recognition of God’s sovereignty and the 
corresponding obedience which issues from this recognition as faith. By setting 
the challenge to the contemporary hearer within the overarching framework of the 
biblical narrative, Barth is clearly  intimating that the faithful obedience of the 
former  is  an  echo  and  a  further  instance  of  the  faithfulness  and  obedience 
demonstrated by Abraham, Moses, Gideon, Samuel and so forth. People of faith, 
as Barth understands them, are neither passive nor restrained, but dare to entrust 
their destiny to the sovereignty of God as one would entrust oneself to a mighty 
river and be carried along by it. Such faith is the child of the ‘spirit in the Bible’ 
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which  will  lead  us  to  ‘grow beyond  ourselves towards the  highest answer.’
164 
Joseph  Mangina,  too,  draws  attention  to  the  self-involving  nature  of  Barth’s 
rhetoric in this sermon. He suggests that for Barth,  
[w]hat the Bible does is to set us into the midst of a new world in which 
human beings are caught up and find themselves out of control. The various 
biblical personalities [that Barth cites] should be considered not as models, 
but  as  figurative  representations  of  the  reader’s  own  situation  coram 
deo.…To pick up the Bible, to enter the world to which it bears witness is to 
have one’s life called into question.
165 
The ‘Worldliness’ of the Triune God 
In the first two sections of this sermon, then, we have seen that Barth speaks of 
‘God’ as the theme and content of the Bible, and of the ‘new world’ which he is 
bringing  into  being.  Barth  speaks  variously  of  the  new  world  as  God’s 
sovereignty, glory and incomprehensible love.
166 The new world is the ‘world of 
God,’ the ‘coming world’ and the ‘world of the Father’ which ‘projects itself into 
our old ordinary world.’
167 The new world is offered to us as a grain of seed which 
we are to let ‘grow and ripen within us according to the laws of the great life 
process set forth in the Bible.’
168 In the final section of his sermon Barth now 
seeks to clarify his understanding of God, and in so doing also clarifies somewhat 
the means by which the new world emerges in human society. 
Having argued that the content of the Bible is ‘God,’ Barth now asks, ‘what is the 
content of the contents?’
169 Who is this God who encounters us in and through the 
Scriptures? The manner in which Barth answers this question is highly significant. 
Instead of stating the matter directly, Barth exploits ‘a series of ready answers, 
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serious and well-founded answers taken from the Bible itself’
170 in order to launch 
an assault against privatised, interior and wholly eschatological understandings of 
God’s identity and purpose in salvation. While it is true that the Bible teaches that 
those turning to God will inherit a kingdom of blessedness in the next life, and 
may experience even in this world inner comfort and peace, Barth asks 
[i]s that all of God and his new world, of the meaning of the Bible, of the 
content of the contents?…that here and there specimens of men like you and 
me might be ‘converted,’ find inner ‘peace,’ and by a redeeming death go 
someday to ‘heaven.’ Is that all…Is not God—greater than that?
171 
When Barth turns to answer the question ‘Who is God?’ he utilises the trinitarian 
formula to provide a positive statement of the divine identity. Nevertheless he 
develops his statement in such a way as to repudiate dualistic and privatised forms 
of Christian thought and existence. Thus, 
[w]ho  is  God?  The  heavenly  Father!  But  the  heavenly  Father  even  upon 
earth, and upon earth really the heavenly Father. He will not allow life to be 
split into a ‘here’ and ‘beyond’…He purposes naught but the establishment 
of a new world.
172 
In a similar manner, God is the Son, not merely as ‘mediator for my soul,’ but as 
the redeemer and mediator of the whole world. The events narrated in Scripture 
about him are the ‘glorious beginning of a new world.’
173 Finally, God also is ‘the 
Spirit in his believers.’
174 By means of a hymn-citation Barth affirms that it is the 
Spirit by whom ‘we own the Son’ and which ‘through quiet hearts forever flows.’ 
But once more he is unwilling to allow this to be the limit or extent of the divine 
activity. Thus he affirms that 
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God is also that spirit (that is to say, that love and good will) which will and 
must break forth from quiet hearts into the world outside, that it may be 
manifest, visible, comprehensible: behold the tabernacle of God is with men! 
The Holy Spirit makes a new heaven and a new earth, and, therefore, new 
men,  new  families,  new  relationships,  new  politics.…The  Holy  Spirit 
establishes the righteousness of heaven in the midst of the unrighteousness 
of earth and will not stop nor stay until all that is dead has been brought to 
life and a new world has come into being. This is within the Bible. It is 
within the Bible for us. For it we were baptized. Oh, that we dared in faith to 
take what grace can offer us!
175 
In  this brief and potent  conclusion Barth makes clear  that the  purpose of the 
Father is nothing less than the establishment of a new world. As such, the coming 
of Jesus must be understood as nothing less than the commencement of the new 
world, while the activity of the Spirit is nothing less than the making visible of the 
new world purposed by the Father and inaugurated in the Son, precisely through 
his regenerating activity in the old world. 
Barth’s emphasis on the ‘worldliness’ of the triune God in this section reiterates 
his contention against forms of dualistic Christianity which would separate faith 
from life, the inner from the outer, the heavenly from the earthly, and the future 
from the present. God’s love is directed toward the world, not the soul or even the 
church—his  purpose  is  all-encompassing.  Indeed,  in  face  of  the  devastating 
realities of life in this world, God does not bless us ‘with the power of the church 
but with the power of life  and resurrection.’
176 Barth, therefore, will brook no 
theology, ideology or spirituality which would deny, despise or forsake the world. 
This is not to say, however, that Barth has no place for the church, or that he is 
dismissive of Christian and ecclesial existence. As was the case in his sermon on 
the righteousness of God, so here. Barth assails the church and religion, not that 
they might be abolished, but that they might be renewed and re-established on 
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new grounds. What he rejects is a church grounded in its own life and power. All 
religions,  even  the  ‘most  perfect,’ are no  more than  ‘a  delusion and  a  snare’ 
without the reality of God.
177 For Barth, the coming into being of the new world 
belongs entirely to God—it is he who establishes it and causes it to grow. 
But  it  is  equally  clear  that  Christian  existence  is  an  essential  aspect  of  this 
development. ‘For [this] we were baptised,’ says Barth. The Christian community 
is the harbinger of the new world, not as responsible for its emergence, but in the 
sense  that  it  announces  and  indicates  the  approach  of  the  new  world  in  and 
through  its  being  and  life.  Through the Spirit’s activity  in its  midst, it makes 
visible and comprehensible the new world in the midst of the old. The ‘new men, 
new families, new relationships, new politics’ which are indicative of the new 
world are to be found and seen here first of all. 
Once  again,  then,  a  close  examination  of  Barth’s  work  reveals  that  he  had  a 
definite vision of Christian and ecclesial existence at this point in his career. In 
this sermon Barth’s criticism of the church is attenuated although it is still present. 
In  and  of  themselves,  the  church,  religion  and  Christianity  are  incapable  of 
producing a true relation to God, a genuine service of God, or the emergence of 
the new world. Nonetheless, if the church and Christians will dare to seek God in 
the  Bible,  if  they  will  ‘listen,  watch  and  wait,’  they  will  find  themselves 
encountered by him, and granted a new beginning in the Holy Spirit which has the 
capacity to renew their entire existence. The Holy Spirit does not simply renew 
their inner life, but intends that the very righteousness of heaven is made visible 
and manifest amongst them in the midst of the continuing unrighteousness of this 
world. The primary aspect of Christian existence displayed in this sermon is faith, 
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which is described as the daring which entrusts itself wholeheartedly to God in 
recognition of his sovereignty, and which is demonstrated in faithful obedience to 
the divine call and command. 
The Nature of Barth’s Ecclesial Ethic 
In this chapter I have argued that from the very beginning Karl Barth’s theology 
was  ethical  in  its  orientation.  Additionally,  I  have  sought  to  show  that  this 
theological-ethical orientation in Barth’s work had an ecclesial dimension which 
was  an  essential  aspect  of  his  work.  Barth’s  break  with  liberalism  occurred 
because of his conviction that the war and nationalism of his era were foreign to 
the being of God, and thus incompatible with authentic Christian existence. He 
joined the Social Democratic Party precisely because it ‘had to be demonstrated’ 
to his congregation that ‘faith in the Greatest does not exclude but rather includes 
within it work and suffering in the realm of the imperfect.’
178  
Barth found in socialism a form of praxis which he believed was superior to that 
generally found in the church of his day. Socialist praxis, at least in its better 
moments, modelled the kind of thorough engagement with the realities of worldly 
life  demanded  by  the  kingdom  of  God.  Nonetheless,  commitment  to  socialist 
praxis was not, for Barth, an ‘-ism,’ a philosophical commitment which stood in 
relative  independence  alongside  or  prior  to  his  theological  and  ecclesial 
commitments. Barth understood socialism as a prophetic call to the church to live 
in accordance with its own integrity. His critique of the church vis-à-vis socialism 
was a critique of the church made from within the church, and for the sake of the 
church. This ecclesial motive in Barth’s deliberations during this period becomes 
especially  evident  in  his  relationship  with  Ragaz.  Confronted  by  the  choice 
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represented by Kutter and Ragaz, Barth rejected the Ragazian option, and in his 
own words, the two ‘roared past one another like two express trains: he went out 
of the church, I went in.’
179 
Thus,  in  contrast  to Marquardt’s claim that Barth’s theology  and ecclesiology 
were  the  predicate  of  his  politics,
180  it  is  here  seen  that  Barth’s  ethics  were 
theological,  just  as  his  theology  was  also  ethical  in  its  orientation.  This 
orientation, which was already evident in Barth’s initial break from his Marburg 
heritage, was dramatically sharpened as a result of Blumhardt’s influence from 
whom Barth learnt the fundamental insight that ‘God is God’ and God is God.’
181 
From Blumhardt Barth also learnt to ‘wait,’ a proclivity which became the basic 
posture of an ethics which he would retain for the entirety of his career. Barth 
used  the  various  insights  gained  from  Blumhardt  to  establish  the  being  and 
activity of the church on a new foundation. Being bound to one Lord, the church 
is  loosed  from  all  lesser  lords  and  allegiances,  and  is  thus  freed  for  its  own 
decisive being and activity as a kind of prophetic community in the midst of the 
broader society, and especially in solidarity with the weaker and poorer members 
of that society.  
Blumhardt’s influence was also noticeable in the two sermons examined in this 
chapter  on  the  righteousness  of  God  and  the  new  world  in  the  Bible.  A 
consideration almost too obvious to mention is also indicative of Barth’s intent to 
form moral community: the fact that these were sermons addressed to particular 
congregations  and  as  such,  calling  them  to  actually  become  the  kind  of 
community portrayed in the message. In these sermons the contours of Barth’s 
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ecclesio-moral  vision  begin  to  emerge.  We  have  seen  that  Barth  envisages  a 
virtuous community of faith and prayer, waiting on and listening attentively to the 
voices of conscience and Scripture. The community exists in contrast to the greed, 
injustice, isolation, immorality and violence of the world, yet also in solidarity 
with it, as it testifies through its life and proclamation to the new world already 
breaking into human society. The virtues mentioned by Barth in these sermons 
include especially hope, faith which issues in faithful obedience, purity, goodness 
and  brotherhood.  These  might  be  supplemented  by  those  in  his  article  on 
Blumhardt which include liberty and compassion.  
Particularly  evident  in  these  works  is  Barth’s  hope  that  the  church  would 
experience the new world of the kingdom of God breaking forth and growing 
vigorously  in  the  world.  The  means  by  which  this  will  occur  remains  under-
developed in these works, but it is evident that the primary agency of this growth 
is the Holy Spirit. In “The Righteousness of God” Barth provides an indication of 
how this will occur when he says, ‘And then God works in us. Then begins in us, 
as from a seed, but an unfailing seed, the new basic something which overcomes 
unrighteousness.…[T]here is born a new spirit out of which grows a new world, 
the world of the righteousness of God.’
182 Although in this sermon Barth mentions 
the ‘spirit’ rather abstractly and only in passing, that he considers the new world 
to be the product of the Holy Spirit’s activity is clear in the “The New World.”
183 
Further, although Barth has not yet developed the trinitarian underpinning of his 
theology, its essential orientation is here present, albeit in nascent form. The fact, 
however, that the Spirit is not limited to working solely within the realm of the 
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church, and is ever pressing the church into a living solidarity with the world, 
shows that this ecclesial ethic is not to be construed in a sectarian sense.  
A criticism that might be made against Barth’s moral vision in these sermons is 
that raised by Hauerwas many years later: that Barth is too abstract, that he does 
not provide any concrete guidance which will enable his hearers to take practical 
steps towards the fulfilling of his grand vision.
184 Interestingly, this very criticism 
was put to Barth personally, seventy  years prior to Hauerwas’ article. In May 
1916 Barth’s “The Righteousness of God” was discussed at a Swiss Religious 
Socialism Conference in Brugg. Following the conference, one of the attendees, 
Emil  Brunner,  corresponded  with  Barth  and  suggested  that  the  faith-response 
Barth calls for is not clear. Brunner was concerned that Barth’s description of 
Christian response as faith was too passive a description. Brunner wants some 
way  direct  his  energy  and  will  to  a  different  goal,  and  in  this  sense,  to  do 
something.
185 In a second letter, Brunner again complains, ‘I soon find that all I 
have  in  my  hands  is  an  empty  word with  four  letters [that is, “G-o-t-t”]…an 
abstract thought, with which I can neither understand nor master my life.’
186 
It must be admitted that in this respect Barth leaves much to the initiative of his 
hearers. But it is incorrect to say that Barth provides no guidance whatsoever for 
his hearers. Three observations from Barth’s sermon on “The New World” may 
be  made  which  may  diminish  the  force  of  this  criticism.  First,  the  various 
challenges issued by Barth in the course of his sermon, and culminating at its 
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conclusion  with  an  invitation  to  ‘Come,  for  all  things  are  now  ready…’  are 
challenges to embark on a journey which can only be legitimately described as a 
daring venture of faith, modelled on the examples of the characters in the biblical 
narrative highlighted in the beginning of the sermon. Barth clearly implies that his 
hearers are to echo the faithfulness of these characters in their own time and place. 
In  addition,  Barth’s  characterisation of the New Testament church  as  ‘a  little 
crowd of folk who listen, watch and wait,’
187 also serves to remind his hearers of 
their responsibility. They too are to wait that they too might be encountered by the 
living God. It is noteworthy that even at this early stage in his career Barth adopts 
the  call-response  schema to depict  ethical faithfulness.  Christian  existence  for 
Barth is constituted by obedient response to the divine call and command, which 
comes as the believer ‘waits.’ 
Second,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  entire  conceptual  framework  within 
which Barth constructs his argument is the idea that the new world is in the Bible. 
Not only is the Bible a witness to the sovereignty of God, and a record of the great 
events by which the new world was established, it is also the vehicle by which we 
are  presently  encountered  by  God.  Barth  says,  ‘there  is  a  spirit  in  the  Bible 
that…begins to press us on…it presses us on to the primary fact whether we will 
or no.…[T]he Bible unfolds to us as we are met, guided, drawn on, and made to 
grow by the grace of God.’
188 When we read the Bible ‘rightly,’ ‘honestly’ and 
‘carefully,’
189—by which Barth no doubt means in terms of theological realism, 
and with a view to the sovereignty of God—we are confronted by the Word of 
God itself which summons us to a decision of faith, and which is itself the ‘living 
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grain of seed out of which a right relation to God, a service of God “in spirit and 
in truth,” necessarily must issue.’
190 
These observations lead us to consider that Barth anticipated that as they carefully 
read  their Bibles, his  congregation  would be grasped by the God  who makes 
himself known through Scripture, and be led out ‘beyond themselves’ as they, like 
the  patriarchs  before  them,  obeyed  the  command  which  came  to  them,  so 
becoming partakers of the new world. Although this may well seem a naïve and 
unrealistic  expectation,  it  must  be  recognised  as  expressive  of  Barth’s  own 
experience with regard to Scripture—‘lo, it began to speak to us!’ 
Third, the criticism that Barth’s vision was too abstract may also be assuaged by 
recalling  the  earlier  observation that  he utilised  the  suggestive  persona of the 
Isaianic Servant to represent the distinctive manner in which the community is to 
have its being in the world. Although he does not develop the implications of this 
motif, its use indicates the shape or contour of his vision of Christian and ecclesial 
existence. This image captures the faithful and obedient devotion, the intercessory 
and in-spirited character, the thirst for justice, and the redemptive and suffering 
identification with the oppressed—all of which were characteristic of Blumhardt, 
and  which  are  also  to  characterise  the  church’s  identity  and  mission.  These 
observations, then, while not diminishing the fact that Barth demanded much of 
his hearers, do indicate that in his view Christian life, far from being an idealistic 
or amorphous entity, has a definite shape and tendency. 
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Conclusion 
The  major elements of Barth’s  vision  outlined in  the  works  examined  in  this 
chapter include, of course, the sovereign priority of God and his unimpeachable 
righteousness  over  against  all  human  activity  and  unrighteousness,  the 
eschatological orientation of Christian life under the purview of the Holy Spirit as 
the  immanent power of  the  coming  kingdom, and  the shape of Christian  and 
ecclesial existence  as  waiting and  hastening  in  the  obedience of  faith,  and as 
brotherhood and solidarity with the oppressed. These themes are also found, and 
indeed, find their climax in this form in the first of Barth’s major works, the first 
edition  of  his  commentary  on  Paul’s  epistle  to  the  Romans  in  1919.  To  an 
examination of this work we now turn.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
LIFE IN THE THIRD DIMENSION: 
DER RÖMERBRIEF (1919) 
Your last special letter was worth a great deal to me. It cannot be otherwise 
than that our ship nolens volens approaches the doctrine of the church as 
though it were a new continent; I, too, see it no differently and actually it 
must be so, for we cruised about in the waters of the third article of the creed 
since the beginning; there,  one  might say, lie  our  home port and  ancient 
coaling  station,  for  the  ‘Holy  Spirit’  was  perhaps  somehow  our  starting 
point; only we cannot remain spiritualists with Kutter and Ragaz and perhaps 
also the younger Blumhardt but have to push on further to the point from 
which the Holy Spirit comes: to the church as the bearer with its doctrine 
and Scriptures.
1 
Barth’s first commentary on Paul’s epistle to the Romans
2 has not received the 
scholarly attention that  has been given to his other works  for several reasons. 
First, it has been neglected in the English-speaking world simply because it has 
not yet been translated. In addition, prominent interpreters of Barth’s theological 
development focussed primarily on the second edition as the epitome of Barth’s 
early work, and accordingly gave little or no attention to the first edition.
3 
However,  by  far  the  primary  reason  for  this  lack  of  attention,  including  the 
probable  grounds  for  the  first  two  reasons derives from Barth  himself.  In  his 
preface  to  the  second  edition  Barth  claimed  that  the  original  has  been  so 
completely rewritten that whatever its merits and failings, the first edition could 
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now ‘disappear from the scene.’
4 In light of these comments it is not surprising, 
perhaps, that the first edition  has been marginalised in scholarly discussion of 
Barth’s theology. McCormack has recently argued, however, that Barth overstated 
the difference between the two editions in order to focus public attention solely on 
the revised version.
5 Be that as it may, examination of Romans I is nonetheless a 
profitable  venture  if  Barth’s  theological  development  and  the  connections 
between the earlier and later periods of his work are to be accurately understood. 
The  aim  of  this chapter  in accordance with  the  aim  and  methodology  of  this 
thesis,  therefore,  is  to  provide  an  examination  of  this  work,  with  particular 
concern to observe Barth’s construal of Christian existence.
6 
The outline of the chapter is straightforward. First, two introductory sections on 
the  composition,  purpose  and  theological  framework  of  Romans  I  provide  an 
orientation to the primary contours of Barth’s thought in this work, and thus also, 
a foundation for understanding his vision of Christian and ecclesial existence. The 
next  section  investigates  whether  the  manner  in  which  Barth  develops  his 
theological metaphysic with its strong emphasis on the universal objectivity of the 
fall  in  Adam  and  redemption  in  Christ,  functions  to  evacuate  the  concept  of 
human agency of any genuine meaning. This section argues that Barth does, in 
fact, provide an account of human agency, but that this agency, while genuine, 
remains ever contingent on the prior and encompassing divine agency on which it 
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is  dependent.  The  fourth  section  of  the  chapter  examines  Barth’s  critique  of 
religion  and  ethics,  both  of  which  share  the  common  fault  of  being  human 
attempts at  the  establishment  of  self-righteousness.  This begs the question,  of 
course, of whether any genuine religion or morality is actually possible, especially 
in light of Barth’s blunt assertion that ‘according to the ultimate standpoint we 
must take in Christ, there are no ethics. There is only the activity of God.’
7 It will 
be seen, however, that Barth has a quite particular notion of ethics in mind when 
he makes this assertion, and that he is, in fact, clearing the ground of competing 
claims in order to commence construction of his own form of ecclesial ethics. 
This is the focus of the final two sections which seek to elucidate the specific 
nature and shape of Christian and ecclesial existence as envisaged by Barth at this 
time. 
The Composition and Purpose of Romans I 
On January 1, 1916 Barth wrote a letter to Thurneysen in which he says, ‘Today I 
looked into Ritschl’s history of pietism and scented in it something of the air that 
Wernle  breathes.  When  the  time  comes  to  strike  the  great  blow  against  the 
theologians,  these  ideas,  too,  will  have  to  be  considered  and  digested  very 
thoroughly.’
8  Later  that  year,  shortly  after  commencing  his  studies  in  Paul’s 
epistle to the Romans, he writes again that ‘the decisive strokes for which we now 
prepare cannot come for another ten years.’
9 Little did he know, however, that the 
little  ‘copy-book  with  comments’  in  which  he  was  recording  the  fruit  of  his 
exegetical  endeavours  would  itself  become  a  significant  blow  against  the 
prevailing theology. 
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Barth, as we saw in the previous chapter, began his investigations in Romans as a 
result  of  a  conviction  that  he  had  to  find  an  entirely  new  foundation  for 
theological and pastoral activity. In addition, he wanted ‘to snatch it from [his] 
opponents,’ as he explained to Ragaz in November 1916.
10 The commentary was 
written, of course, against the tumultuous backdrop of wartime Europe and the 
social  dislocation  that  arose  as  a  result  of  the  war,  as  well  as  the  Bolshevik 
Revolution of 1917. The war ended as Barth was reviewing the final proofs of the 
book, but social conflict continued with the failed Sparticist revolt in Germany 
and the Landesstreik in Switzerland.
11 Yet for all that, Barth notes that the book 
was written ‘with a joyful sense of discovery.’
12 In his study he found himself 
confronted by ‘something from afar, from Asia Minor or Corinth, something very 
ancient, early oriental, indefinably sunny, wild, original, that somehow is hidden 
behind these sentences.’
13 
Barth  also  complained  that  modern  commentaries  on  Paul  missed  perhaps  as 
much as ninety-nine percent of the real content of Paul’s letter.
14 Hart refers to 
Barth’s commentary, therefore, as ‘a frontal attack on the contemporary state of 
New Testament studies,’ while Smart suggests that it was ‘an experiment in a new 
form of exegesis which was to have far-reaching hermeneutical significance.’
15 In 
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his careful examination of the exegetical sources Barth utilised in the preparation 
of  his  commentary  Henry  concludes  that  although  Barth  made  careful  and 
judicious  use  of  historical-critical  commentaries  and  studies,  he  nevertheless 
maintained a fundamentally different presupposition which dramatically affected 
the structure and tone of his work. Henry notes that the major contrast between 
Barth and the historical-critical scholars was that the latter only want to know 
Paul  from  a  ‘purely  historical  view,’  leaving  possible  applications  of  Paul’s 
thought for modern audiences to the reader, whereas Barth wants to know Paul as 
someone whose thought bears contemporary relevance, and through whom God 
continues to speak to people in all ages.
16 
Barth, in other words, wants to penetrate beyond a merely historical interest in 
Paul and his thought, in order to hear afresh the very Word of God that Paul heard 
in the absolutely concrete political realities of his day.
17 Barth did not write to 
produce a new historical-critical account of Romans. His purpose rather, was to 
try to discover how the message of Romans could be preached in the Church.
18 
Barth  said  as  much  in  his  1922  lecture  “The  Need  and  Promise  of  Christian 
Preaching.” Here Barth recalls that the impetus to his study in Romans was the 
weekly struggle to relate Bible and life in his ministry of preaching.
19 He notes 
that ‘naturally and evidently there are many subjects mentioned in the book—
New Testament theology, dogmatics, ethics, and philosophy—but you will best 
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understand  it  when  you  hear  through  it  all,  the  minister’s  question:  What  is 
preaching?’
20 
The  origin  of  this  work  in  Barth’s  pastoral  ministry  helps  account  for  the 
homiletical tone of the commentary. Barth’s explosive language pours forth with 
the bold conviction of a preacher seeking, struggling to bring forth the message of 
the gospel that the Word of God might be heard once more, even in so dark, 
desperate  and  dangerous  days  as  those  in  which  he  lived.  Further,  and  more 
significantly for this thesis, this homiletical form indicates that Barth is not simply 
aiming at the establishment of an esoteric worldview, or the vanquishing of an 
abstract or contrary academic perspective. Rather his work is expressly intended 
to help shape the existence and life of the church in concrete ways. He seeks to 
preach to his congregation in such a way that they were enabled to relate ‘Bible 
and life.’ Similarly, Henry suggests that the aim of Romans I was to invite readers 
to ‘active participation with Paul in the world of God.’
21 In both his preaching and 
writing  ministries,  Barth  was  working  in  accordance  with  an  ecclesio-ethical 
motive. 
This is not to say, of course, that Barth did not write polemically or in order to 
delineate a theological worldview, but to say that his polemics and metaphysics 
function in service of a practical end. The nature of this end might be partially 
discerned by examining the targets of his criticisms. McCormack identifies four 
major  groups  targeted  by  Barth  in  the  commentary.  These  are  a)  Liberalism-
Pietism;  b)  Idealistic  epistemology  and  ethics;  c)  the  ‘Positives’  (what 
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McCormack  names  churchly  Christianity  or  ‘religion’);  and  d)  Religious 
Socialism. According to McCormack, 
[i]f there is a common thread which joins these four (in the details, quite 
different)  movements  it  is  the  element  of  individualism.  Barth’s  new 
theology  represented  an  assault  on  a  central  feature  of  late  nineteenth-
century bourgeois culture: the understanding of the human individual as the 
creative  subject  of  culture  and  history.…Barth  was  at  the  same  time 
attacking a religion which had assimilated itself to the needs of idealistically 
construed cultural development; a religion which prided itself on being the 
animating principle for that development. He was attacking a religion which 
provided  bourgeois  culture  with  perhaps  its  most  crucial  ideological 
support.
22 
McCormack makes clear the inherently ethical and ecclesial orientation of Barth’s 
theology as expressed in Romans I. For Barth, as we shall see, such individualism 
is the very essence of the fall, and thus the complicity of religion (the church) in 
support of such individualism was tantamount to apostasy, an abandonment of its 
true calling and essence. Rather than assimilation to the idolatrous character of the 
prevailing  culture,  the  church  is  to  be  ordered  in  accordance  with  its  own 
distinctive character and charter. Clearly, then, Barth was not engaged in theology 
for  theology’s  sake,  but  had  a  definite  ethical  and  ecclesial  orientation  and 
purpose in his work. 
The Theological Framework of Romans I 
The Two Dimensional World 
In the difficult and dangerous days of November 1918 Barth laments as he refers 
to, 
these  extraordinary  times.…What is  there to  say?  One  stands  astonished, 
does he not, and can only state how the face of the world changes visibly: on 
this side of things. But the other side: the meaning and content, the actual 
trend of it all, the movements in the spiritual realm that now take place, the 
doors  of  God  that  now  open  or  close.…Who  is  there  now  with  a 
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comprehensive view who is able to see to the very roots of world events in 
order to speak and act from that standpoint?…If only we had been converted 
to the Bible earlier so that we would now have solid ground under our feet! 
One  broods  alternately  over  the  newspaper  and  the  New  Testament  and 
actually  sees  fearfully  little  of  the  organic  connection  between  the  two 
worlds  concerning  which  one  should    now  be  able  to  give  a  clear  and 
powerful witness.
23 
It  is  precisely  the  relation  between  these  ‘two  worlds,’  between  ‘this  side  of 
things’  and  ‘the  other  side,’  which  Barth  was  struggling  to  bring  to  light  in 
Romans I. Indeed, Henry has suggested that Barth’s commentary facilitates the 
meeting of these two worlds, the world of the bible and particularly of Paul, and 
that of the turn-of-the-century Europe in which Barth lived.
24 
The manner in which Barth brought these two worlds into relation was through 
the  development  of  a  particular  conception  of  world  history  cast  in  an 
eschatological  framework.  Barth,  influenced  by  the  works  of  Beck  and 
Schweitzer,
25 believed he had found this understanding of world history in Paul 
himself,  particularly  Romans 5:12-21. Many  of  Barth’s  contemporaries  agreed 
that Romans 5:12-21 involves what could be called a philosophy of world history. 
Barth, too, accepts this view, although  he disagrees with them concerning the 
importance of this philosophy of world history with regard to the actual message 
of Romans. Whereas many of Barth’s contemporaries regarded Paul’s worldview 
as  a  relic  of  his  age,  Barth  interpreted  it  in  terms  of  theological  realism.
26 
Furthermore,  Barth’s  interpretation  was  unique  in  that  he  also  introduced  the 
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inclusion of the other-side (jenseitig) dimension of reality as an essential part of 
the understanding of these verses.
27  
Barth’s contribution at this point is highly significant. Underlying world history 
and world events is another history and other events, a cosmic history, a history 
which occurs in God, or better, in the jenseitig dimension of reality, and which 
punctuates earthly history and becomes visible there. It is this notion which is 
behind Barth’s expressed longing for a ‘comprehensive view’ which is ‘able to 
see  to  the  very  roots  of  world  events  in  order  to  speak  and  act  from  that 
standpoint.’
28 McCormack rightly suggests that Romans I is best understood as an 
attempt to engage in a thoroughgoing criticism of obvious or surface reality in 
order  to  create  an  open  space  for  ‘real  reality’—the  kingdom  of  God—to 
emerge.
29 
In Romans I, therefore, Barth writes that 
[t]here is…not only a truth which is beyond this world (jenseitige Wahrheit), 
but also events beyond this world (jenseitige Ereignisse); a world history in 
heaven, an inner movement in God. What we call ‘history’ and ‘events’ are 
only a confused reflection of turns occurring there (jenseitiger Wendungen). 
One such turn of the times (jenseitige Wende der Zeiten) is marked in our 
‘history’  by  the  cross  of  Christ.  God’s  faithfulness  breaks  through  the 
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inescapable  necessity  of  his  wrath  hanging  over  humanity,  creating 
righteousness on earth which he can crown with eternal life. 
30 
Here Barth posits a dynamic relation between the two worlds, albeit, a dynamism 
which travels in a singular direction: from Jenseits (the other side) to Diesseits 
(this  side).  In  speaking  of  the  action  of  God,  Barth  uses  the  imagery  of  a 
‘breakthrough’  to  indicate  the  character  of  this  dynamic  relation:  God’s 
faithfulness,  his  decision  of  redemption  in  the  face  of  human  sinfulness,  has 
broken through from his side to our side and become visible on our side in the 
cross of Christ.
31 Barth uses this same imagery a few pages later: 
With  the  breakthrough:  Immanuel!  God  with  us!  (Mat.  1:23)  which  has 
taken place in now-time, in the messianic present, in the decisive turn of the 
aeons in heaven, a life process is also inaugurated on earth, on the historical-
psychological side of our existence. We are no longer the same. We have 
been placed into the process which reaches from the beyond (vom Jenseits) 
into the present (ins Diesseits).
32 
Again  Barth  declares  that  the  relation between  the  two  worlds proceeds from 
Jenseits  to  Diesseits,  and  so  indicates  the  ontological  priority  that  inheres  in 
Jenseits. Events and history on earth are determined by and subject to events and 
decisions which occur in the jenseitig dimension of reality. The two dimensions, 
then, are not to be considered in terms of a dualistic or static confrontation, but in 
terms of a movement proceeding from the one side to the other. 
Barth employs this worldview to situate the entirety of God’s saving activity in a 
cosmic context. The great events by which human existence and history have been 
determined, that is, the Fall and the redemption accomplished in Christ, are both 
jenseitig events, determinations which had their origin in the jenseitig or geistig 
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(spiritual) dimension and are reflected on this side, in the world of space and time. 
In addition, not only does movement occur between the two worlds as described, 
but world-history itself is set within a broader eschatological movement in which 
Adam gives way to Christ, Fall to restoration, and the realities of earthly history to 
the kingdom of God.
33 Thus, not only have we ‘been placed into [a] process which 
reaches  from  the  beyond  into  the  present,’  but  the  same  process  presses 
inexorably  forward  toward  the  goal  which  God  has  ordained  for  his  entire 
creation. 
Humanity under Sin 
It is important to recognise that not only the incarnation and death of Christ, but 
also the Fall itself was a jenseitig event. When Barth speaks of the Fall, he is not 
referring to an earthly-historical event revolving around Adam alone: 
The  breakthrough  (Durchbruch)  of  sin  and  death  occurred  just  as  the 
breakthrough  of righteousness  and  life, one  time  for the  first time.…The 
‘historical  Adam’  as  such  is  as  insignificant,  as  unimportant,  as  the 
‘historical Jesus’ as such! Adam’s fall and Christ’s death are important on 
account  of  the  universal,  comprehensive,  other-side  turnings  in  heaven 
…which in both instances  have taken place behind the solitary  historical 
event.…It is not a matter of an individual and, as it were, the first in a series, 
but  rather  of  the  absolute  disposition  of  a  whole.…It  is  a  matter  of  a 
presupposition of all happening, which indeed in one point of history breaks 
through (durchbricht) and becomes visible for the first time.
34 
The decision to sin, therefore, is a supra-temporal decision made by humanity as 
such,  a  jenseitig  decision,  on  the  geistig  as  opposed  to  the  seelisch  side  of 
humanity, but one with inevitable consequences of sin and death on this side.
35 
The nature of human sin was the desire of humanity for autonomy over against 
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God, by which they fell ‘out of immediacy of being with God.’
36 For Barth, this is 
the ‘one sin’: it was too little for humanity to simply be God’s.
37 Humanity seizes 
the honour and thanks due to God for itself, thinking of and giving to itself what it 
should think of and give to God.
38 Nor was the decision to sin a matter of fate or 
destiny. Rather, it was a decision freely chosen by humanity, and which became 
the source of all incidents after the manner of Adam’s trespass.
39 
Prior to the Fall humanity existed in a relation of immediacy with God, not only in 
harmony  with  him  but  also  as  a  participant  in  his  creative  power.  It  is  this 
participation which rendered the Fall so devastating. Barth attributes a creative 
power to the human will in its immediacy with God that affects the whole cosmos. 
So long as humanity remained in this union of immediacy with God, everything in 
creation also remained in harmony with God. The human decision for autonomy 
from God, however, also brought about separation from God for the creation.
40 
Although humanity has fallen out of a relation of immediacy with God it has not 
‘become  detached’  from  its  Origin  (Ursprung),  but  rather  bears  unconscious 
memory of him in all of life. In the suppression of this memory humanity commits 
an unnatural deed and thus becomes not only unfaithful to God, but also to itself.
41 
Falling out of a relation of immediacy with God, humanity came under the terrible 
lordship of death, which Barth (citing Beck) refers to as a ‘perverted, downward, 
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centrifugal,  disintegrating  movement.’
42  Death,  as  an  alien  power,  drives 
everything away from its centre in God, and from everything else.
43 Barth, again 
following  Beck,  also  refers  to  death  as  a  ‘power  of  disorganisation’ 
(Desorganisationskraft)  which  ‘deranges,  makes  sick,  undermines  and 
disintegrates  the  organisms  in  their  vitality  (Lebenskräften),  functions,  and 
ultimately in their existence.’
44 
The Victory of Life 
God, however, in spite of human wilfulness and unfaithfulness, has not allowed 
this  profound  and  devastating  alienation  to  continue  to exercise  lordship  over 
humanity. In accordance with Paul’s typology in Romans 5, Barth gathers human 
and world history around the two archetypal figures of Adam and Christ. The 
incarnation, death and resurrection of Christ are a counter-movement inaugurated 
by God in opposition to the disintegrating movement of sin  and death. These 
events in the diesseitig dimension constitute the breaking through of the decisive 
decision and turn already accomplished on the other side. And just as the initial 
jenseitig turn in Adam was cosmic and universal in its scope and effects in the 
realm of space and time, so too the jenseitig turn in Christ is cosmic and universal 
in its scope and effects, although these effects are set within the encompassing 
framework of eschatology, as we see in the passage cited earlier: 
With  the  breakthrough:  Immanuel!  God  with  us!  (Mat.  1:23)  which  has 
taken place in now-time, in the messianic present, in the decisive turn of the 
aeons in heaven, a life process is also inaugurated on earth, on the historical-
psychological side of our existence. We are no longer the same. We have 
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been placed into the process which reaches from the beyond (vom Jenseits) 
into the present (ins Diesseits).
45 
In addition to the two-dimensional  view of reality  evident in this passage, are 
indications  of  two  further  significant  aspects  of  Barth’s  theology  in  this 
commentary. First, says Barth, ‘we are no longer the same.’ Barth’s soteriology 
here, as throughout the entirety of his career, is understood firstly in objective 
terms. The divine-human relation has been fundamentally altered as a result of the 
obedience of Christ, through which he has ‘fulfilled the true destiny of human 
life.’
46 In his obedience Christ regained the relation of immediacy that God had 
always purposed with and for humanity, thereby restoring human essence to its 
‘proper’ (gerechte) condition.
47  
 Christ’s obedience is ultimately demonstrated in his death where his will—a free 
and  wholly  human  will—is  at one  with  God’s will.
48  This  death constitutes  a 
reversal of the death that has reigned over humanity because it was the death of 
one obedient to and in immediacy with God.
49 In his death is revealed the struggle, 
and in his resurrection is revealed the consummated victory of divine power over 
the powers of sin and death.
50 Barth boasts, therefore, of ‘world-redemption on the 
basis of world-reconciliation.’
51 As a result of his death which  has altered the 
disposition of the whole of life in its relation to the Origin, there is no one who 
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cannot  and  may  not  be  righteous  and  live.  ‘In  the  One,’  says  Barth,  ‘all  are 
righteous, and in the One all are drawn into the victory of life.’
52 
Although this ‘victory of life’ is an accomplished reality in heaven, it remains ‘in 
process’ on this side of reality. This is the second significant feature of Barth’s 
theology indicated in the citation above, where Barth says that ‘a life process is 
also inaugurated on earth, on the historical-psychological side of our existence.’ 
This life process commenced with the coming of Christ. He himself is the divine 
seed of the new world, the ‘germ-cell of life’ planted once more in both nature 
and history, the beginning of the new creation in which death will be no more.
53 
According  to  Barth,  God  has  now  cut  the  knots  of  the  hopelessly  entangled 
situation into which humanity has fallen, inaugurating a messianic, divine-earthly 
history in which humanity has been turned again to God.
54 Through his death ‘he 
introduces something new into the history of the world. In finishing his life in this 
way, he fundamentally overcomes the old.’
55 
Barth’s  use  of  ‘process’  language  functions  to  complement  the  language  of 
‘breakthrough’ which indicates that the relation of the two dimensions of reality is 
conceived only as a series of ‘moments,’ with the corresponding problem of the 
continuity of divine activity on this side of things. Thus, in addition to ‘process’ 
Barth  also  uses  other  metaphors  of  continuity  as  well,  such  as  ‘movement,’ 
‘development’ and above all, the terminology learnt from Blumhardt and Beck: 
‘organic’ and ‘organism.’
56 
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Barth uses the concept of the organic in two primary ways. First, he uses it to 
stress the idea that the kingdom of God is an ‘organism,’ that is, a unity, or a 
totality, something complete in itself. Not only is the kingdom of God a unity, it 
unifies; not only is it an entity complete in itself, it embraces all reality within 
itself and brings it into fundamental relation. Barth, therefore, uses the concept of 
the organism to proclaim the universality and all-inclusive nature of the kingdom 
of  God against  all religious and secular  forms of individualism,  isolation  and 
fragmentation that characterise life under the hegemony of sin and death,
57 which 
is,  as  we  have  already  seen,  the  ‘power  of  disorganisation’ 
(Desorganisationskraft).
58 
Second, he uses the concept of the organic as a description of the way in which 
the  kingdom  grows:  ‘The  coming  world  does  not  come  mechanically  but 
organically,’ says Barth,
59 by which he means that the growth of the kingdom 
takes  place  quietly,  gently  and  steadily  by  the  power  of  the  life  process 
inaugurated in Christ and at work in the world.
60 Barth uses this concept to insist 
that the kingdom of God is not the result of our own activity and effort, or built 
upon  any  existing  realities,  but  is  solely  the  work  of  God  in  and  among  us. 
Further, this remains a hidden development which leaves traces in worldly history 
but is never simply identical with visible progress or growth.
61 
This latter point highlights an important distinction between the use of the concept 
in Barth and Beck. According to McCormack, 
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[i]n Barth’s hands…the category takes on a significance which had scarcely 
been  envisioned  by  Beck.  What  Beck  intended  with  the  phrase  ‘organic 
growth’ was ‘a new unique nature principle,’ a cosmic and naturalistically 
conceived Christ-principle which transforms the world from within. Against 
such  naturalism,  Barth  insisted  that  the  history  of  God  was  a  hidden 
‘absolutely not-given’ history (Romans I, 136). The history of God is always 
grounded in the moment-by-moment, present action of God and never passes 
over into a ‘nature principle.’
62 
The  continuity  of  the  development  of  the  kingdom  in  history,  then,  remains 
grounded  in  God,  and  the  teleology  of  the  ‘history  in  God’  in  the  jenseitig 
dimension of reality.
63 The work of God cannot be explained simply in terms of 
events, causes and processes occurring on the surface of history: the movement of 
the kingdom occurs within history, but it is not of history. Barth’s construal of 
reality in this manner allowed him to situate the reality and activity of God within 
history  while  placing  it  beyond  the  reach  of  historical  investigation,  and  the 
constructivist epistemology of historicism.
64 By insisting that the growth of the 
kingdom is everywhere and always the result of divine action Barth was also able 
to set faith beyond the reach of psychological investigation.
65 As we shall see in 
the following sections, these are fundamental moves made by Barth which not 
only enabled him to undermine the basic tenets of the historicism, psychologism 
and pietism which prevailed in contemporary theology, but which also enabled 
him  to  develop  and  delineate  a  particular  vision  of  Christian  and  ecclesial 
existence. 
Origins of Barth’s Theological Framework 
In this commentary, then, Barth  sets forth a theological ontology  in which all 
earthly-historical reality is predicated upon and encompassed by the far greater, 
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ontologically  prior  reality  of  the  ‘other  side,’  which  also  exists  as  the 
presupposition  which  is  determinative  for  all  existence on  this  side  of  reality. 
Those events of fundamental cosmic significance such as the fall, the incarnation, 
and the death and resurrection of Jesus occur there first, and only subsequently 
become visible and real in this dimension of reality. Further, in accordance with 
the sovereign purpose of God, the entirety of earthly-historical existence is also 
placed  within  an  overarching  eschatological  context  so  that  over  against  the 
decentralising disintegrating powers of death at work in the world, the kingdom of 
God grows organically toward the consummation of God’s saving intention. 
Some  commentators,  of  course,  both  in  Barth’s  day  and  more  recently,  have 
conjectured regarding the sources of this theological framework. Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, for example, writes that Barth 
meant to proclaim glad tidings. The vision is enthusiastic and in its own way 
it  unrolls  the  scroll  of  God’s  saving  economy.  But  it  makes  use  of  a 
conceptual framework that owes more to Plato, right-wing (that is, religious) 
Hegelianism  and  religious socialism  than  it  does  to  the  Bible,  Luther  or 
Calvin.
66 
According to von Balthasar, ‘pantheism manages to dissolve the creature both into 
God and into nothingness. In this theology, God is the “innermost, if scattered, 
nature  of  all  things  and  of  man.”’
67  The  work  as  a  whole  is  a  ‘radical 
philosophical  mysticism,’  the  theme  of  which  is  ‘dynamic  eschatology,  the 
irreversible movement from a fatally doomed temporal order to a new living order 
filled with the life of God, the restoration (apokatastasis) of the original ideal 
creation in God.’
68 If von Balthasar’s reading of Romans I were accurate, it would 
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suggest  the  absorption  of  humanity  into  divine  being  with  the  corresponding 
annulment of human agency and corollary loss of any serious notion of Christian 
and ecclesial existence. Von Balthasar’s energetic and influential work established 
the central paradigm of interpretation for a generation of Barth scholars, including 
such as O’Grady and Willis. It is little wonder, then, that their descriptions of 
Barth’s ethics are predominantly negative at this point.
69 
In like manner Henry also finds the origins of Barth’s theological framework in 
philosophy,  but  argues  that  Barth  has  derived  the  categories  of  his  thought 
primarily  from  Kant.
70  Nevertheless,  Henry  argues  that  Barth  also  effects  a 
transformation of Kant’s thought by the imposition of his theological ontology 
with the result that ‘Kant and Barth travel the same road, but they start at opposite 
ends and travel in opposite directions.’
71 The result of this transformation, says 
Henry,  is  that  now  Barth’s  worldview  bears  striking  resemblance  to  the 
philosophical  idealism  of  Hegel.
72  This  is  not  because  Hegel  had  any  direct 
influence on  Barth’s thought, but because both Barth and  Hegel make similar 
transformations of Kant’s thought.
73 Certainly Barth’s familiarity and continued 
engagement  with  Kant  cannot  be  dismissed.
74  Nevertheless,  even  Henry’s 
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description  of  Barth’s  relation  to  Kant  indicates  not  so  much  dependence  as 
critique.  Again,  more  recent  commentators  have  argued  that  although  Barth 
retains some semantic links to Kantian thought, the actual use of his terminology 
and concepts owe more to Kutter than to Kantianism, and are employed more for 
rhetorical and critical purposes.
75 
Barth, of course, believed that his theological framework was predicated on the 
writings of Paul, explicated in accordance with his understanding of the task of 
hermeneutics,  in  the  cosmological  and  metaphysical  terminology  of  his  day. 
Perhaps the best account of the influences discerned in the theology of Romans I 
is delineated by Barth’s associate and biographer, Eberhard Busch, who suggests 
that Barth’s commentary reflects a Herrmannian focus on the concepts of life and 
actuality (together with Beck’s notion of how that life develops organically), the 
socialist insistence that God’s purpose is the establishing of a new world, and the 
influence of one particular group of pietists (several Swabian pietist theologians 
and  commentators;  Blumhardt  also  lived  and  ministered  in  this  area)  who 
emphasised the reality and coming of the kingdom of God.
76 
It was the constellation of these  ideas that influenced Barth’s approach to the 
interpretation  of  Paul’s  letter  to  the  Romans,  and  within  which  his  vision  of 
Christian and ecclesial existence was also nurtured. In the next section I take up 
an  explication  of  that  vision  beginning  with  the  troublesome  issue  of  human 
agency in Barth. 
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The Question of Human Agency 
The  previous  discussion  of  Barth’s  theological  framework  included  a  brief 
treatment of humanity under sin and the divine response to that sin in the death 
and resurrection of Jesus Christ by whom the eschatological  victory of  life  is 
inaugurated. This discussion also raises a question crucial to a consideration of 
Barth’s ethics, namely, whether his construal of the two-dimensional structure of 
reality,  together  with  the  objectivity  with  which  events  and  decisions  in  the 
jenseitig dimension are determinative for occurrences in the diesseitig dimension, 
serves  to  diminish  or  even  annul  the  reality  of  human  agency.  This  section, 
therefore, addresses this question by examining how Barth conceives of human 
agency at this stage of his career in face of the objectivity of the fall in Adam and 
the redemption in Christ.   
In the previous section we noted Barth’s contention that sin is humanity’s desire 
for  autonomy  over  against  God.
77  For  Barth,  as  we  saw,  this  sin  is  a  supra-
temporal decision of humanity, and as such it has become a ‘presupposition of all 
happening.’
78 It is clear that here Barth, while he is careful to qualify what he does 
not  intend,  does  depend  on  a  notion  of  original  sin  whereby  the  free  act  of 
separation  instigated  by  humanity  against  God  lies  at  the  base  of  all  human 
thought and action, and is the source of all ongoing incidents of sin on the earthly-
historical side of reality.
79 
Humanity, then, exists in a tension in which its sinfulness is both determined (on 
account of the solidarity which exists between Adam and every other person) and 
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freely chosen. The fall is the result of the ‘misused freedom of humanity,’
80 ‘the 
division of will into divine and human will’
81 by which the nature of humanity is 
‘poisoned’ by sin.
82  Sin  itself is  now an ‘organic  element’  in the world,
83  the 
movement of the power of disorganisation which characterises the ‘line of Adam’ 
so that the same quest for autonomy which displayed itself in Adam breaks forth 
inevitably in the life of every person. Barth does not seek to explain precisely how 
present human sinfulness is linked to that of Adam’s, except to say that 
[t]he  one  sin  of  humanity,  which  has  become  historical  with  [Adam], 
repeats, varies, and renews itself continually all through subsequent history, 
and we all loyally follow the way which he was the first to take.…The other-
side  hidden  fatal  determinant  of  our  existence  presses  toward  its 
consequence. We now stand objectively under the cosmic power of death. 
‘We are by nature children of wrath.’
84 
As it is the case that human sinfulness is both grounded outside the individual and 
yet is also freely chosen by the individual, so also with regard to salvation. Barth 
trenchantly  insists  that  the  individual  experience  of  salvation  is  merely  ‘the 
smallest part of a world-event,…a matter of world history,’ something which has 
befallen  us  from  entirely  other  dimensions.
85  To  construe  salvation  in  strictly 
individualist terms is the equivalent of seeking to value a single link in isolation 
from the chain of which it is part. 
This salvation  was  decisively accomplished on  our behalf  by God’s  action  in 
Jesus  Christ,  who  is  set over against  the  ‘whole  world of  “fall”  in  which the 
“falling” of Adam lives to the full again and again,’ as the ‘breakthrough of his 
plans, the vindication of his ways, the acquittal of the captive whole of men, the 
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disclosure of a new history.’
86 In Christ is established a new presupposition which 
was activated through the obedience of Christ in his death, where his will—a free 
and  wholly  human  will—is  at  one  with  God’s  will.
87  In  Christ  ‘a  changed 
disposition  of  the  whole  of  life  in  its  relation  to  the  Origin  breaks  through 
(durchbricht) and becomes visible.’
88 God’s gift to the world in Christ is that ‘the 
freedom of humanity from fate is re-established with the same universal validity 
with which it was lost in Adam. As a gift from heaven it has come to us as the 
inauguration of a  new relationship  to  life…a  new  causality  in which a  future 
slumbers which will be other than the past.’
89 
It is evident that Barth’s soteriology is grounded in the objectivity of a world-
reconciliation accomplished in Christ, not by way of penal substitution (‘God is 
spiritually richer than that!’
90) but by God’s action of calling light out of darkness 
in  the  establishment  of  a  new  creation.
91  This  objectivity,  however,  does  not 
obviate the need for human decision. Rather, God’s action has introduced a ‘new 
causality’ which frees the individual to reverse the decision of autonomy by which 
they have fallen away from God, and to follow Christ in his obedience to God. 
The  liberation  of  the  human  will  is  not  an  automatic  accomplishment  or  an 
enacted divine fiat, for, as Barth says, 
[t]he coming world comes not mechanically, but organically. And the means 
by which this is to occur is an anticipation of the goal to be reached: the free 
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union  of  humanity  with God, as it  was accomplished in Christ and  as it 
becomes possible and actual in those called by Christ.
92 
The objective pole of Barth’s soteriology, then, is balanced by a subjective pole in 
which Barth makes genuine place for human agency, albeit an agency which can 
only function as it is freed by God. Thus Barth introduces the theme of Romans as 
follows: 
Our  theme  is  our  knowledge  of  God  realised  in  Christ,  in  which  God 
approaches  us,  not  as  an  object  but  immediately  and  creatively.  In  this 
knowledge  we  not  only  see  but  are  seen,  not  only  understand  but  are 
understood, not only grasp but are grasped.
93 
It is clear that for Barth, the knowledge of God refers not simply to an objective 
knowledge, whereby one might know without participation in and with that which 
is known, but to a self-involving, relational knowledge. This knowledge arises out 
of divine-human encounter and has the character of response to divine initiative. 
Being grasped by God does not spell the end of human freedom but its genesis, 
for humanity in sin is not free but enslaved. Nevertheless, through the objective 
redemption accomplished for us in Christ, God has claimed humanity for himself, 
and  in  so  doing  has  created  a  new  possibility  for  humanity.  In  a  remarkable 
passage Barth says ‘Now humanity may and can and should willingly become 
aware of itself once more! To be sure, we are imprisoned, but we are called to 
freedom and a lane is made for freedom. To which side will humanity say Yes?’
94 
In light of Barth’s view of sin as the quest for autonomy, this is an astonishing 
statement. The quest for autonomy, for self-awareness and expression in Adam is 
original  sin.  Now,  in  accordance  with  the  new  presupposition  created  by  the 
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coming of Christ, humanity ‘may and can and should’ become self-aware. Barth 
says  simply  that  once  people  are  released  from  coercion  they  may  become 
themselves once more since they are God’s.
95 In the re-establishment of human 
dependence upon God, humanity finds not only freedom, but authentic existence 
as well. 
As  already  noted,  the  means  by  which  this  remarkable  transformation  of  the 
human will from captivity to liberty occurs is nothing less than a new creative act 
of God. His response to the desperate fallenness, chaos and brokenness of the 
world  in  general  and  humanity  in  particular  is  ‘the  inauguration  of  a  new 
history…with a sea of darkness God begins, and he ends, by calling light out of 
darkness.’
96 Again, Barth writes of a new creation in the midst of the old world by 
which the new possibility is opened for humanity to live in fulfilment of God’s 
will: ‘God has spoken a second Let there be! by giving his own son in the old 
world:  the  new  human  who  through  his  immediacy  to  God,  an  immediacy 
untouched by Adam’s fall, was himself able to become the beginning of a new 
humanity and a new world.’
97 
This new world and the possibility contained in it breaks forth into individual 
human lives through the hearing of the gospel proclamation,
98 whereby 
[i]f one says Yes to the divine Yes which in Christ has been spoken to them, 
if they make use of the new eyes and ears which have been given to them 
through the power of God, if the faithfulness of God who cannot abandon 
the world and humanity encounters a newly awakened faithfulness in return, 
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that is ‘faith.’ There salvation begins. There the world-turning founded in 
Christ continues.
99 
Barth’s  view  of  salvation  in  Romans  I,  then,  includes  a  strong  and  positive 
affirmation of the reality and necessity of human agency. While it is certainly true 
that the knowledge of God which arises in faith is the result of divine creative 
activity, it is nonetheless a self-involving form of knowledge by which a free and 
definite response is called forth from the believer. For Barth, both the objective 
and subjective poles of salvation are necessary if God’s righteousness is to be 
established on earth.
100 
Further, while it is undeniable that much development would occur in Barth’s 
treatment of this theme over the course of his lifetime, we see already in this early 
period the beginnings of his distinctive ordering of divine and human agency. God 
and humanity are placed over against one another, not as equal subjects, but as 
subjects-in-relation  in  which  human  subjectivity  is  always  derivative  and 
contingent upon prior divine subjectivity. Barth’s refusal to ground the divine-
human  relation  in  subjectivist  terms  from  the  human  side  does  not  entail  the 
abolition  of  human agency,  but its establishing  on a  different  foundation.  His 
manner  of  construing  this  relation  with  regard  to  salvation  bears  significant 
implications for his understanding of Christian life as we shall see shortly. But 
before turning our attention to his positive instruction with regard to Christian 
existence, it will be beneficial to examine his negative characterisation of religion 
and ethics in order to bring his positive statements into sharper relief. 
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Barth’s Critique of Religion and Ethics 
It comes as no surprise to find that the severe critique of religion and church seen 
in Barth’s earlier works comes to fuller expression in Romans I without any loss 
of  his  rhetorical  flourish.  In  this  work  Barth  continues  his  insistence  that  the 
dawning kingdom of God is not a human possibility, nor a development within 
existing  life  possibilities,  but  the  inbreaking  of  divine  power  creating  a  new 
possibility of life.
101 Because this is so, the kingdom of God cannot be identified 
with any human movement, including especially the church, but also other groups 
and movements such as idealism, morality, pacifism or social democracy.
102 
For Barth, all human distinctions between the religious and the irreligious, the 
moral and the immoral are relativised in the presence of God: ‘The difference 
between the mountain and the valley becomes meaningless when the sun at its 
zenith fills both with its light.’
103 Indeed, Barth is able to list the church along with 
‘mammon, war and the state’ as a ‘characteristic outbreak’ of sin!
104 Its history, a 
‘mishmash  of  error  and  violence,’  serves  as  proof  that  the  church  is  itself 
implicated in ‘the whole world of the fall in which the “falling” of Adam lives to 
the full again and again, the whole confusion of sin’ and is thus part of the ‘chaos 
over against God as in the beginning.’
105 
In  a  reference  to  the  early  days  of  his  own  pastoral  career  Barth  recalls  the 
triumphal attitude of the church and religion in 1909-12 which had become an 
‘immensely prominent power.’ He alludes to the publication of the influential Die 
Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, the student movement of John Mott, the 
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World Missions Conference in Edinburgh in 1910, and the International Socialist 
Congress in Basle in 1912.
106 His complaint against these groups and movements 
was that God was expected to crown the  valiant efforts of humanity with  his 
blessing. Nevertheless 
everything was always settled without God.…The fear of the Lord did not 
stand objectively at the beginning of our wisdom.…From God’s standpoint 
that is more of a hindrance than a help, since it continues to delude people 
about the need for the coming of his kingdom. Our ‘movements’ then stand 
directly in the way of God’s movement; our ‘causes’ hinder his cause, the 
richness of our ‘life’ hinders the tranquil growth of the divine life in the 
world.…The collapse of our cause must demonstrate for once that God’s 
cause is exclusively his own. That is where we stand today.
107 
Barth rejected, therefore, the ecclesial triumphalism of the pre-war era, and with 
it, all forms of hero worship. In particular, he also launched an attack on Pietism, 
which  he  developed  as  the  dominant  foil  for  his  thought  regarding  religious 
individualism.
108 
Barth’s Polemic against Pietism 
As already noted, Barth’s interest in Pietism was evident at the very beginning of 
January, 1916, when he wrote to Thurneysen that he had been reading Ritschl’s 
history of Pietism.
109 In November of the same year, soon after commencing his 
exegetical investigation of Romans, he writes again several times to Thurneysen 
regarding a Pietist evangelist named Jakob Vetter who had conducted a preaching 
campaign  in  Safenwil.
110  Barth  found  himself  won  over  by  Vetter’s  friendly 
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humour, and writes that ‘personally he is most certainly an agreeable religious 
man.’
111 Nevertheless, his evaluation of Vetter’s message is less amenable: 
But the things, the things—that for eight whole days he kept proclaiming up 
there—these are really not the gospel but rather a quite bad form of religious 
mechanics. If this were ‘Pietism,’ we would never again believe that there 
was even the slightest point of contact between us and the Pietists. Their 
intentions  would  really  be  something  totally  different  from  ours.  This  is 
psychologizing in its worst form, just a describing of ‘Christian’ spiritual 
experiences….No, that really isn’t it.
112 
Barth reveals his own pastoral and evangelistic concern when he laments that, ‘the 
result will probably be that a number of the men from now on will be still more 
inaccessible than ever.’
113 Vetter’s campaign had the effect of motivating Barth to 
undertake an intensive study of Pietism lasting about six months, during which 
time his work on Romans slowed virtually to a standstill. Barth particularly read 
the biographies and theology of nineteenth century Pietist revivalists as a means to 
access and understand their concerns.
114 
The above citation is illuminating on several counts. First, and most importantly, 
it  shows  that  Barth  believed  that  there  was  a  degree  of  overlap  between  the 
theological  position  he  and  Thurneysen  represented  and  Pietism.  Second,  he 
implies that the form of religion represented by Vetter as Pietism is something 
less  than  (true)  Pietism,  a  departure  from  the  gospel  for  a  form  of  religious 
mechanics and ‘psychologism.’ In his commentary on Romans, therefore, it is this 
particular form of revivalist Pietism that is most likely the focus of Barth’s attack. 
In  his  carefully  nuanced  study  of  Barth’s  relationship  with  Pietism,  Busch 
suggests that Barth employed the insights of one particular stream of Pietism—the 
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Swabian Pietists including Bengel, Rieger and Beck—in order to launch his attack 
against the kind of Pietism represented by Vetter.
115 Because of the centrality of 
the  notion  of  the  kingdom of  God in the theology  of  the  Swabian  Pietists,  a 
‘critical barb against “individualism” had been part of it for a long time.’
116 It is 
the form of Pietism represented by Vetter, therefore, which was of concern to 
Barth,  and  against  which  his  polemics  raged.  Barth  refers  to  ‘the  old 
individualistic horror of Pietism, whose dead ends and mistakes we have escaped 
in Christ.’
117 He rejoices that we may ‘return from the psychological depression in 
which the  horror lives, from the inferno of Pietism, where  the  demons  are  at 
work.’
118 
The problem with this form of Pietism, according to Barth, was its determined 
focus on the human soul, and its unrelenting concern for ‘individual breakthrough, 
individual conversion,  individual sanctification, individual  salvation,  individual 
bliss.’
119 For Barth, religious individualism was simply another variety of the more 
thoroughgoing  individualism  which  characterises  human  existence  under  the 
conditions  of  the  Fall,  and  as  such,  it  shares  the  same  dark  nature  of  the 
unredeemed world which is far from God.
120 Thus although the Pietists saw the 
need for redemption from the fallen and sinful  world, because their model of 
spirituality  shared  the  basic  pattern  of  human  sinfulness  with  the  world,  they 
could not achieve their desired goal. The ‘religious mechanics’ about which Barth 
complained to Thurneysen are nothing more than vain and all-too-human attempts 
to produce redemption by one’s own doing. Such efforts, suggests Barth, may 
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perhaps lead one ‘to the higher realms of the earth, but not into the kingdom of 
heaven.’
121 God’s kingdom is his own work and issues in the new world, which as 
a seed was planted in Christ. It is not the result of our own efforts, or of practices 
deriving from the old world. Only by being planted in Christ and thus ‘growing 
organically’ can we experience the new world.
122 
Barth was also critical of Pietism on account of its tendency to foster separation of 
itself from the world,  rather  than solidarity with  it.  In a  famous statement he 
insists that he ‘would rather be in hell with the world church than in heaven with 
Pietism.…In this case Christ is with us in hell.’
123 There is little doubt that the 
ferocious irony of this phrase serves as a rebuke to the sectarian character of 
Pietism  which  accused  those  churches  who  accepted  all  and  sundry  into 
membership, of being ‘of Satan.’
124 Barth assails the Pietist assurance of purity 
and salvation by insisting that Christ himself has chosen solidarity with the world 
rather than separation from it, and hence is amongst those rejected by the Pietists. 
In their moralistic attempts to secure salvation for themselves, they have distanced 
themselves from the Saviour and have thus failed to secure the very salvation they 
seek. 
In Barth’s ruthless critique of Pietism, therefore, we hear echoes of the themes he 
introduced  in  the  works  examined  in  the  previous  chapter,  including  his 
conviction that God alone establishes his kingdom, the ‘worldliness’ of God, and 
the strident critique of religious reductionism wherein religion and salvation are 
wholly concerned with individual and interior realities. For Barth, as this thesis 
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argues, Christian and ecclesial existence can never be an attempt at one’s own 
sanctity at the expense of the world that God has created, loved and redeemed. 
Christian life and ministry necessarily presupposes solidarity with and presence in 
the world if it is to be a legitimate and faithful representation of Christ. Barth’s 
critique  also  reveals  the  close  connection  he  observed  between  religion  and 
morality, as we shall now see. 
Immoral Morality 
Barth explicates his understanding of this connection in his exposition of Romans 
1:18-21, which he entitles simply, ‘The Fall.’
125 In this section Barth analyses the 
character of the sin which has infected all humanity, and lays the foundation for 
his rejection of religion. In his discussion of Paul’s contention that ‘the wrath of 
God is revealed from heaven against all a*sevbeian kaiV a*dikivan of men,’ Barth 
interprets  a*sevbeian  (wickedness  or ungodliness)  as  a reference  to humanity’s 
irreligiosity,  and  a*dikivan  (unrighteousness)  to  its  immorality,  and  further 
suggests that the former is an outgrowth of the latter. The deepest basis of human 
opposition  to  God  is  found  in  humanity’s  self-exaltation  against  God  which 
subsequently issues in idolatry.
126  
For Barth at this time, the root of sin was the positing of the self as its own centre 
of  value, thereby  usurping  and rejecting the place  of  God. Because  humanity 
refuses to acknowledge God as God, and insists on the contrary to have God on 
their own terms, they lose God himself. Instead of acknowledging its ‘absolute 
dependence’ on  God by  ‘lying down  honestly  and  submissively  in  his  hand,’ 
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humanity establishes itself next to or alongside God autonomous in its morality.
127 
Humanity,  therefore,  has  knowledge  (Kenntnis)  of  God,  but  not  ‘effectual 
knowledge’ (Erkenntnis).
128 That is, humanity has knowledge about God, but fails 
to enter into the reality of knowing and being known by God, into the dynamic 
and  creative  relation  that  occurs  when  his  faithfulness  awakens  and  finds  the 
corresponding faithfulness of humanity. God, therefore, remains ever external and 
distant,  and  although  humanity  knows  of  God,  it  does  not  experience  the 
transformative power of the ‘effectual knowledge’ of which Barth speaks. 
This is not to suggest that Barth dismisses morality and ethics as irrelevant. In a 
discussion  about  the  function  of  the  law  based  on  Romans  5:20-21,  he 
acknowledges that the law, too, is a word of God, ‘only not the last.’
129 As such, 
the law, and hence for Barth morality, has only penultimate significance. While 
morality may have projects and retrospective judgements, ‘it has no word to speak 
through which non-being would be called into being. It is not creative.…It does 
not  contribute  at  the  crucial  point.’
130  Morality  issues  only  in  the  effectual 
knowledge (Erkenntnis) of sin, not the effectual knowledge of God in which lies 
the creative and transformative power of God. Barth insists, therefore, that ‘it 
must be declared: we boast of the world-redemption on the basis of the world-
reconciliation,  and we do  not  conceive  of  it  in  fact  in terms of morality  and 
immorality.’
131 The problem of morality is that it fails to consider the reality of our 
situation from the standpoint of grace: ‘Must we continually think in terms of 
                                                
127 Barth, Romans I, 25, 30. 
128 Barth, Romans I, 30. 
129 Barth, Romans I, 201.  
130 Barth, Romans I, 200-201. 
131 Barth, Romans I, 200.          150 
morality,  as  if  nothing  had  happened?  Must  we  continually  think  from  the 
perspective of Adam and Israel?’
132 
Barth’s  ‘as  if  nothing  had  happened’  is  the  key  to  his  ethical  thought.  He 
steadfastly  refuses  to  allow  ethics  or  morality  an  independent  sphere  of 
deliberation. The event of God’s grace in Christ has occurred and has thus created 
the new presupposition under which we now live. Barth continues, therefore: 
Grace abounds. It enters even as grace, as the free gift of God’s act for us 
through the creation of a new situation, because of which the problem of 
morality  becomes superfluous. In  Christ, Adam and  Israel  are  redeemed. 
And so morality cannot be the question which occupies us in earnest…but 
rather the question is whether we want to accept the reconciliation, enter into 
it, be in Christ, place ourselves on the foundation which has been laid. Here 
is the decisive question. Here we become earnest. Here our heart burns and 
our conscience afflicts us.
133 
For Barth, the question of human righteousness and human activity gives way 
before the righteousness and activity of God, although without the abolition of the 
former. Barth sets the question of human activity on an entirely new foundation so 
that  human  activity  has  the  character  of  response  to  what  God  has  done  and 
continues  to do.  Clearly,  his intent is  to  challenge the  idealist  notion that the 
human  self  may  be  constructed  through  the  autonomous  generation  of  moral 
imperatives.
134 His critique of ethical idealism is grounded upon his analysis of sin 
as the human quest for autonomy. As such, all human attempts to identify, define 
and  perform  the  good  are  not  only  manifestations  of  the  pervasive  sin  of 
humanity,  but  are  also  doomed  to  fail,  because  moral  norms  thus  generated 
confront  the  person  as  an  external  demand  which  must  be  fulfilled  by  the 
individual, that is, as law. Thus, as McCormack has noted, ‘idealistic morality can 
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only postulate the good; it cannot bring it to life…ultimately [it] crashes on the 
rocks of the fact that the good cannot be done by the sinner (i.e. by the individual 
qua individual).’
135 
In this respect, then, Barth’s critique of morality corresponds to his critique of 
religion. Precisely because the dawning kingdom of God is neither a goal nor a 
result of human design or activity, there can be no confusing of divine renewal 
with  human  progress.
136  This  refusal  to  allow  an  identification  of  divine  and 
human  activity  serves  a  dual  purpose.  First,  Barth  disallows  a  religious 
legitimation of the status quo. While Christians have a responsibility to pay their 
taxes and to give honour to whom honour is due, they must go no further: ‘Fulfil 
your duties without illusion, but no compromising of God. Payment of tax, but no 
incense to Caesar! Citizens initiative and civic obedience, but no combination of 
throne and altar, no Christian Patriotism.’
137 Second, and in contrast to this, Barth 
also disallows the identification of the kingdom of God with movements seeking 
social change. Thus, he continues, ‘strike and general strike, and street-fighting if 
needs be, but no religious justification and glorification of it! Military service as 
soldier or officer if needs be, but under no circumstances army chaplain! Social 
democratic but not religious socialist! The betrayal of the gospel is not part of 
your political duty.’
138 
Thus, both conservative and radical alike are refused divine authorisation for their 
programmes and activities. Barth’s refusal to provide religious legitimation for the 
bourgeois culture is of a piece with his critique of the church generally, and, in 
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light of his socialist background, unsurprising. Also anticipated is the sharpening 
of his critique of Religious Socialism into a forthright repudiation of the theology 
of  Ragaz.  Barth  rejects  the  supposition  of  Ragaz  that  the  Religious  Socialist 
movement was a vehicle by which the kingdom of God would be realised on 
earth, along with its underlying (bourgeois) conviction that the human agent is the 
subject of history.
139 
Barth likewise resisted the growing sentiment toward political revolution in the 
aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. For Barth, the replacement of one 
form of state with another by way of armed insurrection was nothing more than a 
capitulation to the means and methods of the fallen aeon—the threat and actual 
use of coercive force—the result being the replacing of one unjust order with 
another of the same ilk.
140 Instead, Barth longed for ‘the absolute revolution of 
God,’
141 by which he means the overturning of all worldly values and dominion 
through the divine establishing of God’s kingdom. 
Ethical Idealism in Barth? 
The  question  which  forces  itself  upon  us  at  this  point  is  clear:  does  Barth’s 
exclusion  of  both  radical  and  reactionary  ethics  imply  a  quietist  ethic  and 
spirituality?  Does  his  eschatological  construal  of  reality  render  Christian  and 
ecclesial existence essentially passive, a sombre waiting for the divine realisation 
of the kingdom of God? At times his rhetoric seems to suggest so: ‘On the basis of 
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the ultimate viewpoint which we must adopt in Christ, there are no ethics, there is 
only the movement of God.’
142 
Some scholars suggest that in Romans I Barth has not succeeded in setting forth a 
comprehensive ethic. McCormack,  for example,  regards  Barth’s  reflections  on 
ethics as belonging to the weakest sections of the commentary.
143 He suggests that 
this weakness is a developmental issue because Barth has not yet developed the 
means by which  he might make clear how  human action could correspond to 
divine action without removing the distinction between the two.
144 In his effort to 
reject every  attempt to ‘Christianize’ particular political options, Barth fails to 
consistently apply his new theological insight into the sovereignty of God. Thus 
according  to  McCormack,  despite  his  thorough-going  criticism  of  ethical 
idealism,  Barth  himself  resorts  to  idealistic  morality  in  his  discussion  of  the 
‘ethics of the confused situation,’ in particular, his discussion of political realities 
in Romans 13:1-7.  
In his exegesis of this passage Barth utilises a citation from Troeltsch to explicate 
the revolutionary stance of the believer in regard to the existing state, although he 
certainly  departs  from  Troeltsch’s  intention:  ‘The  conservative  attitude  (of 
Christianity)…was founded on a mixture of contempt, submission, and relative 
recognition. That is why, in spite of all its submissiveness, it destroyed the Roman 
state by alienating souls from its ideals.’
145 By refusing to accord ultimate status, 
and thus loyalty to the state, the believer relegates the state to a penultimate level 
and creates the presupposition for the kingdom of God, ‘the absolute revolution of 
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God.’
146 The state, along with all that is penultimate has already fallen into ‘the 
process of dissolution,’ and Christians are to seek neither its preservation nor its 
destruction as a goal in itself.
147  Rather, they are to negate and subvert the state by 
denying its fundamental legitimacy. 
Barth’s use of the term revolution at this time is hardly coincidental. Nevertheless 
his characterisation of Christian life as revolutionary bears a very different hue to 
the revolutionary methods and ideals espoused and enacted by the socialists and 
communists. Barth writes, ‘Your state and your revolution are in heaven.’
148 While 
Barth  held  great  sympathy  for  the  revolutionaries,  and  refused  to  rule  out 
Christian  participation  in  an  uprising  against  an  unjust  state,  he  still  clearly 
favoured working within the parameters of the existing state, for the simple reason 
that it is impossible to overcome evil with evil. In the final analysis, political, and 
especially armed, revolution could not achieve the goals it set for itself.
149 The 
revolution of Christ is of a different order. Barth claims that Christianity 
is  more  than  Leninism!  So  far  as  Christianity  is  concerned  it  is  ‘all  or 
nothing’  in  the  sense  that  its  expectation  is  not…the  aim  or  result  of  a 
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development or a gradual ascent of humanity, but the discovery of a new 
creation or the content of a new knowledge (Erkenntnis). This programme 
cannot become the object of ‘ethics.’ The Christ-life must grow in its own 
power.
150 
Because no human action can in and of itself inaugurate the righteousness of the 
kingdom, revolution is doomed to supplant one evil system with another. It will 
share the same fundamental weakness of the system it replaces, namely a reliance 
on coercive power which stands in antithesis to the righteousness and freedom of 
the ‘state of God.’ According to Barth, a state established on such power is evil in 
itself.
151 What is required is the new creation that only God can produce, and 
which is at work in the movement of God. The stance of the Christian and the 
church toward the existing state is revolutionary in that it denies in principle the 
use of coercive power in favour of an order of mutual freedom and love.
152 
It is at this point that the inconsistency observed by McCormack in Barth’s ethical 
vision surfaces, for believers cannot with good conscience involve themselves in 
politics, nor can they withdraw from the political arena in pursuit of a Christian 
asceticism. Barth has already lambasted the Pietists for their sectarian withdrawal 
into a supposed ‘spiritual’ realm of existence separate from the desperate realities 
of the world. Here, too, such withdrawal only serves to confirm the status quo and 
thus to implicate the Christian in the evil that presently exists. ‘“Personal life,”’ 
says Barth, ‘is no longer the answer to world war and revolution.…Whoever will 
not join in solidarity with what is happening on the outside will not save his own 
soul either.’
153 Thus the believer is cast into the fatally ‘confused situation’ where 
the  only  choice  is  between  complicity  in  evil  by  engaging  in  politics  or  by 
                                                
150 Barth, Romans I, 506-507.  
151 Barth, Romans I, 501. 
152 Barth, Romans I, 503-504. See also McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 174.  
153 Barth, Romans I, 489.          156 
avoiding it. It is impossible not to share the guilt which accrues to all political 
activity.
154  McCormack,  as  we  have  seen,  finds  in  Barth’s  treatment  of  the 
‘confused situation’ evidence that Barth lapses into Kantian idealism, failing to 
apply  his  insight  into  the  sovereignty  of  God.  The  believer  is  caught  in  an 
impossible  dilemma  and  must  decide  in  accordance  with  the  dictate  of  their 
conscience and their best judgement what they should do.
155 Gorringe suggests 
that  Barth’s  refusal  to  offer  prescriptive  guidance  for  the  confused  situation, 
serves to protect the immediacy of the divine command.
156 While this suggestion 
has obvious merit, it overlooks the fact that if that were indeed Barth’s intent here, 
he  need  not  have  been  so  pessimistic  in  the  face  of  the  so-called  ‘confused 
situation.’ 
The correctness of McCormack’s judgement is also evident in the citations above 
where one’s political involvement might include either civic obedience or street-
fighting,  depending  on  the  dictates  of  one’s  conscience.  Caught  in  the  tragic 
situation  where  one  cannot  continue  to  support  a  legitimately  constituted  but 
unjust civic authority, but where one also recognises that revolution is inevitably 
mired in human injustice and unrighteousness, one must act boldly and decisively 
as  the  situation requires, inescapably  involving  oneself  in the  inherent  evil of 
political striving for power, and trusting in God for the forgiveness of even ‘our 
political sins.’
157 
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Spencer  follows  McCormack  at  this  point,  but  also  suggests  that  part  of  the 
weakness is due to Barth’s rhetorical purpose in Romans I, which is largely the 
negative task of a thorough critique of ethical  idealism. Spencer suggests that 
although Barth does present an embryonic form of a divine command ethic, ‘it is 
continually submerged in favour of this negative task.’
158 
In this section, then, we have observed that Barth ruthlessly critiques a particular 
expression of Christian and ecclesial existence—that which seeks its own sanctity 
and  salvation  in  supposed  separation  from  the  evil  of  the  world,  and  at  the 
expense of engagement with the desperate realities of worldly life. He also aims 
his critique at a particular form of ethics—that which seeks to establish its own 
vision of the good independently of the goodness God has created and creates 
through  his  gracious  work  in  Jesus  Christ.  This  dual  critique  is  obviously  in 
service  of  a  more  positive  statement  of  both  religious  practice  and  ethical 
existence. That Barth appears unable at this time to present a fully coherent ethical 
vision does not suggest that he has no sense of the nature and shape of Christian 
and ecclesial existence, or of the need Christians have for guidance in facing the 
dilemmas confronting them. In fact, careful attention to his work indicates that 
Barth had a quite specific, albeit underdeveloped sense of the shape of Christian 
life. The positive delineation of this vision is the focus of the final two sections. 
Life in the Third Dimension: Christian Existence in Romans I 
Despite the  fact that Barth’s energies  in  this work  are  more directed  towards 
demolition than construction, the preceding discussion suggests that Barth indeed 
had a particular understanding of the nature of Christian existence at this stage of 
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his career. We have noted, for example, that Barth’s soteriology rotates around 
both an objective and a subjective pole, and that the establishment of Christian 
existence requires a free exercise of human volition. Significant for our purposes 
here is the recognition that for Barth, Christian existence continues and develops 
in the same manner in which it began, that is, as faithful response to the prior and 
initiatory divine faithfulness which has come and comes to us in Christ.
159 
Barth’s  identification  of  the  quest  for  autonomy  as  original  sin,  and  his 
thoroughgoing  critique  of  Pietist  individualism,  are  alike  instructive  for 
highlighting the  contours of his Christian and ecclesial  vision. If the essential 
character  of  sin  is  humanity’s  refusal  to  ‘simply  be  God’s,’  that  is,  ‘to  live 
directly, firmly, child-like, simply, actually in the spirit,’ then it is evident that 
Barth considers the Christian life to be characterised by precisely this form of 
demeanour.
160 The nature of Christian existence is recognition of God as God, and 
a corresponding falling down before God in free and glad submission. Nor does 
this require the super-heated piety of the Pietists, which is simply a variant form 
of self-grounded spirituality.  In a withering blast directed toward both liberal and 
Pietist humanity, Barth writes, ‘He becomes his own delight and his own problem. 
He climbs too high into sublime spiritualisation and, shuddering, looks down into 
the depths of Satan and both times departs equally far from the innocence of the 
Holy  Spirit.’
161  For  Barth,  genuine  spirituality  is  characterised  by  faith  which 
looks away from the self towards God. 
Also evident from the discussion above is Barth’s opposition to the Pietist strategy 
of withdrawal from the world which underlines his conviction that Christian and 
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ecclesial existence is necessarily an existence in, amongst and for the world at 
large. Since Christ himself has chosen solidarity with the world, the church can do 
no other. 
Similarly, his rejection of Pietist ‘mechanics’ and the ecclesial triumphalism of 
the pre-war period is predicated on his conviction that the kingdom of God comes 
‘organically’  as  a  new  creation  which  is  wholly  the  work  of  God:  ‘Our 
“movements” stand directly in the way of God’s movement; our “causes” hinder 
his cause, the richness of our “life” hinders the quiet growth of the divine life in 
the world.…The Christ-life must grow in its own power.’
162 The form of Christian 
and ecclesial existence that corresponds to this divinely quiet action and growth is 
‘quiet waiting.’
163 If believers would ‘stand before God in steady growth’ they 
would have no further need of a ‘heated piety.’
164 ‘Do we still want always to be 
serious and solemn and mechanical,’ asks Barth, ‘where we simply ought to grow 
happily  in  Christ?’
165 Clearly, Barth  has  in mind the  kind of quiet  waiting  he 
learned from Blumhardt, which is a waiting in service of hastening, and which, 
accordingly, is not to be construed in terms of a quietist ethic. 
The Movement of God 
Barth’s  complaint  that  ‘our  movements  stand  directly  in  the  way  of  God’s 
movement’ leads us into the heart of his Christian and ecclesial vision in Romans 
I.  We  have  previously  noted  that  Barth’s  theological  ontology  in  this  work 
envisages a two-dimensional world, where the ontological priority lies with the 
jenseitig  dimension  of  reality,  and  the  whole  is  cast  in  an  eschatological 
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framework. As a result of human sin, the entire diesseitig dimension of reality has 
come under the terrible lordship of death which is itself a ‘perverted, downward, 
centrifugal,  disintegrating  movement,’  which  drives  everything  away  from  its 
centre in God.
166 It is precisely as a counter-movement against this movement of 
death and alienation that God has acted in Christ. In Barth’s words, ‘it is God who 
proceeds, not us. It is power which has proceeded from God in the resurrection of 
Christ from the dead.’
167 Barth insists that the sending of Christ was neither  a 
necessary truth of reason nor an accidental truth of history. Rather it is understood 
only  as  a  movement  or  counter-movement  following  the  perverted  movement 
within the first creation, a movement which has its origin not in history but in God 
himself.  As  the  old  aeon  was  inaugurated  by  the  human  seizure  of  divine 
prerogatives, so the new aeon was brought about by the forgiving descent by God 
into the midst of the old world.
168 
In Christ, then, God has initiated a movement, one in which God himself is in 
eschatological procession. It must be remembered, however, that Barth conceives 
of this procession in terms of actualistic breakthroughs, so that while it is ever 
pressing  toward  the  realisation  of  the  kingdom of  God,  its  appearance  in  the 
diesseitig dimension is often in hiddenness, and hence it is not ‘a state of affairs, 
nor an actuality, not a stable “reality!”…it is a matter of a course, a movement, a 
struggling and a triumphing.’
169 This is also the case with Barth’s use of the image 
of Christ as the divine seed planted and growing in the world. The seed does not 
take on a life of its own as though it were capable of growth without continuous 
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divine intervention.
170 Nevertheless, as Chalamet has shown, Barth’s use of the 
organic image functioned to subvert his intent in this commentary. Although he 
used the organic imagery in order to emphasise the hiddenness of the kingdom, in 
the nature of the case, as the ‘seed’ (the kingdom) grows, its presence becomes 
less hidden and more obvious so that ‘God’s reality erupts into the old aeon and 
thus ceases to be hidden.’
171  
Nevertheless, the actualistic portrayal of the divine movement within history is 
also  indicative  of  the  fundamentally  unstable  character  of  Christian  existence 
when viewed from the side of humanity. McCormack correctly notes that Barth’s 
use of the two dimensions of reality 
serves as a circumlocution for two ways of being in the world which Barth 
refers  to…as  ‘Adam’  and  ‘Christ.’  ‘Adam’  and  ‘Christ’  stand  for  two 
movements: a movement away from an original relationship of fellowship 
with  God  (Fall)  and  a  counter-movement  of  return  to  the  ‘Origin’ 
(Reconciliation).  These  two  movements  are  not  to  be  conceived  of  as 
sequential, but rather as parallel and simultaneous.
172 
Both the line of Adam and the line of Christ pass through every human existence 
in such a way that the person is continually confronted with the decision regarding 
whether they will live in accordance with the line of Adam and the verdict of sin 
and death, or with the line of Christ and the verdict of righteousness and life.
173 
And  while  it  is  the  case  that  the  Christian  is  ‘much  more  in  Christ  than  in 
Adam,’
174 it is also the case that their status before God is highly provisional, 
depending moment by moment on whether genuine faith is present.
175 
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McCormack’s  note  that  these  ‘two  ways  of  being  in  the  world’  are  to  be 
understood as ‘parallel and simultaneous’ also identifies what Barth refers to ‘the 
crucial problem of human life: on which line we find ourselves and under which 
verdict we thus place ourselves.’
176 It is precisely at this juncture that Barth rejects 
the  role  of  idealistic  morality  on  the  grounds  that  although  it  can  indeed 
accompany  the  believer  as  a  ‘searchlight’  in  the  struggle  between  the  great 
realities of Adam and Christ, ‘it has no word to speak through which non-being 
would be called into being. It is not creative.…It does not contribute at the crucial 
point.’
177 Barth reasons that once morality is allowed to become an independent 
object of thought, 
[o]ur  participation  in  God’s  victorious  struggle…becomes  endangered, 
because  we  lose  the  meaning  of  the  third  dimension,  of  the  movement 
itself.…Because we do not want that, we do not grant an independent place 
to the moral question. It will find its answer in the context of the whole, in 
the movement.
178 
Here,  finally,  we  gain  the  crucial  insight  into  Barth’s  Christian  and  ecclesial 
vision in Romans I, as well as an understanding of his provocative, and often 
misunderstood statement that ‘in accordance with the ultimate position we must 
take in Christ, there are no ethics. There is only the movement of God.’
179 Genuine 
Christian existence  is  being  caught up  in  ‘the  third  dimension,’ that  is, being 
grasped and led by the Spirit in the eschatological movement and procession of 
God. For Barth in this period, Christian faith and life is not something a person 
‘possesses,’ nor is it something grounded in Christians themselves. Rather, it is 
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the result of being grasped and placed into a new order or context of being, as 
Barth insists: 
Grace  is  no  ‘experience.’…That  is  a  prejudice  of  Pietism  and  a  modern 
theology  which…reads  with  Pietist  glasses.  Grace  obviously  will  not  be 
without  experiences; but grace is primarily the  divine presupposition, the 
new order under which we are placed, the altered world-context into which 
our lives are inserted.
180 
The Body of Christ 
Rather than a stable or static possession, then, Christian life is the very act of the 
person’s  life  as  they  are  grasped  by  God  and  respond  in  faithfulness  to  the 
decision with which they are continually confronted. In response to the question, 
‘What shall I do?’ Barth replies: 
Answer: Above all stop asking that question! Every word of this question is 
ambiguous and confused. For it abolishes freedom once again, placing itself 
next  to  the  creative  power  of  the  good  under  which  we  are  placed  in 
Christ.…We  are  to  remain  in  the  ‘body  of  Christ,’  in  the  power  of  the 
resurrection  inaugurated  in  him  in  which  all  moral  obligation  proceeds 
organically out of the new ‘being in the Spirit,’ in which the good is not 
something problematic, but rather only something which occurs.
181 
It is evident that Barth, in this text, casts Christian existence in a passive light. 
Here, it seems, it is not so much that people live the Christian life, as it arises in 
them and is lived through them. Nonetheless, in light of the preceding discussion, 
it is evident that Barth’s distinctive ordering of divine and human volition cannot 
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be ignored. The moral imperatives which characterise the good are not a dilemma 
to be  investigated  or agonised over, but rather ‘proceed organically’ from the 
power of the resurrection at work in the world, and ‘occur’ in the life of the one 
who ‘abides’ in it. This abiding, of course, is critical. Earlier in his treatment of 
Romans, Barth states that ‘the righteousness of God, where it finds faith, transfers 
us into a movement which has a goal in  view, into a growth which  is full of 
promise as soon as it takes a path with us.’
182 The human agent, then, remains an 
active subject, but their activity is  strictly responsive in nature, following and 
empowered by the prior divine activity. 
Also of note in this citation is Barth’s reference to the ‘Body of Christ’ and the 
‘new being in the Spirit.’ In a further discussion of the ‘Body of Christ’ Barth 
clarifies and sharpens his understanding of the relation between human agency 
and  the  community  of  faith.  Humanity  in  and  of  itself,  including  Christian 
humanity, is wholly incapable of performing the good, and it is only as a person 
abides in the ‘Body of Christ’—that is, only as they empowered and moved by the 
Spirit—that the good can be accomplished in and through them. While it is true 
that the faith and activity of the individual is important, it is only a momentary 
expression of the movement, and not the movement itself, for ‘the movement is 
not borne by the individual but by the Christian community.’
183 
By grounding the agency of the individual in the Body of Christ, Barth is not 
attacking human agency per se, but the notion of independent human agency and 
form  of  individualism  which  he  identifies  as  sin.  For  Barth,  ‘it  is  not  the 
individual who thinks, believes, and acts on his account and at his risk; rather, the 
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“Body  of  Christ”  thinks,  believes,  and  acts  in  him  and  through  him,  in  the 
measure in which it can do so in this moment.’
184 When he states that it is the 
‘Body of Christ’ who thinks, believes and acts in the believer, it is understood 
first, as Christ himself, in the power of his resurrection at work in and through the 
community gathered around his name, and only then in and through the individual 
who is part of that community.
185 It is not the individual qua individual who does 
the good, therefore, but the individual as a participant in the Body of Christ. 
Thus  it  is  clear  that  for  Barth,  Christian  existence  is  necessarily  a  corporate 
existence. It is also evident that when Barth refers to the Body of Christ, he is not 
simply making reference to the empirical or phenomenal church, for he goes on to 
say that 
[w]e are not an external, accidental fellowship [Gemeinschaft] like the state 
or  the  church  [Kirche],  which  are  established  in  authority  and  freedom 
without God and without love. We are the inner, necessary fellowship which 
exists and is maintained by a higher will. We stand under grace.
186 
For Barth, the Body of Christ is identified with the kingdom of God and the new 
world.
187 It  refers  to  the  hidden movement of  God  which  leaves  traces  in  the 
ongoing march of history, but which cannot be identified with any institution or 
cultural  development  within  history,  including  the  organised  churches.  It  is 
composed of those who are gathered by the power of the resurrection when they 
obey  the  gospel—’an  international  people of  God,’  and  knows  no  boundaries 
between an arena called ‘church’ and another named ‘world.’
188 This company 
already stands in the movement of God: ‘No longer under judgement, but under 
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grace, no longer in sin but in righteousness, no longer in death, but in life. That is 
the course of salvation which the power of God wills to take and will take, now 
with us and someday with the whole world. Now with us!’
189 
Barth’s ‘now with us’ indicates his belief that even now, during which time the 
divine  eschatological  procession  goes  forth  predominantly  in  hiddenness,  the 
community of faith serves as a proleptic witness and paradigm of God’s intent for 
the world at large. In this community the righteousness of God will come into 
visibility, albeit in an actualistic form. ‘On earth as in heaven,’ Barth says, ‘God’s 
work has begun to come to pass. In the midst of the world of flesh, an enclave of 
God’s world has arisen.’
190 For those who are in Christ, the possibility of doing the 
good has become a ‘genuine reality’ on account of the ‘power of God which 
appeared in the life of Christ’ appearing once more ‘in us as the members of his 
body.’
191 
The Nature of Barth’s Ecclesial Ethic 
The preceding section indicates that the heart of Barth’s ethics in Romans I is 
located in the central concept of the divine movement inaugurated in Christ and 
proceeding  through  history  as  God  himself  is  in  eschatological  procession 
encountering  and  gathering  a  people  who  serve  as  a  proleptic  witness  and 
paradigm  of  his  intent  for  the  world  generally.  As  Barth  begins  the  positive 
delineation of  his ethics  it  becomes  evident  why  he claims  that  there  are  ‘no 
ethics.’ For Barth, there are no ethics because there is no possibility of any human 
action establishing that which is truly good: the establishing of God’s kingdom is 
God’s work alone, a work of new creation in the midst of the old world. The 
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whole question of morality finds its resolution only in the movement and activity 
of God.  
Such a vision of ethical existence, of course, raises the inevitable question as to 
whether it is actually a viable description of ethical existence or moral community 
at  all.  Surely,  the  simple  rejection  of  ‘ethics’  per  se,  and  the  complementary 
assertion  that  Christian  existence  is  being  caught  up  in  the  eschatological 
procession of God such that the good simply ‘occurs,’ is naïvely utopian. Has 
Barth constructed an impossible vision of Christian and ecclesial existence which 
fails to do justice to actual life in this present age in which the kingdom of God is 
not present in its fullness, and in which believers and non-believers alike must 
struggle with life in a fallen world? Is it sufficient to assert that the good will 
occur ‘organically,’ without provision of any moral instruction or guidelines? 
In answer to questions such as these, McCormack argues that Barth was not blind 
to the need for moral guidance in the Christian life, and that close examination of 
his commentary reveals that Barth had an ethic after all, though he preferred not to 
call  it  that.  Following  Romans  12:1,  Barth  preferred  to  name  his  programme 
‘Christian exhortation.’
192 Similarly, Spencer maintains that Barth is trading on a 
semantic distinction between ‘ethics’—a term he reserves for the characterisation 
of moral idealism—and ‘exhortation,’ a term he adopts to speak of a distinctly 
Christian form of moral exhortation in the new community of those in Christ.
193 
The significance of this semantic distinction for Barth’s ecclesial vision must not 
be understated. By  identifying ‘ethics’  with  idealistic  morality which  seeks  to 
generate  universally  valid  norms  to  govern  human  behaviour,  and  by  then 
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contrasting  it  with  ‘Christian  exhortation,’  Barth  clearly  indicates  that  the 
Christian community is to be guided by a particular ethics, that he envisages a 
distinctive ecclesial ethics  in contrast to the universal  imperatives of idealistic 
morality. 
The Command of the Moment 
Barth commences his exposition of Romans 12 with the question ‘What is the will 
of God for us?’ in the new situation created by the lordship of the ‘Spirit of Life.’ 
His response to the question posed is simple: ‘The answer is already given to us… 
It says, stand in the victory of life (chapter 5), in grace (chapter 6), in freedom 
(chapter 7), in the Spirit (chapter 8).’
194 This counsel, however, is not something 
that  can  be  routinely  applied  to  all  and  sundry,  but  applies  specifically  and 
exclusively  to  those  who  are  in  Christ,  in  whom  the  ‘new  situation’  is  an 
actualised reality. It is in this context alone that ‘Christian exhortation’ is to be 
practiced—only amongst ‘brothers and sisters, fellow travellers in the movement, 
those who find themselves with me in the same situation…for these I speak.’
195 
Barth insists that outside of Christ, Christian exhortation has no meaning, and that 
it can only appear as law unless the presuppositions of chapters 5-8 have become 
actual in the lives of the listeners.
196  
Not only is Barth’s concept of exhortation specific to the Christian community, 
but it also functions in the immediacy of the situation confronted, and thus cannot 
be reduced to a system of rules or law. In his comment on Romans 12:11, Barth 
adopts  a  variant  reading  to  translate  the  verse  ‘Obey  the  command  of  the 
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moment!’
197 Christian obedience occurs moment by moment as believers seek to 
be, and remain, and become obedient to the living call of God. Only in this way is 
the will of God understood, comprehended and fulfilled.
198 In this context, it is 
crucial to recall the point made earlier, that this being, remaining and becoming 
obedient  is primarily a function of the ‘Body of Christ,’ and only then of the 
individual who  is a  part of  that  body.  It  is,  then, the community of believers 
together who seek the living voice of God. 
This ‘command of the moment,’ issuing in the situation itself, is recognised by 
those who have been restored to a relation of immediacy with God, and whose 
minds have been ‘renewed.’ For Barth, a critical aspect of the fulfilment of God’s 
will  involves  an  intellectual  pursuit:  ‘Adequate  thought  is  the  principle  of 
transformation, which will enable you to become new and to represent something 
new toward the old world.’
199 ‘Adequate thought’ is thought obedient to faith, 
which for Barth aims at reflecting God’s thoughts in a continuous begetting of the 
truth from truth itself. This process takes place in permanent confrontation with 
the reality of this world which is passing away.
200 Clearly Barth intends the society 
of believers to function as a community of discernment, seeking to hear in its 
actual confrontation and interface with the realities of life in the old aeon, the 
‘command of  the  moment.’  Because  the  command  of  the  moment  is  entirely 
zeitgemäß—contemporary, and in keeping with the immediate time and context—
the action of the community in obedience to this command is also zeitgemäß.
201 
Through a process of critical reflection, and ‘through a prayerful following of the 
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“real development of things…behind the curtain of time,”’
202 the community is 
enabled to bear the particular character of God’s people in the world.
203 
That  God’s  people  in  the  world  are  to  bear  a  ‘particular  character’  shows, 
significantly, that the command of the moment is not to be conceived of in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner. To the contrary, because God’s will is consistent, 
his command will also be consistent, following a particular trajectory or Tendenz 
from moment to moment. Further, because the divine will has a definite tendency, 
Christian norms which seek to apply that will in specific situations will also be 
characterised by that tendency.
204 
What are some of the features of this Tendenz which characterise the command of 
the moment, and hence also, the activity of the church? Barth takes it as virtually 
axiomatic that Christians are to have nothing to do with ‘monarchy, capitalism, 
militarism, patriotism  or  liberalism’:  such  a  stance  need  hardly  be  asserted!
205 
Rather, in the midst of the old world of the flesh, the enclave of God must arise in 
which  the  power  of  God  which  appeared  in  the  life  of  Christ  must  and  will 
manifest and prove itself in the members of his body.
206 Two observations may be 
made  here.  First,  Barth  evidently  views  Christ  himself  as  the  paradigm  of 
Christian existence, although not as a paradigm to be emulated as in a mimetic 
ethic. Rather, as believers are incorporated into the new being in the Spirit, the 
divine life which appeared in the life of Christ will once again come to expression 
in them. Moment by moment men and women must ‘become what they are in 
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Christ,’ so that the turn of the ages from Adam to Christ might be provisionally 
realised in them anew.
207 
Second, it is also clear that Barth envisages the community of faith as a group 
within society which, carried along by the divine movement, stands, or better, 
moves, in contrast to the dominant cultural powers over against which it is placed. 
To fall into alignment with these cultural powers would be nothing less than a fall 
from grace back into the sinfulness of the world. ‘How shall we who have died to 
sin,’ Barth asks, ‘continue to live in it?’
208 The movement of this people echoes 
and reflects the divine movement of grace which is a movement from below. For 
Barth, there can be no neutrality in this: 
You  belong  under  all  circumstances  to  the  common  people.…God  is 
certainly a God of the Jews and the heathen, but not a God of the powerful 
and the lowly, but rather, one-sidedly, a God of the lowly; not a God of the 
great  and  the  small,  but  rather  recklessly,  a  God  of  the  small.…The 
movement  of  the  kingdom  of  God  within  social  and  cultural  conflicts 
is…fundamentally  and  one-sidedly  a  movement  from  below.  Those  who 
participate in it must…be willing to stand below where everything depends 
on God. I can certainly become a Jew to the Jews and a Greek to the Greeks, 
but not a lord to the lords.…Where idols are erected, I may not be present. 
Over against everything that wants to be great I must take the standpoint of 
the small people, with whom God begins.
209 
The Tendenz, therefore, of a Christian action which reflects the being and activity 
of God will show itself as such by its echoing of the divine preference for the 
lowly, over against the mighty. Against the backdrop of revolutionary movements 
in his own milieu, Barth proclaims the revolution of Christ, whose revolution is 
nothing less than the dissolution of all dependencies save dependence on God. For 
                                                
207 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 164. 
208 Barth, Romans I, 509. 
209 Barth, Romans I, 490.          172 
Barth,  the  only  legitimate  dependency  is  dependence upon  God, which  is the 
foundation of true liberty.
 210 
The  freedom  of  which  Barth  speaks  is  mutual  freedom.  Life  in  Christ  is 
characterised  as  a  life  for  others.  In  accordance  with  his  identification  of 
individualism with original sin, and religious individualism as simply one variety 
of  the  larger  species,  Barth  not only  decentres  the  individual  self  by  granting 
priority to the community as Body of Christ, but also insists that genuine personal 
subjectivity cannot be ‘a subjectivity imprisoned in itself,’ as was the fatal case 
with Adam.
211 Humanity resting only in itself and for itself is characteristic of life 
without God.
212 Thus, says Barth, we must not take our own freedom too seriously. 
Those the apostle refers to as ‘strong in faith’ (Romans 14:1) are those with the 
capacity  to  limit  their  own  freedom  in  order  to  grant  freedom  to  another.
213 
Accordingly, the truly free subject is one who is free for others, who lives in and 
through others.
214 This too, then, will be reflected in the Tendenz of Christian 
activity. As God is at work liberating men and women from their self-relatedness 
and  creating  a  community  of  fellowship  and  freedom,  so  Christian  activity 
grounded in the divine movement will show itself to be such by its efficacy in 
producing fellowship and freedom.
215 
This notion receives additional treatment in Barth’s comments on Romans 13:8-
10 where he develops what he calls the ‘positive principle’ of his programme, 
namely,  love:  ‘Only  love  builds  the  new  world,  but  love  will  surely  build 
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it.…Love  is  the  power  of  the  resurrection  through  which  the  new  creation 
comes.’
216 It is this love which, as a reflection of the love God has shown us in 
Christ, leads the believer into solidarity with the lowly and suffering, and into the 
formation of a community of fellowship and freedom. Elsewhere Barth refers to 
this community in the love of Christ as the community of the Spirit in which the 
righteousness of the kingdom of heaven grows.
217 
It is precisely this growth of the righteousness of the kingdom as expressed in the 
love  of  the  community  which  Barth  views  as  revolutionary.  The  Spirit  who 
inspires and empowers this love is the power of the new world, and, Barth notes 
with an eye toward the political developments of his era, ‘can at this present time 
be  nothing  other  than  revolution—precisely  what  we  at  the  moment  call 
revolution!’
218 In spite of  his criticism of the religious socialism advocated by 
Ragaz, Barth had not given up hope for a ‘true socialism’ which would come into 
being, not through the revolutionary activities of human agents, but organically, as 
the ‘healing unrest that is set in the heart by God’ deepens and grows until the 
rising flood of the divine will itself ‘break through the dams’ and establish the 
‘state of God.’
219 The ‘absolute revolution’ of God comes through the power of the 
Spirit who is at work in the entire world and who brings life from the dead: 
Perhaps God at present, is in the process of leaving the old and uncertain 
socialism  behind.  Perhaps  its  historical  hour  has  now  run  out,  without 
bringing the world what it was to have brought.…But more important than 
this dissolution  will be another  hour which fulfils history,  when the now 
dying flow of Marxist dogma will illuminate a new global truth, when the 
socialist church will be resurrected in a socialist world.
220 
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Conclusion 
When, in the middle of 1916, Barth sat under his apple tree and opened Paul’s 
letter to the Romans together with a few commentaries, he had no idea that his 
‘little notebook’ in which he recorded his observations and insights would become 
the proverbial ‘bombshell in the theologians’ playground,’ and that as a result of 
its publication he would be offered a chair of theology at Göttingen University a 
few years later. 
As I suggested in the conclusion to the second chapter, the primary emphases 
identified in Barth’s initial work following his break with his liberal heritage came 
to a climax and received more complete expression in his first commentary to the 
Romans. Here, once more, we find the same theological realism, the sovereignty 
and  centrality  of  God,  the  critique  of  religion  and  especially  religious 
individualism, and the notion of the organic development of the kingdom of God 
which characterised Barth’s earlier works. We also find that Barth had a definite, 
albeit nascent, vision of Christian and ecclesial existence, and that this ecclesial 
dimension is an essential aspect of his theological work. Barth tackles Pietism, 
Liberalism and Idealism in a mighty struggle to demolish the vision of life and 
Christian existence presented by exponents of these groups in order to call the 
church and believers to a different order of existence. His polemics, therefore, 
function in service of a practical end, which was to recall the church from its 
disastrous assimilation to the idolatrous character of the prevailing culture to a 
more faithful praxis in accordance with the eschatological nature of the coming 
kingdom. 
The nature and shape of ecclesial existence in Romans I also echoes the portrait 
provided  in  the  earlier  works.  Once  more  Christian  existence  falls  under  the          175 
purview of the Holy Spirit as the immanent power of the coming kingdom. When 
Barth speaks of the church he intends the concrete fellowship of believers rather 
than  the  institutional  or  hierarchical  church,  the  Gemeinde  rather  than  simply 
Kirche. Christian existence is necessarily corporate, a fellowship of faith, love and 
freedom which stands in dependence upon God and in solidarity with the poor and 
oppressed. 
Barth’s depiction of the Christian life also presupposes the free and responsive 
activity  of  human  agents.  The  community  is  portrayed  as  a  community  of 
discernment seeking to hear and discern the command of the moment in order that 
God’s will might be done amongst them. This obedience, while active and freely 
chosen, is not independent however, but the work of the divine life evident in 
Jesus Christ coming to expression once more in the community and the individual 
by the Spirit. While the doctrine of the command of God in this phase of Barth’s 
career is not nearly as developed or nuanced as it will become later, it is clear 
nonetheless that already  he  is  developing  his  ethics  in  this direction. Gerhard 
Sauter has noted that the motif introduced here in Romans I—thought obedient to 
faith—is one which will in time ‘pervade his entire oeuvre,’ incorporating not 
only his dogmatics, but his ethics also.
221 
The  evident  tension  in  Barth’s  treatment  of  the  political  responsibility  of  the 
Christian may reflect, as Gorringe suggested, an attempt to apply the command of 
the  moment  in  impossibly  trying  circumstances.  More  likely,  however,  it  is 
indicative, as McCormack and Spencer suggest, that Barth has not yet developed 
the theological resources that will enable him to treat the matter more adequately. 
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Certainly in this work Barth endeavoured to lay out a comprehensive theological 
worldview  and  corresponding  field  of  ethical  existence.  The  eschatological 
framework within which he developed this worldview was, however, ultimately 
inadequate for the task he set himself, and as a result he quite quickly jettisoned 
this framework in part in order to locate and develop a more useful one. While 
retaining an eschatological orientation in his work, Barth turned from a process or 
evolutionary eschatology to a consistent eschatology. Why he felt impelled to this 
turn is the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Life in the Shadow of Death? 
The  only  source  for  the  real, the  immediate, revelation  of  God  is death. 
Christ unlocked its gates. He brought life to light out of death. Out of death! 
The word cannot be spoken significantly enough. The meaning of God, the 
power of God, begins to shine upon the men of the Bible at the boundary of 
mortality.…Life comes from death! Death is the source of all.
1 
We have earlier noted that the end of the war did not signal the end of the tumult 
which had threatened to engulf Europe. The six months following the cessation of 
hostilities saw the establishment of the fledgling Weimar Republic in Germany, 
the violent repression of the attempted ‘Sparticist’ coup in Berlin, and the failed 
attempt  at  revolution  in  Germany.
2  Although  Switzerland  was  spared  these 
upheavals, the general strike of November 1918 caused great concern in the nation 
because  of  the  possibility  that  more  radical  elements  might  commandeer  the 
socialist attempts to force a change in  governmental policy, and seek through 
violent  means  to  force  a  change  of  government  along  Bolshevik  lines.  The 
uncertainty felt at this time is illustrated in comments written by Thurneysen to 
Barth on October 30, 1918: ‘So where does the journey go from here? Towards 
world Bolshevism? Only one thing is clear to me: we must think of the kingdom 
of God consistently as “other” and keep our hope pure from all democratic and 
other “preliminary stages.”’
3  
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For his part, Barth continued his pastoral work and biblical investigations, as well 
as  continuing  his  engagement  in  local  political  affairs.  He  wrote  several 
statements for local distribution regarding Swiss socialism, warning the Socialist 
Party against joining the Third International, which was dependent on Russia, and, 
after  a  lengthy  hiatus,  resumed  his  lectures  to  his  Workers’  Association  in 
February 1919 providing commentary on the political events of the day. He also 
continued to present formal lectures and to write occasional articles on theological 
issues during the immediate period following the war, which provide insight into 
his vision of Christian and ecclesial existence during this time of political turmoil 
and social instability. 
This chapter begins by examining a short article Barth wrote upon the death of 
Christoph Blumhardt in August 1919 in which he compares the influence and 
legacy of Blumhardt with that of fellow churchman-politician Friedrich Naumann, 
who died the same year. For Barth, the two men represent the past and the future 
possibilities of Christianity. The second section considers a lecture given by Barth 
in Tambach, Germany in September 1919 at a conference for Religious Socialists, 
entitled “The Christian’s Place in Society.” Barth’s lecture develops and extends 
his  understanding  of  Christian  existence  within  the  theological  framework 
unfolded  in  his  commentary  on  Romans.  The  third  work  investigated  in  this 
chapter is another review article Barth wrote in early 1920, this time on the work 
of Franz Overbeck. The influence of Overbeck on Barth should not be under-
estimated, for from Overbeck Barth gained the tools to sharpen his critique of the 
modern church and its theology. This influence is clearly discerned in the next 
lecture examined in this chapter, “Biblical Questions, Insights and Vistas” which 
was given in April 1920 to a student conference in Aarau. In this lecture we have   179 
substantial  evidence  of  Barth’s  development  in  the  period  between  the  two 
editions of his commentary. Barth has sharpened his understanding of the divine-
human relation by bringing the concepts of divine election and ‘crisis’ into the 
foreground of his theological reflection. He provides an exposition of Christian 
and ecclesial existence in terms of witness, in which genuine piety is radically ‘ec-
centric’ in orientation and grounded in the forgiveness of sins. In a surprising 
development, we also note a new awareness of and appreciation for the role of the 
individual in God’s interaction with humanity. The final section of the chapter 
examines  a  series  of  seven  sermons  delivered  by  Barth  to  his  Safenwil 
congregation in mid-1920. The value of these sermons lies in the insight they 
provide of how Barth sought to apply his developing theological framework in the 
context of local church ministry, including the notion of election and crisis, the 
dialectical structuring of the divine-human relation in terms of eternity and time, 
the new emphasis on the importance of the individual, and the attempt to ground 
ethical existence in the forgiveness of sins. 
 The works examined in this chapter show that while Barth’s theology in the two 
years following the publication of Romans I underwent clear development, several 
aspects  of  his  vision of Christian  and ecclesial  existence remained  continuous 
with what  had gone before. Nevertheless, the tightened eschatological  horizon 
within which Barth now began to work also had the effect of reducing some of the 
rich descriptions of Christian and ecclesial existence  found in  his works from 
1915-17. Thus, at the end of the chapter we find that we are left with several 
questions  concerning  the  viability  of  his  attempt  to  ground  ethics  in  the 
forgiveness of sins, particularly in such turbulent times as those in which he and 
his congregation lived.   180 
The Bourgeois Church: Measured and Found Wanting 
On August 2, 1919 Christoph Blumhardt died and Barth used the occasion to 
write  a  short  piece  in  recognition  of  his  contribution,  comparing  him  with 
Friedrich  Naumann,  another  German  pastor  who  had  exercised  enormous 
influence in the German church and who had also recently died.
4 In an interesting 
co-incidence Barth had met both men on the same journey when in April 1915 he 
attended his brother’s wedding in Marburg. Naumann was an uncle of the bride. It 
was on the return journey to Switzerland that Thurneysen  introduced Barth to 
Blumhardt, to whom Barth had the duty of conveying Naumann’s greetings.  
Still  earlier,  in  July  1914,  Barth  had  written  a  review  article  of  Die  Hilfe,  a 
periodical founded in 1890 by Naumann, which had as its motto ‘Help for God, 
help for one’s brother, help for the State, help for oneself.’ Barth began that article 
with an acknowledgement of the  significant contribution towards social  issues 
made by Die Hilfe over the years, but noted the changing attitude and stance of 
the editor in more recent times. By 1914 Naumann had consigned Christian belief 
and practice to personal piety and morality, with virtually no relevance to political 
life, and thus, according to Barth, pursued politics ‘under the presupposition that 
there is no God.’
5 This, for Barth, was impossible since God cannot be excluded 
from any arena of life, and because genuine Christian hope is ultimately unable to 
make  final  peace  with the world  as  it  is.  He  expressed  his  disappointment  in 
Naumann’s  political  shift  towards  capitalism,  nationalism  and  militarism,  and 
refused the idea that ‘a politics which simply capitulates before certain alleged 
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realities is the only possible, the correct politics. We should expect more from 
God.’
6 This article, of course, was written just prior to the Socialists’ capitulation 
to nationalism at the commencement of the war, which, as we have already seen, 
came as a profound disappointment to Barth.  
The divide between Barth’s position and that of Naumann also surfaced at the 
1915 wedding where Barth met Naumann. One evening in conversation Barth and 
Thurneysen heard Naumann remark that one now sees how well ‘religion can be 
used for purposes of conducting the war.’ The remark infuriated Barth: ‘What do 
you mean “use religion”? Is that permissible? Can one do that?’
7 Hunsinger has 
rightly noted that it was intolerable for Barth that the sovereign God should be so 
misused by the contemporary church as to support the political horror of the war.
8 
It was precisely this decadence of the church, represented so well by Naumann, 
which compelled Barth to break with the liberal tradition of academic theology 
and the form of ecclesial praxis it engendered.  
In the present  article Barth presents  Naumann’s life as an odyssey, tracing  in 
outline  the  development  of  his  career  and  thought.
9  Naumann  had  begun  his 
ministry working with a well known charitable organisation in Hamburg before 
serving as a pastor in an industrial community in Saxony, and as an industrial 
chaplain in Frankfurt. In these positions he became familiar with the conditions of 
industrial workers and the emerging tenets of Social Democracy. In these early 
years  of  his  career,  claims  Barth,  Naumann  was  confronted  with  the  radical 
message of the New Testament—the message directed towards the transformation 
                                                
6 Barth, “Die Hilfe 1913.” Cited in McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 110. 
7 Hunsinger, “Toward A Radical Barth,” 200. 
8 Hunsinger, “Toward A Radical Barth,” 201. 
9 Barth, “Past and Future,” 35-37.   182 
of the world. As Barth saw it, however, Naumann shifted over the years from his 
understanding of ‘the social Jesus’ to what Barth calls ‘a religious veneration of 
nature and of modern culture:’
10 
Why not? God speaks everywhere. But without his noticing it, everything 
that existed began to be surrounded with a peculiar halo of religion—the 
State and the Hohenzollerns and the Prussian military, the German citizen 
with his incomparable ‘efficiency,’ capitalism, trade, enterprise, in short, the 
whole  Germany  of  Kaiser  Wilhelm.…Overnight  the  flag  of  ‘Christian 
socialism’  changed  into  that  of  a  ‘national  socialism,’  and  in  1903 
disappeared  completely  into  the  museum  of  ‘liberalism.’  Then  came 
Naumann’s journey to Palestine, on which he made the discovery that Jesus 
could not possibly have been the practical social reformer whom we need, 
for if  he  had been, the  streets and  roads  in  that  land  would  be in  better 
condition!
11 
Barth describes Naumann’s shift as a ‘truly tragic second conversion,’ in which he 
moved from positive Christianity to modern theology, and from there again to 
what  Barth  refers  to  as  Darwinism,  or  naturalism.
12  His  emphasis  on  the 
immanence of God and revelation in  nature and culture led to an enthusiastic 
fusion  of  religion  and  nationalist  politics,  which  envisioned  an  industrialised 
Germany strengthened by her allies as ‘the preliminary citadel of German world 
rule.’
13  
Barth locates the genesis of this transformation in Naumann’s understanding of 
God. Instead of adhering to that which the New Testament calls ‘God,’ Naumann, 
according to Barth, now understood God in idealistic terms as the presupposition 
of life binding humanity with necessity to its nature and to the general laws of 
nature, and launching  it into the struggle for existence  and  self-preservation.
14 
Under the influence of idealism and naturalism Naumann had jettisoned any form 
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of eschatological hope in favour of liberal notions of progress and power. In place 
of a faith that was bound to God and his purpose of transformation in the world, 
faith  was  the  courageous  taking  up  of  the  struggle  for  existence.  In  the  end 
Naumann settled for an inscrutable God and a religion of the soul ‘which may 
seek comfort and power in the world, but does not seek victory over the world.’
15 
Indeed, as Hunsinger has suggested, the bourgeois theology of liberalism, having 
flattened the eschatological horizon and thus vitiating the concept of God from 
within, was  wholly unable to imagine the transcendence of God over existing 
social  conditions:  capitulation  in  the  face  of  political  crisis  was  virtually 
inevitable.
16 
By  contrast, Blumhardt, as we  have  previously  seen,
17 embraced a  thoroughly 
realist and eschatological view of God in his relation to the world. It was this 
which first attracted Barth to him when they met in 1915. Blumhardt stood not for 
religion but God, not for idealism but reality. His main contribution, according to 
Barth, was the recovery of eschatology:  
What appeared again  in  Boll  that  was  new  and  in  accord  with the  New 
Testament can be comprehended in one word: hope—hope for a visible and 
tangible appearing  of the lordship  of God  over the  world.…to believe in 
‘God’  meant,  for  the  two  Blumhardts,  to  take  this  comprehensive  hope 
seriously, more seriously than all other considerations.
18  
This hope, for Barth, relativises all earthly ‘realities,’ and is itself a critical hope 
which  includes  ‘a  comprehensive  attack  on  the  bases  of  present-day  society, 
culture  and  church.’
19  Nevertheless,  it  is  a  hope  that  also  inspires  patient 
                                                
15 Barth, “Past and Future,” 39. 
16 Hunsinger, “Toward A Radical Barth,” 203. 
17 See pages 87-88 above. 
18 Barth, “Past and Future,” 41-42. ‘(Bad) Boll’ was the home of the Blumhardts’ ministry. 
19 Barth, “Past and Future,” 42.   184 
engagement  in all  of  the  affairs  of  human society  and  culture because  in the 
coming kingdom of God all earthly reality will be transformed. 
It is clear in this brief article that Barth continues to view the God-world relation 
in terms of the theology outlined in Romans I. He still longs for the new world
20 
that is to be born out of the old,
21 and which will come into being as a result of 
God’s  activity,  specifically,  an  outpouring of the Holy  Spirit.
22  He  retains the 
process eschatology of the commentary and again refers to the relation of God to 
the  world as  ‘a  mighty, historical  process,  a  movement,  a victorious  struggle, 
which must end with the renewal of all things.’
23 He still regards Socialism as the 
form of political praxis that most adequately represents the coming kingdom of 
God, although it is now the chastened affirmation of Socialism that views it as a 
parable of the kingdom, rather than the presence of the kingdom itself.
24 He also 
eulogises Blumhardt’s ‘endless movement between hurrying and waiting’ as a 
prophetic message which exemplifies authentic eschatological existence in this 
age.
25 
Finally, and of particular concern to this thesis, this article also echoes the critique 
of  the  church found  in earlier works,  and is  in  fact here  particularly  scathing 
because  of  the  way  in  which  Barth  rhetorically  associates  the  church  with 
Naumann but not with Blumhardt. Barth begins his discussion of Naumann with 
the assertion that 
[t]he church was the home of this German member of the Reichstag.…It was 
the orthodox Lutheran Church of Saxony, but that was accidental; it could 
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just as well have been the Catholic or the Mohammedan—in any case, the 
church, for which the relationship of the world to the divine is an a priori, 
fixed,  ordered,  unchanging  connection  which  merely  needs  religious 
explanation and transfiguration.
26 
When Barth aligns Naumann with the church, his critique and rejection of the 
Naumann is also an implicit critique and rejection of the church. This citation 
indicates, however, that Barth is not speaking of the church in an absolute sense, 
but as a reference to an undifferentiated sense of ‘religion,’ or, in the context in 
which  Barth  is  writing,  to  the  modern  church  grounded  in  idealist  theology. 
According to Barth, this church, which assumes a static connection between God 
and  the  world,  and  which  is  thus  oriented  towards  the  maintenance  of  the 
established order, does not understand the God of the New Testament who seeks 
the  transformation  of  the  world.
27  This  church,  as  Naumann  himself  came  to 
suspect in his early years when he read the New Testament ‘with new eyes’ and 
came ‘very near to the sacred fire,’ had fallen short of God’s intention and was in 
need of repentance: ‘Is it possible,’ he asks, ‘that the godless Social Democrats 
(they were fighting against the church!) understood God better than the church 
did? Was it possible that the church needed to repent and turn to the God of the 
godless?’
28  Naumann,  as  we  have  seen,  turned  from  this  early  insight  and 
subsequently ‘always remained the typical pastor’
29—one firmly committed to the 
maintenance of the established order. 
While Barth notes that Blumhardt also started out as a pastor, and that his work as 
director of the spa Boll ‘was very nearly that of a pastor,’ in reality ‘his path had 
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nothing in common with the church.’
30 When he spoke of ‘God,’ says Barth, he 
meant something very different to what the church meant. His new insight—the 
recovery of eschatological realism—’is all along the line and in all points down to 
the present day a total contrast to the general religion of churches and pastors of 
all denominations.’
31 Indeed, says Barth, the prophetic character of his life and 
message,  as  well as  his practical  devotion  to  socialism as  the  most important 
contemporary parable of the kingdom ensured that he remained an enigma to all 
those willing and able to feel at home in the church.
32  
Barth’s unrelenting critique of the church in this article raises a question for this 
thesis that must be faced: does his rhetoric here actually betray an anti-ecclesial 
motive in his theology? It is certainly true that it is not possible from this article to 
identify a positive ecclesial concern as the motive for his theology. Nonetheless, 
he gives indication that his critique is directed specifically against the kind of 
ecclesial  existence  represented  by  Naumann.  Further,  his  approbation  of 
Blumhardt is indicative, as we have previously seen, of the kind of Christian and 
ecclesial vision that Barth maintained in this period. To the extent, therefore, that 
the church has forsaken the reality of God and eschatological hope, and thereby 
compromised and accommodated itself to the form of this age which is passing 
away, it is to be rejected. Thus, it is the form of Christian and ecclesial existence 
represented by Naumann that Barth rejects as belonging to an era now past, not 
church  and Christianity  generally.  Once  more,  it  is the praxis exemplified  by 
Blumhardt which Barth holds forth as that which is authentic eschatological and 
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prophetic  existence,  even  while  not specifically  referring to it  as Christian  or 
ecclesial existence. 
“The Christian’s Place in Society” 
Barth’s Tambach Lecture 
About the same time that Barth was writing his piece on Naumann and Blumhardt 
he was also preparing a lecture to be delivered at a September conference for 
Religious Socialists in Tambach (Thuringia), Germany. Initially Barth declined 
the invitation, preferring to stay in Switzerland, but when Ragaz (who was first 
choice for the speaker) pulled out, the organisers requested once more that Barth 
speak. The topic assigned to Barth for the lecture was ‘The Christian in Society.’ 
This  he  changed  to  ‘The  Christian’s  Place  in  Society’—a  not  insignificant 
amendment which indicates his concern to offer a theological description of the 
ethical agent, and which also and somewhat ironically served to distance himself 
from the position of Ragaz.
33 For Barth, the kingdom of God and socialism stood 
over  against  each  other,  but  he  was  concerned  that  Religious  Socialism  had 
equated itself with the arrival of the kingdom of God. He did not want to deliver a 
theological basis for zeal into the hands of a few zealots for social reform.
34 If the 
organisers had been more fully aware of Barth’s position they may have chosen to 
invite someone else to their conference. As it was, they heard a lecture where it 
was  made  clear  in  no  uncertain  terms  that  such  an  identification  is  wholly 
illegitimate. Nonetheless, according to Busch, his address had an extraordinarily 
powerful effect on his hearers, not entirely positive, of course. When Ragaz heard 
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what Barth had had to say he felt that Barth had ‘vitiated the influence of the 
movement in Germany by “dialectical distortion.”’
35  
The  lecture  itself  is  a  lengthy  convoluted  affair  comprising  five  sections  of 
dialectical argument. In a letter to Thurneysen Barth himself acknowledges that ‘it 
has  become  a  rather  complicated  kind  of  machine  that  runs  backwards  and 
forwards  and  shoots  in all  directions  with  no  lack of  both  visible  and  hidden 
joints.’
36 Webster has described the lecture as ‘not an easy work. At points it is 
simply  unclear.’
37  He  suggests  the  dialectical  complexity  of  the  form  of  the 
address is reflective of the content Barth  is seeking to communicate, and that 
Barth is best understood not so much as constructing a position as attempting to 
bring home to the reader a spiritual and intellectual process in which he found 
himself inescapably caught up.
38 Accordingly, Webster suggests that we read the 
essay backwards, from the fifth section into what is argued earlier, since it is only 
at  the  end  that  the  full  scope  of  Barth’s  argument  emerges  into  view.
39  The 
contention that Barth utilised the dialectical form in order to engage his listeners 
in the spiritual and intellectual process in which he was caught up may well be 
true.  To  claim,  however,  that  Barth  is  not  constructing  a  position  is  to 
underestimate the intent of his rhetoric. While Webster’s suggestion to examine 
the  lecture  backwards  has  undoubted  heuristic  merit,  for  the  purposes  of  this 
thesis we will endeavour to read and interpret the lecture in accordance with the 
manner in which Barth delivered it, in order to appreciate the nuanced character of 
his presentation as he builds towards his climax. It will be seen that Barth clearly 
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intended to lead his hearers towards a particular kind of ethical response, and will 
thus illustrate once more the ethical and ecclesial motive that is of a piece with his 
theological reasoning. 
The Hope of the Christian: Divine and Human Action 
Barth  begins  his  lecture  with  a  meditation  on  the  title  given  for  the  lecture, 
identifying and discussing the concepts of ‘Christian’ and ‘society.’ He identifies 
society  with  various  social  orders  and  arrangements:  marriage  and  family, 
civilisation and economics, art and science, the state, the party, and international 
relations. Each of these takes a familiar course in accordance with its own inner 
logic. The problem is that their familiar course is apparently wrong, says Barth, 
more  so  in  light  of  the  catastrophic  events  from  which  Europe  is  only  now 
emerging. Indeed, in light of these realities, one could wish to withdraw from 
society, but, alas, one cannot. Barth perhaps gives voice to some of the cultural 
despair of the time when he mournfully says, ‘we are still painfully aware that in 
spite of all the social changes and revolutions, everything is as it was of old.’
40 In 
view of this pessimistic assessment he asks whether there is any basis for hope in 
the present situation, the answer to which is simply, for Barth, ‘The Christian.’ He 
goes on to say that 
[h]ere is a new element in the midst of the old, a truth in the midst of error 
and  lies,  a  righteousness  in  the  midst  of  a  sea  of  unrighteousness,  a 
spirituality  within  all  our  crass  materialistic  tendencies,  a  formative  life-
energy within all our weak, tottering movements of thought, a unity in a time 
which is out of joint.
41 
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Barth  very  plainly  identifies  ‘the  Christian’  as  a  promise  of  hope  within  the 
present darkness which pervades the social realities of contemporary Germany. 
And not only a promise of hope, but that which is new, true, righteous, spiritual, 
and unified, a formative life-energy. This is a very high estimation indeed! But it 
must be noted that when Barth speaks thus of ‘the Christian’ he is not simply 
referring  to  the  individual  believer,  nor  to  the  church  generally,  nor  to  those 
specific  believers  who  concern  themselves  with  religion  and  social  relations. 
Rather, ‘the Christian is the Christ. The Christian is that within us which is not 
ourself but Christ in us.’
42 For Barth, this notion—Christ in us—is not reducible to 
a personal existential reality which we might identify, but is ‘a presupposition of 
life’ over, behind and beyond us, that is, encompassing our existence on every 
side, and which is in principle inclusive of all humanity.
43 As such, it cannot be 
used as a means of division whereby to identify those within and those without 
because ‘the community of Christ is a building open on every side, for Christ died 
for all—even for the folk outside.’
44 Because this is true Barth deduces that, ‘if 
Christ is  in us, then society, in spite of its being on the wrong course, is not 
forsaken of God.…So: we bid you hope.’
45 
Barth’s opening salvo is, then, a proclamation of hope: that hidden like leaven 
within  the  darkness  of  a  world  which  seems  God-forsaken  is  The  Christian. 
Immediately,  however,  he  warns  that  the  connection  and  relationship  of  the 
Christian with society is neither apparent nor easy. The two stand over against 
each other like two great ‘magnitudes’ which are inherently foreign to each other. 
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Part of the blame for this must lie with the Christians themselves, who, on account 
of their own religious indigence have become aloof from society in their attempt 
to create and maintain an honourable religious domain. To this Barth declares 
that, ‘the meaning of so-called religion is to be found in its relation to actual life, 
to life in society, and not in its being set apart from it. Holiness in itself is no 
holiness whatever.’
46  
Thus, on the one hand Barth rejects an isolationist withdrawal of the Christian 
from society, and yet, on the other hand, he also appeals to the divine aseity to 
reject  simplistic  identifications of the Christian  with society,  as  found in  such 
hyphenations  as  Religious-Socialism  or  Christian-Democracy,  as  though  the 
kingdom of  God will be  realised through  existing  mechanisms or movements 
within human culture. ‘The Divine,’ insists Barth, ‘is something whole, complete 
in itself, a kind of new and different something in contrast to the world. It does not 
permit of being applied, stuck on, and fitted in.’
47 For Barth, then, the attempt to 
identify the Christian’s place in society by positing a unity between the two serves 
only to ‘secularise Christ.’
48 Nor, in any case, will society itself permit such an 
identification, for ‘society is now really ruled by its own logos; say rather by a 
whole pantheon of its own hypostases and powers.’
49 Not only does God assert his 
independence over against society, but society, under the demonic influence of its 
own idols, continues to assert its own independence over against God. 
Neither is the relation between the two a matter of clericalising the society, or of 
making the church more relevant: ‘for all our new patches, the old garment still 
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remains the old garment.’ Thus, Barth admonishes his audience, ‘let us withstand 
the new temptation of ecclesiasticism!…God alone can save the world…and we 
shall deceive society about it if we set to work building churches and chapels and 
do not learn to wait upon him in a wholly new way.’
50 
Barth brings the initial section of his message to a conclusion by re-iterating what 
he perceives in the theme announced for his lecture. On the one hand there is a 
great promise to be found in the present situation. On the other hand, however, 
there  is  an  inevitable  separation  between  the  Christian  and  the  society,  ‘a 
thorough-going opposition between two dissimilar magnitudes.…This is our hope 
and our need both as Christians and as members of society.’
51 What solution may 
be found for this situation? Barth is unequivocal: ‘Do not expect me to provide a 
solution! None of us may boast a solution. There is only one solution, and that is 
in God himself.’
52 
Before he takes up the main concern of his lecture, Barth inserts another section in 
which  he  introduces  a  discussion  of  his  ‘general  standpoint,’  beginning  by 
suggesting that his position is not so much a position as ‘an instant in a movement, 
and any view of it is comparable to the momentary view of a bird in flight.’
53 This 
movement, of course, is not to be identified with any particular human movement, 
but is rather 
a movement from above, a movement from a third dimension, so to speak, 
which transcends and  yet penetrates all these  movements and  gives them 
their inner meaning and motive; a movement which has neither its origin nor 
its aim in space, in time, or in the contingency of things, and yet is not a 
movement apart from others: I mean the movement of God in history or, 
otherwise expressed, the movement of God in consciousness, the movement 
                                                
50 Barth, “The Christian’s Place,” 281. 
51 Barth, “The Christian’s Place,” 282. 
52 Barth, “The Christian’s Place,” 282. 
53 Barth, “The Christian’s Place,” 282.   193 
whose power and import are revealed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from 
the dead. This must be the gist of all our thinking about the Christian’s place 
in society.
54 
Here we hear unmistakable echoes of the theology of Romans 1, and of Barth’s 
contention  that  Christian  existence  involves  being  caught  up  into  the  divine 
eschatological  procession  inaugurated  by  the  resurrection  of  Jesus  Christ.  He 
insists, though, that it is a mistake to think of the movement as an end in itself. 
What  is  important  is  neither  a  theory  nor  description  of  the  movement,  but 
becoming a participant in the motion. Such participation is possible only on the 
basis of the miracle of revelation, for we can do nothing to place ourselves into 
this movement.
55 He also emphasises that this movement is not to be equated with 
religious forms or experience, for Christ is ‘the absolutely new from above; the 
way,  the  truth,  and  the  life  of  God  among  men;  the  Son  of  Man,  in  whom 
humanity  becomes  aware  of  its  immediacy  to  God.’
56  Rather,  this  movement 
‘penetrates and passes through all our forms of worship and our experiences; it is 
the world of God breaking through from its self-contained holiness and appearing 
in secular life; it is the bodily resurrection of Christ from the dead. To participate 
in its meaning and power is to discover a new motivation.’
57 
Clearly, then, Barth considers that the various human movements seeking social 
and cultural reformation are permeated by and find their true significance and 
coherence  in  this  divine  movement,  although  the  initiative  for  this  interplay 
between the divine and the human lies only on the divine side. While we cannot 
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secure a way to bridge the separation between the human and divine worlds, God 
has  no  such  limitation.  He  manifests  himself  in  consciousness  through 
‘compelling,  revealing,  immediately  self-confirming  insights  and 
communications’
58 by which we are ‘impelled to venture our lives…immediately 
and completely.’
59 Thus, to the miracle of revelation corresponds the answering 
miracle of faith, itself the work of God in us. 
Of particular significance for this thesis is the nature of this venture to which the 
human agent is impelled. Just as God’s movement is a movement into the secular 
arena of human life, a movement into history and consciousness, so too those who 
are gripped by revelation ‘prove their devotion to the holy by daring to relate it 
directly to the secular life of man.’
60 They do so, however, in light of the newly-
recognised fact that they can no longer submit themselves to earthly realities and 
powers as to ‘ultimate independent authorities.’
61 In the event of their awakening 
to the soul’s immediacy to God as their true Origin, they have been liberated from 
dependency to lesser authorities. 
Further, and in a move that highlights the fundamentally ethical orientation of his 
theology in this lecture, Barth insists that the divine movement into the world 
awakens people in such a way that they are caught up in the movement, so that 
their activity becomes an echo and instrument of the divine activity: 
There can be no awakening of the soul which is anything but a ‘sympathetic 
shouldering of the cares of the whole generation.’ This awakening of the 
soul is the vivifying movement of God into history or into consciousness, the 
movement of Life into life. When we are under its power, we can but issue a 
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categorical challenge to all the authorities in life.…We are engaged in Life’s 
revolt against the powers of death that inclose it.
62 
The sphere of the human agent’s activity is simply society in all its breadth. Barth 
notes the seeming universal unrest of his era and exhorts his listeners to view the 
‘strangely confused and ambiguous’ movements of the time sympathetically, and 
in accordance with the belief that they are part of the inbreaking movement of 
God, and therefore, ‘in the fear of God to enter into the movement of the era.’
63 By 
so doing they will participate in a critical opposition to life as it is in order that the 
victory  of  Christ—the  new  world  accomplished  in  the  resurrection—might 
advance amongst them. Barth refers to the resurrection as the Archimedean point 
where God applies the lever in order to lift the world. He insists that ‘as a matter 
of  fact  we  do  share  in  the  resurrection  movement:  with  or  without  the 
accompaniment of religious feeling we are actuated by it.…We are moved by 
God. We are conscious of God. God in history lives in us and about us.’
64  
Christian existence, therefore, is existence in hope of the ultimate victory of God 
even now coming to expression in history. Christian existence occurs in this time 
of transition. While Barth is careful to acknowledge the genuine seriousness and 
tragedy of the present circumstances, he is also adamant that the final word has 
already been spoken, that ‘the advancing glory of God is already vouchsafed us.’
65 
The world and history is in process, gathered into the transition from ‘death to 
life, from the unrighteousness of men to the righteousness of God, from the old to 
the  new  creation.  We  live  in  society  as  those  who  understand,  as  those  who 
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undergo, and as those who undertake.’
66 Consequently, Barth’s view of Christian 
existence is one of active and hopeful engagement in the realities of this world. 
He deliberately crafts his theology in such a manner as to exclude ethical passivity 
and quietism.  
The Posture of the Christian: Critical Affirmation 
Having argued that the nature of Christian existence involves being caught up in 
the divine eschatological procession towards the realisation of the  new world, 
Barth turns, in the third section of his lecture, to describe more clearly the posture 
of  the  Christian  in  their  interactions  with  society  and  culture.  He  begins  by 
contending  once  more  that  the  kingdom  of  God  cannot  be  identified  with  or 
limited to human movements of reform or revolution. Nor, on the other hand, can 
it be identified as a wholly  future reality. Rather, the kingdom of God ‘is the 
revolution which  is before all revolutions, as  it is before the whole prevailing 
order of things. The great negative precedes the small one, as it precedes the small 
positive.  The  original  is  the  synthesis.  It  is  out  of  this  that  both  thesis  and 
antithesis arise.’
67  
In this convoluted section Barth utilises an inverted form of Hegel’s conception of 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis, as well as meditations on Colossians, Ecclesiastes 
and Jesus’ use of parables in order to press one simple point: the initial posture of 
the Christian towards culture and society is one of critical affirmation:  
Insight into the true transcendence of the divine origin of all things permits, 
or rather commands, us to understand the particular social orders as being 
caused by God, by their connection with God. Naturally, we shall be led first 
not to a denial but to an affirmation of the world as it is.…Only out of such 
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an affirmation can come that genuine, radical denial which is manifestly the 
meaning of our movements of protest.
68 
Because ‘all things were created by Christ and for him’ (Col. 1:16), the world, 
even in its fallen condition, is God’s world, and as such always retains a ‘living 
and divine element,’ so that ‘the new from above is at the same time the oldest 
thing  in  existence,  forgotten  and  buried.’
69  Even  the  regnum  naturae  is  the 
kingdom of God although its glory is presently veiled. Because this is so, says 
Barth, we must accept that there are orders of creation in all social relations just as 
there  are  in  the  natural  world.  Christian  existence  begins,  therefore,  with  a 
commitment of the self to ‘the living and divine element which is always there; 
and this very committing of ourselves to God in the world is our power of not 
committing ourselves to the world without God.’
70  
By affirming that the world was created by Christ and for Christ Barth is able to 
preclude both an ascetic denial of or withdrawal from the world, as well as an 
uncritical affirmation of the world as it is. Both of these constitute false one-sided 
options. The Christian posture as envisaged by Barth is one in which opposition to 
the  world as it presently  is  (antithesis)  arises  precisely  because  the  prevailing 
conditions of the sinful world (thesis) stand in opposition to the original intent of 
the creator (original synthesis). It is because Christians recognise the divine order 
of creation as intended in Christ, that they must take a position of opposition to 
that which is presently not in submission to the rule of Christ. Christians not only 
find in Christ the criterion for this world, but are themselves found in Christ. As 
such, they cannot take a position of neutrality with regard to the world: 
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It is not ours to be onlookers; it is ours to take our appointed place in the 
world’s  march.  We  are  forced  to  it  by  the  consciousness  of  solid 
responsibility laid upon our souls for the degenerate world; we are forced to 
it by the thought of the creator who is and remains the creator even of our 
fallen world.
71  
Barth acknowledges that our work is certainly  limited in its capacity to effect 
change  in  the  world,  but  nonetheless  encourages  determined  and  happy 
participation in all the varied spheres of social and cultural life in hope that ‘the 
spark  might  come  from  above,  and  the  eternal  be  brought  to  light  in  the 
transitory.’
72 
As presaged in the preceding discussion, the Christian’s posture toward the world 
is not simply that of affirmation, but includes criticism and denial as well. These 
two  aspects  of  posture—affirmation  and  denial—are  not  brought  into  a 
harmonious  balance  but  continue  to  interact  in  tension  with  each  other,  with 
denial  at  all  times  surpassing  affirmation  in  worth  and  meaning.  Thus  Barth 
confesses that 
we live more deeply in the No than in the Yes, more deeply in criticism and 
protest  than  in  naïveté,  more  deeply  in  longing  for  the  future  than  in 
participation in the present.…Our Yes toward life from the very beginning 
carries  within  it  the  divine  No,  which  breaks  forth  as  the  antithesis  and 
points  away  from  what but  now  was  the thesis  to the  original  and  final 
synthesis. That No is not the last and highest truth but is the call from home 
which comes in answer to our asking for God in the world.
73 
For Barth, the Yes which arises from the original synthesis issues in a louder and 
more urgent No against the form of the world in its present condition, in order that 
the original synthesis may be restored. Because we would say Yes to the intent of 
the creator we must also say No to that which is contrary to this intention. The No 
arises,  therefore,  from  the  Yes  and  functions  in  service  of  an  ultimate  Yes. 
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Christian existence involves not only affirmation, but life in echo of the divine No 
uttered against the fallenness of this age.  
Significantly, Barth hints that this No arises in prayer, in our calling upon God in 
and for the world. Under the impulse of divine movement we are moved forward 
as ‘the kingdom of God advances to its attack upon society.’
74 Yet, although we 
are impelled and moved forward, we also participate voluntarily in the ‘onward 
march of God in history.’
75 Precisely because God the creator is also God the 
redeemer, the Christian ‘must enter fully into the subversion and conversion of 
this present and of every conceivable world, into the judgement and grace which 
the presence of God entails,’ lest they fall away from the truth and power of Christ 
and his resurrection.
76 In this context Barth explicitly turns his attention to the 
church:  
How terrible if the church, of all institutions, should not see this, but put her 
effort  into  maintaining  for  men  a  balance  which  they  must  finally 
lose!…Have  we  heard the  call that  we have  heard? Have  we  understood 
what  we  have  understood?—that  the  demand  of  the  day  is  for  a  new 
approach in God to the whole of life?
77  
Thus Barth calls the church to ‘make good that approach by frank criticism of 
particulars, by courageous decision and action, by forward-looking proclamation 
of truth and patient work of reform.’
78 
The Activity of the Christian: Sub Specie Aeternitatis 
In the  fifth and final  section of the lecture Barth recapitulates the position he 
outlined in the previous sections, and reiterates the eschatological nature of the 
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Christian’s place in society. In a blunt summary statement he asserts that ‘simple 
cooperation within the framework of existing society is followed by radical and 
absolute opposition to that society.’
79 Both postures are necessary and ongoing in 
the  Christian’s interaction with society  and culture. Clearly Barth sets  himself 
against political revolution and uprising in favour of democracy, and yet also calls 
for  a  revolutionary  opposition  to  all  that  is  not  aligned  with  the  original  and 
coming  synthesis.  He  anticipates  that  Christians  will  criticise,  protest,  reform, 
organise, seek democracy, socialism, and even revolution, but that they must not 
expect that their endeavours will ‘satisfy the ideal of the kingdom of God. That is 
really beyond us.’
80 All human endeavours are strictly provisional. The God in 
whom we find rest is also the God who stirs our unrest, and neither state in this 
age is final.  
In a turn of phrase that indicates a  shift from the theology of Romans I, and 
echoing  his recent article on Naumann and Blumhardt, Barth refers to  human 
activity as parabolic of the ‘wholly Other’ kingdom which belongs solely to God. 
Human action represents the Other, but can and does not in itself produce it. 
Christian and ecclesial existence derives its life from that Other, but this is a life 
wholly in a period of transition—there can be no thought of development from 
one side to the other for the synthesis we seek is in God alone.
81 Certainly the 
Christian is caught in the movement of God issuing from the resurrection of Jesus 
and the outpouring of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. Nevertheless, says Barth,  
[i]f we understand ourselves rightly, we shall see that power to grow comes 
always from above and never from below. For the last thing, the e[scaton, 
the synthesis, is not the continuation, the result, the consequence, the next 
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step after the next to the last, so to speak, but, on the contrary, is forever a 
radical break with everything next to the last.
82  
Thus, Christians are to ‘throw their energies’ into the business nearest to hand in 
order to make a new Switzerland and a new Germany, but this only looks forward 
to, and will not result in the creation of the New Jerusalem.
83  
Barth, then, concludes with Calvin to fix the place of the Christian in society 
within the  spes futurae vitae.
84 Christian and ecclesial existence draws its life, 
motivation and energy from the hope given in the vision of the regnum gloriae. It 
considers its situation and makes its decisions sub specie aeternitatis, and is in 
this  respect,  a  thoroughly  eschatological  existence.  In  its  thought,  speech  and 
action it seeks to represent the coming kingdom, and works energetically for the 
character  of  that  kingdom  to  be  replicated  in  this  age,  but  with  the  modest 
apprehension that the fullness of the kingdom belongs to God alone.  
Following after God: A Community of Discernment 
In this lecture, then, Barth reiterates for a new audience themes familiar from his 
earlier works. Once again we encounter his resolute theological realism and his 
emphasis on the sovereignty of God. Once again Barth insists that the coming of 
God’s kingdom is God’s own work, and that human attempts, including religious 
attempts, in this direction cannot succeed. We also hear an echo of Blumhardt in 
Barth’s admonition that the church need learn to ‘wait’ upon God in a ‘wholly 
new  way.’ So,  too,  the  earlier  recognition  that  in binding  us  to  himself,  God 
liberates us from subjection to all other deities and powers is found in this lecture 
also. Finally, Barth continues to envisage an active Christian ethic. Although he 
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has not yet developed the category of correspondence to describe the relation of 
divine and human action, his thought is already tending in this direction. Faithful 
human activity echoes the direction and priority of divine action, thus proving its 
devotion to the latter.  
Of particular note in this lecture is the shift identified in Barth’s eschatology when 
compared to Romans I. Although he continues to utilise the imagery of the third 
dimension and movement of God into history, it is apparent that Barth has begun 
to shift from the process eschatological framework of the commentary to a more 
consistent eschatology in this lecture. Christian and ecclesial existence remains 
thoroughly eschatological in its orientation, and the note of hope and optimism 
that characterised the former work, while somewhat attenuated, continues here.
85  
This examination of Barth’s Tambach lecture also supports the present thesis, 
namely,  that  Barth’s  theology,  far from having  no place  for  ethical  existence, 
actually functions towards the formation of moral community, and presupposes an 
active Christian and ecclesial existence. The knowledge that the kingdom of God 
is not the work of humanity does not exonerate the Christian or the church from 
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the need for active engagement in temporal affairs. Rather, through the event of 
revelation which includes within it the answering response of faith, the believer is 
impressed into the service of the kingdom of God.  
The particular character of the Christian life as portrayed in this lecture stands in 
continuity  with  Barth’s  works  surveyed  earlier.  Once  more  Barth  refuses  to 
prescribe  normative  Christian  activity,  although  he  is  willing  to  hope  for  the 
‘possibility of comradeship and brotherhood on our earth and under our heaven.’
86 
Likewise he extols such virtues as hope, courage, endurance, liberty and joy,
87 
while also identifying false paths such as that taken by Naumann or an unnamed 
German theologian during the war who, on the basis of divine immanence, argued 
for ‘the Life Within’ rather than ‘the Life Beyond.’
88  
Barth’s unwillingness to provide prescriptive guidance for Christian activity is, of 
course, a source of concern for some interpreters of his ethics. In his analysis of 
this  lecture,  for  example,  Willis  correctly  notes  that  Barth  has  adopted  a 
dialectical structure to frame his argument in order to enable an approach to the 
question of ethics without becoming committed to a particular stance or ideology. 
He also acknowledges that Barth’s proposal does allow the possibility of concrete 
human  action,  but  complains  that  ‘what  are  needed  are  criteria  or  conditions 
enabling one to decide in particular cases, i.e. when the response at the human 
level is properly acceptance of existing structures, patterns, and norms, and when 
criticism,  modification,  or  overthrow  of  these  is  required.’
89  Further,  Willis  is 
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concerned that the diastasis posited by Barth between God and humanity renders 
human ethics ‘at the outset problematic’ by ‘relativising all human activity’ and 
placing a question mark ‘at every point over its validity.’
90  
Here  Willis  not  only  misrepresents  Barth,  but  fails  to  grasp  the  fluidity  of 
Christian and ecclesial existence as Barth conceives it. Barth’s concern in this 
lecture, as Spencer has noted, is not the justification of a particular politics (or, 
one  might  add  more  broadly,  a  particular  ethics)  but  the  theological 
circumscription of all political-social action.
91 In this lecture Barth continues the 
preliminary work of establishing the parameters of the divine-human relation, and 
the situating of the ethical agent within those parameters. In contrast to Willis’ 
reading, Barth refuses to allow the human an independent status over against God, 
or to allow the divine-human relation to be reduced to a static relation in which 
God is effectively muted and initiative is given over to the human agent. For this 
reason, the divine-human relation is characterised as a living relation befitting the 
living God and the living human, and so it is not by accident that Barth adopts the 
image of a bird in flight as a motif of his Christian and ecclesial vision.  
Has Barth, as Willis alleges, failed to provide any constructive ethical guidance 
for his listeners? It is certainly true that in later years Barth will indeed formulate 
his  ethics  in  such  a way  as  to allow a  legitimate though  subordinate role  for 
ethical  analysis  and  reason.  Here,  nonetheless,  his  concluding  remarks  are 
instructive: 
Our theme contains a question which must now be upon the lips of us all: 
What ought we then to do? It is true that many other questions, great and 
small, burning questions for which we are badly in need of an answer, are 
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contained in this fundamental question and have not apparently been met by 
the fundamental biblical answer we have given. But they merely seem not to 
be answered. We are moved by the truth of Christ.…We are grounded in 
God:  why  should  eternity  not  then  be  set  in  our  heart?  And  sub  specie 
aeternitatis, why should we not know what is to be done? We can indeed do 
only one thing—not many. But it is just that one thing which we do not do. 
What can the Christian in society do but follow attentively what is done by 
God?
92       
Ironically, Barth asks the very question which in Romans I he insists we cease 
from  asking!
93  Once  more,  however,  his  answer  is  not  given  in  terms  of 
prescriptive  virtues  or  activities,  save  the  requirement  of  practical  Christian 
discernment.  Only  here  is  it  possible  to  resolve  the  dilemma  of  the  correct 
practical  relation  of  the  Yes  and  the  No. This relation,  says  Barth,  cannot be 
resolved systematically, but only historically. That is, ‘without being disturbed by 
the inconsistent appearance of it we shall then enjoy the freedom of saying now 
Yes and now No, and of saying both not as a result of outward chance or of 
inward caprice but because we are so moved by the will of God.’
94  
Barth again conceives of ethics  in terms of the ‘command of the moment’ he 
elaborated in his commentary on Romans. Ethical existence finds its genesis in 
the liberty of believers before God, and his theological labour is directed toward a 
description of this divine-human relation. That Barth situates this guidance at the 
climax of his address, and laments that this  is the one thing  we do not do, is 
indicative of his motive towards the formation of moral community, a community 
of Christians who are enabled by the Spirit to take  an active place  in society 
because they are actively attentive to God in prayer and discernment. He remains 
convinced that earthly reality can be changed because God is actively at work and 
moving in the world. The task of the Christian is ‘to learn the meaning of true 
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revolution,  to  join  in  the  revolution  of  the  kingdom  which  is  before  all 
revolutions.’
95 
The Influence of Overbeck 
Franz Overbeck   
In  June  1920  Barth  published  a  pamphlet  entitled  “The  Inner  Situation  of 
Christianity”  which was  later reprinted in the second  volume of his collected 
essays and addresses.
96 The essay was an extended review of an edited collection 
of  the  literary  remains  of  Franz  Overbeck  published  posthumously  in  1919.
97 
Overbeck, who died in 1905, had been professor of New Testament and Early 
Church History at the University of Basle from 1870-1897. His most important 
work, published in 1873, was Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie, 
in which he offered ‘a severe and trenchant critique of all historical Christianity’ 
in contrast to the original foundation of the church in Christ and his apostles.
98  
Overbeck’s professional aim had been to write a ‘profane church history’—that is, 
a  completely  objective  history  of  the  church  with  all  religious  illusions  and 
colouration stripped away. In the process of applying his historical method he 
discovered that apostolic Christianity had been intensely eschatological in nature, 
and  concluded that in  its  beginning, Christianity  derived its  life  from  another 
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world and thus stood in radical contradiction to everything in this world.
99 The 
church’s loss of this animating eschatological faith in succeeding generations had 
two fundamental implications for Overbeck. First, with the loss of eschatological 
faith  the  church  became  a  historical  entity,  an  aspect  of  this  world  living  in 
accordance with the ebb and flow of general historical forces, and thus a living 
contradiction to its original essence. Second, the unfulfilled hope of the Parousia 
in effect falsified the truth claim of original Christianity and thus also rendered the 
entirety of subsequent church history and Christian theology false.
100 According to 
Overbeck,  these  implications  were  amply  demonstrated  in  the  nature  of 
contemporary  Christianity  and  its  historicist  theology  which  he  assailed  with 
iconoclastic fervour.  
Overbeck  denied  the  possibilities  that  Christianity  can  have  a  historical 
development, or that the historian can treat Christianity apart from culture. As 
soon as Christianity is treated as a historical reality  its  very essence  has been 
denied. ‘Historic Christianity,’ says Overbeck, ‘that is, Christianity subjected to 
time, is an absurdity.…To include Christianity under the concept of the historical, 
means to admit that it is of this world, and like all life has lived in the world in 
order to die.’
101 Overbeck developed the category of Urgeschichte to distinguish 
primal Christianity from all ensuing expressions of it. As McCormack has pointed 
out, Urgeschichte is a technical term, a geschichtsphilosophische category which 
insists on a hiatus, an unbridgeable chasm, between the originating events of early 
Christianity and all subsequent periods of church history. Overbeck developed the 
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category and invented the term in order to demonstrate the hermeneutical limits 
governing all historical enquiry and thus to criticise the foundational assumptions 
of contemporary historical studies.
102  
The sharpness of his polemic alienated most of his contemporaries, and ensured 
that  Overbeck  remained  something  of  a  misfit  in  theological  circles,  a  most 
unlikely  theologian.  In  addition  to  being  an  outspoken  critic  of  contemporary 
Christianity and theology, he was also a close friend of Friedrich Nietzsche, and, 
according to McCormack, inwardly an atheist whose historical studies had led to 
the loss of faith.
103 And although Barth recalls that ‘one merely needed to mention 
[Overbeck] in Basle at that time to make everyone’s hair bristle,’
104 he nonetheless 
found in him an ally. In a letter to Thurneysen dated January 5
th 1920, Barth wrote 
‘our Melchizedek is probably—Overbeck. I may write something about him.’
105 
By the end of February Barth had finished his essay.
106 In April the same year 
Barth visited Overbeck’s widow and reported to Thurneysen, 
She is fully abreast of affairs, a lively, sensible old lady, who received me 
very warmly and portrayed her husband for me in a way that simply tallies to 
the hairbreadth with our conception of him. It will be alright for our booklet 
to appear since everything is in order.…This is a splendid relationship that 
protects us against attack from the rear, is it not? Now we must both of us 
spit  on  our  hands  in  preparation  for  new  deeds.  It  is  clear  that  the  idol 
totters.
107 
Barth’s rear-guard defence was certainly required. Thurneysen notes that when the 
pamphlet  was  published  it  became  the  cause  of  much  head-shaking  and 
                                                
102 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 229. 
103 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 226. 
104  Karl  Barth,  The  Theology  of  Schleiermacher:  Lectures  at  Göttingen  Winter  Semester  of 
1923/24, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1982), 265. 
105 Cited in Eberhard Jüngel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, trans. G. E. Paul (Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1986), 56. 
106 Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth and the Pietists: The Young Karl Barth’s Critique of Pietism and 
Its Response, trans. Daniel W. Bloesch (Downers Grove: IVP, 2004), 73. 
107 Smart, ed., Revolutionary Theology, 50. The letter is dated April 20, 1920.   209 
opposition. Opponents asserted that his interpretation was based on insufficient 
knowledge  of  the  real  Overbeck.
108  Nevertheless,  Thurneysen  defends  Barth, 
insisting that he did not misrepresent Overbeck but, ‘seeing through his outward 
profession of scepticism to his real intentions,’ probably understood him better 
than  Overbeck  understood  himself.
109  Despite  this  testimony,  however,  some 
contemporary  scholars  agree  that  Barth  has  co-opted  Overbeck’s  trenchant 
polemics for his own purposes.
110 What was it, then, that Barth found—or thought 
he found—in Overbeck which excited his enthusiasm? 
Between Overbeck and Blumhardt
111 
Before  answering  this  question  directly  it  is  instructive  to  note  the  similarity 
between  Barth’s  treatment  of  Overbeck  and  Auf  das  Reich  Gottes  warten—
Barth’s first essay on Blumhardt. Both essays take the form of an extended review 
on a publication of what might be considered ‘fragments’ of the authors in view. 
That  is,  neither  work  is  a  systematic  presentation  of  a  position,  nor  even  a 
developed  argument.  Further,  both  objects  of  Barth’s  attention  are  also 
characterised by their opposition to contemporary theology and church. They are 
both contemporary religious personalities who are to some extent at least, ignored 
and even scorned by the prevailing theology. Nor is this association of Overbeck 
with  Blumhardt  arbitrary  or  accidental,  for  Barth  himself  makes  explicit  the 
connection between the two men:  
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Actually, Blumhardt and Overbeck stand close together; back to back, if you 
like, and very different in disposition, in terminology, in their mental worlds, 
in their experience, but essentially together. Blumhardt stood as a forward-
looking  and  hopeful  Overbeck; Overbeck  as  a backward-looking,  critical 
Blumhardt. Each was a witness to the mission of the other.
112 
And so Barth begins his review with a question as to why contemporary theology 
refused  to  allow  itself  to be  challenged by  these two  very  different men  who 
nevertheless bear the same message. His introduction is a call for theology to hear 
what it has so far refused to hear: a challenge to its vocation which threatens to 
capsize the ship. He suggests that Overbeck’s Christentum und Kultur is  
an inconceivably impressive sharpening of the commandment ‘Thou shalt 
not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.’…It is a dangerous book, a 
book filled with the apocalyptic air of judgement. It is a balance sheet, a 
book  which  calls  the  comprehending  reader  away  from  the  fleshpots  of 
Egypt into the desert, to a place of durance where he can neither gain nor 
possess, nor feast, nor distribute, but only hunger and thirst, seek, ask, and 
knock.
113 
Barth insists that the events and experiences of the previous years have clearly 
indicated that contemporary theology is illusory and bankrupt, that ‘we have been 
living  until  now  in  a  house  built  on  sand;  and  that  theology—if  this  venture 
“Theology” is to continue longer to exist—would do better to clench its teeth and 
take the road to the desert.’
114  
The remainder of the review is a defence and explication of this basic call for 
renewal. In the first section after the introduction, Barth outlines the essential 
framework of Overbeck’s thought as he understands it from his literary remains. 
This  framework  has  two  primary  aspects:  the  notion  of  ‘super-history’ 
(Urgeschichte) on the one hand, and death on the other. For Barth, Urgeschichte 
refers to the ‘supra-temporal, unknowable, inconceivable super-history which is 
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composed wholly of beginnings, in which the boundaries dividing the individual 
from the whole are still fluid,’ while death refers to the great unknown into which 
all  humanity  is  going.
115  Human  existence,  and  all  human  knowing,  is  utterly 
bounded by these great unknowns from which we arise and into which we go. 
That which is historical, which arises on its own account in the period between 
these  two  boundaries  is  necessarily  of  this  world  and  thus  has  in  itself  no 
ultimacy,  but  is  limited  and  relative.  Barth  interprets  Overbeck’s  concepts  of 
Urgeschichte  and  death  with  the  more  familiar  imagery  of  creation  and 
redemption,  and  views  them  as  the  critical  basis  upon  which  three  primary 
polemical discussions are founded. Barth treats each of these in turn.
116  
Overbeck’s  first polemic is directed against the  formal possibility of historical 
Christianity, which as we have already seen, denies the possibility of the historical 
development of Christianity as well as the possibility of grounding contemporary 
Christianity upon historical scholarship. His second complaint targets the modern 
church and theology as a perversion of Christianity leading inevitably to its own 
demise. The roots of the declension lie in the loss of the eschatological horizon 
which  was  so  central  to  original  Christianity,  and  which  set  it  in  invariable 
opposition to all that is of the world. In contrast, the modern church seeks above 
all to establish itself in the world as an entity alongside other entities, and so is 
thoroughly accommodated to the prevailing culture, as revealed by its capitulation 
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to nationalism and the ‘religion of Bismarck.’
117 As a result modern Christianity is 
simply unchristian.  
Finally, Overbeck’s third protest is directed against modern theology, which he 
labels ‘the Satan of religion,’
118 and specifically against modern theologians who 
‘expect indeed “to put God daily into their bag”’ and ‘allow themselves “to play 
[with God and the human soul] like children with their dolls, and they have the 
same  assurance  of  ownership  and  the  right  of  disposal.”’
119  Because  modern 
theology exists in service of a compromised and accommodated church, it is itself 
compromised and accommodated and in Overbeck’s estimation, not ‘Christian’ at 
all. In fact, the logic of Overbeck’s argument is that theology as an academic 
pursuit  is  impossible,  for  all  that  passes  for  theology  can  be  subsumed  more 
accurately  under  other  branches  of  intellectual  pursuit  such  as  history, 
anthropology or morality, and that if theology had any intellectual integrity at all 
it would acknowledge it no longer existed and had in fact ceased to exist some 
time before.
120 
Thus, Barth found in Overbeck an ally for his own project, seeing that he, too, had 
come to reject modern theology and the kind of ecclesial existence it engendered. 
Overbeck not only confirmed Barth in his own trenchant criticism of the modern 
church and theology, but also provided additional resources that enabled Barth to 
develop his critique in  new directions. One example is the substitution of the 
language and imagery of ‘life’ which characterised Der Römerbrief and Barth’s 
earlier  essays,  with  that  of  ‘death.’  With  this  move  Barth  continues  to purge 
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remnants of liberalism from his own theology, and denies that the presence of the 
divine  in human existence and experience is immediately  given. Death, which 
names the end of all human potentiality, is the source from which all that is of 
God flows.
121 
Another clear example is Barth’s adoption of Overbeck’s term Urgeschichte, to 
sharpen the eschatological framework with which he is working. The term was 
coined, as we have already seen, as a technical term describing a category in the 
philosophy of history. For Barth, however, the term functions as a theological 
category and indicates an ontological reality. Thus, ‘the only possible abode of 
Christianity lies, so far as the past is concerned, not in history, but in the history 
before history, the super-history (Urgeschichte).’
122 The life and faith of Jesus, 
Paul, the apostles are understood under the category of miracle and not, therefore, 
as arising as part of normal historical occurrence.  
Thus, in place of the former emphasis on a process eschatology, is now found a 
more consistent eschatology. Again, it is not so much that Barth learnt a new 
eschatology from Overbeck, for Overbeck, while acknowledging the thoroughly 
eschatological conceptual world of Jesus and the early Church, denied that such a 
world  view  was  possible  any  longer.  What  Overbeck  did  provide  was  an 
insistence  that  this  eschatological  world  view  was  essential  to  genuine 
Christianity,  a  status  forfeited  by  the  modern  church  through  its  inability  to 
conceive  of  itself  in  such  eschatological terms.  Barth,  however, did  not  share 
Overbeck’s  pessimism  at  this  point  for  he  had  already  been  instructed  by 
Blumhardt. He already knew of ‘a living Christianity whose “theology” was a 
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proclamation of the kingdom of God which hinged on the resurrection of Jesus.’
123 
It was no accident then, that his final sentence for the Overbeck review was a 
citation from 1 Corinthians 15: 42-43: ‘It is sown in corruption, it is raised in 
incorruption; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, 
it is raised in power.’
124 But whereas formerly Barth envisaged the resurrection as 
the inauguration of a life-process growing organically through history, he now 
views it as the action of God on the other side of all human possibility.  
Overbeck provided Barth the means for radicalising the message of Blumhardt, 
for  declaring  even  more  stringently  than  he  had  in  Romans  I  that  although 
revelation can occur in history, it is not of history. In return, Blumhardt provided 
Barth the means for accepting Overbeck’s critique of the current situation without 
falling into theological despair. It is quite clear that Overbeck did not believe that 
genuine theology was possible, and that he did believe in the ‘gentle fading away 
of Christianity.’
125 Barth, however, argued that Overbeck was merely presenting 
the negative side of the point which now had to be set forth positively.
126 Indeed, 
he likens Overbeck to Jeremiah, and contends that Overbeck’s analysis was itself 
‘from  beyond,’  a  ‘fragment  of  super-history’  appearing  now  as  a  prophetic 
message to a compromised church, escaping from the prophet ‘almost against his 
will.’
127 If Christianity is to live once more, it must do so on a thoroughly new 
foundation, and it is this task that Barth sets himself and those who will hear him.  
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A New Christianity 
Barth  affirmed Overbeck’s contention that ‘modern theology  was a  species of 
non-theology,’ but rejected his corollary contention that theology in and of itself 
was  impossible.
128  ‘Our  next  task,’  says  Barth,  ‘is  to  begin  the  desert 
wandering.…A  theology  which  would  dare  that  passage—dare  to  become 
eschatology—would not only be a new theology but also a new Christianity; it 
would be a new being, itself already a piece of the “last things,” towering above 
the Reformation and all “religious” movements.’
129  
This citation makes clear that Barth was not only seeking a new theology, but a 
new Christianity, a new form of authentic Christian and ecclesial existence. Thus, 
while MacDonald’s contention that ‘all of Barth’s theology is best understood 
within the horizon of the specific Enlightenment legacy of Hume and Overbeck’s 
metatheological dilemma’
130 may well be true, it is not sufficient. Barth’s concern 
was not only for the intellectual integrity of theology as an end in itself, but for 
the renewal of Christianity itself, for authentic Christianity, the ‘new being’ which 
is present in history, but which is not explainable in any historical terms including 
developments from the Reformation or other religious movements.  
Indeed, while it is true that Barth’s theological and ethical concerns must not be 
separated, it is at least arguable that in 1920 Barth’s greater concern was with 
regard  to  the  actual  life  of  contemporary  Christianity than  for  the  theological 
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question raised by Overbeck’s critique. At this time he entitled his pamphlet “On 
the  Inner Situation of  Christianity” and only  later, with the publication of  his 
second  collection  of  essays  eight  years  later,  changed  the  title  to  “Unsettled 
Questions for Theology Today.” For Barth, the ‘inner situation of Christianity’ 
has reference to the nature of Christian and ecclesial existence. This is seen in the 
review itself where Barth raises the issue of the inner situation of Christianity by 
means of a direct citation from Overbeck:  
‘A façade can lack an interior…on the other hand it is unendurable that an 
interior should present a false façade; and that is the case with present-day 
Christianity. But  you cannot summon its interior  as a  witness against its 
exterior as though it could be found without it. And anyhow, no one has to 
listen to it.…Those representatives of Christianity who currently appeal to its 
“inner life” are its worst traitors’ (p.71). For ‘the innermost and the real need 
of  Christianity  at  the  present  time  is  the  practice  of  it  in  life’  (Praxis) 
(p.274).
131 
Barth concurs with Overbeck that the façade of modern Christianity is false, a 
betrayal of the interior essence of Christianity, and that its most pressing need is 
genuine praxis. Modern Christianity’s thorough accommodation of its dogmatic 
heritage to modern thought ‘erases the last traces which true Christianity still has 
left  in  life.  What  is  accomplished  serves  wholly  for  the  greater  glory  of  the 
modern…and to the detriment of Christianity.’
132 This is particularly evident in the 
inability of the modern church to stand apart from and against modern German 
nationalism. In a paraphrase of Overbeck’s concern Barth exhorts his reader to, 
Consider…the religion of Bismarck (pp.148-59), which provides the most 
magnificent  example  of  the  way  the  world  pleases  itself  and  wins  the 
applause of the representatives of religion. Therefore Bismarck is the best-
known  advocate  of  the  indispensability  of  religion  for  all  earthly 
effectiveness. He  had  religion simply in  order to keep his  hands free  for 
secular  work.…His  religion  was  erected  on  the  basis  of  his  self-esteem. 
Moreover, it was something which he had reduced to the size of a personal 
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plaything and which he could lay aside at any time. But the fact that he could 
play with it and occasionally had a Christian notion was sufficient in the 
eyes of the modern advocates of Christianity to make him a Christian, even a 
model  Christian.…Thus Christianity  has  now  been  handed  over  to  every 
holder of power. So cheap is today’s canonization in the Christian heaven.
133 
These sentiments are, of course, simply echoes of those we have heard from Barth 
time and again since his initial break from his theological mentors. As a result of 
its thorough enculturation the integrity of modern theology and Christianity has 
been gutted with the result that religion and the church has been co-opted by the 
secular  powers  to  legitimise  national  ideologies  and  agendas  alien  to  its  true 
essence. It is precisely this evisceration which led to the devastating capitulation 
of the church to Kaiser Wilhelm’s war agenda in 1914 and which set Barth on his 
search for a new foundation for theology, which would in turn sponsor a more 
authentic form of Christian and ecclesial existence. 
Two other features of Barth’s review merit comment. The first is recognition once 
more of the pivotal place  Blumhardt continued to play  in the development of 
Barth’s thought and ecclesial vision. In this review Barth placed Blumhardt back 
to back with Overbeck, seeing in them both the same criticism against modern 
Christianity from the central standpoint of eschatology. Criticism alone, however, 
is insufficient, and it is here that Blumhardt’s hope-filled influence is decisive. 
Not only must the old be torn down but the new must arise, and for Barth, it is the 
theological and ecclesial vision inspired by Blumhardt that continues to provide 
the impetus for his search for a new foundation for theology and corresponding 
Christian and ecclesial existence. 
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The  second  feature  of  the  review  that  merits  comment  is  several  remarks 
regarding  Pietism  which  indicate  a  development  of  perspective  in  the  period 
which had elapsed since Barth wrote Romans I. The first remark is a citation from 
Overbeck to the effect that ‘Pietism is for me the only form of Christianity under 
which a personal relation to Christianity would be possible for me.’
134 By this 
Overbeck did not mean the kind of Pietism which was akin to other forms of 
modern Christianity seeking to discover God within the human psyche, but the 
more  ‘ascetic’  forms  of  Pietism  which  stood  aloof  from  modern  culture  and 
against the  secularising of the  faith.
135 Overbeck argued that such Pietism was 
actually  closer  to  genuine  Christianity  than  the  modern  orthodoxy  which  had 
arisen in Protestantism:  
The modern world is ready to do everything to make it possible to remain 
within the illusion of Christianity; and for that purpose, as it is easy to see, 
orthodoxy  is  more  usable  than  Pietism.…In  modern  life,  Christianity  is 
thirsting for life and so for Pietism. In modern Christianity, the modernity 
thirsts  for  orthodoxy  since  it  has  already  drunk its fill  of life;  and  so  in 
modern Christianity, Christianity gets nothing to drink.
136 
While it remains to be seen how Barth will develop this reserved affirmation of 
Pietism, it seems evident nevertheless that Barth has learnt from Overbeck a way 
of  viewing  Pietism  more  positively  than  he  was  able  when  writing  the 
commentary.  
The  influence of Overbeck on  Barth’s  theological  development  should  not be 
underestimated. While Barth’s critique of contemporary Christianity had arisen 
independently  of  Overbeck,  it  received  renewed  force  as  a  result  of  his 
                                                
134 Barth, “Unsettled Questions,” 60. Barth has truncated Overbeck here. The full statement reads, 
‘For Ritschl the Pietistic form of Christianity is the most detestable. For me it is the only one under 
whose  influence  a  personal  relationship  to  Christianity  would  be  possible  for  me’  (Overbeck, 
Christentum und Kultur, 179).  
135 Busch, Karl Barth and the Pietists, 76-77. 
136 Overbeck, Christentum und Kultur, 274, cited in Barth, “Unsettled Questions,” 67.   219 
engagement with the thought of the latter who bluntly avowed that Christianity 
and theology were in fact impossible under the conditions set forth in the modern 
church. Reading Overbeck convinced Barth that Christianity must of necessity be 
eschatological in its very essence. His concept of Urgeschichte, modified as it was 
by  Barth,  allowed  him  to  insist  even  more  stringently  that  revelation  is  non-
historical  in  the  sense  that  it  does  not  arise  as  a  result  of  historical  process. 
Finally, his meditations on death also captured Barth’s theological imagination, 
causing him to rethink the way he articulated his theological convictions. This 
influence came to expression very quickly as can be seen in a lecture given by 
Barth shortly after he completed this review. 
“Biblical Questions, Insights and Vistas” 
On April 17, 1920 Barth delivered a lecture to the Aarau Student Conference 
entitled “Biblical Questions, Insights, and Vistas,”
137 and addressed the question, 
‘What does the Bible offer us toward an understanding of the meaning of the 
world?’
138 The venerable Adolph von Harnack, Barth’s former teacher, was also 
present  at the conference  and  had earlier addressed  the  same  audience  on the 
question ‘What assured knowledge can historians provide for the interpretation of 
world events?’
139 Several days after the lecture Barth had opportunity to meet with 
Harnack who was clearly dismayed with Barth’s lecture. In a written report of this 
meeting to Thurneysen Barth records that Harnack admitted that  
[i]t may be desirable that the church should be shaken a bit, but I do best to 
keep my conception of God to myself and not make an ‘export article’ of it. 
Finally  I  was  branded  a  Calvinist  and  intellectualist  and  let  go  with  the 
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prophecy that according to all the experiences of church history I will found 
a sect and receive inspirations.
140  
This section investigates what Barth had said to so arouse Harnack, and which 
threatened perhaps, to inordinately ‘shake’ the church. 
The Bible and the Knowledge of God 
In the first section of his address Barth suggests that the immediate answer to the 
question posed is that the Bible’s contribution is to offer us the knowledge of God 
as  the  origin,  limit  and  creative  unity  of  all  knowledge  and  of  the  world’s 
meaning. Accordingly, ‘it is our part to confirm it in our own lives by labouring to 
relate ourselves, our daily task, and our hour of history to God the creator and 
redeemer.’
141  Barth’s  ethical  concern  is  disclosed  in  these  opening  comments. 
Indeed he goes on to lament that ‘the knowledge of God, instead of being the 
presupposition  which  gets  us  somewhere…comes  to  be  a  philosophical  or 
mythological problem which one must try to get somewhere with.’
142  
This  is  the  problematic  of  the  knowledge  of  God,  according  to  Barth  in  this 
lecture. Humanity generally is not outside the knowledge of God, but inside, for 
we cannot escape the reality that God is the origin of our existence: we cannot 
quite forget the soul’s provenance or its original unity with God.
143 Yet humanity 
is not led by this innate knowledge of God to a full acknowledgement of God and 
his  claim  upon  their  lives.  Rather,  ‘our  individualism  revolts  against  its 
comprehensiveness. The unredeemed mind of man, split off from the mind of the 
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creator, denies its Origin, denies itself.’
144 Just as our primal acknowledgement of 
God is a ‘last inevitability’ grounded in God, however, so too is our thorough-
going refusal of him. Barth grounds human alienation from God in God’s No 
rather than any human or historical necessity. What, then, does the Bible have to 
say to people thus caught in the tension between an original Yes by which they 
are inescapably related to God, and an original No by which they inevitably refuse 
acknowledgement of him?  
With the Yes and the No, the No and the Yes in which we find ourselves, we 
are thrown into the perplexity, into the crisis, of the Scriptures.…Give no 
credence  to  any  secondary  reasons  and  explanations  for  the  perplexity. 
When we ask the Bible what it has to offer, it answers by putting to us the 
fact of election.…The really vital core, the secret both of history and of our 
existence, is our response to the fact of election.
145 
Two aspects of this citation are significant. First is Barth’s use of the term crisis, 
which  features  prominently  in  this  lecture  and  becomes  the  major  motif  of 
Romans II. The term is not completely new in Barth’s oeuvre, appearing once in 
Romans  I,  but  the  emphasis  placed  on  it  indicates  a  development  of  Barth’s 
thought. In his first commentary Barth refers to the ‘crisis…in which all men and 
women of all classes stand again and again before God.’
146 Crisis, therefore, is 
descriptive of the situation of human persons when placed under the judgement of 
God.
147 It is precisely this sense that Barth intends in his usage of the term in this 
lecture.  
The second significant aspect of this citation, Barth’s grounding of the human 
condition in the problem of election, functions on two levels. First, in accordance 
with his fundamental commitment to the sovereignty of God, Barth refuses any 
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theological description which reduces God to an object of human study. Thus 
election  serves to assert and protect the  sovereign  aseity of  God. Second, the 
concept also serves to indicate the fundamental nature of human and Christian 
existence. Barth rejects the concept of election as proposed by Augustine and the 
Reformers, opting instead for a more existential account:  
The  idea  of  election  is  well  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  individual 
freedom:  our  responses  cannot  be  determined  once  and  for  all:  they  are 
constantly  to  be  made  anew.  Indeed,  opposite  responses  are  awakened 
simultaneously in a single individual. There is never so decisive a Yes that it 
does not harbour the possibility of the No: there is never so decisive a No 
that it is not liable to be toppled over into the Yes.…From the Bible we may 
learn to soften the affirmations of our belief or unbelief, and perhaps to keep 
silence, until we perceive the true relation between God and ourselves.
148 
In this account of election human existence is a matter of being ever confronted 
by God. Sharp distinctions between those who are Christians and those ‘outside’ 
are blurred. Christian life is a life before God, being encountered by him in an 
ever-renewed call to faith and decision in which God holds the ultimate say.
149  
Genuine Biblical Piety 
Barth begins the second section of his address with an affirmation of the human, 
historical and psychological character of the Bible, asserting that the humanity of 
the  Bible  is  a  given.  Nonetheless  he  maintains  that  its  composition  was  by 
particular human persons who had been thrown out of their course and enabled to 
‘see the invisible and hear the inaudible.’
150 They had been captured and moved by 
something external to themselves, and thereby drawn into the movement itself. 
                                                
148 Barth, “Biblical Questions,” 58-59. 
149 For further discussion of Barth’s doctrine of election see Michael D. O’Neil, “Communities of 
Witness: The Concept of Election in the Old Testament and in the Theology of Karl Barth,” in 
Text and Task: Scripture and Mission, ed. Michael Parsons (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2005), 172-186, 
Michael D. O’Neil, “Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Election,” The Evangelical Quarterly LXXVI, no. 4 
(2004): 311-326, and Michael D. O’Neil, “The Mission of the  Spirit in the Election of  God” 
(Unpublished Dissertation for the Master of Theology (Honours), Murdoch University, Western 
Australia, 2001). 
150 Barth, “Biblical Questions,” 64.   223 
For Barth, ‘this movement meets us in the Bible in an unescapable way.’
151 Thus, 
while  he  acknowledges the validity of such historical questions Barth  is more 
concerned  with  the  ‘special  content  of  this  human  document,  the  remarkable 
something with which the writers of these stories and those who stood behind 
them were concerned, the biblical object,’
152 which for Barth is nothing other than 
God: 
The  Bible  has  only  one  theological  interest  and  that  is  not  speculative: 
interest in God himself.…God is the new, incomparable, unattainable, not 
only heavenly but more than heavenly interest, who has drawn the regard of 
the men of the Bible to himself. He desires their complete attention, their 
entire obedience. For he must be true to himself; he must be and remain 
holy. He cannot be grasped, brought under management, and put to use; he 
cannot serve. He must rule. He must himself grasp, seize, manage, use.…He 
is  not  a  thing  among  other  things,  but  the  Wholly  Other,  the  infinite 
aggregate of all merely relative others. He is not the form of religious history 
but is the Lord of our life, the eternal Lord of the world. He it is of whom the 
Bible  speaks.  And  is  he  spoken  of  elsewhere?  Certainly.  But  whereas 
elsewhere consideration of him is left to the last, an imposing background, 
an esoteric secret, and therefore only a possibility, in the Bible he is the first 
consideration,  the  foreground,  the  revelation,  the  one  all-dominating 
theme.
153 
Two matters from this lengthy citation bear further reflection. First, it is plain that 
Barth has sharpened his characteristic emphasis on divine transcendence. Second, 
he emphasises the ‘ec-centric’ nature of biblical piety. I will look at each of these 
is turn. In his infinity and sovereignty God towers over all creaturely reality as the 
Wholly Other, and is as such the content of the Bible. All other interests, whether 
piety, experience, religion, religious history or church are form and must not be 
confused with the overriding focus of Scripture. These lesser interests function in 
the subordinate role of witness to the divine reality towards which they point, like 
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the enlarged finger of John the Baptist in Grünewald’s Isenheim altar piece.
154 
And like John they must decrease: 
The prophet, the man of God, the seer and hearer, ceases to be, as that to 
which  he  unwaveringly  points  begins  to  be.  The  object,  the  reality,  the 
Divine himself takes on new meaning; and the meaning of piety as such, of 
the  function  of  the  church  as  such,  falls  away.  We  may  call  this  the 
characteristic insight of the Bible.
155 
Barth’s identification of piety, religion, experience and church as form distinct 
from content functions to relativise them, prohibiting them from becoming things 
in and for themselves. This critique echoes and develops the similar critique he 
made in earlier works. In this lecture Barth insists that religion and church have a 
right to exist only when they continually do away with themselves.
156 But this is 
what the church refuses to do. Rather, 
[s]he does not tolerate her own relativity. She has not the patience to wait; 
she lacks that spirit of the stranger and pilgrim, which alone justifies her 
coming into the world.…Form believes itself capable of taking the place of 
content.…Man has taken the divine into his possession; he has brought it 
under his management.
157  
Barth is emphatic: ‘at the moment when religion becomes conscious of religion, 
when it becomes a psychologically and historically conceivable magnitude in the 
world, it falls away from its inner character, from its truth, to idols.’
158 For Barth, 
genuine biblical piety is conscious of its limits and relativity: ‘In its essence it is 
humility, fear of the Lord. It points beyond the world, and points at the same time 
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and above all beyond itself. It lives absolutely by virtue of its Object and for its 
Object.’
159  
Barth’s refusal to grant religious experience and practice legitimacy as a thing-in-
itself highlights the second matter of importance from the lengthy citation above. 
Not only has he sharpened the transcendence of God in relation to all creaturely 
reality, but he also emphasises the ‘ec-centric’ nature of biblical piety, and hence 
also, of Christian and ecclesial existence. God drew ‘the regard of the men of the 
Bible to himself,’ desiring ‘their complete attention, their entire obedience.’
160 The 
biblical  authors  were  captured,  directed  and  drawn  to  a  centre  outside  of 
themselves, and  henceforth lived  from  that  centre and  toward  that  centre.  For 
Barth, the true purpose of Scripture is to testify to this centre, directing humanity 
toward the same Object that had laid hold of the biblical authors. Likewise, the 
true purpose of biblical piety, religion and church is also to point away from 
themselves towards God as the central reality of their existence. By construing the 
nature of genuine piety  in this manner Barth again repudiates the  inwardness, 
idealism and historicism characteristic of much Pietism and liberal Protestantism. 
These forms of ecclesial existence are those which have fallen away from their 
true character and from their truth to idols, and as such are indicative of ‘false 
Christianity.’
161  In  their  place  Barth  intends  the  construction  of  an  alternative 
framework designed to support and sustain a new form of Christian and ecclesial 
existence, one in which the entire being of the church derives from and is directed 
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toward this supreme Object which has encountered it. God claims the ‘complete 
attention’ and ‘entire obedience’ of this people as his own.
162 
This radical orientation of the believer to an external centre secures the primacy of 
God over against the Christian and the church, and identifies the role or task of 
these in terms of witness. Or to say it in terms more closely aligned to Barth’s in 
this lecture, the task of the believer and the church consists in being once more the 
pointing finger of Grünewald’s John. The character of this witness includes the 
attributes of ‘obedience, righteousness, love, open ears, thanksgiving, a contrite 
spirit and broken heart,’
163 each of which stands in antithesis to the triumphant 
posture of the modern church. Genuine biblical piety will engender a church with 
‘the patience to wait,’ displaying the ‘spirit of the stranger and pilgrim’ in the 
world,
164 and ready to decrease as God increases. It is this aspect of the character 
of witness that Barth takes up in the lengthy third and final section of the lecture. 
It is also in this third section of the lecture that we encounter most forcefully the 
changing structure of his theological framework. 
The Wisdom of Death 
Barth  begins  the  third  section  of  the  lecture  by  again  utilising  Grünewald’s 
imagery, this time to indicate that the witness of John, and thus of the church also, 
is to the crucified Christ:  
The  only  source  for  the  real, the  immediate, revelation  of  God  is  death. 
Christ unlocked its gates. He brought life to light out of death. Out of death! 
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The word cannot be spoken significantly enough. The meaning of God, the 
power of God, begins to shine upon the men of the Bible at the boundary of 
mortality.
165  
For the Barth of this lecture, the entire witness of Scripture, culminating in the 
story of Jesus, reveals that witness is cruciform, tending toward death and self-
dissolution. The biblical characters ‘witness not to humanity but to the end of 
humanity.’
166 In place of the optimistic organic metaphor for the coming of the 
Kingdom in Romans I Barth now says:  
‘The  axe  is  laid  unto  the  root  of  the  trees,’  consummatio  mundi,  the 
dissolution of all things, the crumbling away of all being, the passing of this 
age—this is the meaning of the ‘kingdom of God.’…To understand the New 
Testament  Yes  as  anything  but  the  Yes  contained  in  the  No,  is  not  to 
understand it at all. Life comes from death! Death is the source of all.
167  
Once again Barth is emphatic: ‘The affirmation of God, man, and the world given 
in the New Testament is based exclusively upon the possibility of a new order 
absolutely beyond human thought; and therefore, as prerequisite to that order, 
there must come a crisis that denies all human thought.’
168 
That the new order of the kingdom is neither a possibility of the old order, nor a 
religious possibility,
169 is something Barth has reiterated often since his break with 
liberalism. In this lecture, however, Barth has sharpened this assertion with the 
insertion of absolutely, and the insistence on crisis as a prerequisite for that order. 
Humanity now stands before the closed wall of death, hardly aware of the new 
world  that  may  be  waiting  behind  it.
170  God  himself  awaits  us  beyond  this 
boundary of our existence, the divine first being ‘on the further side of the human 
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last.’
171 Yet it is here, confronted in the New Testament by ‘the wisdom of death,’ 
that we discover at the same time that it is the most comprehensive wisdom of 
life.
172  Death,  the  threat  and  reality  of  dissolution  as  the  crisis  visited  upon 
humanity,  is  comprehensively  addressed  and  overcome  in  the  resurrection  of 
Jesus Christ. For Barth in this lecture, the Easter message of resurrection has five 
decisive implications: the sovereign victory of God over all the power of death; 
the entrance of eternity into time at that point which is therefore also the dawn of 
the new time; the miracle of the new world which includes the reconstitution of 
the moral subject; a new corporeality in which the totality of creaturely being is 
subject  to  the  activity  and  power  of  God  the  redeemer;  and  finally,  the 
resurrection as an experiential reality in the life of the God-fearing individual.
173 
Such  is  the  comprehensive  victory  of  the  resurrection.  Nevertheless  Barth  is 
forced to ask whether it is really true that life springs from death. Is the rhythm 
revealed in the passion and exaltation of the Messiah—from life into death, from 
death into life—really credible, rational and real?
174 Glib answers from religion 
and the church are wholly insufficient in light of the enormity of the death which 
has  descended  upon  Europe.  Indeed,  ‘if  any  utterance  at  all  is  in  need  of 
substantiation, attestation, and demonstration in corresponding moral, social, and 
political action, it is the biblical utterance that death is swallowed up in victory,’ 
says Barth.
175 ‘The only real way to name the theme of the Bible, which is the 
Easter message,’ he continues, ‘is to have it, to show it, to live it. The Easter 
message becomes truth, movement, reality, as  it is expressed—or it is not the 
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Easter message which is expressed. Let us be satisfied that all biblical questions, 
insights, and vistas focus upon this common theme.’
176 
Here Barth rejects the arrogant presumption of a church that claims it possesses 
the  victory  of  God when  so  little  of  the  reality  of  the  resurrection is  actually 
manifested ‘in our conventional and self-reliant lives.’
177 Nor will the situation be 
remedied by the church continuing along its familiar paths of busy evangelism, 
social work or religious experience.
178 He insists that ‘religion’s blind and vicious 
habit  of  asserting  eternally  that  it  possesses  something,  feasts  upon  it,  and 
distributes it, must sometime cease, if we are ever to have an honest, a fierce, 
seeking, asking, and knocking.’
179  
Barth  applies  Overbeck’s  ‘wisdom  of  death’  to  the  being  and  activity  of  the 
church. Only as the church  confronts  the  relativity  of  its  own existence,  as it 
enters into the crisis common to all human being and activity, will it cease from 
the relentless pursuit of its own works and cry to God for his work. The actuality 
of the resurrection in the life and being of the believer and the church is sheer 
grace,  ‘an  absolute  novum  and  original  datum,  wherever  its  traces  are 
discernible.…There are no transitions, intermixings, or intermediate stages. There 
is only crisis, finality, new insight. What the Bible brings us from beyond the 
grave is the perfect, the absolute miracle.’
180 It is for this reason that the church’s 
first movement must be movement toward God in earnest prayer. 
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Also noteworthy in this lecture is Barth’s description of the moral agent, who, as 
the recipient of the forgiveness of sins 
is constituted anew by virtue of his interconnection with the order of the 
kingdom of heaven, by virtue of his being counted unto God; the beginning 
of  good  is  perceived  in  the  midst  of  bad;  the  royal  freedom  of  man  is 
established by virtue of the royal freedom of God; the possibility is given of 
understanding all things in the light of God, of doing the greatest and the 
smallest deeds to the glory of God.…Man, for all his limited, constrained 
and  ephemeral  existence,  is  at  the  same  time  ‘in  an  all-exclusive  way’ 
dependent upon God, animated by God, and supported by God.
181  
For  Barth,  the  forgiveness  of  sins  represents  ‘the  highest  expression  of  the 
totaliter aliter which the Bible utters…even more astonishing than the raising of 
Lazarus.’
182 The raising of Lazarus represents resuscitation to the same form of 
existence as he previously had. In the forgiveness of sins the crisis confronting 
humanity  is  vanquished,  with  the  result  that  the  human  agent  is  ‘constituted 
anew.’ The human subject is ‘born anew, that is, “from above,” and is conscious 
of itself in God.’
183 Ultimately this will issue in the utter renewal of the entirety of 
their  being—a  new  corporeality  in  which  nothing  from  ‘below’  remains. 
Meanwhile, it means the granting of possibilities hitherto unknown which will 
issue in the ‘royal freedom of man,’ that is, the restoration of the human agent into 
a  correctly  ordered  relationship  with  God  the  creator  and  redeemer.  In  this 
freedom the ‘beginning of good’ may be perceived in the  fields of moral and 
political reality. 
Finally, we have noted already that at the outset of the lecture Barth laments the 
human individualism which separates us from God and frustrates the knowledge 
of  God  from  coming  to  fruitfulness  in  our  lives.  Barth’s  repudiation  of 
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individualism, however, does not spell the dissolution of the individual per se, for 
in  and  through  the  resurrection  it  is  the  ‘God-fearing  individual’  who  finds 
themselves addressed, and who is first to be touched.
184 It is the individual who is 
called to believe, to venture and to persevere. This person responds to the crisis 
which breaks upon humanity in the fear of the Lord, and their repentance consists 
in a ‘radical change of mind, in a revaluation of all practical values.’
185 But why 
this individual? Barth concludes his lecture at the same point where he began, that 
is, with the puzzle of election, and the implicit call to live responsively to the 
ever-renewed call and claim of God which confronts the human person. 
In  sum,  this  lecture  evidences  several  definite  points  of  Barth’s  theological 
development. Most notable is the absence of ‘organic’ language in his description 
of God’s relation to the creation. But, to use the words of Helmut Gollwitzer, ‘his 
turning away from J. T. Beck does not imply that he also turned away from the 
Blumhardts.’
186  Indeed,  as  may  be  expected,  the  continuing  influence  of 
Blumhardt is evident in this lecture, chiefly in the priority that Barth gives to the 
need for urgent, fervent prayer, and his criticism of a church that does not have 
‘the patience to wait.’ Especially evident is the new influence of Overbeck, who 
Barth used to radicalise his eschatology by means of his emphasis on death as the 
crisis befalling all humanity. Indeed, Barth would later recall that his change of 
theological direction first became apparent in this lecture.
187 
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With regard to this thesis, Barth constructs his theology with an ethical horizon in 
view, and he seeks to shape the praxis of his hearers through the construction of 
an  alternative  theological  perspective  of  reality.  The  primary  element  of  this 
construction, which stands in continuity with his earlier work, is his insistence that 
human existence is radically ‘ec-centric,’ thoroughly and decisively oriented to a 
centre external to the individual subject. It is this feature of his theology which 
undergirds his depiction of human existence as ever-renewed existential response 
to  the  electing  God,  who  is  also  creator  and  redeemer.  It  also  functions  to 
determine  the  fundamental  character  of  Christian  and  ecclesial  existence  as 
witness.  Nevertheless, it must  be  acknowledged that in  this  lecture his  ethical 
vision is more concerned with formal categories, with the result that the material 
content of his Christian and ecclesial vision is relatively thin. Barth says more 
about  waiting  than  hastening,  a  factor  exacerbated  by  his  grounding  of  the 
reconstituted  moral  agent  in  the  forgiveness  of  sins  rather  than  in  the  vital 
presence, movement and growth of the coming kingdom. His tightening of the 
eschatological  horizon  introduced  a  sombre,  indeed  pessimistic,  note  into  his 
theology, and functioned to constrict his depiction of moral existence. Whether 
this new theological perspective is able to sustain his hitherto vibrant vision of 
Christian and ecclesial existence remains to be seen. 
Life in the Shadow of Death: Sermons on 2 Corinthians 
Throughout this period Barth’s pastoral responsibilities in Safenwil continued to 
demand  his  attention.  This  is  true  most  particularly  of  his  preaching 
responsibilities, which also continued to fuel his biblical investigations. We have 
noted already the role of Colossians and Ecclesiastes in his Tambach lecture. His 
letters to Thurneysen also indicate that Barth laboured over Ephesians, Psalms,   233 
the Acts and the Corinthian correspondence.
188 In a letter dated November 11, 
1919 Barth writes: 
Yesterday and today I sat over 1 Corinthians 15, but I came to a dead stop in 
the earliest stages as I started to work through it thoroughly.…The chapter is 
the key to the entire letter with its profound disclosures that have their source 
in ultimate wisdom, some of which have struck us recently like shocks from 
an electric eel. Not without effect.
189  
These epistolary references indicate the continuing and formative influence that 
Scripture had on Barth’s theological development. His preaching ministry also 
provides another avenue by which to examine this development. A month after 
the Aarau lecture Barth again writes to Thurneysen, ‘The Second Letter to the 
Corinthians sweeps over me like a torrent. Only the smallest part can flow on in 
the form of sermons.’
190 Seven of these sermons, however, were published in a 
joint collection of Barth and Thurneysen’s sermons in 1924.
191 In these sermons 
the practical outworking of Barth’s new emphasis can, to some extent at least, be 
seen,  and  so  in  this  section  I  will  examine  these  sermons  with  a  view  to 
explicating  their  contribution  to  our  understanding  of  Barth’s  Christian  and 
ecclesial vision. Because Barth’s treatment of these themes is somewhat uneven 
across the particular sermons, in this  section I  will adopt a thematic approach 
across the seven sermons rather than treating each sermon as a unit. My treatment 
of the sermons will unfold in three sub-sections. In the first, I investigate Barth’s 
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theological framework as it is expressed in these sermons, and find substantial 
evidence of his theological development in this period between the two editions of 
his commentary. The second sub-section unpacks Barth’s growing awareness of 
the  individual  with  respect  to  his  or  her  participation  in  the  activity  of  the 
kingdom of God. We shall see that Barth adopts the apostle Paul as a paradigm of 
Christian existence, and calls his congregation to be amongst those who walk in 
the way of Christ after Paul. In the final sub-section Barth outlines the nature of 
an ethics grounded in the forgiveness of sins and inhabiting the pathways of grace 
as he wrestles with a Christian approach to the particularly live issue of national 
reconstruction in the immediate post-war era.  
Barth preaches to his congregation against the familiar background of the events 
unfolding  in  their  world.  Thus  he  speaks  of  ‘living  in  a  time  when  collapse 
threatens society,’ of the ‘break-up and collapse which mark our day.’
192 Yet he 
can also speak in light of the new hope springing forth as Europe and the world 
work toward reconstruction: ‘Our age is seething with a feeling of high hope and 
with a spirit of new life.’
193 He remarks that ‘tremendous forces are at work.’ Over 
that summer five different international Congresses were convened in Switzerland 
alone.  New  associations,  new  attempts  at  international  and  inter-religious 
cooperation were being founded.
194 In light of this great threat and equally great 
hope, what response should Christians and the church make?  
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Touched by Eternity in the Midst of Time 
Barth intends theology and church to be engaged in the broader issues of society 
and culture, and thus it is not surprising that his regular preaching occurs within 
the same ethical horizon that we have observed in his earlier lectures and works. 
Yet  also  apparent  here  are  differences  from  what  has  gone  before.  There  is 
virtually no trace at all of the organic metaphor for describing the activity and 
advance of God’s kingdom in the world. In fact, Barth does not speak of the 
‘advance’  of  God’s  kingdom  at  all.  Neither  is  socialism  even  mentioned—
although this might be anticipated given the context of these addresses. What, 
then, is the theological framework of these sermons? 
Prominent in these sermons are meditations on the human condition, of the ‘loss 
of heart’ and despondency which often characterises  humanity, as well as the 
human determination to do whatever is possible to rectify that which we see as 
wrong.
195 In an echo of the Aarau lecture Barth presents the human situation as a 
‘groaning’ which arises from the seeming reality in which we live: ‘We have seen 
the truth of our life, in one way or another, and its truth is death.’
196 While this is 
indeed true—‘we  are  standing under  a  large,  all-embracing  and all-destroying 
Nay’
197—it is not the ultimate source of our groaning. Rather, the true source of 
our groaning is the innate memory of the Yes within us, the memory of our origin 
which is also our goal and homeland.
198 Thus Barth continues, 
Here is the cause of our groaning. Do you understand now why you must 
groan? Yes, the present tabernacle must be broken down that the building 
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from  God  may  receive  you.  And  you  are  groaning  now  not  because  the 
tabernacle is being broken down, but because the building from God has not 
yet taken  you up.…It is not death that is painful, but that we do not yet 
live.…The cause of our anxiety is not the Nay; but the Yea which has been 
pronounced over us even before the Nay has come over us.…If there were 
no God and if the heavenly habitation were not awaiting us, there would be 
no cause for groaning. But God has begun to trouble us with an anxious 
restlessness.  He  is  the  cause  of  our  groaning;  and  therefore,  we  must 
groan.
199 
In  these  sermons,  then,  we  hear  a  strong  emphasis  on  the  crisis  that  God  is 
bringing upon humanity from above.
200 Humanity exists in the shadow of death, 
and  it  is  only  by  way  of  death  that  we  may  find  life—’through  an  extended 
cancellation, removal, limitation, and discarding of what we call life. True life 
begins where everything ends.’
201  
Yet it is also clear that humanity is not abandoned in its earthly existence, but 
rather already belongs to God and is addressed by God.
202 This divine address—
the Word of God—is the gospel, which is addressed to common persons in the 
ordinary circumstances of their lives, reminding them of the eternity which they 
have known but forgotten.
203 Here again the interplay between divine and human 
agency is evident, although as in the Aarau lecture, Barth predicates a sovereign 
freedom to the Word of God beyond the freedom of the human agent, grounding 
this greater freedom in the mystery of election. Thus  
[t]he free Word of God always has some effect where men face it with their 
liberty. But it does not have the same effect in every instance, for man’s 
liberty is also freedom. Only in freedom here and there, does God carry on 
his work. ‘He chooses whom he will, and hardens whom He will.’…For heat 
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has  the  power  to  melt  but  also  to  wither;  light  may  illumine  and  cause 
blindness; wind can bring relief from heat and it can carry on its wings the 
winter’s icy blasts.
204 
Barth speaks of the Word of God ‘waiting for men who will give it attention.’ 
This same word ‘comes over them, and overcomes them. But it does not care to 
overcome them save in its own freedom and in their liberty.’
205 When a person, in 
the interplay of this divine-human encounter, gives their attention to and hears the 
Word  of  God,  eternity  touches  time  in  the  circumstance  of  their  personal 
existence. In them ‘the new man’ is being born, who ‘must also think and speak 
and act in a new way. He is completely severed from the old man and his whole 
kind.’
206  
In  these  sermons,  then,  Barth  maintains  the  earlier  emphasis  on  the  divine 
freedom vis-à-vis humanity, although his structuring of this relation is now altered 
in  order  to  secure  this  freedom  more  adequately.  In  the  earlier  works  Barth 
conceived of a two-dimensional reality in which God’s kingdom, planted as a 
seed in the resurrection of Christ, grew vigorously in the world as the kingdom 
advanced  in  accordance  with  the  impetus  of  ‘the  other  side.’  Now  the  two 
dimensions stand in a more stark relation to each other, reconceived under the 
rubric of time and eternity. ‘The very mystery and meaning of our existence,’ says 
Barth, ‘consists in this, that we are living in time and in eternity. But these two 
factors of our existence are not of equal strength.’
207 Eternity is ever present to 
time, casting its light over time in such a way that time is never without eternity. 
Nevertheless, Barth insists that ‘there are no bridges leading back from…life to 
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death. Time shall become as eternity; but never, never can eternity become as 
time. The earth shall become like heaven; but never, never even unto the end of 
time, can heaven become like the earth.’
208 Thus, while eternity encompasses time 
on every side, and even penetrates time, it remains distinct from time in its nature 
and  essence.  For  Barth,  time  is  ‘eternity  emptied,  pauperised,  despoiled;  and 
eternity is time fulfilled.’
209 Time, in this sense, represents the world and humanity 
fallen away from God, empty, impoverished and spoiled. Its only hope is that it 
might somehow be taken up into eternity that it might be fulfilled, or as it were, 
healed and restored to its proper estate.  
The question confronting us is now clear: how shall time become as eternity, earth 
as heaven, if the entirety of earthly existence lies under the doom of the divine 
No, the all-encompassing reign of death? This is the crisis under which humanity 
has  its existence.  Although Barth  does not  address  this  question directly  it  is 
possible to find in these sermons several indications of how he approached it, all 
of which serve to maintain the freedom of God in his relation to humanity. Barth 
begins with reference to Jesus Christ through whom ‘eternity rushes into time as a 
mountain freshet rushes into its empty bed after a shower. The kingdom of heaven 
bursts upon earth as an army bursts into hostile territory.’
210 The coming of Christ 
has  resulted  in  a  decisive  reconstitution  of  the  human  situation  so  that  all 
humanity is claimed by God and belongs to him. Significantly, however, Barth 
insists  on  both  a  historical  and  a present  fulfilment  of  time  in  the  coming of 
Christ: ‘“When the fullness of time came, God sent forth his Son” and we must 
understand it so. That time was, and is being, fulfilled in this: that God is sending 
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his Son.’
211 The fulfilling of time so that it may become as eternity is a continuing 
work  of  God.  Here,  however,  in  place  of  the  organic  language  which  was 
indicative  of  process,  we  find  the  language  of  proclamation,  and  of  the 
Paternoster:  
Thy  name  be  hallowed—in  time  where  it  is  not  yet  holy.  Thy  kingdom 
come—in time where it is not yet established. Thy will be done—in time 
where  it  is  not  yet  being  done.  In  this  Thine,  Thine,  Thine  in 
contradistinction to all what is not yet Thine, the word of God, the Gospel, 
Jesus Christ, lives, moves and has his being. Yes, here is the place where 
Jesus Christ is standing. They are God’s interests that he is minding and of 
which  he  reminds  us. That  we  let  ourselves  be  reminded  of  them is  our 
salvation and our redemption. It is the end to which God’s love for us tends. 
But we cannot be helped except as we help God. Here is God’s end; his 
impetuous message which will meet us, strike us, that we also shall have a 
part in its fulfilment and that we also shall discover it and become aware and 
alive in resurrection. We are being led to the point where time and eternity 
meet. We are being asked if we will acknowledge eternity’s advantage and 
preponderance  over  time.  We  are  being  offered  this  insight  that  there  is 
hidden behind all decay and death a greater advent and a larger life. We are 
given a perspective of the victory and perfection toward which our whole 
existence tends.
212 
Several points in this passage call for attention. First, Barth speaks of the message 
of  God  which  will  ‘meet  us,  strike  us,  that  we  also  shall  have  a  part  in  its 
fulfilment.’ Barth understands the proclamation of the gospel itself to be a means 
by which time comes to its fulfilment. This proclamation, though, is not simply a 
human  activity.  Barth  insists  that,  ‘The  Word  of  God  promotes  itself.  Its 
proclamation is God’s own deed. Man merely attends; he is the ear, the heart, and 
head  and  mouth,  and  hand  and  foot.’
213  Barth  uses  the  language  of  personal 
encounter  to  indicate  that  God  addresses  the  human  subject  by  means  of  the 
proclamation. In this encounter the person is confronted with realisation of a new 
reality and the demand and promise it brings. This renewal of vision constitutes 
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the call of the person thus encountered by the gospel, and becomes the catalyst for 
a new existence as he or she is incorporated into the activity of God, and becomes 
part of the fulfilment he intends for creation and humanity. 
Second,  Barth  also  indicates  that  the  human  agent  is  incorporated  not  just 
generally into the activity of God, but specifically into the prayer of Jesus that 
they might become part of the fulfilment of his purpose. In the  giving of the 
Lord’s Prayer, and particularly the first three petitions, Jesus is minding God’s 
interests, and reminding his followers of them. Further, Barth indicates that ‘the 
Word of God, the Gospel, Jesus Christ, lives, moves and has his being’ in this 
place where these petitions are presently being offered to God in prayer. Where 
the people of God join with Jesus in his cry for the hallowing of God’s name, for 
the coming of the kingdom, for the doing of God’s will, there ‘is the place where 
Jesus Christ is standing,’ there it is that ‘we are being led to the point where time 
and eternity meet.’ Here again we observe the ethical horizon of Barth’s theology, 
and  see  also  the  integral  role  that  prayer  has  in  his  vision  of  Christian  and 
ecclesial existence. Summoned by the gospel we pray. In prayer we not only cry 
out to God for the coming of his kingdom, but are ourselves moved and become 
part of the answer of that prayer. Only in allowing ourselves to be reminded of 
God’s interests, and in being moved in accordance with these interests, do we find 
salvation. Thus, for Barth, an election which does not issue in ethical response is 
not God’s election.  
Finally, it is clear in the passage cited above that the personal encounter which 
initiates our incorporation into the redeeming activity of God is freighted also 
with cognitive content. We are reminded of God’s interests. We are ‘being offered   241 
this insight that there is hidden behind all decay and death a greater advent and a 
larger life. We are given a perspective…’ In other words, the person encountered 
by God experiences an alteration of their worldview, a renewed vision of reality. 
Given his emphasis on ‘thought obedient to faith’ in Romans I, it seems likely that 
Barth would argue that this renewed vision must be theologically construed and 
underpinned, but its genesis is grounded in the revelatory encounter of God. 
In these sermons, then, Barth has begun to apply his new theological insights. The 
manner in  which  he  construes  the divine-human  relation  reflects a  heightened 
sense of divine sovereignty, now explicated by means of a time-eternity dialectic 
and set within an embracing context of divine election. Humanity exists in the 
shadow  of  death  confronted  by  the  divine  crisis  befalling  it  from  above  and 
putting its entire life into question. Yet, for all this, humanity is not abandoned but 
addressed  by  God  in  promise  and  hope,  most  particularly  through  the 
proclamation  of  the  gospel.  Through  this  address  particular  people  are 
encountered by God, and, touched by eternity in the midst of time, they are made 
new, given a new comprehension of reality and set on a new path of life. Crucial 
to this new manner of life is responsiveness to God’s interests, and the act of 
prayer by which they are incorporated into the divine activity presently occurring 
in the world. 
Called as an Individual 
After his tirades against individualism, especially in Romans I, it was curious to 
observe at the end of Barth’s Aarau lecture, a positive account of individuals in 
their relation to God. In his sermon series on Second Corinthians Barth extends   242 
his reflections on this theme in his sermon on 4:7-15, entitled ‘The Individual.’
214 
This sermon has particular significance for this thesis because Barth establishes 
Paul  as  an  exemplar  of  ‘the  true  life,’  and  thus  as  a  paradigm  of  Christian 
existence.
215 ‘For is there a man who is not equally  necessary to God, as was 
Paul?’ Barth asks. ‘If only a man will understand the divine necessity of this kind 
of a life—and engage in living it. God has need of men who will lend their ears to 
his call, even if many others remain deaf to him.’
216 He continues, 
[i]t is simply a divine necessity and a law in God’s kingdom that there shall 
be such individuals. God’s relation to humanity is not fashioned after the 
principle of our political states where all citizens are equal before the law. 
Neither does God follow the rule of the army where a thousand men lift their 
right feet at the same moment when the regiment begins to march. God’s 
relation to mankind is constituted in liberty. God does not start with mass 
movements.  He  begins  with  a  few  individuals;  and  even  among  them 
different stages and degrees of preparedness and alertness for divine service 
are possible.
217 
To be such a person is not a badge of merit, or a sign that God loves this one more 
than others. Nor does it implicitly suggest that those who remain deaf  have  a 
lesser status. They are distinguished from others as those ‘who search and wait’ 
for God’s truth, and who ‘surrender’ to God.
218 Nevertheless, says Barth, God uses 
such individuals precisely because his eye is on the whole of humanity, and as 
such,  they  ‘must  be  God’s  servants  in  his  movement  toward  men.’
219  Such 
individuals become leaders of ‘God’s vanguard’: ‘amidst the sham life of their 
fellowmen, and for their benefit, they are living the true life that men ought to 
                                                
214 Karl Barth, “The Individual (2 Corinthians 4:7-15),” in Come Holy Spirit (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1934), 242-253. 
215 Barth, “The Individual,” 243. 
216 Barth, “The Individual,” 244. 
217 Barth, “The Individual,” 244. 
218 Barth, “The Individual,” 245. 
219 Barth, “The Individual,” 245.   243 
live.’
220 Thus, ‘God employs individuals who offer themselves to his service; and 
of them more is required than of others.’
221  
Paul’s cruciform life also serves as a pattern for Christian existence. The person 
who lives for God, suggests Barth, invites attacks upon themselves, for their ‘very 
existence is an attack upon the world and its existing order, on what it prizes and 
values.’
222 Further, this person has no weapons they can use to defend themselves 
from these attacks but must simply ‘stand and suffer.’
223 By participating in the 
sufferings and death of Christ, Paul, and those who follow him, become testimony 
to the dethroning of humanity, to the dethroning of what  is highly exalted by 
humanity that God may be highly exalted. Those who serve Jesus as Lord cannot 
expect to be led on any road other than the one he trod.
224  
The corollary of this, of course, is that those who participate in the dying of Jesus 
shall also share in his resurrection, and therefore, this existence is borne along 
with joyfulness and hope in the promise of God. In his sermon on 2 Corinthians 
5:1-8 Barth again returns to the example of Paul for the contemporary believer. 
Paul was empowered to participate in the sufferings of Christ by his vision of the 
resurrection. Although in the crisis of the cross every little light was extinguished 
and earthly life closed, in the resurrection true life appears from beyond death and 
a new great light arises from the darkness. Paul viewed life from the perspective 
of the resurrection, from the turning of God to humanity, and as a result,  
He did not become a hermit with his insights…he did not lock himself up 
with  a  few  chosen  disciples…he  did  not  rest,  but lived,  and  fought,  and 
suffered, and fell, and rose again, and triumphed with these insights, and 
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filled the world, this dreary world of death with his victorious deeds and set 
it in motion to God’s glory.
225  
The  vision  of the  resurrection  is  thus  an empowering  vision calling  men  and 
women in whatever station they hold in life to embark on the way of Jesus in hope 
of sharing his resurrection. Although only few actually surrender to this call, it is 
clear that Barth is calling his congregation to be amongst this number. 
This  call  is  apparent  also  in  the  final  sermon  of  the  series  as  Barth  asks 
rhetorically, ‘Why should God be farther removed from us than from Paul and the 
Corinthians? Why  should we  not receive  grace  and  salvation  today?’
226  Again 
Barth  casts  the  answer  in  terms  of  waiting,  seeking  and  crying  out  for  God, 
although ‘when men have learned that they can only wait for God, they do no 
longer  need  to  wait  for  him.’
227  He  speaks  of  those  gripped  with  a  ‘holy 
impatience’ whose sincere question Why not? ‘drives them on until they stand in 
God’s presence.’
228 In this presence they can only continue to cry out, and in so 
doing experience the grace which not only gathers them up but also commissions 
them making them co-workers together with God, as Paul was.
229 Barth concludes 
his message with the exhortation that 
[w]hen men like Paul come forth from the presence of Christ, God’s time 
has  come.  What  shall  we  say  of  our  time?  Look  about  you  for  such 
men!…Let it be your concern that we may have such men with us.…Be such 
men yourselves, if you can! Why not? Why should we not be taught humility 
and find grace at the feet of the Christ? Why should not the righteous wait 
upon God in joy today? Is not everything prepared? Do you not hear what 
our time is telling us? Everything is prepared, if only we are prepared. Yes, 
Paul would call our time with the same call as he called yesterday. Give us 
again a Paul who speaks thus. A Christ who makes Paul speak as he spoke, 
we have.…What are we waiting for? For a harvest where no seeding has 
been done? For fruit that grows by our hands? It is God who works, both to 
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will  and  to  do.  Therefore  work  out  your  own  salvation  with  fear  and 
trembling!
230 
Here, once more, the interplay between waiting and hastening is evident, although 
it is also placed within the new framework of the time-eternity dialectic. Barth is 
concerned that ‘God’s time’—the fulfilling of time by eternity—might be realised 
in  ‘our  times.’  His  use  of  Paul  as  exemplar,  and  his  exhortation  that  the 
congregation seek the presence of Christ that they might come forth from that 
presence as Paul did, is clearly indicative that he does not conceive of Christian 
existence in quietist terms. He has already described the way of Paul in the world 
in terms of activity, struggle and ultimate triumph in which he ‘filled the world, 
this dreary world of death with his victorious deeds and set it in motion to God’s 
glory.’
231 This, too, is his call to his Safenwil parishioners: a life of activity which 
arises from a holy restlessness which drives them into the presence of Christ.  
Forgiveness and Freedom 
When he considers the direction this activity—Christian existence—is to take, 
Barth is also careful to warn his parishioners against taking a false path. In his 
sermon  on  2  Corinthians  3:12-17  Barth  identifies  such  a  path,  labelling  it  as 
‘Moses-time.’
232  The  opening  words  of  this  sermon—‘Your  question  is  quite 
pertinent, is it wise to preach on these words?’
233—suggest the possibility that his 
sermon arises out of dialogue, or perhaps criticism, occurring in his congregation 
as a result of this preaching series.  
                                                
230 Barth, “Behold, now!,” 286-287. 
231 Barth, “Confident Despair,” 277. 
232 Barth, “Moses-Time and Christ-Time,” 230-241. 
233 Barth, “Moses-Time and Christ-Time,” 230.    246 
In his extended opening salvo Barth reflects on Paul’s claim that ‘we use great 
boldness of speech, and are not as Moses’ (2 Corinthians 3:12-13). For Barth, to 
‘be as Moses’ represents the bold imposition of law, and striving for order as a 
means  of  rebuilding  society  in  chaotic  times.  It  further  implies  an  ethics  of 
responsibility and diligent work in a time of moral corruption: 
The shadows of night are settling ever deeper on the hearts of peoples and 
nations. Must we not give all that we are and have to keep at least flickering 
a few candles of conscience and duty toward higher things, and if possible to 
relight  a  few  that  have  been  extinguished?…It  really  will  not  do  to 
extinguish the light of laws which sheds a few rays in our twilight hours. It 
may be that, some time or other, a new day will fully dawn for us. Then we 
shall dispense with our artificial lights because the end to which they tend 
and point has come to pass. In the full splendour of that day-to-come we 
shall discard the makeshifts which served us in our twilight hours. But today 
we have certainly not reached the point where we can do without them.…We 
live in the twilight of an interim, and we do not know whether it is the dusk 
before an oncoming night or the dawn of a new day. But can we do better 
justice  to  the  demand  of  our  time  than  by  accepting  our  present  fate, 
becoming wanderers in the twilight, eating our bread in the sweat of our 
brows as did our first parents, and by clinging to law as Israel did in its 
wilderness-journey? Do you know of a better and more perfect way?
234 
Before Barth answers the question posed by his (assumed) protagonist, he sets 
about  destroying  the  presupposition  upon  which  his  protagonist’s  position  is 
founded. The protagonist may have correctly asserted that the present culture is 
bearing the rightful burden and sentence of its own guilt-worthiness, but their 
solution is inadequate:  
Have we not done enough, we ask, if we have finally become aware of the 
precariousness of  our  situation  and  if  we  feel  our  guilt  and  are  ready  to 
atone? No, Paul would say, you have really not done enough, even if you 
have repented, even if you shoulder your guilt and make restitution as best 
you can; and even if you should go to the jungles of Africa to atone there for 
the sins of our civilisation with a life of self-sacrifice; and if you give your 
body to be burned and all your goods to the poor. All these things you may 
do and perhaps you ought to do them; but not enough has yet been done. For 
none of them atones for your sin; none of them clears the road. All this is 
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‘being as Moses,’ and Moses does not redeem. If you go wrong here, it may 
well be that you are turning away from God by your very conversion.
235 
Barth’s rhetoric applies classic reformational theology in the face of a theology 
and spirituality of works. He insists that the repentance of those who would thus 
‘be as Moses’ is not genuine repentance, nor does it lead to genuine conversion. In 
this  form  of  repentance  the  self  never  escapes  its  own  orbit  but  remains 
fundamentally oriented to itself, in spite of its submission to an external law. The 
self uses the law as a means of its own preservation and deliverance. But it is 
impossible to redeem oneself, or to escape the legitimate divine wrath which has 
fallen upon the society by the works of the law. It is likewise impossible to build a 
new world by our own efforts, even should we be aware of things which must be 
done. Thus Barth cries out,  
Oh, that we would let ourselves be brought to the point where we shall lay 
aside, not only our folly and sin, but also our conversion, our awareness, all 
our  resolutions  and  faculties,  our  whole  ‘being  as  Moses’  with  this 
confession: No, what must be done, if we are to be truly free from our chains 
and burdens, has not yet been done with all that we have done and are doing. 
We have lighted candles in the darkness; it had to be done; but the New Day 
has  not  dawned  with  them.…Something  that  we  cannot  acquire  from 
ourselves must be given us; no, not something, but everything;…The best 
must still be given us, and this is it: to turn to the Lord.
236 
In this sermon Barth wrestles with the categories required to ground Christian 
existence in the forgiveness of sins, refusing to allow any form of self-grounded 
Christian existence. That which we must have must be given to us, for we are 
incapable  of  supplying  it  for  ourselves.  In  this  sense,  Christian  existence  is 
entirely gratuitous, including its very inception and reception: even our turning to 
the Lord is gift given to us, by which ‘we are called; we are addressed; before our 
eyes the veil is being removed; and we see through and into the mystery of him 
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who is perfect—into the mystery of our help and salvation!’
237 Genuine repentance 
radically reorients the self to a new Lord—Jesus Christ not Moses—not according 
to  works,  but  in  faith,  which  ‘God  works  in  our  hearts  through  his  Spirit.’
238 
Through this gift of faith the believer is granted a participation in the victory and 
liberty of Jesus Christ and may thus ‘make a real fight for self-discipline and 
purity’ being freed from the fear and dominion of ‘fate,…death and devils.’
239  
Barth’s attempt to ground Christian existence in the forgiveness of sins does not 
mean he relinquishes engagement with the ethical arena, for 
the great truth of the Moses-time is not simply invalidated when our veiled 
face begins to behold a new vision.…Now, if ever, we see how fearfully 
godless the world is and how necessary it is for her to break away from it. 
And we shall also be making attempts to bring it to pass. We shall rise from 
our slumbers. We shall rekindle the candles of faith in a dark world and 
breathe  life  into  our  dead  Christianity.…Because  [Jesus  Christ]  is  here, 
Moses has passed away. Because Christmas has come, what we will with 
eager zeal, transitory though it may be, has the promise of a large fulfilment. 
Before this we are standing; but before this there is no standing still.
240 
We see, then, that Barth does not reject the ‘lighting of candles’ in an absolute 
sense, but rather anticipates that the Christian community will be actively engaged 
in the same kind of works that others are, but the underlying motive and form of 
its  engagement  will  fundamentally  differ.  The  Christian  community  may 
participate  in  lighting  the  candles  of  national  reconstruction,  but  will  do  so 
specifically with an eye toward reconstruction in light of the world to come rather 
than simply a reconstruction of the old world of godless darkness and oppression. 
Being freed  from the fear of  ‘fate,  death  and devils,’  the  believer  is  freed  to 
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engage the questions confronting the age with courage and grace. For example, as 
a result of being forgiven it has learned the way of forgiveness. For Barth, 
[f]orgiveness saves. Forgiveness reconciles. Forgiveness must permeate our 
politics again; forgiveness and not moral codes; forgiveness and not Moses-
zeal!  For  forgiveness  alone  makes  it  possible  for  us  to  live  together. 
Forgiveness alone heals wounds. Forgiveness does not make void the laws 
of God; no indeed, it teaches us to keep them.
241  
As ‘the company of people among whom Christ will live on earth until he can 
reveal himself fully,’
242 it is imperative that the church learn to conduct its affairs 
in love and forgiveness, not only that the head of the church is not disgraced, but 
also that it might exhibit an alternative way of life in a society threatened with 
collapse because parties in conflict do not and cannot forgive.
243  
Finally, we see in these sermons a reiteration of the notion of the command of the 
moment as a way characterising the nature of Christian life:  
God’s way of grace is like a mountain trail between two abysses, high up 
above the lowlands.…At every moment only one right step is possible for 
us, and we must take it. Every other possibility is in reality an impossibility 
which must end with our precipitous fall into one or the other of the two 
abysses.
244  
Neither is this way of grace an easy path, for it contains no comfortable spots or 
resting  places.  ‘We  can  only  incessantly  push  on,’  says  Barth,  ‘paying  strict 
attention only to the steps we are to take.’
245 Barth thus characterises the Christian 
life as a ‘daring venture,’
246 a life of obedience to the ‘voice of God with its ever-
new demands.’
247 The believer is free, but must also be flexible on account of the 
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command which comes anew in every moment, and whose coherence is in God 
alone.
248  
In conclusion, it is unquestionable that in this preaching series Barth was seeking 
to form his congregation into a community that actively pursued a life founded in 
a theological vision of the resurrection, even if that life should take the form and 
shape of the cross. Although for Barth the community has a certain priority over 
the  individual, nevertheless the  individuality  of  each  person cannot  be  forfeit. 
Individuals are living subjects who must actively exercise their volitional powers 
in response to the awakening and empowering grace of the God who encounters 
them, and to whom they cry. He exhorted his parishioners to live the ‘true life’ in 
the midst of a world filled with sham. This true life is a life of prayer and activity, 
of  love  and  forgiveness,  courage,  purity  and  hope,  and  of  obedience  to  the 
command of the moment. We see in this series of sermons the beginnings of an 
ethics grounded in the forgiveness of sins, and resulting in the formation of moral 
community, a community of reconciliation and holiness, and a community which 
actively seeks to bear witness to the truth of this forgiveness in the broader social 
context. Fundamental to this ethics is the concept of liberty, which arises from 
faith and issues in courage, and hope, by which the human agents actively work in 
anticipation of the larger fulfilment which will occur through the activity of God 
who makes all things new, and thus, who alone is able to bring into being the new 
world for which we hope. 
Conclusion 
The  works  examined  in  this  chapter  provide  a  clear  indication  that  Barth’s 
theological understanding underwent significant development and change in the 
                                                
248 Barth, “A Narrow Way,” 211.   251 
two  years following the completion of his  first commentary on Romans. This 
development is particularly noticeable with regard to the shift in his eschatology 
and the prominence of the concept of election, both of which serve to strengthen 
the objective sovereignty of God over against humanity. The optimistic imagery 
of  life  proceeding  organically  towards  eschatological  consummation  has given 
way to the more sombre and pessimistic imagery of death as the crisis befalling 
humanity.  
These developments do not, however, suggest complete discontinuity with what 
has preceded. Barth’s characteristic emphasis on divine sovereignty remains, as 
does the eschatological orientation of his theology, despite the shift in the model 
used to explicate it. So, too, the severe critique of modern Christianity and idealist 
theology continues and indeed increases here. In addition, many of the features 
which characterised his vision of Christian and ecclesial existence in 1915-1918 
remain evident in this time of transition and development. There is within these 
works a surprisingly positive account of the moral agency of the individual in 
respect of God, although this agency remains firmly anchored in a subordinate 
and responsive position vis-à-vis divine agency. Barth’s notion of the command of 
the moment is repeated here and corresponds to his understanding of election. So, 
too, the importance of prayer is reiterated as foundational for authentic Christian 
existence, which is construed as an ‘ec-centric’ existence, a life radically oriented 
to a centre outside of the self in allegiance and obedience.  
While  Barth again refuses to provide prescriptive  guidance with regard to the 
character  of  Christian  and  ecclesial  existence,  he  does  provide  an  array  of 
attributes that he evidently considers ‘typical’ of Christian and ecclesial existence.   252 
These include attributes of faith, love, liberty, courage, humility, righteousness, 
obedience, open ears, thanksgiving, contrition and hope. Further, the individual 
and community exist not for themselves or their own blessedness but for the sake 
of the world. Their activity echoes the divine movement into the world for the 
sake of the world, and they exist as a witness to and a parable of God’s kingdom. 
Barth exhorts the Christian community to ‘live resurrection,’ but to do so as a 
cruciform community in hope of God’s ultimate vindication and victory. They are 
the vanguard of God’s kingdom called upon to live the ‘true life that men ought to 
live’ amidst the sham life of their compatriots and for their benefit.
249  
Thus, while Barth’s theological development in this period did not function to 
evacuate his Christian and ecclesial vision of its major contours and substance, 
some questions remain. First, does Barth’s heightened emphasis on the objectivity 
of  divine  sovereignty  over  against  humanity  undermine  his  hitherto  carefully 
construed relation between divine and human agency? Second, Barth’s trenchant 
criticism of the church has become even more severe in this period. Given the 
tightening of the eschatological tension that exists between time and eternity, will 
he be about to delineate a viable ecclesiology which in turn shapes a genuine 
ecclesial  praxis?  Third,  the  situating  of  ethical  life  under  the  rubric  of  the 
forgiveness of sins appears to restrict the nature and scope of ethical existence. 
Will Barth’s grounding of the moral agent in the forgiveness of sins sustain the 
kind of robust vision of Christian and ecclesial existence that characterised his 
earlier  works?  In  the  second edition  of  his  commentary  to  the  Romans,  these 
themes of Barth’s new theological framework find their fullest exposition. We 
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now turn  to that work  to  see  how Christian  and  ecclesial  existence  comes  to 
expression under this new regime.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DER RÖMERBRIEF (1922): 
A THEORY OF PRAXIS 
In reality the entire direction of Barth’s thought leads to praxis: to faith as 
the  praxis-determining  element,  not  to  faith  as  the  enabling  of  dogmatic 
utterances—the latter is only a stage on the way to praxis. Analogia fidei 
corresponds at the theoretical level to ‘parable’ at the level of social praxis; 
the former is necessary in that it grounds and secures the correct occurrence 
of the practice of the Christian life.
1 
The attempt to provide a succinct account of Barth’s thought as it unfolds in his 
second  commentary  on  Paul’s  Letter  to  the  Romans  might  be  likened  to  the 
attempt to swallow an elephant! G. C. Berkouwer has remarked that this book is 
the most difficult and demanding of all Barth’s works.
2 As we shall see shortly, 
the book was written in great haste as Barth prepared to leave his pastoral ministry 
in Safenwil and take up a new appointment as lecturer in Reformed theology at 
Göttingen.  Despite  the  pressure  under  which  he  worked,  however,  the 
commentary itself is robust and sinewy, displaying a profound theological vision 
and bristling with creative insights and imagery. Nevertheless, it will also be seen 
that the questions raised at the end of the previous chapter are particularly acute in 
this commentary, because of the new theological framework Barth brings to his 
work. Indeed, had this framework been applied consistently, it would have not 
only threatened but actually would have evacuated human agency and Christian 
and ecclesial existence of any genuine possibility and meaning. As it is, however, 
we find that Barth compromises his own framework at critical points with the 
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result that he still manages to provide an account of human agency and to find 
‘space’ for genuine Christian and ecclesial existence. 
This  chapter  begins  with  a  summary  of  the  circumstances  that  led  to  the 
composition  of  this  work,  before  turning  to  examine  the  content  of  the 
commentary  in  two  parts.  In  the  first  part  I  endeavour  to  follow  the  road of 
thought that Barth treads in chapters 1-11, briefly outlining the major features of 
Barth’s theological vision before focussing on matters of particular relevance to 
this  thesis,  in  particular  the  nature  of  human  faith  in  response  to  revelation, 
Barth’s ecclesiology, and the nature of grace as both indicative and imperative. 
The section on the imperative of grace is particularly significant for it is at this 
point that Barth compromises his theological framework in order to establish the 
grounds  upon  which  he  might  explicate  his  ethical  vision.  That  he  finds  it 
necessary  to  compromise  his  theological  framework  precisely  at  this  point  is 
indicative of the serious ethical intent he brings to his theological reflection. This 
intent becomes explicit in the second part of the chapter where I examine Barth’s 
exposition of Romans 12-13 in which he treats ethics and certain ethical issues 
specifically. Finally and because of its specific relevance to this thesis, I examine 
one last lecture, “The Problem of Ethics Today,” which Barth gave during this 
period of his career.  
Review and Revision 
In late October 1920 Barth decided to rewrite his commentary on Romans rather 
than  approve  a  reprint  of  the  original  work.  In  a  letter  to  Thurneysen  dated 
October 27 Barth announced: 
And now a strange and decisive bit of news: when Gogarten, with whom I 
had so many good conversations by day and night, was gone, suddenly the   257 
Letter  to  the  Romans  began  to  shed  its  skin;  that  is,  I  received  the 
enlightenment that, as it now stands, it is simply impossible that it should be 
reprinted; rather it must be reformed root and branch….I have already wired 
to Munich a ‘Halt!’ in this regard. But better this delay than that the first 
version (which now all at once I find overloaded, bloated, etc., wherever I 
look into it) should continue to give rise to misunderstandings and errors.
3 
Barth’s  ‘enlightenment’  was  predicated upon  two  things. First,  his  theological 
development had resulted in a sense of personal dissatisfaction with the original 
work so intense that ‘it is simply impossible that it should be reprinted.’ Second, it 
became  evident  to  Barth  that  his  intention  in  the  first  edition  had  been 
misunderstood at least to some extent by his readers and reviewers. Indeed, in the 
preface to the second edition Barth is explicit: ‘I am bound to say that the more 
favourable reviews  have been the most valuable in compelling me to criticise 
myself. Their praise has caused me such dismay that I have had sometimes to 
express  the  matter  otherwise,  sometimes  even  to  adopt  an  entirely  different 
position.’
4 Not all the reviews of Barth were favourable, of course. In July 1920 
Adolf  Jülicher  gave  a  polite  but  damning  review  of  Barth’s  commentary,
5 
labelling it a ‘practical exposition’ rather than a ‘strictly scientific exegesis,’ and 
taking Barth to task on a number of exegetical points.
6 According to Jülicher, 
Barth  is a  pneumatic,
7 whose approach  to  the  relation of  spirit  and history  is 
‘exactly’ that of Origen and the Gnostics, and most especially Marcion who ‘held 
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the same position as Karl Barth in his exegesis of Paul.’
8 This judgement was 
echoed by Karl Ludwig Schmidt, and also by Harnack, who compared Barth to 
Thomas  Münzer.  The  young  Rudolph  Bultmann  dismissed  the  book  as 
‘enthusiastic revivalism.’
9 
Nonetheless, it was the positive reviews which, as we saw in the citation above, 
proved most troubling to Barth, because they indicated that his work was being 
read in ways which were not true to his intention. In a letter dated May 21, 1919 
Barth  writes  to  Thurneysen,  ‘In  the  Brosamen  [Crumbs]  of  the  Evangelical 
Fellowship in Bern there has appeared a review of Romans…astonishing in its 
approval, with the exception of chapter 7.’
10 To Barth, it seemed incredible that 
such a conservative Pietist group would respond so positively to the commentary. 
The  misunderstanding  which  arose  around  the  commentary  did  so  primarily 
because of Barth’s use of organological language to describe the relation between 
God and the  world. Philipp Bachmann,  for example, wrote  that  the ‘religious 
relationship of a human being to God…appears to him [Barth] with particular 
emphasis under the viewpoint of the immanence of God in the human soul.’
11 
From  Bachmann  Barth  learned  that  his  primary  metaphor  in  Romans  I  was 
insufficiently  dialectical  because  it  risked  the  eschatological  reservation  and 
threatened to transform faith into sight.
12 Likewise Emil Brunner, whose review 
was the first to appear in print, understood Barth to be addressing ‘that part of our 
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souls which is not imprisoned in the temporal and finite, but has remained an 
undisturbed  reservoir  for  the  voice  of  God,  undistorted  by  the  “culture”  and 
adaptation to the world of merely human knowledge.’
13 In fact, it was precisely 
those aspects of the commentary lauded by Brunner which Barth cut from the 
second edition, as Robinson has perceptively noted.
14 
The issue at stake was the apparent relational nexus posited between God and 
humanity  suggested  by  the  organological  language  used  in  Romans  I.  This 
‘native’ relationality, of course, was precisely the very core of the liberalism Barth 
had sought to dismiss. He had intended to dismantle the very subjectivism that 
Brunner was now affirming, and began to realise that the conceptuality employed 
in the first edition of the commentary was not able to bear the freight intended for 
it: a full revision was necessary if the objective sovereignty of God was to be fully 
and  properly  delineated.
15  According  to  Chalamet,  all  the  sentences  which 
betrayed  a  kind  of  theologia  gloriae  in  the  first  edition  required  substantial 
correction  by  a  thoroughgoing  theologia  crucis  in  the  second.  The  romantic 
terminology of the first edition had proven unable to respect the distance. A more 
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critical thought was required.
16 As such, the second edition was for Barth a much 
bolder  attempt  to  construct  a  theology  ‘which  may  be  better  than  that  of  the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth in that it is concerned quite 
simply with God in his independent sovereignty over against man, and especially 
the religious man, and that seeks to approach God as we believe that we can see 
him in the Bible.’
17 
Barth set to immediately on the revision of his commentary working at an intense 
rate so that by the  first week of December he was already wrestling with the 
difficult  issues of Romans  3:25,  and  by  mid-February  the  following  year  had 
finished the work up to the end of chapter five.
18 In addition to the publisher’s 
complaint that he must wait for the revision,
19 on January 31, 1921 Barth learnt 
that the Reformed Churches wanted to appoint him to a newly established chair of 
Systematic Theology in Göttingen, an appointment he eventually accepted and 
which increased the pressure to finish Romans quickly. In August he wrote that 
‘this hot summer will ever be unforgettable to me. I amble like a drunk man back 
and forth between writing desk, dining table, and bed, travelling each kilometre 
with my eye already on the next one.’
20 The manuscript was finally complete by 
September 26, 1921, and within a week the Barth family had packed up their 
belongings for the move from Safenwil to Göttingen.
21  
Before engaging the content of Romans II it is well to pause for a moment and 
consider the form of Barth’s work. An examination of the various prefaces to each 
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succeeding German edition of his Romans commentary reveals Barth providing an 
extraordinary discussion justifying  his  hermeneutical method. It is evident that 
from the time of its initial publication many people have regarded Romans II as 
something other than a commentary, and that he is providing an account of his 
own dogmatic  thought  which  is  only  very  loosely concerned  with  the  text  of 
Paul’s letter.
22 In October 1932, however, in the preface to the English edition of 
the commentary, Barth states that his ‘sole aim was to interpret Scripture,’ and 
that he felt himself ‘bound to the actual words of the text, and did not in any way 
propose to engage…in free theologizing.’
23  
No doubt this immediate and long term appraisal of Barth’s commentary was due 
in no small part to the very distinctive way in which his commentary differed in 
substance  and  style  from  other  biblical  commentaries  written  by  his 
contemporaries.  There  is  also  little  doubt  that  this  difference  is  due  to  his 
hermeneutical approach to the biblical text.
24 Barth sought to hear the Word in, 
through and under the words of the text, to stand, as it were, alongside Paul in 
order to see what Paul saw and hear what Paul heard.  
What did Barth see as he watched with Paul? He saw the sovereignty of God in 
his relation to humanity and the strange outworking of his saving purpose. He 
found the climax of Paul’s argument in Romans 11:32, and used this text—rightly 
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or wrongly—as the lens through which he read the remainder of the letter. Barth’s 
comments on this text are revealing: 
For God hath shut up all unto disobedience, that he might have mercy upon 
all.…it is precisely this conclusion which brings into prominence the grim 
disturbance  underlying  the  whole  Epistle,  and  not  this  Epistle  only.  Our 
understanding or our misunderstanding of what Paul means—and not only 
Paul—by  the  key  words,  God,  Righteousness,  Man,  Sin,  Grace,  Death, 
Resurrection, Law, Judgement, Salvation, Election, Rejection, Faith, Hope, 
Love, the Day of the Lord, is tested by whether we do or do not understand 
this summary. How are we to spell out the meaning of those great words? In 
what  context  are  we  to  interpret  them?  Well!  It  is  this  passage  which 
provides the standard by which they can be measured, the balance in which 
they can all be weighed.
25  
Barth found in this text the key by which to unlock the entire Epistle:  
For by it the final meaning of ‘Double Predestination’ seeks to make itself 
known. Pregnant with meaning is the divine shutting up; pregnant also is the 
divine mercy. Most significant is the first all; most significant also is the 
second  all.…Here  it  is  that  we  encounter  the  hidden,  unknown, 
incomprehensible God, to whom nothing is impossible, the Lord, who is as 
such our Father in Jesus Christ.
26 
While it most certainly remains an open question whether Barth correctly or even 
adequately interpreted Paul’s Romans,
27 or whether his use of this particular text 
as the organising principle of his commentary is legitimate, it will become evident 
that the  issues  identified here regarding the  hidden and incomprehensible God 
who deals with humanity after this manner of judgement in order that he might 
have mercy upon all are the very issues around which Barth has structured his 
commentary. Whatever our answer to the question just posed, it remains essential 
to gain a purchase on Barth’s orientation to the Epistle, and it is also a salutary 
reminder not to expect him to address topics in a commentary which might well 
find more detailed exposition in a formal theological treatise. 
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Barth’s reading of Paul’s letter to the Romans views it as an organic whole, which 
nonetheless has a movement of thought which may be traced. Having followed 
Paul’s  argument to its climax  in  chapter  11 with  its  concluding  doxology,  he 
begins  his  exposition  of  chapter  twelve  by  considering  the  relation  of  the 
remaining chapters to what has preceded: 
We are not now starting a new book or even a new chapter of the same book. 
Paul is not here turning his attention to practical religion, as though it were a 
second thing side by side with the theory of religion. On the contrary, the 
theory, with which we have hitherto been concerned, is the theory of the 
practice of religion. We have spoken of the mercies of God, of grace and 
resurrection, of forgiveness and Spirit, of election and faith.…But the ethical 
problem has nowhere been left out of account.…We have not been searching 
out hidden things for the mere joy of so doing.…the concrete situation—this 
has always been our starting-point. In following the road of thought, this it is 
which has caused us to enter dark recesses. The need of making decisions of 
will, the need for action, the world as it is—this it is which has compelled us 
to consider what the world is, how we are to live in it, and what we are to do 
in it.
28 
From the start, says Barth, his focus has been on ‘the concrete situation.’ There is 
no division between dogmatics and ethics, theory and practice; rather, the theory 
is the theory of the practice of religion. Immediately, then, Barth reminds us that 
his theology is intentionally and inescapably moral theology. Of course for Barth, 
‘the  concrete  situation,’  and  ‘the  world  as  it  is’  are  understood  in  very 
idiosyncratic ways. The ‘concrete situation of the world as it is,’ is not understood 
by the accumulation of facts and knowledge garnered by observation of life as it 
occurs around us. Such a procedure is desperately insufficient because it is not 
privy to the truth of our situation as Barth understands it. The concrete situation of 
the world as it is, is the reality that we live in a world created by and for God, a 
world which has sinfully fallen away from him, and which has been redeemed by 
him  through  Jesus  Christ,  and  which  under  the  guidance  of  his  sovereign 
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providence  hastens  towards  the  consummation  of  his  purpose.  All  human 
existence,  including  Christian  and  ecclesial  existence,  occurs  within  the 
overarching reality of this concrete situation, and is only understood and viable to 
the degree it conforms with this reality. With these thoughts in mind we may now 
begin our investigation of ‘the theory of the practice of religion’ that Barth lays 
out in his commentary. 
Romans 1-11: The Theory of Praxis 
The Sovereignty of God 
Barth’s exposition of Paul’s Epistle to the Romans opens with a focus on the 
gospel which ‘proclaims a God utterly distinct from men.’
29 The gospel is neither 
event, experience nor emotion, but rather ‘the Word of the Primal Origin of all 
things’ which addresses and confronts humanity with a demand for participation 
and cooperation. It is a ‘communication which presumes faith in the living God, 
and which creates that which it presumes.’
30 The content of the gospel is Jesus 
Christ who is the point of intersection between this world which has fallen out of 
its union with God, and ‘the world of the Father, of the Primal Creation, and of 
the final Redemption.’
31  
Already  in  the  first  pages  of  the  commentary  both  the  commonality  and  the 
distinction  of  this  commentary  to  its  predecessor  become  evident.  In  both 
commentaries Barth seeks to impress upon his readers the sheer transcendence of 
God vis-à-vis humanity, the solidarity of all humanity in its culpability before 
God, as well as the eschatological structure of the divine-human relation.
32 But 
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while  the  eschatological  structuring  of  the  divine-human  relation  constitutes  a 
common feature of the two works, it is also evident that it is here that the major 
distinction  between  them  is  found.  It  will  be  recalled  that  in  the  former 
commentary the resurrection of Jesus initiated the life-process of the new creation 
within history. In the later commentary Barth avers that ‘the resurrection is the 
emergence of the necessity of giving glory to God.…In the resurrection the new 
world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of the flesh, but touches it as a 
tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it.’
33  
Barth’s  famous use of  this mathematical  metaphor functions  in  service  of the 
heightened eschatological framework he has brought to this exposition, whereby 
he  strives  to  remove  any  possibility  of  historicising  divine  revelation  or  of 
psychologising the human response of faith to that revelation.  In place of the 
organic imagery of the first commentary which emphasised the interiority of God 
to all reality, and the growth and progress of divine activity in the world, Barth 
now  insists  that  ‘our  world  is  the  world  within  which  God  is  finally  and 
everywhere—outside.’
34 Indeed, ‘the kingdom of God has not “broken forth” upon 
the earth, not even the tiniest fragment of it.’
35 The world of God is utterly beyond 
the circumference of the circle; the world of humanity, time and things is entirely 
bounded by the circumference, which is nothing less than the reality of death and 
dissolution. Thus, the world of God, of eternity, is entirely closed and inaccessible 
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to  humanity,  and  although  humanity  still  bears  a  faint  memory  of  its  Primal 
Origin, all that can really be known of God is that God is the Unknown One.
36  
In a distilled summary of his exposition of the  initial eight chapters of Paul’s 
Epistle to the  Romans  Barth  provides an outline of the major  features of the 
theological framework he brings to this work:  
God, the pure and absolute boundary and beginning of all that we are and 
have and do; God, who is distinguished qualitatively from men and from 
everything  human, and  must  never be identified  with anything  which  we 
name, or experience, or conceive, or worship, as God; God, who confronts 
all human disturbance with an unconditional command Halt!, and all human 
rest with an equally unconditional command Advance!; God, the Yes in our 
No and the No in our Yes, the First and the Last, and, consequently, the 
Unknown, who is never a known thing in the midst of other known things; 
God, the Lord, the Creator, the Redeemer:—this is the Living God. In the 
Gospel, in the message of salvation of Jesus Christ, this hidden, living God 
has  revealed  himself  as  he is. Above  and  beyond the  apparently  infinite 
series of possibilities and visibilities in this world there breaks forth, like a 
flash  of  lightning,  impossibility  and  invisibility,  not  as  some  separate, 
second, other thing, but as the truth of God which is now hidden, as the 
Primal  Origin  to  which  all  things  are  related,  as  the  dissolution  of  all 
relativity, and therefore as the reality of all relative realities. Though—nay 
rather, because—human life is temporal, finite, and passing to corruption, it 
is  revealed  in  the  gospel  that  the  glorious,  triumphant,  existential 
inevitability of the Kingdom of God cannot be hidden. It is made manifest 
that the  knowledge of God—faith working through love—is presented to 
men as the possibility  which, though realised at  no  particular  moment in 
time,  is,  nevertheless,  open  to  them  at  every  moment,  as  the  new  and 
realisable possibility of their being what they are in God—his children—
cast, as men of this world, under judgement, looking for righteousness and 
awaiting redemption, but, under grace, already liberated.
37 
In  this  passage  Barth  raises  a  number  of  issues  which  could  be  fruitfully 
investigated. In the discussion which follows we will limit our examination to the 
primary  issues  of  divine  sovereignty  and  revelation.  Because  Christian  and 
ecclesial existence have their genesis in the event of revelation, following sections 
will  take  up  reflection  on  the  nature  of  human  reception  of  and  response  to 
revelation.  
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For Barth, the awesome sovereignty and aseity of God are primary. Nonetheless, 
although God is so utterly sovereign and so utterly distinct from all things human, 
he is not to be construed as absolutely ineffable, for although it is impossible for 
humanity to discover or attain the knowledge of God in and of themselves, the 
ineffable God gives himself to be known in the act of revelation. In this way Barth 
can insist that the way of knowing God proceeds always and only from above to 
below and never the reverse. Indeed, even when God gives himself to be known 
by  humanity,  this  knowledge  of  God  never  passes  over  to  become  a  human 
possession. Even in his revelation God remains ever beyond human reach. Thus 
Barth  speaks  of  revelation  as  ‘the  possibility  which,  though  realised  at  no 
particular  moment  in  time,  is,  nevertheless,  open  to  them  at  every  moment.’ 
Revelation therefore has  the  character  of  miracle,  a  humanly-impossible  event 
breaking forth at every moment like lightning from above.  
Barth’s concern  in this commentary was not an abstract formulation of divine 
ineffability, but the relationship of this God to humanity, a relationship which 
continues even  in spite of human sin.
38 Nevertheless, Barth’s emphasis on the 
divine ineffability, together with his actualistic construction of revelation renders 
an  authentic  concept  of  Christian  and  ecclesial  existence  problematic.  This 
problem is further exacerbated by the stringent time-eternity dialectic Barth used 
to explicate the theological vision of this commentary. It has long and often been 
acknowledged  that  Barth’s  claim  in  the  preface  of  his  commentary  correctly 
identifies the abiding concern he brought to his exposition:
39  
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If I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called 
the ‘infinite qualitative distinction’ between time  and  eternity,  and to  my 
regarding this as possessing negative as well as positive significance: ‘God is 
in heaven, and thou art on earth.’ The relation between such a God and such 
a man, and the relation between such a man and such a God, is for me the 
theme of the Bible and the essence of philosophy.
40 
This  distinction  between  time  and  eternity,  Creator  and  creature,  God  and 
humanity forms the central motif of Barth’s exposition. As we  have  seen, for 
Barth, this diastasis or distance is both ontological and epistemological.
41 Thus, as 
McCormack has correctly noted, Barth sought to locate God ‘beyond the realm of 
any  and  every  conceptuality  readily  available  to  us,  whether  through  a  via 
negativa or a via eminentiae or a via causalitatis. The being of God lies on the far 
side of the “line of death” which separates the world of time, things and people, 
together with every conceptuality bound to it, from the eternal.’
42  
For Barth, it is precisely this reality—the ‘line of death,’ and our existence on this 
side  of  the  line  apart  from  God—which  constitutes  the  Krisis  that  befalls  all 
humanity whether religious or not. It is important that this prominent motif in 
Barth’s  commentary—Krisis—be  carefully  interpreted.  Berkouwer  is  surely 
correct in asserting that for Barth the term is a theological description of the all-
encompassing judgement of God befalling humanity, and that it does not arise as a 
result of historical, social, cultural or political pessimism on account of the first 
World  War.
43 Rather, as Berkouwer points out, 
                                                                                                                                 
Barth’s relationship to Kierkegaard over the course of his career, see Julia Watkin, Kierkegaard 
(London: Continuum, 1997), 99-101. 
40  Barth,  Romans  II,  10.  It  is  certainly  true  that  in  Romans  II  the  accent  on  the  negative 
significance of this relation far outweighs the positive with the result that the positive significance 
of  the relation  has  often  been  undeveloped  or  overlooked.  That  Barth genuinely intended  the 
positive significance of this relation is, of course, the point of this thesis.  
41 Hart, Karl Barth Vs. Emil Brunner, 29. 
42 McCormack, Karl Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 248.  
43 G. C. Berkouwer, The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, trans. H. R. Boer (Grand 
Rapids:  Eerdmans,  1956),  25-33.  Compare  Gorringe’s  claim  that  ‘the  point  of  the  infinite   269 
[t]he Krisis is not intended as a self-evident and automatic negation of man 
and of all things human, it does not indicate an ontological disposition of the 
creature  as  such.  Rather,  it  functions  in  Barth’s  theology  as  a  means  of 
unmasking  man’s  own  righteousness.…The  proclamation  of  the  absolute 
Krisis  is  not  a  theme  of  despair,  but  it  opens  the  only  possible  way  to 
salvation by shutting off all others. Therefore the Krisis, seen from God’s 
point of view, is the reverse side of grace.
44  
Barth utilises the image of the Krisis to press his conviction that humanity can 
never claim the knowledge or experience of God in such a way that they become 
the possessors of that knowledge, as though God has become an object over which 
they  exercise  mastery.  All  human  knowledge  and  experience,  and  especially 
religious knowledge and experience, arise as an element of this world and are thus 
subject to the Krisis, to death and final dissolution as the  great barrier which 
reduces every human work and hope, together with everything of ‘the world of 
time and things,’
45 to nothing but ashes. All humanity finds its common end here 
and  without  the  miracle  of  resurrection  there  is  no  human  possibility  of 
knowledge of God or fellowship with him. Death is the boundary and limit of 
humanity,  an  impassable  barrier  beyond  which  no  human  work  or  hope  or 
righteousness can proceed. There are no avenues by which human beings might 
reach beyond themselves to lay hold of the divine glory and salvation. Nor are 
there any means by which religious persons might exalt themselves over against 
other people as though they had attained a superior status: all alike remain subject 
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to  the  Krisis  of  dissolution  befalling  humanity.  The  universality  of the divine 
Krisis functions in service of the establishing of the particularity of the gospel: 
God alone is the Saviour, and if humanity will be saved it will be as a result of his 
activity and not their own.  
This, of course, is the message of the gospel. The line of death is also a line of 
grace.
46 Although there remains no human possibility whatsoever of crossing the 
line of death from this side to that, God is able to cross from that side to this, and 
has  done  so  and  does  so.  This  divine  activity  of  revelation  calls  forth 
corresponding though subordinate human action: the response of faith. Because 
this response of faith signals the commencement of Christian existence, we now 
turn to examine how Barth conceives it.  
Divine Revelation and Human Faith 
Revelation is God’s action in the world from the other side, a punctiliar action that 
nonetheless leaves an imprint as a testimony to its occurrence. Barth develops a 
series of metaphors to describe the impact of revelation, all of which are strongly 
expressive  of  divine  absence rather  than presence.
47  Thus  Barth  speaks of the 
tangent which touches the circle—without touching it, of the impress of a signet 
ring,  of  the  crater  which  remains  after  the  bomb  has  exploded,  of  an  empty 
channel or canal which once ran full of water, of the void at the centre of the 
wagon wheel, and so on.
48 In this way Barth sought to preclude any possibility of 
the  continuity of revelation  or  of the other  world generally  onto  the  plane of 
history and time, and so protect the divine subjectivity not only as the source of 
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revelation,  but as the subject  who  retains  control  of  revelation  throughout  the 
entire process of its unveiling and reception.
49 
Thus, even in the event of revelation God remains utterly beyond us. That which 
remains after the event of revelation is neither ‘history, time or thing.’
50 That is, 
the impress of revelation is not revelation itself. Nor is the medium of revelation 
to be confused with the revelation itself, even if that medium is Jesus Christ!
51 
Thus Barth can aver that ‘Christ is not one of the righteous,’
52 and that apart from 
the resurrection by which Jesus is declared to be the Son of God, he ‘has no more 
significance or insignificance than may be attached to any man or thing or period 
of history in itself.’
53 For Barth, 
[t]he  revelation  which  is  in  Jesus,  because  it  is  the  revelation  of  the 
righteousness  of  God,  must  be  the  most  complete  veiling  of  his 
incomprehensibility. In Jesus, God becomes veritably a secret: He is made 
known  as the  Unknown,  speaking  in  eternal  silence; He  protects  himself 
from  every  intimate  companionship  and  from  all  the  impertinence  of 
religion. He becomes a scandal to the Jews and to the Greeks foolishness.
54 
Jesus, in his life and in his death is not the medium of revelation, but its veil. It is 
only as the light which shines forth from his resurrection illuminates his life and 
his passion that revelation occurs. The cross itself is a veil which hides the reality, 
presence  and  faithfulness  of  God.  It  is  here,  where  Jesus  enters  ‘the  deepest 
darkness  of  human  ambiguity,’  where  he  ‘stands  among  sinners  as  a  sinner,’ 
where he ‘sets himself wholly under the judgement under which the world is set’ 
that the righteousness and faithfulness of God is found.
55 Here, where the death of 
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Jesus signals the negation of every human possibility or claim—My God, my God, 
why hast thou forsaken me?—is the end of humanity and the revelation of the 
faithful God who indeed has  not forsaken humanity but who at this point  has 
inaugurated  the  new  era  of  his  saving  righteousness.
56  But  this  end,  and  this 
faithfulness is not self-evidently known, but is perceived only when the veil is 
lifted and the light proceeding from the resurrection discloses the meaning of this 
man’s death. That this unveiling and disclosure occurs at all is pure miracle. So 
desirous is Barth of locating revelation beyond the reach of human capacity that 
the cross and the resurrection alone form the locus of God’s revealing activity—
and  even  this  is  perceivable  only  as  God makes  himself  known.  McCormack 
suggests that Barth, at this time, ‘was haunted by the fear that his readers might 
once again turn the veil into a medium which functions as such, under its own 
steam,  thus  failing  to  preserve  the  critical  distance  separating  revelation  and 
medium.’
57  
It is immediately apparent that Barth’s formulation of revelation at this point of 
his career is problematic, at least threatening if not destroying the possibility of a 
real incarnation.
58 Also imperilled is the possibility of a genuine Christian and 
ecclesial existence, for how is such existence possible when Barth so stridently 
disallows the extension of revelation onto the plane of history and time? How is 
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the formation of moral community possible when even the recipients of revelation 
nonetheless remain subject to the all-embracing Krisis befalling humanity, never 
actually attaining to any righteousness or knowledge of God? Thus, once more, 
Barth’s  emphasis  on  the  ineffability  of  God,  together  with  his  actualistic 
formulation of revelation renders Christian and ecclesial existence problematic.  
Because Barth conceived his task so thoroughly as the work of ‘clearing away the 
debris,’ the tonality of his work was iconoclastic and one-sided.
59 In 1956 Barth 
would criticise the ‘powerful one-sidedness’ of Romans II which led to an ‘almost 
catastrophic opposition of God and the world, God and humanity, God and the 
church.’
60  He  also  admitted  that  the  eschatological  basis  upon  which  the 
commentary was built was ‘too strong,  arbitrary  and independent.’
61  We have 
already noted, however, that Barth’s intent in this commentary was to set forth 
both  the  negative  and  the  positive  significance  of  the  infinite  qualitative 
distinction between God and humanity. That his emphasis fell decidedly on the 
former in no way requires the obliteration of the latter. As McDowell has noted, 
‘It is inadequate to read Barth’s eschatology as a purely negatively critical mode 
of discourse and a mere cipher for the repudiation of all that is finite, serving 
therein to codify the divine-human diastasis.’
62 Indeed, careful attention to Barth’s 
commentary does indicate that even in this work he  found a place for human 
agency and Christian and ecclesial existence, as we shall now see. 
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When Barth considers the subjective aspect of the event of revelation he does not 
shrink from using the language of experience:  
How  is  it  that  there  exist  any  far-seeing  and  intelligent  men—real  men, 
living  in  the  real  world—who,  like  the  Jews  of  the  time  of  Jesus,  have 
caught a glimpse of the Last Things, and to whom waiting upon God, upon 
God  alone,  is  well  known?  In  such  men  a  miracle  has  occurred  above, 
behind, and in them. They have encountered the grace of God; have met the 
incomprehensibility of God, as Job did—out of the whirlwind. They were 
terrified in their ungodliness and unrighteousness and were shaken out of 
their dreaming.…[T]hey heard the indiscoverable, saw the negation of God! 
Felt the barrier of the judgement, the paradox of existence, and, hopeful in 
their distress, divined the meaning of life. They came to themselves in fear 
and awe and trembling and in—’clarity of sight.’ In the presence of God 
they were compelled to stand still. What, then, is all this?…The encounter of 
grace  depends upon  no human possession.…He who has been chosen by 
God cannot say that he has chosen God.
63 
In  language  reminiscent  of  his  earlier  works  Barth  construes  the  event  of 
revelation  as  personal  encounter  in  which  the  human  agent  is  graciously 
confronted with the reality of God in his judgement and mercy. In the ‘eternal 
“Moment” of apprehension,…in order that our vision may have space to perceive, 
not what men think and will and do, but what God thinks and wills and does,’ we 
are ‘encountered’ by the truth ‘from beyond a frontier we have never crossed; it is 
as though we had been transfixed by an arrow launched at us from beyond an 
impassable river.’
64 The agent of this encounter is the Holy Spirit: ‘As a tumbler 
sings when it is touched, so we and our world are touched in faith by the Spirit of 
God, who is the eternal Yes.…He is the miraculous factor in faith, its beginning 
and its end.…He creates the new subject of the man who stands upright in the 
presence of God.’
65 
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Thus for Barth, faith is a miraculous effect, occurring in a person as a result of the 
gracious election of God through the  Holy Spirit. Indeed, in his discussion of 
Romans  4  he  refers  to  faith  as  ‘absolute  Miracle…pure  Beginning…primal 
Creation.
66 ‘He who says God,’ intones Barth, ‘says miracle:’  
God  encounters  the  soul  as  ‘either-or’;  and  this  involves  acceptance  or 
rejection,  affirmation  or  denial,  waking  or  sleeping,  apprehension  or 
misapprehension.  We,  however,  are  capable  only  of  rejecting,  denying, 
sleeping, and misapprehending.…In so far as there is human comprehension 
and affirmation of God, in so far as spiritual experience is directed towards 
God, receives its impress from him, and possesses the form of faith, there 
has occurred what is impossible, the paradox and the miracle.
67 
This  divine  work  is  not  a  single  operation  which  once  accomplished  endures 
forever, but, reflecting the actualistic  structuring of revelation, is and must be 
ever-renewed in the eternal ‘Moment’ which is, as we have already seen, open to 
us at every moment of time. Faith, then, is the consequence of existential response 
to  the  presence  and reality of God  as  he  makes  himself  known  to  us  ‘in the 
moment:’  
Faith is the ground, the new order, the light, where boasting ends and the 
true righteousness of God begins. Faith is not a foundation upon which men 
can emplace themselves…not a system under which they can arrange their 
lives.…The law of faith is the place where we are established by God. There, 
there is nothing but God himself, God only; and there the place is no place; 
for it is the ‘Moment’ when men are moved by God, by the true God, the 
Creator and redeemer of men and of all human things; the ‘Moment’ when 
men surrender themselves and all that they are to God. The ‘Moment’ of the 
movement of men by God is beyond men, it cannot be enclosed in a system 
or a method or a ‘way.’ It rests in the good pleasure of God, and its occasion 
is to be sought and found only in him.
68 
Once more Barth protects the divine sovereignty of revelation by grounding both 
its origin and reception in the concept of election, and by locating its dynamic 
within the time-eternity dialectic. Those whose lives are thus awakened by God 
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find themselves standing in a place which is ‘no place.’ Just as God’s election ‘all 
hangs in the air’ as ‘pure, absolute, vertical miracle,’
69 so the person awakened to 
faith has ‘been lifted up into the air, so that we have no standing-place except the 
protection of God.’
70 Christian faith and salvation, therefore, bears the character of 
the resurrection, that is, of an ‘impossible possibility’: ‘The righteousness of God 
is our standing-place in the air—that is to say, where there is no human possibility 
of standing—whose foundations are laid by God himself and supported always by 
him only; the place where we are wholly in his hands for favour or disfavour.’
71  
Further,  as  was  the  case  with  his  lecture on  “Biblical  Questions,  Insights  and 
Vistas,” so here: Barth utilises the concept of election to establish the priority of 
divine  initiative  and  agency  over  human  initiative  and  agency.  He  does  not 
thereby abolish human agency but once more orders it in the particular manner we 
have previously noted. Human agency is genuine, just as human experience is 
genuine.  Nevertheless,  it  ever  remains  subordinate  to  the  greater  and  primary 
agency of God.  
In terms of this thesis, however, another evident problem arises. By defining faith 
as miracle, and by situating Christian existence ‘in mid-air’ and referring to it as 
an ‘impossible possibility,’ Barth appears to jettison any possibility of a genuine 
Christian life, for if the extent of faith is limited to the moment of revelation it is 
clear that there can be no life of faith. Thus, despite his attempt to secure a place 
for authentic human response, such agency remains threatened by the theological 
framework Barth has employed. Nevertheless, Barth has more to say as regards 
the nature of faith. 
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The Critique of Religion and the Nature of Faith 
Further insight into Barth’s conception of the nature of faith and its implications 
for Christian and ecclesial existence at this juncture of his career may be gained 
by briefly noting how his critique of religion comes to expression in the present 
work. Here, as before, Barth is relentless in his attack on human religion, although 
he also manages to find a positive role for it. In fact, religion, though a thoroughly 
human reality ever subject to the dissolution of the Krisis,
72 arises as a result of 
recollection  of  prior  revelation  and  exists  as  a  testimony  to  revelation  once 
given.
73  In  Romans  II  Barth  is  able  to  refer  to  religion  as  ‘the  unavoidable 
reflection in the soul—in experience—of the miracle of faith which has occurred 
to the soul. The church, from which we can never escape, is the canalisation in 
history of that divine transaction in men which can never become a matter of 
history.’
74 As the canal where the waters of revelation once ran; that is, as the 
impress of revelation, religion exists and finds its true purpose and validity in 
being a sign or witness to the reality which lies beyond the horizon of this world 
and this age.
75 Religion, then, has a particular and positive mission:  
The utter godlessness of the course of history does not alter the fact that it is 
marked everywhere by peculiar impressions of revelation, by opportunities 
and open doors, which, when seen from God’s side, can summon men to 
recollection and knowledge. Whenever men wait upon God, they possess a 
mission and a character indelebilis, even though God be shrouded from their 
eyes  and  from  the  eyes  of  all  in  utter  incomprehensibility…God  never 
reveals himself to no purpose. Where there is law, even if it be nought but 
burnt out cinders, there is a word of the faithfulness of God.
76 
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Two problems arise for religion, however. The first is religion’s inability to reach 
and attain that towards which it points. Despite being an impress of revelation, 
religion, as a human reality, is not spared the all-encompassing Krisis befalling 
humanity: the line of death passes through religion also.
77 Religion may provide a 
context in which humanity  can await the Moment of revelation, but it cannot 
produce or attain that Moment itself.
78 Second, and for Barth this is the heart of 
the matter, religion is ever tempted to become a thing in itself, to dwell within the 
empty canal and become busily engaged in preserving the impress.
79 Not content 
to be simply a sign pointing away from itself toward that other reality, it seeks to 
become a significant reality in its own right.
80 True religion, however, can be no 
more than a sign pointing to that which eternally precedes it, and which extends 
infinitely beyond it. As soon as religion or the church claims to possess the reality 
to which it points, as soon as it seeks or boasts to be anything more than a void in 
which the gospel reveals itself, it has embraced the No-God of this world, and 
fallen under the sentence of judgement.
81 Whenever the characteristic marks of 
Christianity become possession and self-sufficiency rather than deprivation and 
hope,  ‘there  emerges,  instead  of  the  community  of  Christ,  Christendom,  an 
ineffective peace-pact or compromise with that existence which, moving with its 
own momentum, lies on this side [of the] resurrection.’
82  
Religion  acts  upon  humanity  ‘like  a  drug  which  has  been  extremely  skilfully 
administered.’
83 By means of religion humanity seeks to inoculate itself against 
the righteousness of God by parading its own righteousness. The religious person 
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seeks a place to stand where they are protected from the impending Krisis. But 
this is precisely the great sinfulness and deception of religion:  
Transforming time into eternity, and therefore eternity into time, they stretch 
themselves beyond the boundary of death, rob the Unknown God of what is 
his, push themselves into his domain, and depress him to their own level. 
Forgetting the awful gulf by which they are separated from him, they enter 
upon a relation with him which would be possible only if he were not God. 
They  make  him  a thing in this world, and set  him in the  midst of other 
things.
84 
It is of signal importance that we recognise that it is this form of religious activity 
that Barth assails. This form of religion, to which ‘men cling…with a bourgeois 
tenacity…must die.’
85 The great problem with this form of piety is the unbroken 
confidence of its practitioners, who believe it to be ‘deathless and unshattered.’
86 
Thus,  Barth  characterises  the  ‘mature  and  well-balanced  man,  standing  firmly 
with  both feet on  the  earth,  who has  never  been  lamed and  broken  and  half-
blinded by the scandal of his life’ as a godless man.
87 Clearly his targets here, as in 
the first commentary, are the respectable bourgeoisie of Liberalism and Pietism 
who  use  religion  as  a  means  of  attaining  and  proclaiming  their  own 
righteousness.
88 For Barth, however, a faith which is not a ‘standing in mid-air,’ a 
faith which is not inherently ‘broken’ is not genuine faith.
89  
In  this commentary  Barth  adopts  the  image  of  ‘unbrokenness’ to describe the 
fallen existence of humanity. Such humanity is ‘unbroken’ in heart and mind and 
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as such is incapable of rightly understanding the true nature of existence or of 
constructing truly moral conduct.
90 It marches confidently along ‘the unbroken 
road’ in the wisdom of night towards dissolution and death, not knowing that 
‘there is no other relation to God save that which appears upon the road along 
which Job travelled.’
91 Humanity will remain ‘unbroken’ unless and until they are 
confronted by the reality of God in the moment of Krisis. 
But while Barth uses this image primarily as a description of fallen humanity, he 
also applies it, as we have seen, to the attempt of the religious person to remain 
‘unbroken’ in the world, of the one who seeks to find a place of security where 
one may be sure of one’s own rightness over against others, because they assume 
a sure and comprehensive knowledge of God. Religion seeks to ‘discover and 
pursue a road which is unbroken by any radical negation and which claims to 
stretch from human nature to the divine nature.’
92 But such an existence is now 
impossible for those enlightened in the Moment of revelation, and the way of 
direct and unbroken apprehension of God must be abandoned at all points.
93 
It is at this point that we are led to the core of Barth’s thought regarding the nature 
of faith. For Barth, faith is nothing other than human fidelity encountering the 
faithfulness of God.
94 What this means in practice, however, is perceived only at 
the cross. We have earlier noted Barth’s contention that the faithfulness of God is 
revealed in the utter negation of all human possibility represented in Jesus’ death 
on the cross, for in his death Jesus has forsaken every human possibility by which 
he might lodge a claim against God, and is upheld by God alone. According to 
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Barth, ‘his entering within the deepest darkness of human ambiguity and abiding 
within it is the faithfulness. The life of Jesus is perfected obedience to the will of 
the faithful God.’
95 For Barth, then, faith is the relinquishing of every support 
whereby humanity might seek to support itself. It entails our bowing, in free and 
full acknowledgement of our sinfulness and blameworthiness and of the justness 
of his judgement, under the divine judgement that legitimately falls upon us.
96  
In this way Barth has posited Jesus in his death as the paradigm and analogy of 
Christian  faith  and  existence.  Faith  is  the  antithesis  of  ‘possession,’  and  is 
characterised rather by  non-possession. There is ‘no such thing as mature and 
assured possession of faith: regarded psychologically, it is always a leap into the 
darkness of the unknown, a flight into empty air.’
97 Barth speaks of faith as a void, 
and as a hollow space. It ‘means motionlessness, silence, worship—it means not-
knowing.’
98  Faith  corresponds  to  the  fear  of  the  Lord  arising  from  the  Krisis 
befalling the  individual in the Moment.
99 Thus, ‘faith  is to fear and love God 
above all things; to fear and love him as he is, and not as we think him to be. Faith 
is to bow ourselves under the judgement by which the whole relationship of God 
and man is governed.…Faith is born in fear and trembling from the knowledge 
that God is God.’
100  
Christian  faith,  then,  is  ever  the  matter  of  divine  miracle  confronting  and 
awakening the human agent to the fear and love of God. Christian existence in 
faith takes the form of an uncertain pilgrimage in which the person is ‘wholly 
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directed towards God and towards him only.’
101 Such a person must be prepared 
always for ‘surrender and dissolution, ready always to decrease in honour, ever 
tireless in descending the ladder of renunciation and death. To be pilgrims means 
that  men must  perpetually return  to  the  starting-point of that  naked  humanity 
which is absolute poverty and utter insecurity.
102 Nor may Christians find comfort 
or significance in self-abnegation as though their negative experience and work 
has religious merit and may function as a foundation or evidence of faith: 
The man who boasts that he possesses something which justifies him before 
God and man, even if that something be his own insecurity and brokenness, 
still retains  confidence  in  human self-justification.…No  work,  be  it  most 
delicately spiritual, or be it even a work of self-negation, is worthy of serious 
attention. In fact, our experience is that which we have not experienced; our 
religion  consists  in  the  dissolution  of  religion;  our  law  is  the  complete 
disestablishment  of  all  human  experience  and  knowledge  and  action  and 
possession.
103 
This section has endeavoured to show that Barth’s critique of religion functions to 
illuminate the cruciform nature of human faith and agency in his theology. But 
once more the question must be put regarding the adequacy of Barth’s construal 
of  these  concepts.  It  is  already  apparent  that  Barth’s  tightening  of  the 
eschatological horizon results in a stringent ordering of the divine-human relation 
in which any possibility for genuine Christian existence beyond the Moment of 
revelation is seriously imperilled. Obviously this poses a great difficulty for the 
present thesis which seeks to show that Barth has developed his theology with the 
specific  aim  of  forming  and  shaping  moral  community.  In  fact,  if  the  above 
citation is accepted at face value, that is, if it is actually the case that ‘our religion 
consists in the dissolution of religion; our law is the complete disestablishment of 
all human experience and knowledge and action and possession,’ then it appears 
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that the Barth has reduced the ‘space’ for human activity to the point of revelation 
alone, and that no elongation of this existence onto the plane of time and history 
can occur. This leads to the conclusion that, as it presently stands, Barth is unable 
to provide a coherent account of Christian existence. Whether this is the case with 
regard to his understanding of ecclesial existence is the focus of the next section. 
The Church in Romans II 
In his examination of the church in Barth’s commentary Colm O’Grady opines 
that ‘his doctrine on the Church is but another facet of his presentation of the one 
main  theme.…simply  the  description  of  God  and  man  infinitely  qualitatively 
distinct, yet related solo Deo.’
104 According to O’Grady, this has dire implications: 
Since  Christianity  is  completely  unhistorical  and  eschatological,  and  the 
crisis of everything historical, it follows that a visible, historical Church can 
have no ‘part’ in it. A visible Church is for him nothing but man’s greatest 
‘titanic’  achievement,  the  ultimate  manifestation  of  his  opposition  to  the 
Gospel.…As a result, Barth’s whole ‘ecclesiology’ is nothing but a denial of 
the Church, an out-and-out attack on the existing historical Church.
105 
O’Grady’s claim that ‘Barth’s whole “ecclesiology” is nothing but a denial of the 
Church’ overstates the case. We have already seen that Barth can posit a positive 
role for the church in the divine economy as the impress of revelation, that is, the 
sign and witness to the revelation which has previously occurred, and a location 
where people may wait in hope for further revelation. Nevertheless, it must be 
acknowledged with Kimlyn Bender that this role was ‘so limited as to make a 
coherent ecclesiology impossible.’
106 Bender continues: 
Completely absent in the Romans commentary is a positive and constructive 
account of the church as a new community in the world, or a discussion of 
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the church in the traditional terminology of its being the people of God, the 
body  of  Christ,  or  the  fellowship  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  Nor  is  there  any 
sustained discussion of the church’s teaching, worship, or practices from a 
positive  standpoint.  Perhaps  most  conspicuously  absent  is  any  type  of 
connection between the resurrection and the church in the light of this event. 
In the Romans commentary the church seems to be a community of sin that 
precedes and opposes the resurrection more than a new community that is 
established in the light of and through the resurrection. In short, Barth seems 
to have emphasised the division, or diastasis, between the kingdom and the 
church  to  such  a  degree  as  to  have  neglected  their  positive  relation, 
identifying the  church’s  visibility  and  historicity  with  its sin  in  an  over-
simplified manner.
107 
It is possible to respond to Bender’s observation with the counter-observation that 
Barth was writing a commentary rather than a treatise on ecclesiology, and so it is 
not surprising that these more systematic concerns remain unaddressed.
108 To do 
so, however, avoids the evident emphasis on ecclesiology that Barth wished to 
bring  to his  commentary, especially  in  his treatment  of  chapters nine  through 
eleven of Paul’s Epistle. In a quite significant departure from the first edition of 
his  commentary,  Barth  entitles  his  comment  on  these  chapters  the  ‘The 
Tribulation  of  the  Church,’  ‘The  Guilt  of  the  Church’  and  ‘The  Hope of  the 
Church’ respectively.
109 Bender’s criticism, then, of the way in which Barth has 
constructed his ecclesiology within the constraints of the divine-human diastasis 
is not without some justification. While it is correct, however, to assert that he has 
not provided a comprehensive and coherent ecclesiology, it is not the case that his 
account amounts to a ‘denial of the church,’ as O’Grady has asserted. Rather, 
                                                
107 Bender, Karl Barth’s Christological Ecclesiology, 36. 
108 It is noteworthy, however, that even in his later career Barth resisted discussion of the church in 
these terms. In his 1948 address at the Amsterdam Assembly which saw the establishment of the 
World Council of Churches, Barth declares that, ‘No matter how sincere, all praise of the Church 
as the Body and Bride of Christ, as the City, Colony, People, and Flock of God then becomes 
spurious and untrustworthy, for all these New Testament insights and words are related to the 
living congregation of the living Lord Jesus Christ, and to it alone. No matter how earnest, all 
discussion  of  the  nature  and  unity  of  the  Church,  its  order  and  task,  its  inner  life  and  its 
commission in the world then leads into uninteresting dead-ends. It is to be feared that no matter 
how honourable and zealous, all concern about the Church not focused concretely on this reality 
must ultimately be in vain’ (see Karl Barth, God Here and Now, trans. Paul M. van Buren, 2003 
Classics ed. (London: Routledge, 1964), 75-76. 
109 In the first edition the chapters are entitled simply ‘Tribulation,’ ‘Guilt’ and ‘Hope.’    285 
Barth  employed  the  eschatological  diastasis  between  God  and  humanity  as  a 
critical  tool  to  demolish  any  form  of  synthesis  or  identification  between  the 
church and culture and so to provide the ‘space’ for the emergence of a new form 
of Christian and ecclesial existence.  
Barth begins his discussion by accusing the church of a thorough-going attempt to 
domesticate God and the gospel: 
The Church is situated on this side of the abyss which separates men from 
God…the  place  where  the  eternity  of  revelation  is  transformed  into  a 
temporal, concrete, directly visible thing in this world.…In the church, faith, 
hope, and  love  are  directly  possessed,  and  the Kingdom  of  God  directly 
awaited, with the result that men band themselves together to inaugurate it, 
as though it were a thing which men could have and await and work for. To 
a greater or lesser extent, the Church is a vigorous and extensive attempt to 
humanize the divine.…From this it is obvious that the opposition between 
the Church and the Gospel is final and all-embracing: the Gospel dissolves 
the Church, and the Church dissolves the Gospel.
110 
Barth  thus  insists  that  the  church  as  a  human  and  historical  reality  stands  in 
solidarity  with  every  other  human  possibility,  that  is,  as  subject  to  divine 
judgement. The tribulation of the church consists in the fact that although it is 
‘that  visibility  which  forces  invisibility  upon  our  notice,  that  humanity  which 
directs  our  attention  towards  God,’
111  the  church  itself  can  never  actually 
apprehend or possess or convey the reality of God regardless of its claim to the 
contrary. Barth defines the church as ‘the fellowship of men who proclaim the 
Word of God and hear it.’ Nevertheless, because of the inadequacy of human lips 
and ears ‘the Church is condemned by that which establishes it, and is broken in 
pieces upon its foundations.’
112 Thus, the Word of God is the theme of the church 
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by which it is both established and condemned, and divided into the ‘Church of 
Esau’ and the ‘Church of Jacob.’  
When Barth speaks of the Church of Esau he is speaking of the human, visible 
and historical church. It is to this church that Barth refers when he so stridently 
warns of the opposition between church and gospel, and declares that ‘the Gospel 
dissolves the Church, and the Church dissolves the Gospel.’
113 Barth sees in the 
historical  and  institutional  church  a  thorough-going  attempt  by  humanity  to 
defend  itself  against  the  righteousness  of  God  by  the  establishing  of  its  own 
righteousness, and the pursuit of its own self-grounded life and success.
114 Such 
behaviour amounts to a betrayal of God and the gospel. Thus, not only is the 
church the Church of Esau, but also of Judas, Ahab and Jezebel!
115 It betrays God 
and the gospel by refusing to acknowledge and bow before the fiery judgement of 
God’s  supreme righteousness. Its  guilt  is  precisely  its failure  to give  God the 
honour due to him by acknowledging the qualitative distinction between God and 
humanity,  the  ‘recollection’  of  which  is  ‘the  life  of  the  church.’
116  Instead  it 
‘enthrones piety’ in an attempt to present itself worthy of mercy, and ‘needs to be 
continually reminded of the most serious of all symptoms. It was the Church, not 
the world, which crucified Christ.’
117 
The  Church  of  Jacob,  on  the  other  hand,  is  no  church  in  time:  it  is  ‘the 
unobservable, unknowable, and impossible Church, capable neither of expansion 
nor of contraction; it has neither place nor name nor history.’
118 The Church of 
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Jacob is the invisible church which exists only  in the miracle and moment of 
revelation. Barth clearly applies the major structural motif of his commentary to 
his concept of the church so that the Church of Jacob is understood as touching 
the Church of Esau as the tangent touches the circle: that is, without touching it. 
In the secret of predestination God has determined that all humanity are united 
under judgement: ‘In its presence they all stand on one line—for Jacob is always 
Esau also, and in the eternal “Moment” of revelation Esau is also Jacob.…But this 
victory is hidden from us in every moment of time. We cannot escape the duality, 
since the visible Jacob is for us Esau, and we can only conceive of Jacob as the 
unobservable Esau.’
119  
Because the Church of Esau  is  the  Church  of  Jacob only  in  the  moment  and 
miracle  of  revelation,  it  can  never  presume  to be  the  Church  of  Jacob,  or  to 
possess the reality or blessing of God in itself. Barth makes this move, however, 
not in order to deny the church, but to undermine the church-culture synthesis 
which had developed in Europe prior to the War; to ‘dethrone’ the church and to 
clear  the  space  for  the  emergence  of  a  different  kind  of  ecclesial  existence. 
According to Barth, once the church is dethroned it may be justified if in being 
dethroned it is also the recipient of revelation. ‘The Gospel which we proclaim,’ 
says Barth, ‘is that this does occur, has occurred, and will occur; and that this 
occurrence is Truth. When the Truth occurs…the Church—the whole Church and 
every  Church—has  not been cast off.  The  Church of Jacob  is  already  at  this 
present time in the midst of the Church of Esau.’
120  
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As demonstrated in the previous section, Barth’s critique of religion functioned to 
illuminate his understanding of the nature of human faith and agency. So here, 
Barth’s rhetoric functions, not to deny the possibility of a genuine and faithful 
church,  but  to  establish  the  only  conditions  by  which  it  might  emerge.  God 
troubles and disturbs the church and, on account of its guilt, hands  it over to 
tribulation in order that it may thereby be opened to God, which is the goal of its 
tribulation.
121 And, as was also the case in the previous section, genuine ecclesial 
existence is the product of a faith given in the moment of revelation, and issuing 
in  a  love  and  fear  of  the  Lord  that  calls  earnestly  upon  God  and  keeps  his 
commandments, while it remains ever conscious that in and of itself, it is the 
Church of Esau.
122  
When Barth speaks of the possibility of the faithfulness of the church, therefore, 
he does so under the rubric of repentance: 
Were the Church to appear before men as a Church under judgement…it 
would be the Church of God. The Church, however, which sings its triumphs 
and trims and popularises and modernises itself, in order to minister to and 
satisfy  every  need  except  the  one!;  the  Church  which,  in  spite  of  many 
exposures, is still satisfied with itself, and, like quicksilver, still seeks and 
finds its own level; such a Church can never succeed, be it never so zealous, 
never so active in ridding itself of its failings and blemishes. With or without 
offences, it can never be the Church of God, because it is ignorant of the 
meaning of repentance.
123 
In typical fashion Barth construes repentance in dialectical terms. He refers to 
repentance as a presupposition required of the church as a means by which the 
church might encounter God, and yet also insists that this is not a presupposition 
that the church can accomplish in and of itself.
124 Rather, it is ‘the new orientation 
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of all possible human activity.’
125 The Word has drawn near to humanity and is 
near to us, but  
because it is the Word of Christ, it is beyond our hearing and beyond our 
speaking; for, to hear it and to proclaim it—we must wait. Weighed down by 
the ambiguity of our existence, we must await.…The Word is nigh unto us. 
Wherever we cast our eye, the dynamite is prepared and ready to explode. 
But if there is no explosion, or if something less final takes place, can we not 
take just the smallest risk which is, in fact, the greatest? Are we always to 
prefer a thousand other days to one day in the outer courts of the Lord? Shall 
we never permit our hands to be empty, that we may grasp what only empty 
hands can grasp?…Impossibility presses upon us, breaks over us, is indeed 
already present. Impossibility is  more possible than  everything  which  we 
hold to be possible.
126 
It is clear that Barth does, in some sense at least, believe that the church is able to 
present  itself  before  God  in  hope.  The  church  may,  and  indeed,  must  be  a 
community who wait upon God in hope that revelation may occur once more.
127 
Furthermore, it may present itself before God with empty hands, having released 
from its grasp everything in which it has hitherto trusted, acknowledging its own 
guilt worthiness before God, bowing before his judgement in hope of his mercy.  
For Barth, repentance is the ever renewed and ever necessary acknowledgement 
of the sovereignty and righteousness of God over against all human righteousness, 
the relentless honouring of God in ‘his pre-eminence over all human eminence.’
128 
It is  
preparedness to enter upon the divine, seasonable, eschatological possibility, 
to bow before the wrath and before the mercy of God, to be accessible to the 
one-sided,  passionate,  and  exclusive  claim  which  God  makes  upon  men. 
Repentance means being open to the strangeness of resurrection and to the 
free and boundless initiative of faith.
129  
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It involves the church in a persistent denial of every attempt to establish its own 
righteousness, or its own relevance in the eyes of the world or of humanity. Only 
then is the church ‘what men look for in it and expect from it. The Church is the 
place of fruitful and hopeful repentance; and it is nothing else.’
130  
Repentance  also  includes  obedience,  which  means  ‘being  committed  to  a 
particular  course  of  action,  a  readiness  to  surrender  individual  freedom  of 
movement to the free movement of God, a readiness to offer up everything that 
the known man of the world supposes to be important and necessary and right.’
131 
Barth characterises the obedience which is congruent to the Gospel as freedom, 
but it is the limited freedom wherein the human agent is free to ‘move along the 
same road backwards and forwards again and again without ever standing still’ 
between judgement and mercy, following as it were, the free and uninterrupted 
motion of a pendulum.
132  
In sum, humanly speaking and apart from God, the church has no hope.
133 By 
means, however, of his concept of double predestination, Barth grounds the hope 
of the church in God alone. The one God who hands the church over to tribulation 
after the manner of the crucifixion of Jesus, and who so frees himself from every 
human claim, is also the one God who according to his own free grace brings 
forth in the church the resurrection of Christ.
134 Rejection issues in election, but 
only in hope. The one God slays in order to make alive, condemns in order to 
justify, hands over to the judgement of death in order to bring forth salvation unto 
life. In this way the church embodies and witnesses to the general situation of all 
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humanity. Although the pinnacle of human endeavour with regard to God, it finds 
itself judged, rejected and cast down to hell, and yet—reconciled.
135 The church, 
therefore, is the theatre in which the judgement and grace of double predestination 
is set forth so that humanity may be ‘made aware that there is always in its midst a 
place where the consequences of its inherent possibilities are fully worked out, 
and  where  its  proved  impossibility  makes  room  for  the  appearance  of  the 
possibility of God. And so we know that rejection is not the final word either for 
humanity as a whole or for the Church.’
136 
Interlude: An inconsistency in Barth’s Theology 
The problems for this thesis which we have noted in previous sections are present 
also in Barth’s discussion of the church. It is simply the case that Barth’s use of 
the  qualitative  distinction  to  structure  the  divine-creaturely  relation,  and  his 
restriction of the inter-play of divine and human agency to the actualistic moment 
of  revelation  reduces  the  event  and  reality  of  both  Christian  and  ecclesial 
existence  to  a  mathematical  point  which  must  be  ever-renewed  at  the  good 
pleasure of God. There is no ground for the extension of Christian and ecclesial 
faith and life onto the plane of history, and no possibility of growth, progress or 
development in sanctification or vocation. Rather, the Christian life is a dreary 
existence confined to walking back and forth on the same road time and again, 
caught in the endlessly recurring pendulum-cycle of judgement and mercy. And 
while it may be said that Barth does have a role for the church in the world, this 
role  is  admittedly  very  bleak  and  uni-dimensional.  So  too,  while  there  is  a 
profound insight into the cruciform nature of faith, and its expression as the fear 
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and love of God, the sharp limitation in which it is set is more akin to despair than 
to hope.  
In short, Bender’s assertion that ‘in the Romans commentary the church seems to 
be a community of sin that precedes and opposes the resurrection more than a 
new community that is established in the light of and through the resurrection’ 
appears justified.
137  Given that  this  theological  framework  forms the theory  of 
practice,  it  is  unclear  just  what  practice  might  arise  from  it,  save  a  dismal, 
isolationist  and  passive  ‘waiting’  of  the  community  on  God—a  waiting  that 
cannot issue into a hastening or activity, but can only linger until God finally 
establishes the fullness of his kingdom. 
At  this  point,  however,  we  are  happily  confronted  with  the  inconsistency  in 
Barth’s theology that was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. According 
to Bruce McCormack, given the manner in which he constructed his dialectic of 
time and eternity, Barth ‘should not have been able to say that revelation and the 
new humanity project themselves into time—but he did.’
138 Similarly, Smart has 
noted  that  ‘the  tangent  was  really  meant  to  do  more  than  merely  touch  the 
circle.…In  short,  Urgeschichte  becomes  a  reality  in  time.’
139  In  blunt  terms, 
Barth’s metaphysic in Romans II does not work, or, to state the matter differently, 
it works too well. If Barth were to apply his theological framework in Romans II 
with utter consistency there would be no possibility of Christian and ecclesial 
existence, no possibility of a life of faith, of progress in sanctification, of moral 
community.  
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Does this mean that those interpreters who accuse Barth of denying the church 
and eradicating human agency are actually correct in their assessment? No, for as 
McCormack and Smart point out, Barth is not content to colour within the lines he 
has drawn, but strays outside them. Thus, while it may be appropriate to judge his 
work strictly in accordance with the theological framework he established, Barth 
did  not  adhere  strictly  to  this  framework.  Indeed,  this  is  evident  in  the  one 
significant passage in his exposition of Romans 1-11 where Barth does turn his 
attention to consider the life of the believer: Romans 6:11-23.
140 So we, too, turn 
our attention to consider his treatment of this theme in this passage. 
The New Subject and the Imperative of Grace 
In the preceding treatment of divine revelation and human faith, we found that the 
moment of revelation involves the action of the Holy Spirit whereby the human 
recipient of revelation is constituted anew as a new subject ‘who stands upright in 
the  presence  of  God.’
141 Barth uses  the  imagery  and  terminology  of  the  ‘new 
man’—the new subject or new humanity—to refer both to the new situation of all 
humanity as a result of the coming of Christ, and to the individual awakened in 
the moment of revelation. This distinction is significant for it helps illuminate 
how Barth conceives the movement from the indicative to the imperative of grace.  
In the  indicative of triumphant  grace the  new subject refers to the ontological 
restoration of humanity into right relationship with God, whereby all are now set 
at liberty from the fallenness of the world and placed under divine affirmation.
142 
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This  new  subject,  who  ‘has  no  existence  except  non-existence’
143  is  the  ‘new 
man…who is righteous before [God] and in whom he is well pleased, the man in 
whom God again discovers himself as a father discovers himself in his child.’
144  
In the moment of revelation the  individual is confronted by this transcendent, 
existential reality: 
Upon the threshold of my existence there appears, demanding admittance—
the new man of the new world, the new man in Christ Jesus, justified and 
redeemed, alive and good, endowed with attributes which are not mine, have 
not been mine, and never will be mine. This new man is no visible figure in 
history, no metaphysical phantom of my imagination; he is no other, second 
person, with whom I  may be compared;  he  claims to be  me  myself,  my 
existential, unobservable, EGO. In God I am what I am.
145  
This recipient of revelation is the new subject who has been ‘lifted up into the air’ 
and who has ‘no standing-place except the protection of God,’ and who may be 
‘what he is not…a new subject related to a new object’ so long as they ‘remain 
still in fear and trembling, in awe and gratitude.’
146  
Barth’s use of the ‘new subject’ to refer to both the ontological restoration of all 
humanity to divine affirmation, and to the individual awakened by the Holy Spirit 
in the moment of revelation suggests that he is making a functional distinction 
between  that  which  is  ontological  and  that  which  is  ontic.
147  Ontological 
statements refer to the being of something and the range of possibilities open to it.  
Ontic statements refer to the being of something in its actual relations with other 
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entities.  To speak onticly is to presuppose the ontological, whilst the reverse is 
not so. Thus, in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ God has effected an 
ontological alteration in the human situation whereby all humanity is constituted 
anew whether they ever experience this reality existentially or not. The possibility 
exists that they may be actually amongst those who are confronted and claimed in 
the moment of revelation. This, however, is not certain, for it is only those who 
‘are led to apprehend [their] Sonship by the Spirit’ who are thus brought into the 
orbit of a new relation with God.
148 Thus in his comment on Romans 8:15, Barth 
affirms that  
this Spirit of Sonship, this new  man  who I am  not, is  my  unobservable, 
existential EGO. Thence I am known, directed, enlivened, and beloved. In 
the light of this unobservable EGO I must now pass my visible and corporeal 
life. In its light I must live within the realm  of that old duality, pressed 
against the narrow gate of critical negation where the fear of the Lord must 
be the beginning and end of my wisdom. I must live in the darkness, but not 
now without the reflection of light uncreated; God’s prisoner, but as such his 
freedman; his slave, but as such his Son; mourning and yet blessed. I must 
still cry unto him who confronts me only as unknown and undiscoverable, as 
the enemy who has vanquished me, and as the judge who has sentenced me 
to death—but nevertheless, crying to him, Abba Father.…For assuredly, in 
such crying the possibility of God is secreted: assuredly it is possible, when 
human action has become quite thin and transparent, for the glory of God to 
shine through it or, maybe, to rend it asunder.
149 
In this remarkable passage we see that Barth does allow the impact and effect of 
revelation  to  pass  onto  the  plane  of  history  and  time,  even  to  the  extent  of 
declaring a certain human action—the cry of worship and prayer—to be an action 
which  may  become  transparent  to  the  glory  of  God.  Again,  it  is  ‘wholly 
congruous,’ says Barth in a discussion of divine grace toward humanity based on 
Romans 5:15, ‘that the positive relation between God and man should assume 
positive form among men in Christ’s world.…Through the death of Christ men 
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are made new and are translated into the realm of life.’
150 In an evident echo of 
Luther’s language, though not his meaning, Barth declares that, ‘though mankind 
has become the slave of all things, yet in the death of Christ men are lord of 
all.…they  stand  as  individuals  under  the  law  of  liberty  through  the  grace  of 
Christ.’
151 Barth goes on characteristically to express the eschatological reserve 
under which this liberty occurs:  
We have as yet only been declared free;…our actual redemption cannot be 
identified with any concrete happening in history. Here, too, men do not pass 
beyond the threshold of the Kingdom of God.…Yet they do stand hopefully 
on the threshold; and, because they have hope, they do not wholly lack the 
anticipatorily present reality of what is hoped for.
152 
The new subject created by the Holy Spirit in the event of revelation stands on the 
threshold of the kingdom of God as a partaker of divine grace—in hope. This 
grace  is  the  divine  disposition  whereby  ‘we  are  no  longer  treated  by  God  as 
sinners.’
153  Accordingly,  ‘grace…means  neither  that  men  can  or  ought  to  do 
something, nor that they can or ought to do nothing. Grace means that God does 
something. Nor does grace mean that God does “everything.” Grace means that 
God does some quite definite thing.…Grace means that God forgives men their 
sins.’
154 
Yet, as the above citation also suggests when it says that believers do not ‘wholly 
lack the anticipatorily present reality of what is hoped for,’ grace is also more than 
pronounced forgiveness, being the power of the resurrection which at all times 
impinges upon the present existence of humanity, crossing the ‘threshold’ of our 
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world from that side to this, ‘the act of God by which the new man shall be and is, 
and  by  which  also  he  is  free  from  sin.’
155  The  visible,  concrete  existence  of 
humanity  is  overshadowed  and  overturned  by  the  invisible,  future,  yet  truly 
concrete existence of the believer as they now exist in God through their union 
with Christ by faith.
156 Faith is a venture which must be risked, says Barth, ‘seeing 
what God sees, knowing what God knows, reckoning as God reckons.’
157 By grace 
and in faith the believer may, and indeed, must live as the new subject they are in 
God for the indicative of this grace passes over into an imperative. 
Grace for Barth, therefore, is not only the forgiveness of sins and the power of the 
resurrection impinging on our lives, but also the mighty claim of God upon our 
lives whereby God lays hold of us for his purpose and will: ‘Grace is the royal and 
sovereign  power  of  God,  the  existential  presentation  of  men  to  God  for  his 
disposal, the real freedom of the will of God in men.’
158 Grace has introduced a 
‘fissure  and  disturbance’  into  the  being  of  the  person  between  the  former 
subjectivity and the new, so that their bondage to sin has been decisively broken, 
and their existence has been co-opted for the service of righteousness.
159 Thus, 
grace  is a categorical imperative, a call, command and order which cannot be 
disobeyed.
160 By grace the new subject is awakened to a new responsibility. Barth 
uses military language to describe  this responsibility:  ‘I  am  the warrior under 
grace, the new man, who can neither admit nor submit to the tyranny which sin 
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exercises over me and over my mortal body.…I am, consequently, in full revolt 
against it. I can be no neutral observer of the conflict between grace and sin.’
161  
Barth also rejects any dualism between grace and sin, as though God’s claim and 
action is  limited to only one  aspect of the life  of the individual. God’s grace 
claims the whole of the person, the totality of their existence, and there remains no 
aspect of their person or life which lies beyond the bounds of God’s claim. There 
is  no  dualism  between  visible  and  invisible,  tangible  and  intangible:  ‘[Grace] 
cannot hand visible  life  over  to  sin  in  order  that  it  may  be satisfied  with the 
righteousness of some “other” invisible and intangible life.…Grace seizes visible 
life and demands that it be presented to righteousness.’
162 Nor is there any dualism 
between  life  in this  present  age, and  some  future age,  but rather,  ‘the  barrier 
between them has been removed. Grace, as the invisible truth, cannot but press to 
concretion.…Grace means: thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven.’
163 As those 
in  a  ‘state  of  grace,’  and  who  now  ‘stand  under  the  imperative  of  grace,’
164 
believers  
must  serve  righteousness  with  the  same  members,  with  the  same  visible 
concreteness,  with  which  they  hitherto  served  uncleanness  and  iniquity. 
They must bring sanctification into concrete existence.…They must glorify 
God  with  their  bodies.…There  is  demanded  of  them—of  each  single 
person—a different being and having and doing.
165  
In fact, if the disturbance of grace does not so work within the human agent that 
they long for and stretch out toward a life of sanctification to such a degree that 
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true  righteousness  begins  to  break  visibly  through  in  the  members  of  their 
bodies—grace is not grace.
166 
Barth is well aware of the tension which exists between the language he is using 
in this section, and the ruling conceptuality of Romans II. The possibility of the 
emergence of the visible and concrete sanctification of human life is not a human 
possibility. The reality he seeks to describe belongs to an order wholly distinct 
from every other human reality, and any concrete expression of it in the order of 
human being and having and doing is strictly a matter of miracle, of new creation. 
The  divine  imperative,  however,  is  not  unjustly  demanding  something  which 
humanity has absolutely no possibility of fulfilling, for the imperative is grounded 
in the indicative. Although its fulfilment is not a human possibility, in the power 
of  grace  it  becomes  possible  in  the  moment  of  revelation,  which  as 
‘lightning…sets our existence ablaze, illuminates at once our being and knowing, 
our thinking and speaking, our will and its execution, the motions of our souls and 
the achievements of our bodies, the aims we yearn after and the purposes we 
attain.’
167 In the moment of revelation we gain knowledge of God’s sovereignty 
and  our  own  sinfulness  and  contingency,  an  awareness  of  our  origin  and  the 
purpose and hence of the meaning of our existence, and so also insight into the 
nature of good and evil.
168 The criterion by which iniquity is known is simply, 
death. That which issues from ‘the vitality of mortality,’ which finds it origin, 
logic and  telos  in  death, which  spreads and is dedicated to death,  is  iniquity. 
Contrariwise, that which has its origin, logic and telos in life, which is devoted 
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even imperfectly to life, may survive the fiery test of divine judgement and so be 
shown to be righteous.
169  
Finally, in the climax of his exposition on this chapter, Barth also acknowledges 
that  those  whose  lives  are  enlightened  by  revelation,  and  who  have  come  to 
understanding of the criterion of good and evil ‘are again and again compelled to 
draw up a list of sinners and righteous men and to make a catalogue of what is 
permitted and what is forbidden. They are bound to attempt a system of ethics.’
170 
Although it might be anticipated that Barth would condemn this activity, he does 
not. Instead, he insists that such systems are human responses to revelation and as 
such always remain contingent, no more than attempts to understand the divine 
righteousness. As a means to the attainment of righteousness, of course, they are 
vain. Is the entire exercise therefore vain? Barth does not suggest this. It seems he 
considers ethics—and in this case, even the provisional attempt to construct a 
system  of  ethics—to  be  always  necessary  yet  always  contingent,  leaving  the 
possibility open, at least in this instance, that such lists and categories may have a 
heuristic function within the community of faith. 
Given the importance of this notion for the thesis that Barth develops his theology 
with the formation of moral community in view, it is necessary to respond to a 
significant rejection of this view. David Clough insists that the English translation 
of this passage in Barth is misleading, and that Barth has not, in fact, said that 
those enlightened by grace are to make an attempt at a system of ethics: ‘In fact, 
Barth says that it is ordinary persons, who live in a “twilight world” where they 
cannot  see  the  chasm  between  good  and  evil,  who  are  condemned  to  this 
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unrelenting search for an ethical system. Those under grace rely instead on the 
“power of obedience,” which is the “power of the resurrection.”’
171 
Certainly the passage is difficult, and translator Edwin Hoskins has attempted to 
render it more simply in English by inserting certain persons as the grammatical 
subject in several of his sentences, in place of Barth’s more abstract language. In 
point of fact, it is only the final sentence of the paragraph which has a human 
grammatical subject, the subjects of the previous sentences being ‘sin and grace,’ 
‘no bridge,’ ‘the clarity,’ ‘the abyss,’ ‘its presence’ (that is, the presence of the 
abyss), and ‘the knowledge of God’ respectively. Thus, strictly speaking, it is 
neither those enlightened by grace nor, as Clough suggests, those who inhabit the 
twilight world of ungraced humanity who are the subject of the attempt of an 
ethic. A more literal rendering of the passage runs as follows:  
Just as death and life cannot stand together, beside one another or as links of 
a chain one after the other, so neither can sin and grace. No bridge leads 
across the abyss that is opened here. The clarity, which is brought about here 
does  not  tolerate  any  confusion.  Right  across  the  fissures  of  ‘good’  and 
‘evil,’ ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy,’ ‘holy’ and ‘unholy,’  which  cannot bring 
about clarity and distinction in the twilight world of ungraced humanity, runs 
the abyss [which functions] as the orientation of a [the?] new order and as 
the unambiguous criterion. Its presence makes the attempt at an ethic, which 
is a list of sinful and just, prohibited and commanded (i.e. dead or living) life 
purposes, an absolutely necessary task, only to make an ethic that is meant to 
be  more  than  an  attempt  absolutely  impossible.  This  is  because  the 
knowledge  of  God,  in  which  this  orientation  takes  place  and  this 
unambiguous criterion of what is sinful and what is just is brought about, 
brings about human knowledge ever anew by dissolving human knowledge. 
The fact that we recognise and grasp the possibility of the impossible as our 
own task is the power of obedience in which we stand, because it is the 
power of the resurrection.
172  
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So wenig Tod und Leben zugleich, nebeneinander oder als Glieder einer Reihe hintereinander sein 
können,  so  wenig  Sünde  und  Gnade. Über  den  Abgrund,  der  hier aufgerissen  ist,  führt  keine 
Brücke. Die Klarheit, die hier geschaffen ist, duldet keine Vermischung. Quer hindurch durch die 
Risse  von  ‚Gut‘  und  ‚Böse,‘  ‚Wert‘  und  ‚Unwert,‘  ,heilig‘  und  ‚unheilig,‘  die  in  der   302 
The logic of Barth’s sentences is that the abyss which opens up between death and 
life,  sin  and  grace  cuts  across  all  conceptions  of  good  and  evil,  worthy  and 
unworthy,  and  holy  and  unholy  and  thus  renders  impossible  any  bridging, 
confusion, mixture or blending of these polarities. Those inhabiting ‘the twilight 
world of ungraced humanity’ are thus left without any genuine means of clarity or 
distinction regarding them: they do not possess the criterion of  good and evil 
given  in  the  moment  of  revelation.  For  those  enlightened  in  the  moment  of 
revelation, however, the abyss functions as an orientation to the new world and as 
the  unambiguous  criterion.  Its  presence  requires  the  attempt  at  an  ethics  and 
simultaneously renders any such attempt which seeks to be more than an attempt 
invalid.  
Who, the question must be asked, are those who must make this attempt ever and 
again—those ‘graced’ or ‘ungraced’? That this new orientation takes place ‘in the 
knowledge  of  God’  surely  indicates  that  Barth  means,  contrary  to  Clough’s 
assertion,  that  it  is  the  graced  who  undertake  this  task.  This  view  is  further 
confirmed in the final sentence of the passage in which Barth quite explicitly says, 
‘The fact that we recognise and grasp the possibility of the impossible as our own 
task is the power of obedience in which we stand, because it is the power of the 
resurrection.’
173  Thus,  while  the  formulation  of  a  system  of  ethics  is  quite 
                                                                                                                                 
Dämmerungswelt  des unbegnadeten Menschen  –  keine  Klarheit,  keine  Scheidung  zu  schaffen 
vermögen, geht als Orientierung neuer Ordnung, als das eindeutige Kriterium dieser Abgrund. 
Sein  Vorhandensein  wird  den  Versuch  einer  Ethik,  einer  Tafel  der  sündigen  und  gerechten, 
verbotenen  und  gebotenen  (weil  toten  oder  lebendigen)  Lebenszwecke  immer  wieder  zur 
unerbittlich notwendigen Aufgabe machen, um eine Ethik, die mehr als Versuch sein sollte, immer 
wieder  ebenso  unerbittlich  zu  verunmöglichen.  Denn  die  Erkenntnis  Gottes,  in  der  sich  jene 
Orientierung vollzieht, in der jenes eindeutige Kriterium des Sündigen und des Gerechten erzeugt 
wird, schafft immer wieder menschliche Erkenntnis, indem sie menschliche Erkenntnis aufhebt. 
Daß wir die Möglichkeit des Unmöglichen begreifen und ergreien als unsre eigene Aufgabe, das 
ist die Kraft des Gehorsams, in der wir stehen, weil sie die Kraft der Auferstehung ist. (See Karl 
Barth, Der Römerbrief (Zweite Fassung) 1922 (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1989), 229.) 
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impossible,  it  is  nevertheless,  for  the  Barth  of  Romans  II,  an  impossibility 
rendered possible for those who by grace may comprehend the criterion disclosed 
by revelation, so long as it remains clear that all such attempts are no more than 
attempts, that is, that every such system is recognised as radically and inherently 
contingent, standing ever and always in need of reformulation.  
Further evidence might be adduced that Hoskin’s rather free translation of this 
passage  is in accord with Barth’s  intent in this work. In the midst of Barth’s 
discussion  of  the  imperative  of  grace  is  a  brief  though  significant  passage  in 
which he acknowledges the necessity of moral formation if the community is to 
realise its calling as the people of God. We have seen that those claimed by grace 
can  no  longer  live  their  lives  in  servitude  to  sin,  for  they  ‘stand  under  the 
imperative of grace,’ and hence must take their place as God’s servants.
174 This 
will hardly occur, however, without ‘pastoral exhortation’ whereby people are 
summoned to repentance, and the forgiveness of sins is spoken over them as 
the Word of God. They are bidden to think of themselves as existentially 
under grace, as belonging to God, and as brought within the sphere of the 
resurrection. Looking on him who has been crucified on their behalf, they 
are bidden to—believe; yes! to believe in their power of obedience. This is 
the venture which must be dared. How is it possible to speak of the grace 
and  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  if  each  man  be  not  persuaded  that  the 
description  concerns  him  and  that  he  is  under  grace  and  within  the 
Kingdom? How is it possible to pronounce the truth that the grace of God 
concerns all men, if it be not boldly applied to each particular man?
175 
We have previously seen in his first commentary on Romans, that Barth was not 
unaware of the need for moral formation in the Christian community, although he 
preferred to name such formation ‘Christian exhortation.’
176 So here, under the 
same nomenclature, Barth clearly intends that some form of spiritual and moral 
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formation occurs within the Christian community such that believers are enabled 
to  reckon  as  God  reckons.  Without  this  formation  and  pastoral  exhortation 
believers will be unequipped to embark on the daring venture of faith asked of 
them.  Using the passive  voice to describe  what  must  transpire  in the lives of 
believers, Barth says that, ‘we must be enabled to discover that we are no more of 
this evil world,  no  more under  its  power.’  He continues,  ‘We  must be  set  in 
radical opposition to it, and in such a manner that in the conscious tribulation of 
discovering its mere this-worldliness and negativity we discover also the promise, 
and in apprehending our deprivation we also apprehend our hope.’
177  
Barth desires that the believer be ‘enabled to discover’ their new identity in God 
and  the  promise  that  he  gives,  and  to  consciously  wrestle  with  the  ‘this-
worldliness’  of  the  world until  they  are  set  in  radical  opposition  to  it.  These 
sentences  indicate  that  the  kind  of  formation  Barth  proposes  would  require 
extensive theological instruction and exhortation, as well as substantial reflection 
upon the daily realities of human life and society. Further, the truth of grace is to 
be pressed upon each one so that each person understands both the blessing and 
the responsibility of divine grace. It is in this context that Barth then speaks of 
grace which ‘cannot but press to concretion,’ but which is ‘bound to move from 
the indicative of the divine truth concerning men to the imperative by which the 
divine reality makes its demand upon them. They must will what God wills, as 
hitherto they have not!’
178 Here again, as we have recently seen, ‘They must serve 
righteousness.…They  must  bring  sanctification  into  concrete  existence.…They 
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must glorify God with their bodies.…There is demanded of them—of each single 
person—a different being and having and doing.’
179  
And yet, in accordance with the dialectical manner in which Barth has constructed 
his understanding of the imperative of grace, they will no doubt also be instructed 
in the nature of faith as a response to grace. That is, that genuine responsiveness 
to God is to appear before him ever and again with empty hands, refusing to rely 
on one’s performance or achievement, but ever awaiting the fresh encounter of 
God  by  which  our  life  is  once  again  illuminated  in  the  lightning  event  of 
revelation. 
Barth  describes  the  manner  of  this  formation  in  terms  of  proclamation, 
exhortation,  and,  unexpectedly,  a  reminder  of  the  experiences  of  grace  that 
Christians have encountered. Surprisingly, he also allows this formation to occur 
using the ‘language of romanticism,’ that is, direct language which describes the 
immediacy  and  actuality  of  divine  forgiveness  so  that  the  reality  of  God’s 
gracious  provision  may  truly  grip  the  hearer:  ‘broken  men,  we  dare  to  use 
unbroken language.’
180  
In sum, then, the movement of the indicative to the imperative has significance 
out of proportion with its length in Barth’s exposition, for here we see clearly 
Barth’s  intention  to  provide  ‘space’  for  a  positive  account  of  Christian  and 
ecclesial  existence  in  his  commentary.  The  movement  from  indicative  to 
imperative also indicates the movement of eternity into time and onto the plane of 
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history as grace presses for concretion. It further indicates a movement beyond the 
general ontological alteration of the human situation as a result of the coming of 
Christ,  to  the  ontic  renewal  of  certain  individuals  in  the  gracious  power  and 
presence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  who  constitutes  them  anew.  These  individuals, 
awakened  and  claimed  by  divine  grace  in  the  power  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  are 
exhorted to make the sanctification of human life visible, exhibiting a ‘different 
being and having and doing.’ As such, they are also called to be a community 
enabled to distinguish, though only provisionally, between good and evil, and to 
be set in radical opposition to the world. Whilst Barth does not use the language I 
have adopted in this thesis, it is difficult to see how his exposition can be can be 
seen as anything other than an attempt at the formation of moral community. That 
he would expect his readers to be anything less is barely conceivable. As such, the 
argument of this  thesis,  that  Barth  deliberately  develops  his theology  with  an 
intention to form moral community and shape Christian and ecclesial existence 
receives strong confirmation at this point. Admittedly, this confirmation is at the 
expense  of  claiming  that  Barth  is  inconsistent  in  the  application  of  his  own 
theological ontology. Nevertheless, the fact that this inconsistency occurs at this 
point—where he considers the moral existence of the believer and community—
serves only to underline the significance of this ethical motive in his theology.  
This does not eliminate all the questions that  have been raised, however. The 
discussion thus far at least indicates how stringent Barth has become in the space 
he allows for human initiative and activity. Even given the fact that Barth himself 
does not adhere strictly to his theological framework, the quite rich descriptions of 
human agency and Christian existence found in some of his earlier works have all 
but disappeared, with the exception of the short exposition on the imperative of   307 
grace. Further, Barth has also, in this revised edition of the commentary, removed 
ethical discussion from some sections where it is found in the first edition. It may 
be recalled, for example, that in Romans I Barth treats the entry of the Law in 
Romans  5:20-21  as  an  occasion  to  discuss  the  ‘question  of  morality,’  and 
develops his idea of the ‘third dimension,’ of the believer being caught up in the 
eschatological procession of God. In Romans II, by contrast, the verses are now 
grounds for a discussion of the earth-bound nature of religion—which must now 
be abandoned.
181  
Thus, serious questions in Romans II remain, if not about the bare possibility of 
ethical existence, at least about the nature and scope of such existence. Thus far 
this  chapter  provides  an  outline  of  the  ‘theory’  Barth  seeks  to  present  to  his 
readers. The theory, of course, is not intended as an end in itself but is rather ‘the 
theory of praxis.’ We now turn, therefore, to the second major section of Barth’s 
commentary: his exposition of chapters twelve to thirteen of Paul’s Epistle where 
he specifically and extensively addresses what  he refers to as ‘the problem of 
ethics.’ 
Romans 12-13: The Theory of Praxis 
The Problem and Presupposition of Ethics 
For Barth, the problem of ethics consists in the question What must we do? and 
humanity’s evident incapacity to answer that question in any kind of definitive 
manner. Nor is it a secondary or inconsequential problem, one we might easily 
dismiss or fruitfully ignore. Rather, it is pressed upon us constantly in the actual 
tension  of  our  daily  existence,  and  most  particularly  in  our  interactions  and 
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confrontations with the other, who Barth also refers to as our neighbour.
182 For the 
Christian the problem is often especially acute, for the believer naïvely anticipates 
that God’s will may be clearly apprehended and applied, and is troubled when this 
is not the case. In fact, it is precisely this problem which drives us to perceive the 
reality  under  which  we  live and to  seek  the  knowledge of  God. Accordingly, 
David Clough  has rightly seen that the problem of ethics functions  in Barth’s 
Römerbrief to provoke the Krisis by the way it generates innumerable questions 
that only God can answer.
183  
This was certainly the case for Barth, who, as we have seen in the introduction to 
this chapter, declares that ‘the whole concrete situation’ was the starting point for 
his  reflections  in Paul’s Epistle to  the  Romans.  That  is,  ‘the  need  of  making 
decisions of will, the  need for action, the world as it is—this  it  is which  has 
compelled us to consider what the world is, how we are to live in it, and what we 
are  to  do  in  it.’
184  He  rejects  the  notion  that  he  has  engaged  in  extensive 
theological reflection ‘for the mere joy of so doing,’ or that it has been an exercise 
in abstract thought.
185 Barth insists rather that 
it  is  our  actual  observation  of life as  it  is  that  thrusts  us back  upon  the 
necessity  of  hearing  and  speaking  the  Word  of  God.  So  also,  it  is  our 
pondering  over  the  question,  ‘What  shall  we  do?’  which  compels  us  to 
undertake  so  much  seemingly  idle  conversation  about  God.  And  it  is 
precisely because our world is filled with pressing, practical duties; because 
there  is  wickedness  in  the  streets;  because  of  the  existence  of  the  daily 
papers; that we are bound to encounter ‘Paulinism’ and the Epistle to the 
Romans.
186 
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These  statements  forcefully  affirm  the  ethical  nature  of  Barth’s  theology  and 
provide further evidence in support of the contention of this thesis, namely, that 
Barth practiced theology with a view to form and shape Christian and ecclesial 
existence.  Further,  Barth  considers  that  he  is  following  Paul  himself  in  this 
emphasis, for Paul’s Epistle is itself ‘nothing but exhortation,’ and that the whole 
conversation between Paul and the Romans forms one long reminder of the vast 
disturbance which has taken place.
187  
This claim stands in contrast to that of Neil MacDonald who has argued that the 
crisis to which Barth responded in Romans II was ‘fundamentally a theological 
crisis,’ and secondly, that ‘Overbeck’s dilemma [that one either practices non-
theology or gives up the attempt at theology altogether] is the final horizon of 
Romans II and not just a horizon.’
188 I do not wish to diminish the important 
contribution MacDonald has made to our understanding of Barth, and agree with 
him that Barth was consciously writing with Overbeck’s challenge in the forefront 
of his mind. I argue, however, that these passages indicate Barth’s ethical concern 
was the more immediate horizon within which he approached his commentary. Of 
necessity, however, the ethical problem drove him, as he indicates, back to God 
and to a fresh hearing and speaking of the Word of God. At this point, Overbeck’s 
dilemma arises: how may we speak of God, of his will, and of his commandment 
in light of the criticism that Overbeck brought against theology?  
Barth approaches his discussion of ethics by outlining the orientation and major 
structural features of his ethical method. His major presupposition is expressed 
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quite simply: ‘God is God: this is the presupposition of ethics.’
189 This seemingly 
simple assertion, however, is laden with significance. Barth insists that the entire 
theological ontology portrayed in his exposition of Romans 1-11 functions as the 
presupposition of ethics. In other words, the presupposition of dogmatics is also 
the presupposition of ethics: Soli Deo gloria!
190  
This  presupposition  requires  that  ethical  thought,  like  dogmatic  thought,  be 
dialectical in its form. Barth is firm that ‘genuine thought must always be broken 
thought,’ for when our thought is comprehensive and unbroken ‘it is quite certain 
that we are not thinking about life; we are not thinking, that is to say, about the 
Krisis in which human life is in fact being lived.’
191 Thus Barth argues that, ‘Pure 
ethics require—and here  we  are  in complete  agreement  with Kant—that  there 
should be no mixing of heaven and earth in the sphere of morals. Pure ethical 
behaviour depends upon its primal origin, an origin which needs to be protected 
by a determination on our part to call God God and man man.’
192 No human 
activity  whether  thought,  will  or  deed—including  even  those  activities  which 
occur as a result of the inspiration or empowering of the Spirit—can claim divine 
justification: all are subject to the same Krisis which proved determinative in the 
arenas of theological epistemology and soteriology. 
This is not to say, however, that human activity cannot actually be righteous—
simply that we cannot claim this for our activity. By his use of dialectic, Barth 
intends  to destabilise  human  confidence  in  its own  goodness and capacity  for 
ethical conduct. This is the function of the negative pole of his dialectic. But the 
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positive  pole,  although  certainly  attenuated  in Romans II, must be  heard. The 
positive pole does not deny the reality of human finitude and incapacity in the 
ethical arena, nor does it overturn it through the provision of some new standpoint 
from which we might now have confidence. Rather, as Clough has noted, 
[i]t tells us that our ability to act virtuously is balanced on a knife-edge, or 
hangs  from  a  single  thread.  But  it  tells  us  that  if  we  can  accept  this 
instability, if we can embrace an existence in which we are not in charge of 
our destiny and do not make the rules, if we can repent of our desire to eat 
the fruit of the tree in the middle of garden and be like gods, then we can 
perform responsible, significant, genuinely human actions.
193 
When Barth turns to consider the possibility of human ethical behaviour he begins 
by recalling the imperative of grace from Romans 6: ‘Sanctify  yourselves! Be 
servants of God!’
194 He  now explicates this demand in terms of Romans 12:1 
saying that  
[t]o  sanctify  something  means  to  separate  and  prepare  it  that  it  may  be 
presented  and  offered  to  God.  This  is  more  precisely  defined  in  the 
conception of sacrifice. The exhortation which is grounded upon the mercies 
of God and is directed towards men is summed up in the demand that men 
should  present  their  bodies—that  is, their  concrete,  observable,  historical 
existence—as a sacrifice.
195 
For Barth, this self-offering which  is the ‘primary  ethical action’ may also be 
termed worship or repentance. Repentance involves the recognition of the ‘vast 
ambiguity’  of  our  existence,  whereby  we  affirm  and bow  in  adoration  of  the 
righteous judgement of God.
196 Repentance, as such, is not a work which qualifies 
as ‘good,’ or a credible position upon which we may stand, but rather, is the ever-
renewed,  never  completed  dissolution  of  any  such  claim  or  position.  It  is  a 
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continual  act  of  ‘rethinking’  by  which  we  are  re-oriented  time  and  again  in 
submission toward God.  
That Barth characterises repentance in terms of ‘rethinking’ is a move to be noted. 
Repentance is not construed in religious or ritualistic terms, as though certain 
activities might be undertaken, and so become, in themselves a means of ethical 
justification. By construing repentance as rethinking Barth calls the believer and 
the  community  to  return  time  and  again  to  the  kind  of  theological  reflection 
exemplified in Paul’s Epistle to the Romans (and in his commentary?), whereby 
they  acknowledge  afresh  in  each  new  circumstance  the  fundamental 
presupposition  of  dogmatics  and  ethics,  and  the  theological  realities  of  their 
‘concrete situation.’ It is also likely, as we shall see shortly, that such rethinking 
will also include what these theological realities mean and call for in the particular 
circumstances being confronted by the community. 
The value or power of repentance lies in the re-presentation of the human agent as 
a sacrifice to God for his service and glory. Repentance, understood as rethinking, 
operates as a precursor to action ‘for it is the place where the turning about takes 
place by which men are directed to a new behaviour.…Like the turning of a key in 
a lock, it is the prelude to a new action, to that conduct which is marked by the 
divine protest against the great illusion, and through which the light of the coming 
Day shines clear and transparent.’
197 
Barth’s mention of ‘the divine protest against the great illusion’ introduces his 
concept of the ‘secondary ethical action’ which he associates with the phrase not 
to fashion yourselves according to the present form of this world, but according to 
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its  coming  transformation  (Romans  12:2,  his  translation).  Secondary  ethical 
actions presuppose and arise from the primary ethical activity of repentance, and 
bear the two-fold witness unveiled in the citation above: they may take the form 
of a protest against ‘the great illusion,’ against the form and idols of the present 
world, or they may be an expression of the ‘coming Day.’
198  
Barth notes three things about the character of these secondary ethical actions. 
First, these actions arise out of the act of rethinking in which ‘sufficient wisdom is 
given men to choose the road which is for the moment the right road.’
199 Once 
more we observe Barth’s assertion that ethical activity occurs ‘in the moment’ as 
God’s people present themselves to him. This occasionalist orientation of Barth’s 
ethics stands in contrast to modes of ethics where the good may be predetermined 
apart from the presenting issue, and without the centrality of worship and prayer 
that Barth brings to the moment of ethical decision. It is noteworthy, however, 
that  the  ethical  agents  receive  ‘wisdom  to  choose  the  right  road’  rather  than 
simply a bare command. This indicates that the ethical decision, at least as Barth 
construes it in this instance, involves genuine human engagement and reflection—
rethinking—as part, though not the determinative aspect, of the ethical decision. 
Second, Barth is emphatic that secondary ethical activities are and remain wholly 
human in nature, and that at best they can only point to and represent the action of 
God. They may function as sign-posts or parables, bearing witness to the glory of 
God, but whether this does in fact occur is entirely in his hands and not ours.
200 
This is the risk of faith to which believers are called. Impressed into service by 
grace, they cannot remain still. But nor can they be assured that their service is 
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accepted.  They  may  only  offer  their  life  and  service  as  a  sacrifice,  claiming 
nothing for themselves. ‘All  human duties and virtues and good deeds are set 
upon the edge of a knife. They hang on a single thread,’ says Barth. He asks, 
therefore, ‘is the man who practices them and cherishes them really prepared to 
sacrifice them; really prepared to see in them no more than demonstrations, and 
thus to give glory to God?’
201  
Finally, Barth suggests that the ethical nature of a particular activity or virtue 
depends ‘upon the light which shines in it,’ upon whether the human agent has 
‘been overcome’ in accordance with the coming transformation of the present 
age.
202 Therefore, 
there is no human action which is not in itself fashioned according to the 
form of this world; and yet there are actions which seem almost to bear in 
themselves the mark of the divine protest against the great error. There is no 
human action which is in itself fashioned according to the transformation of 
this world; but there are actions which seem so transparent that the light of 
the  coming  Day  is  almost  visible  in  them.…So  it  is  that  every  human 
position, every far-reaching, deeply penetrating human achievement, is to be 
sought out and recommended, for it is an urgent testimony to the power of 
the Spirit.
203 
In this passage Barth clearly acknowledges the possibility that in the midst of all 
human activity there may be a ‘fruit of the Spirit, a fruit of the light, a doing 
which is justified by God.’
204 The situation of ethics may be tenuous at best, ‘set 
upon the edge of a knife,’ but there remains—even in Romans II—the possibility 
of genuinely human, genuinely good acts which testify to the glory of God ‘that 
he may be known as—Lord.’
205 
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One  final  aspect  of  Barth’s  exposition  requires  comment  before bringing  this 
section to a close. At the beginning of this section we noted that the problem of 
ethics arises in confrontation with the human other. In his discussion of the body 
metaphor in Romans 12 Barth writes, ‘But the parable does, of course, remind the 
individual of the fact of the community. That is to say, it reminds him of the 
existence of other individuals. And, indeed, the ethical problem—what shall we 
do?—appears at the point where the existence of these ‘others’ itself emerges as a 
problem.’
206 The ethical significance of the other does not lie in any phenomenal 
distinction or external reality—such factors are irrelevant. What is important is 
that ‘every man is a parable of the oneness of men—in God.’
207 Most especially, 
‘the believers—men in relation to God—are therefore, in their full-grown and in 
no way attenuated individuality, one body, one individual in Christ. They are not a 
mass of individuals.…but The Individual, The One, The New Man. This one, this 
Body  of  Christ, it  is  which confronts  us  in  the  problem of the  ‘other’  in the 
fellowship of the believers.’
208 Thus Barth is able to suggest that ‘the other—the 
neighbour—who stands at the side of each one of us is the uplifted finger which 
by its ‘otherness’ reminds us of the wholly other,’ and further, ‘the community is 
that fellowship which reminds us of the Fellowship which is the oneness of every 
man and of all mankind in the unsearchableness of God.’
209  
In light of this Barth asks, ‘Is the foundation of Ethics to be found, then, in the 
constitution of the community as Fellowship? Yes; for this is what these verses 
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mean.’
210  Although  the  community  remains  the  visible  Church  of  Esau,  it  is 
capable of reflecting the coming light: 
This light need not be altogether hidden, and indeed is not altogether hidden; 
for  wherever  men  are  gathered  together—perhaps  their  particular 
community is constituted by reference to the One—there men are found to 
be wrestling with the ethical presupposition, hoping for it, suffering for it—
and this cannot be all to no purpose.
211 
It should now be evident that the discussion of this section serves to confirm the 
argument of this thesis: that Barth does envisage a definite form of Christian and 
ecclesial existence, and that he developed his theology with an explicit intention 
to form moral community. The question, however, of the material content and 
shape of that existence and community is still unclear. Thus far Barth has been 
satisfied to set forth the formal characteristics of a theological ethics, which as we 
have seen in previous chapters of this thesis, has been his priority in all his work. 
This is not to say that in the Römerbrief Barth provides no indication of what this 
content might look like. As he continues his exposition of Romans 12 and 13 we 
find Barth not only wrestling with major ethical issues relevant to his historical 
context,  but  also  suggestions  as  to  the  directions  and  shape  of  Christian  and 
ecclesial existence. His exposition of the content of these chapters is the focus of 
the next three sections. 
Positive and Negative Possibilities 
In his exposition of the second half of Romans twelve, Barth provides an account 
of  positive  and  negative  ethical  possibilities,  and  in  so  doing  provides  some 
reflection  at  least  on  the  material  content  of  theological  ethics.  Some  care  is 
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required  here  if  Barth’s  meaning  and  intent  is  not  to  be  misunderstood.  By 
‘positive ethics’ Barth means, ‘that volition and action which constitute a negation 
of  the  form of  this world, a behaviour which  contradicts  it  erotic  course,  and 
which protests against its great error.’
212 Similarly, he defines ‘negative ethics’ as 
‘things that are willed and done, which, being congruous to the transformation of 
this world, stand in a positive relation to the Coming World.’
213 Thus, ‘positive’ 
ethics function in terms of negation while ‘negative’ ethics stand in a positive 
relation to the new world! This apparent confusion of terms may, however, be 
overcome when it is understood that Barth uses the terms positive and negative to 
refer to the mode of action undertaken by the ethical subject. That is, ‘positive’ 
ethics indicate definite actions undertaken whereas ‘negative’ ethics  indicate a 
definite ‘not-doing’ or withdrawal of action.  
Barth  characterises the form of the world in terms of Eros, a deceptive force 
which  impels  humanity  to see, to  create, to  shape and to possess,  all  without 
perception into the true nature of the surrounding world.
214 The great error of the 
erotic course of the world is precisely its failure to recognise the Other in the 
other, or to acknowledge the fundamental presupposition that God is God. Over 
against Eros as ‘the supreme, positive ethical possibility’ stands Agape, ‘the love 
of one man for another.’
215 Barth refers to Agape as the recollection that in the 
encounter with the other we are faced with the reality of the hidden God—even if 
that other is our enemy!
216 In this encounter ‘the primary act of worship must be 
extended, or rather translated, into the secondary act of love towards our brother 
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men. Indeed, it is precisely by this extension or translation of worship that the 
honour of God is demonstrated.’
217 For Barth, then, love toward God can only be 
genuine  to  the  extent  that  there  is  a  corresponding  extension  of  love  toward 
humanity. Conversely, love toward humanity functions as a parable and witness 
of the believer’s love toward God, and of God’s love toward this other human 
object of the believer’s love.
218  
Agape must not be understood as some form of generally possible loving activity. 
In order to be a positive ethical activity which contradicts and protests the erotic 
course of the world, love must take the form of an offering or sacrifice within 
human relations that arises because of that Other encountered in the neighbour. 
The dialectic observed in Barth’s treatment of love is indicative of the manner in 
which he treats all such positive ethical actions. The activity in and of itself is not 
constituted as an ethical activity unless and until it is an action that arises from the 
primary ethical activity of worship and repentance, and is directed towards the 
honour  of  God.    Thus  even  love,  which  Barth  denominates  as  ‘the  supreme 
positive ethical possibility,’ is no absolute virtue, nor can there be an ‘absolute 
exhortation to love.’ Rather, these positive possibilities are and always remain 
relative ethical possibilities, and can never function other than as parables which 
point to the new and coming world.
219  
This is the case with other positive virtues and practices that Barth extols from 
Romans twelve: brotherliness, service, honour, hope, patience, perseverance  in 
tribulation and in prayer, hospitality, solidarity with others and blessing are all 
included as examples of positive ethical possibilities. Each constitutes a protest 
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and contradiction against the form of the world, but only to the extent that they are 
directed  toward  the  honour  of  God.  Barth  correlates  the  two  tables  of  the 
Decalogue to the primary and secondary ethical actions, and insists that these 
secondary activities are only legitimate to the extent that ‘our ethical behaviour 
bends backwards from the commandments of the second ‘Table’ to those of the 
first, from secondary ethical actions to the primary ethical action.’
220 Thus Barth 
insists that 
[a]ll possibilities, negative or positive…are human possibilities, and are, as 
such,  open  to  question;  for  they  are  subject  to  the  right  which  must  be 
reserved for God alone; they are liable to the judgement of the first ‘Table’ 
and to the Krisis of the passage from death to life. Indeed, they are ethical 
possibilities only  because  they  are  strictly  related  to their  Primal  Origin. 
Destroy  this  relationship,  seek  their  essential  nature  in  what  they  are  in 
themselves or in what they contain in themselves, and their ethical character 
is done away.
221 
The honour of God as the presupposition of ethics remains the criterion by which 
any activity is judged as truly ethical. Apart from this criterion, which is never at 
human disposal, all attempts at ethical conduct remain subject to the Krisis. Moral 
activity, then, can never be understood as more than a sacrifice. The Christian 
community must attempt ethical behaviour, but it may never presume upon it, as 
though the behaviour is justified in itself, or as though it provides them with some 
ground by which they may proclaim their own superiority or worthiness in respect 
to others. 
When Barth turns his attention to discussion of negative ethical possibilities, he 
begins by laying out a ‘rule’ for Christian ethics (despite his claim that ‘these 
words do not seem to refer, at least in the first instance, to the universal rule that 
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governs all human doing and not-doing’).
222 The words he refers to are Paul’s 
exhortation to ‘set not your mind on high things, but condescend to things that are 
lowly’ (Romans 12: 16). Barth goes on to indicate the significance of this rule 
saying, ‘from the dialectic of this rule, that is to say, from the Rule in the rule—
Soli  Deo  gloria!—the  great  contradictions  emerge,  world-denial  and  world-
acceptance,  enthusiasm  and  realism,  the  wisdom  of  death  and  the  wisdom of 
life.’
223  
Barth utilises this text to argue powerfully for a preference for things which are 
lowly on the grounds of an analogy of the cross whereby 
[i]In the haphazard happenings of this life the things that are lowly have, at 
least relatively, a greater parabolic capacity than have those things that are 
set on high.…Seen in the light of the Resurrection, every concrete thing that 
we appreciate as life and fullness, as great and high, becomes primarily a 
parable of death; death, however, and everything that is related to death—
weakness  and  littleness,  decrease,  deprivation  and  lowliness—become  a 
parable of life.…This is the great disturbance of men.
224  
Accordingly,  Barth  counsels  non-support  and  non-enthusiasm  for  projects 
characterised by some human eminence, confidence or boastfulness, even if they 
appear  as  movements,  developments  or  ideals  traditionally  well  aligned  with 
Christianity, such as morals and religion, marriage and family. The grave danger 
Barth seeks to avoid is the church becoming a chaplain for the state or for secular 
causes,  and  in  so  doing  becoming  complicit  in  the  construction  of  idolatrous 
towers of Babel.
225 For should it ever presume that it can enact and enforce any 
form of ‘objective righteousness,’ it shall have become guilty of ‘Titanism’ and 
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have seized the sceptre of God.
226 The calculated not-doing of the believer and the 
Christian community becomes a testimony against the human presumption that it 
can establish the new world of God’s kingdom by its own endeavour. 
Having established the principle Barth now radicalises it, so that this preference 
becomes a critical tool in the hands of the church, and the possibility that the 
church may develop an established position with respect to any particular societal 
group or movement is undermined. Barth draws a contemporary illustration to 
press his point: whereas in previous years the proletariat might well have been 
considered lowly, recent events, including especially the Russian revolution, have 
indicated that they are now busily engaged in tower-building. Therefore, and in a 
turn which appears as a marked reversal of his stance in the first edition of the 
commentary, Barth wonders whether the time has now arrived 
[t]o condescend to things which are lowly, to arise, that is, and plunge into 
the world—to marry and care for wife and children, to enter politics—not 
merely  on  the  side  of  the  socialists!—to  hold  art  in  high  esteem,  to  be 
cultured,  and  perhaps,  with  the  last  grim  comedy  of  life,  to  become—a 
Churchman. The theses of Christianity here become its antithesis; for it is 
possible for the parable  of  death, though it be but  a parable, to  overstep 
itself.
227 
Barth  therefore insists  that  no ‘position’ can  ever be  assumed, but a constant 
return, reorientation and relation to our Primal Origin is required.
228 That which 
previously was regarded as lowly and as the object of Christian preference has 
now set itself to become a human eminence, with the result that conservatism and 
reaction are now considered more radical and ethical than radicalism.  
                                                
226 Barth, Romans II, 473. 
227 Barth, Romans II, 464.  
228 Barth, Romans II, 465.    322 
By  radicalising  his  rule  Barth  has  introduced  a  fundamental  instability  and 
relativity into the nature of Christian ethics. The extent to which this is the case is 
seen in the fact that Barth can even go so far as to declare ‘the possibility that 
from time to time God may be  honoured in concrete  human behaviour which 
contradicts  the  second  Table  must…be  left  open.’
229  Barth  intends  by  this 
relativising  of  all  ethics  to  undermine  every  attempt—Christian  attempt 
included—to construct and occupy a new human eminence with the consequent 
triumph and sorrow that such attempts produce.
230 Nevertheless, the relativity that 
Barth introduces to ethics is not a capricious relativity. Rather, it is an insistence 
that in each concrete circumstance the believer and the community take up the 
necessity of their primary ethical activity, that is, worship and repentance, that 
they might once again be granted ‘sufficient wisdom…to choose the road which is 
for the moment the right road.’
231 The ‘knowledge of God,’ says Barth, ‘directs us 
to God; it does not direct us to some human position or to some human course of 
action.’
232  
Barth  goes on to provide several other negative ethical possibilities,  including 
non-retaliation to provocation and evil, a refusal to engage in conflict and war 
which  is  almost—though  in accordance with  the  freedom of God  not quite—
absolute,  and  finally,  a  repudiation  of  vengeance  towards  an  enemy.  Such 
‘withdrawal’ from activity, that is, such purposeful and deliberate ‘not-doing,’ 
                                                
229 Barth, Romans II, 451.  
230 Barth, Romans II, 466. 
231 Barth, Romans II, 437. Barth’s own shift in emphasis regarding revolution between the first and 
second commentaries provides an example of how he applied this principle in his own life and 
thought. While Barth’s attitude toward the state in both editions has not altered, the prevailing 
circumstances demanded a different response in 1921 than in 1918-19. See McCormack, Karl 
Barth’s Dialectical Theology, 282.  
232 Barth, Romans II, 471.    323 
gives  place  to positive  ethical  activities  which  in  turn  serve  to  testify  to  and 
announce the forgiveness and peace of the Coming World.
233 
The ‘Great’ Negative Possibility 
As Barth turns his focus to comment on the opening verses of Romans thirteen, 
which deal with the believer’s relation to the ‘powers that be,’ he introduces a 
discussion  of  the  great  negative  possibility,  which  is  concerned  with  that 
‘collective attitude and behaviour in relation to the plurality of neighbours,’ rather 
than  the  ‘demonstration  to  the  honour  of  God  effected  by  the  behaviour  of 
particular  individuals  towards  their  neighbours.’
234  The  human  agent  not  only 
confronts  the  Other  in  the  other  as  an  individual,  but  also  encounters  vast 
corporate  entities  which claim to  hold  the  answer  to  the  ethical question  and 
dilemma. According to Barth, ‘these concrete, visible powers claim…to be, not 
merely things in human life, but that order and direction which constitute the 
solution of the problem.…These powers demand recognition and obedience, and 
we have to decide whether we shall or shall not yield to their demand.’
235 
Barth identifies the powers as such entities as Church and State, Law and Society, 
Family and Science. These powers or ‘orders,’ however, must not be identified 
with the Order as though they possessed inherent divine legitimation. Rather, they 
are ordained of God as ‘a pregnant parable of the Order that does not exist.…The 
evil of the existing order bears witness to the good, since it stands of necessity as 
an order contrasted with the Order. Precisely in this contrast the existing order 
bears involuntary witness to the Order.’
236 For Barth, the evil of the existing order 
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lies in its predisposition to function as a bulwark against the sovereign claim of 
God upon humanity by lodging its own claim for the allegiance and obedience of 
humanity that rightly belongs to God alone. As a result, Barth questions the right 
of governments to exist at all:  
This  whole  pseudo-transcendence  of  an  altogether immanent  order  is  the 
wound that is inflicted by every existing government—even by the best—
upon those who are most delicately conscious of what is good and right. The 
more successfully the good and the right assume concrete form, the more 
they become evil and wrong.
237   
Given this state of affairs it might be anticipated that Barth would reiterate the 
revolutionary stance of his first commentary on these verses. This, however, is not 
the  case.  Indeed,  although  Barth  admits  to  having  ‘no  material  interest  in 
Legitimism,’  he  also  confesses  that  he  is  ‘most  anxious  about  the  man  who 
embarks  on  revolution.’
238  The  ground  of  his  anxiety  is  simply  stated:  the 
revolutionary, as one who understands the fundamental requirement of negation; 
as one with insight into the corrupt nature of present earthly authority; as one 
imbued with a vision of a new and different order, stands far closer to the truth 
than does his or her reactionary counterpart who has no sense of deficiency or 
negation  with  respect  to  the  present  order.
239  While  Legitimism  functions  to 
preserve  the  present  evil  order,  the  revolutionary  seeks  its  overthrow  and  the 
establishment of a new and better order which is presumably more attuned to the 
hope of the coming world.  
It is precisely at this point, however, that Barth spies the mortal weakness of the 
revolutionary.  For  while  the  revolutionary  aims  at  the  true  Revolution  which 
ushers in the new world, he or she can actually only attain to the establishment of 
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another  earth–bound  and  in  principle  evil  regime  or  structure,  for  the 
establishment of the kingdom of God remains the impossible possibility, beyond 
the reach of any human act. ‘Even the most radical revolution,’ says Barth, ‘can 
do no more than set what exists against what exists.…Revolution has, therefore, 
the  effect  of  restoring  the  old after  its downfall in  a  new  and  more powerful 
form.’
240  
Further,  the  taking  up  of  arms  against  the  existing  order  reveals  that  the 
revolutionary has ‘adopted the possible possibility of discontent and hatred and 
insubordination, of rebellion and demolition,’ which is a decisive indication that 
they have been ‘overcome with evil’ rather than ‘overcoming evil with  good’ 
(Romans 12:21).
241 In light of the reality of the time-eternity dialectic, then, both 
the  legitimist  and  the  revolutionary  remain  subject  to  the  Krisis  befalling  the 
political realm. The  legitimist is  implicated in the  evil of the present age and 
stands as a rebel against the inauguration of the coming kingdom, while both the 
means and the accomplishment of the revolutionary are subject to divine wrath, 
for they cannot but participate in the corrupt nature of fallen humanity. Caught, 
then,  on  the  horns  of  this  dilemma,  what  is  the  revolutionary  to do?  Barth’s 
counsel  is  that  the  revolutionary  turn  toward  the  action  of  God:  ‘What  more 
radical action can he perform than the action of turning back to the original root of 
‘not doing’ — and not be angry, not engage in assault, not demolish?…There is 
here no word of approval of the existing order; but there is endless disapproval of 
every enemy of it.’
242  
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Barth  describes the  great  negative possibility  in  terms of  subjection:  ‘Though 
subjection may assume from time to time many various concrete forms, as an 
ethical conception it is here purely negative. It means to withdraw and make way; 
it means to have no resentment, and not to overthrow.’
243 To exercise subjection as 
Barth intends it, is not facile submission to the will of the existing powers, but a 
deliberate posture which refuses to recognise the legitimacy and claim of these 
powers, and so ‘starves’ them of their ‘pathos.’
244  
Barth develops the notion of subjection strictly in accordance with the believer’s 
relation to the existing social powers. Over against these powers, both reactionary 
and revolutionary, the believer maintains the calm, critical posture of a so-called 
‘good citizen’ who understands the penultimate nature of all human activity, and 
so refuses to invest it with any sense of ultimacy. Thus, the powers of revolution 
are also deprived of their pathos, enthusiasm and claim to be a ‘high place.’
245 
Subjection means ‘no more than that vengeance is not our affair. It means that the 
divine minus before the bracket must not be deprived of its potency by a series of 
anticipatory negations on our part.…The real revolution comes from God and not 
from human revolt.’
246 Thus, in this commentary Barth places far greater emphasis 
upon the concept of waiting than of hastening, and in this instance subjection 
amounts to waiting. The work of not-doing is an ‘action’ oriented toward the 
Primal  Origin  as  the  human  agent  waits  for  that  work  which  only  God  can 
                                                
243 Barth, Romans II, 481. 
244 Barth, Romans II, 483. 
245 Barth, Romans II, 485. 
246 Barth, Romans II, 485. Barth adopts the mathematical image of the minus sign outside the 
brackets to indicate the manner in which the Krisis negates whatever is in the bracket – in this 
case, all existing social powers. The negation that the revolutionary achieves remains inside the 
bracket and results in the establishment of a new order which remains subject to the fundamental 
negation of the Krisis. See Barth, Romans II, 482-483.    327 
accomplish. Insofar as they do this they become ‘ever more and more invisible, 
inaudible and undimensional.’
247  
The ‘Great’ Positive Possibility 
It  is  evident  that  if  the  ethical  posture  that  Barth  develops  here  as  the  great 
negative possibility were elevated to become the primary ethical principle of the 
Christian  community,  it  could  only  result  in  an  ethic  which  is  sectarian  and 
isolationist, and in the withdrawal and complete disengagement of the believer 
and  the  community  from  the  wider  society.
248  It  is  important,  therefore,  that 
Barth’s notion of subjection not be understood as such a principle, as though there 
were no positive ethical possibilities, and as though the waiting was not for the 
sake of hastening. Thus, when Barth turns in his exposition to Romans 13:8-14 he 
introduces the new section of his work by insisting that the wall represented by a 
determined  ‘not doing’ is  not  inviolable,  but  may be  breached  by the equally 
determined positive activity of loving one’s neighbour:  
To every man we should owe love. It is not permitted us to excuse ourselves 
for the absence of love by saying that, since we live in the shadowy region of 
evil, we can only bear witness to the Coming World by ‘not doing.’ Even in 
the world of shadows love must come into active prominence, for it does not 
stand under the law of evil. Love of one another ought to be undertaken as 
the protest against the course of this world, and it ought to continue without 
interruption.
249 
Barth,  of  course,  has  already  given  attention  to  love  as  a  positive  ethical 
possibility in his discussion of Romans 12:9, referring to agape as ‘the supreme 
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positive ethical possibility.’
250 In this context, however, love is the great positive 
possibility, by which Barth distinguishes love ‘as the combination of all positive, 
that is to say, protesting, possibilities’ from single, individual acts of love.
251 ‘We 
define love as the “Great Positive Possibility,”’ says Barth,  
because in it there is brought to light the revolutionary aspect of all ethical 
behaviour, and because it is veritably concerned with the denial and breaking 
up of the existing order.…Inasmuch as we love one another we cannot wish 
to uphold the present order as such, for by love we do the ‘new’ by which 
the ‘old’ is overthrown.
252 
In the passages just cited we see that for Barth, love is an essential activity which 
‘must come into active prominence,’ a ‘protest against the course of this world,’ a 
revolutionary activity concerned with the ‘denial and breaking up of the existing 
order,’ the new by which the old order ‘is overthrown.’ Love and all that proceeds 
from  it  is, according to  Barth,  a demonstration  that  the  form of  this  world  is 
passing  away,  and  that  the  kingdom  of  God  is  coming.
253  Indeed  love  is  the 
solution to the ethical question: ‘What shall we do? To this question we  now 
answer — Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, inasmuch as “he that loveth 
the other hath fulfilled the law,” does the truth and is therefore proceeding along 
the “more excellent way.”’
254 Love, therefore, is the truly revolutionary activity, 
the positive human activity which corresponds to and fulfils all human not-doing, 
for in the Thou shalt! is summed up every divine Thou shalt not! The person ‘who 
has been compelled to that “not-doing” which is his turning back to God is once 
again impelled by God to action.’
255  
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Barth’s contention that love of the neighbour constitutes the solution to the ethical 
dilemma must not be understated. In a remarkable meditation on this text Barth 
goes on to insist that 
[i]n the concrete fact of the neighbour we encounter, finally and supremely, 
the ambiguity of our existence, since in the particularity of others we are 
reminded  of  our  own particularity, of  our  own  createdness, our  own lost 
state, our own sin, and our own death.…Here a decision must be sought as to 
whether the impossible possibility of God—which lies beyond all  human 
possibility—is or is not a mere phantom of metaphysics; whether, when we 
speak  of the presupposition  of all things that are  capable  of analysis and 
description,  when  we  speak  of  the  outpouring  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  our 
hearts, we are or are not merely dreaming; whether our apprehension of the 
final Yes  in the  final No  is  or  is  not  merely  a  wild  guess;  whether  our 
knowledge  of  God  is  or  is  not  simply  the  ‘renunciation  of  knowledge’ 
(Kierkegaard); whether the Unknown God has spoken to us in Jesus Christ; 
whether our being touched by the freedom of God, the establishing of our 
personalities,  our  proceeding  along  the  still  more  excellent  way,  are 
existential events. The decision lies in our answer to the question—Do we, 
in the unknowable neighbour, apprehend and love the Unknown God? Do 
we, in the complete Otherness of the other—in whom the whole riddle of 
existence is summed up in such a manner as to require its solution in an 
action on our part—hear the voice of the One?…If I hear in the neighbour 
only the voice of the other and not also the voice of the One—that is to say, 
if I do not detect in him both question and answer,—then, quite certainly, the 
voice of the One is nowhere to be heard.
256 
In  short,  the  entire  truthfulness  of  Christian  confession  and  of  Christian  and 
ecclesial existence finds its criterion in the love of the neighbour. In the neighbour 
we are confronted with the riddle of our existence and with its answer which can 
only be expressed ‘in  an action on our part.’ If the criterion of all  secondary 
ethical activities is that they arise from and are directed toward the honour of God, 
it is also true that all such activities will reflect the nature of love if they are 
genuinely ethical. Here again we see Barth’s insistence that love for God will 
overflow and find its essential demonstration in the love people show for one 
another.
257 
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Again it must be emphasised, however, that the activity of love as a genuinely 
ethical  action  is  not  a  human  or  religious  possibility,  but  is  that  ‘impossible 
possibility’ which only becomes possible through the activity of the Holy Spirit in 
the Moment.
258 As such, the occurrence of love is always a miracle, a genuinely 
human action that  nevertheless ‘springs from supreme knowledge;  for he who 
loves  is  he  who  has  been  touched by  the  freedom  of  God.’
259  In  saying  this, 
however,  Barth  does  not  intend  to  diminish  the  urgency  of  the  duty  or  the 
responsibility of the Christian community to practice this love. Instead, in this 
context he provides a development of the notion of the Moment of revelation, and 
in  so  doing  intensifies  the  ethical  demand  which  confronts  the  community  in 
every moment. Barth understands Christian and ecclesial existence as situated in 
the midst of a radical temporality in which every moment in time is a parable of 
the  eternal  Moment,  and  indeed  bears  within  itself  ‘the  unborn  secret  of 
revelation.’ In every moment of time humanity is confronted with the overhanging 
wall of eternity. The Christian, therefore, must ‘become aware of the dignity and 
importance  of  each  single  concrete  temporal  moment,  and  apprehend  its 
qualification and its ethical demand.’
260 Every moment in time ‘apprehended and 
comprehended  in  its  transcendental  significance’  is  an  occasion  for  the 
incomprehensible action of love.
261 Thus, even though love is only possible in the 
Moment of revelation, Barth insists that because we live in the flux of time, ‘if we 
do not love within a succession of moments, we love not at all.’
262 Knowing the 
Moment in the moment, and having been loved in Christ, the only response left to 
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the believer is to act, to love.
263 Those who take up this duty to practice love for 
one another fulfil the law, do the truth, and are ‘therefore proceeding along the 
more excellent way.’
264  
This, then, is the climax of Barth’s treatment of ethical issues  in his Romans 
commentary.  While  Barth’s  answer  to  the  ethical  dilemma  does  not  issue  in 
specific  rules,  concrete  behaviours  or  normative  character  requirements,  his 
proposal that the ethical dilemma may find its solution in a love of the neighbour 
which fulfils the law indicates that such love is the paradigm within which the 
answer to the question may be found in every temporal moment. David Clough 
rightly observes that in his exposition on this passage (that is, Romans 13:8-14) 
Barth moves beyond his previous position that judged it impossible to provide any 
answer to the ethical dilemma. Here, remarks Clough,  
Barth is driven beyond a simple thesis and antithesis by the Pauline texts that 
portray love as the consummation of all things. To be sure, this escape from 
paradox and duality is an eschatological reality, rather than a present one. 
We  can  hope  for  this  consummation,  however,  rather  than  remaining 
agnostic as to whether God’s Yes or No will be finally determinative. The 
hope of this realm beyond the dialectical tension of the crisis is the most 
positive possibility we have yet seen in Romans II.
265 
Barth  has  thus  traced  the  climax  of  Paul’s  argument  to  this  point  in  chapter 
thirteen where love is the fulfilment of the law. While one might anticipate an 
exposition  on  Romans  14-15  to  provide  rich  fodder  for  ethical  reflection, 
particularly with respect to the corporate life of the community, Barth’s treatment 
of  these  final  chapters  of  Paul’s  Epistle  does  not  proceed  in  this  direction. 
                                                
263 Barth, Romans II, 501. 
264 Barth, Romans II, 494. 
265  Clough,  Ethics  in  Crisis,  21.  Clough  has  rightly  seen  that  even  here,  Barth  ‘respects  the 
distance’  for  although  he  is  driven  beyond  the  simple  thesis  and antithesis,  yet  the  synthesis 
remains  an eschatological reality,  found only in God, only in hope. Cf. Chalamet, Dialectical 
Theologians, 135.    332 
Although he admits that ‘there can be no doubt that, according to the Epistle to the 
Romans,  there  is  demanded  of  us  a  quite  precise  manner  of  life’  which  he 
characterises as ‘free detachment,’
266 his interpretation of Romans 14-15 subverts 
any attempt on the part of the reader to adopt this manner of life as an ethical 
platform upon which they might confidently stand:  
Once again our brokenness is broken. Paul against ‘Paulinism!’ The Epistle 
to the Romans against the point of view adopted in the Epistle! The Freedom 
of  God  against  the  manner  of  life  which  proceeds  inevitably  from  our 
apprehension of it! Such is the amazing facing-about which takes place in 
the fourteenth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.…Once again, therefore, 
at  the  end  of  the  Epistle  to  the  Romans…there  is  presented  to  us  the 
impenetrable ambiguity of human life—even of the life of the Christian and 
the Christian community.
267 
Simply put, the Krisis breaks forth even upon those adopting the manner of life 
that issues from the Epistle, so that there is no escaping the precarious status of 
ethical existence which ever remains poised on the edge of a knife. 
To conclude: Barth’s treatment of the great negative and positive possibilities in 
his exposition of Romans 13 is very significant because it clearly indicates his 
understanding of Christian and ecclesial existence as an active life, despite the 
apparent passivity of his exposition on subjection as ‘not-doing.’ The ‘not-doing’ 
of the believer is in relation to the idolatrous claim of existing powers; in relation 
to  God,  however,  it  is  an  action  that  corresponds  to  the  primary  ethical 
requirement of honouring God alone. Further, as we have seen, this not-doing is 
for the sake of the entirely radical action of love which is made possible by the 
prior action of the Holy Spirit. Thus, in his construction of the great negative and 
positive possibilities, we find a similar structuring between the two elements as 
we found in Barth’s earlier structuring of the elements of waiting and hastening, 
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in which the waiting was for the sake of the hastening. Here, too, the not-doing is 
for the sake of the doing. Finally, far from undermining human ethical activity, in 
this section we observe that Barth’s time-eternity dialectic serves to radicalise the 
human ethical situation so that every moment confronts the human agent as an 
ethical demand.  
Conclusion:  Romans II and the Ethics of Grace 
Barth characterises the ethics of Romans II as an ‘ethics of grace,’
268 that is, the 
form  of  life  and  community  that  comes  to  expression  as  grace  ‘presses  for 
concretion.’ Because this  form of ethics  is conditioned by the ultimate reality 
which also conditions human existence, Barth can boldly proclaim that, ‘though 
its purity is nowhere to be found, Christianity is human behaviour purified of all 
biological, emotional, erotic factors. Christianity is the final protest against every 
high place that men can occupy. For this reason it is the absolute ethic (absolutes 
Ethos), and for this reason it proclaims the Coming World.’
269  
There is more than a little irony in the fact that Barth can refer to this ethic as 
‘absolute’ given the way in which he has continually assailed the proposition of 
normative  ethics,  and  given  also  the  manner  in  which  his  interpreters  have 
sometimes accused him of lacking any ethics. Nevertheless, it remains true that 
Barth’s concern throughout Romans II has been to sketch and describe the moral 
field in which ethical existence and moral community actually occurs. This is not 
to say, however, that Barth fails to provide any concrete guidance with respect to 
ethical life. Rather, as we have shown, he developed his theology with an explicit 
concern to enable his readers to respond to the ethical issues of the immediate 
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post-war context in which he wrote. To this end he details an array of ‘positive 
and negative’ ethical possibilities that include behaviours and actions, attitudes 
and virtues which the community may exhibit in their lives. But even here, Barth 
is careful to insist that none of these practices or virtues are inherently normative, 
but are ethical only to the extent that they arise from and are directed toward the 
honour of God. They remain secondary ethical activities subject always to the 
primary ethical activity of repentance. Nor can the practitioner ever assume that 
their activity is justified, for their action is ever a sacrifice awaiting a justification 
which comes from God alone. It is also apparent, though not surprising given the 
overall critical purpose of Barth’s commentary, that his exposition places more 
emphasis on the negative possibilities than the positive.
270  
In some respects then, it is more accurate to describe Barth’s commentary as a 
work of meta-ethics rather than ethics proper. His work details the arena in which 
ethical reflection and decision occur, the various factors which impinge upon the 
ethical subject and moral community, the posture of this subject and community 
with regard to God and the world and to all internal and external reality, and 
finally, the directions that ethical behaviour will take. If any aspect of Barth’s 
ethics  might  be  considered  as  having  normative  value,  it  is  the  insistence  on 
repentance and worship as the primary ethical responsibility, arising simply from 
the fundamental presupposition of ethics: Soli Deo gloria. Thus Barth posits a 
normative  way  in which  ethics  is  to proceed, and  a  normative  posture of the 
ethical agent rather than a normative behaviour, character, virtue or habit. This 
posture includes a radical orientation to God in worship and repentance, a radical 
orientation to the other as the  locus of our encounter with God, and a radical 
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orientation to the Moment—which impinges upon us at every moment—as the 
occasion in which the ethical demand is pressed upon us.  
The previous chapter of this thesis explored Barth’s theological development after 
the publication of the first edition of his commentary on Romans and finished by 
posing three questions regarding the impact of this development on Barth’s ethics. 
The questions posed were as follows: 
1.  Does  Barth’s  heightened  emphasis  on  the  objectivity  of  divine 
sovereignty  over against  humanity  undermine  his  hitherto  carefully 
construed relation between divine and human agency? 
2.  Does  his  grounding  of  the  moral  agent  in  the  forgiveness  of  sins 
sustain the kind of robust vision of Christian and ecclesial existence 
that characterised his earlier works? 
3.  Given the tightening of the eschatological tension that exists between 
time  and  eternity,  will  Barth  be  about  to  delineate  a  viable 
ecclesiology which in turn shapes a genuine ecclesial praxis? 
Having surveyed the theological ontology of Romans II together with the ethical 
implications of this ontology we are now in a position to address these questions. 
With respect to the first question, it is clear that Barth’s construal of the relation 
between divine and human agency remains remarkably similar in Romans II to the 
relation developed in his earlier works. Although the moral self is certainly de-
centred, and the grounds of genuine ethical activity are strictly limited; although 
the heightened eschatological horizon renders all human activity subject to the 
Krisis,  including  Christian attempts  at ethical  behaviour  arising from  worship, 
prayer,  repentance  and  ethical  deliberation;  although  genuine  ethical  action  is 
always subordinate to and responsive to the prior divine action, nevertheless this 
study has shown that there can be no doubt that there remains, even in Romans II, 
an authentic though limited form of human agency in which the human agent may 
enact morally responsible particular behaviours in hope that they will be accepted   336 
as ethical by God. That this will be the case cannot, of course, be presumed, ‘for 
the  world is  the  world  and  men are men.  Questionable  at all  times is  human 
conduct whether it be delicate or coarse.…Nevertheless, we are then the beloved 
of God.’
271  
With respect to the second question, Barth’s grounding of the ethical subject in 
the forgiveness of sins does not preclude the ethical agency of the moral subject, 
but details the only grounds by which that agency may issue in genuinely ethical 
conduct. In such  a scenario, intent is everything, although even  here, one can 
never  presume that one’s ethical  intent  is  justified. Any  attempt at  obedience 
which seeks to be more than a sacrifice of oneself for the honour and love of God 
fails to achieve its goal. Having once established this basic premise, however, and 
given  the  qualifications  raised  in  the  answer  to  the  first  question, there  is  no 
reason why Barth’s ethical vision in Romans II cannot sustain a robust, though 
carefully nuanced, expression of Christian and ecclesial existence.  
With respect  to  the  final  question,  we  have  seen that Barth does not, in  fact, 
delineate a comprehensive ecclesiology in this commentary, and that substantial 
elements  belonging  to  this  dogmatic  locus  are  left  untreated.  Further,  his 
dialectical treatment of  ecclesiological themes  means that  the church, like the 
human agent, is radically de-centred and made, even in its attempts at obedience, 
ever subject to the Krisis. This does not mean, however, that Barth cannot develop 
a coherent account of ecclesial existence and praxis, although it is certain that the 
account he does develop lacks the breadth, depth and definition that will begin to 
emerge later in his career. In this work the praxis of the community, like that of 
the  individual agent, is strictly  limited. Its primary ethical conduct is ever the 
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activity of worship and repentance from which may then issue various forms of 
‘secondary’ ethical behaviour appropriate to the specific moment and particular 
context in which the community finds itself. Its determination to radically orient 
itself to the reality of God in  each moment  frees the  church from its cultural 
captivity and assimilation to pursue its own distinct form of praxis.  
What shape might we anticipate this praxis to take? Clearly Barth believes that the 
Epistle to the Romans claims the reader for a quite definite manner of life which 
he characterises as ‘free detachment.’
272 Such free detachment issues both from 
the devastating reality of the ever-present Krisis that overshadows our existence, 
and from the hopeful reality that in Christ we have been so wholly claimed by 
God and bound to him that we have been set in a relative independence to every 
other competing claim or value. ‘If then,’ says Barth, ‘we are to live in Pauline 
fashion we must dare to live freely.’
273  
Perhaps  this  detachment  is  best  seen  in  Barth’s  development  of  the  negative 
ethical possibilities, the deliberate not-doing by which the Christian community 
bears witness to the coming world by refusing to grant legitimacy or pathos to 
present social powers and conditions. But, as we have seen, in this detachment the 
believer  and  the  community  is  freed  for  the  doing  of  the  positive  ethical 
possibilities, particularly love, which is a radical orientation toward God as he 
encounters us and  makes  himself  known  to  us in the other.  Love  is  the  very 
climax of ethical behaviour, the ultimate positive ethical possibility which we owe 
to every person in every moment.  
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But love is not the only characteristic of the moral community. The discussion in 
this chapter shows that Barth anticipates the life of the community to be also 
characterised  by  faith  and  hope, each  of  which  is  understood  in quite  radical 
terms. The hope of the community is radical inasmuch as it knows its only hope 
lies in the gracious activity of God on its behalf. Knowing that its existence occurs 
‘under the beetling crag of his Krisis,’ the community ‘hurries and tarries’ in light 
of  the  judgement  and  hope  set  before  it.
274  Faith,  too,  is  a  radical  orientation 
toward God in accordance with the analogy of Jesus’ death on the cross which 
signifies  the  relinquishing  of  every  support  whereby  humanity  might  seek  to 
support itself, and of every claim which we might lodge against God. Instead, 
faith as the disposition of the believer and the community ‘is simply open-hearted 
preparedness  and  willingness  to  receive’  in  ‘fear  and  trembling,  awe  and 
gratitude.’
275  
Further,  the  manner  in  which  Barth  has  structured  his  ethics  presupposes  a 
community  of  exhortation,  a  community  gathered  in  worship  and  prayer 
constantly ‘rethinking’ itself in relation to God and its specific historical context. 
Barth also allows the community to engage in extensive ethical deliberation so 
long as it remains aware that any and all conclusions or systems deriving from 
such reflection remain radically contingent, subject to continual rethinking and 
even negation in the freedom of God. Thus, the community may never, even for a 
moment, presume that it has attained to ethical righteousness  or  established  a 
position upon which it might stand. In a memorable image Barth asks, ‘Dost thou 
see the stone rising in the midst of the stream? Well, put just one foot on it, and 
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that only for a second, and then—jump. That is the only way to reach the other 
side.’
276  
‘Free detachment,’ therefore, is applied by Barth even to those who seek to live 
such a life. The community must live in ‘free detachment’ even from itself and its 
own attempts at righteousness, for the life of free detachment is itself subject to 
the Krisis.
277 So it is that in his treatment of the final major section of Romans 
(14:1-15:13), Barth subverts the very manner of life he sees demanded of us in the 
Epistle. As Mark Lindsay has very aptly said, ‘in the context of ethical praxis, it is 
clear why Barth’s Romans II was, and remains, a bombshell. When it explodes, it 
shatters every human standpoint, including itself.’
278  
*** 
In this chapter we have demonstrated that Barth wrote his second commentary on 
the Epistle to the Romans with an explicit intention to form moral community and 
to  shape  Christian  and  ecclesial  existence.  That  Barth  addresses  issues  of 
immediate ethical concern in his historical context, particularly those issues of 
love and community, peace, war, revolution, and the relation of the believer and 
the church to the state and to other secular powers, is also suggestive that he 
sought  to  shape  the  faith  and  praxis  of  his  readers.  While  it  is  true  that  his 
exposition  with  regard  to  ethics  is  again  concerned  primarily  with  formal 
categories, and as such fails to provide rich descriptions of ethical praxis, he has 
not left his reader without some instruction regarding the directions ethical praxis 
will  take.  This  thesis  has  also  addressed  concerns  that  Barth’s  time-eternity 
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dialectic in Romans II serves to preclude the possibility of genuine human ethical 
conduct. Indeed, if the dialectic were strictly applied it would appear that such 
ethical conduct would be impossible. We have demonstrated, however, that these 
concerns are mitigated by Barth’s failure to apply his dialectic strictly. That this 
failure occurs, especially in contexts of  ethical discussion,  is indicative of the 
seriousness with which Barth intends his theology to be read as moral theology 
concerned with the formation of moral community, and the shaping of Christian 
and ecclesial existence. 
Postscript: The Problem of Ethics (1922) 
Eleven months after he completed his manuscript of Romans II, Barth delivered a 
lecture  to  Ministers’  conferences  in  Wiesbaden  and  Lüneburg  entitled  “The 
Problem of Ethics Today.”
279 Although strictly speaking, this lecture belongs to 
Barth’s  Göttingen period, it will be  beneficial  to provide a  brief  overview  of 
Barth’s address at this point, first, because of the chronological proximity of this 
address to Romans II, second, because it shares the same title as the opening 
section in Barth’s treatment of ethics in that commentary, and finally, because of 
its relevance to this thesis.  
That Barth still inhabits the thought-world of the Römerbrief period is evident by 
his frequent use of the Krisis motif in this lecture, particularly in the first section 
where it is used some eleven times, by his use of Kierkegaard to subvert the 
ethical  idealism  of  modern  Protestantism,  and  by  his  continuing  use  of  other 
motifs  such  as  the  eternity-time  dialectic  and  the  forgiveness  of  sins  as  the 
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primary ethical datum. Nevertheless, at several places in the lecture there are hints 
of further theological development. Barth’s immersion in dogmatic theology due 
to  his  teaching  responsibilities  at  Göttingen  is  beginning  to  exert  a  greater 
influence on his thought. 
The lecture has four major sections, plus a shorter fifth section that functions as a 
conclusion. Barth commences his lecture by insisting that the problem of ethics 
arises as ‘man finds himself seeking the inner meaning and law of his conduct, the 
truth  about  his  existence.’
280  When  the  question  regarding  things  as  they  are 
merges with the ethical question regarding how they might and ought to be, the 
Krisis is precipitated and the human agent is brought face to face with the riddle 
of their own existence. Nor can it be otherwise: it is impossible to approach the 
whole question of life and ethics from the perspective of a spectator, for  
we are compelled to conceive ourselves as living doers.…The fact remains 
that man as man is irresistibly compelled to acknowledge that his life is the 
business for which he is responsible, that his desires require examination, 
and that the might-be is sometimes the ought-to-be which is the truth about 
truth, the ultimate governor of conduct.
281  
Immediately then, Barth sets the parameters for his lecture. First, the problem of 
ethics  is  fundamental  to  human  life,  an  ontological  question  grounded  in  the 
actual conduct of daily existence.
282 Second, and as a  consequence of this,  no 
neutral vantage point may be secured whereby one might calmly and objectively 
survey the ethical field. By construing the nature of the ethical question in this 
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manner  Barth  is  undoubtedly  turning  his  sights once more  against  the  ethical 
idealism  of  modern  Protestantism  in  order  to  lay  the  foundations  for  a  new 
account  of  human  agency.
283  Finally,  because  the  reality  of  things-as-they-are 
never attains to the what-ought-to-be, the problem of ethics subverts every form 
of human thought and conduct with the growing realisation that we are not good, 
and hence the Krisis by which the human agent is cast into the hands of God.  
In this lecture Barth construes the good in terms of a transcendent moral realism. 
The What in the question what must we do? is not part of this world as we know 
and conceive it. According to Barth, ‘our question reaches toward a good which 
lies beyond all existence. Every random and temporal What shall we do? contains 
a  What to  which  no  random  and temporal That  can  give  a  satisfying  answer, 
because it is a last and eternal What.’
284 When a person or community ask the 
question  they  find  themselves  confronted  by  ‘an  Eye  looking  at  [them]  from 
beyond  all worlds,’  and are assailed by  the  knowledge that  their  every  act  is 
weighed  and  judged.  In  the  very  asking  of  the  question  the  human  agent 
‘annihilates himself,’ for in his inability to attain the good required of him, he 
perishes.
285  Nor  is  asking  the  question  an  optional  activity.  Rather,  it  is 
‘fundamental,  first,  a  priori  in  the  situation;  it  takes  us  up.’
286  This  is  the 
unavoidable situation in which humanity finds itself. This is the Krisis in which 
humanity is faced with God and must perish. 
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In accordance with the topic of his address “The Problem of Ethics Today,” Barth, 
in  the  second  section  of  the  lecture,  situates  the  ethical  problem  within  the 
contemporary socio-economic and political context of post-war Germany. While 
the question What shall we do? is one which persists in every age, the present 
circumstances give it a particular force and urgency. According to Barth, the pre-
war era of ethical optimism and certainty has disappeared forever. No longer is it 
possible  to  ignore  the  ‘unavoidable  and  ultimate  character  of  the  perplexity, 
embarrassment,  and  uncertainty  under  which  man  is  placed  by  the  ethical 
question.’
287 Indeed 
[t]he  naïve  belief  in  those  better  days  essentially  simplified  the  question 
about the good.…It was then a pleasure to study ethics. Fundamentally, it 
was a matter not of asking what to do, as if that were not known, but rather 
of  finding  out  whether  philosophy  or  theology,  Kant  or  Schleiermacher, 
provided the more illuminating formula for the obvious—for it was obvious 
that  what  to  do  was  to  further  this  infinitely  imperfect  but  infinitely 
perfectible culture.
288 
As in earlier works, so here Barth rejects the church-culture synthesis that had 
arisen  in  modern  Protestantism  whereby  ethics  became  an  exercise  in  the 
legitimising of the status quo. He accuses the ethics of the Ritschlian school as 
being  those  of  the  ‘bourgeoisie  growing  prosperous’  with  the  expansion  of 
empire,  and  those  of  Troeltsch  as  an  accommodation  of  Christianity  to  the 
emerging  German  economic  civilisation.
289  In  other  words,  the  answer  to  the 
ethical question was simply that ‘we ought to do this—something which, in the 
state, in society, or in the church, was already being done before the question was 
asked.’
290 For Barth, the failure of this approach is evident. The war has revealed 
the emptiness and vanity of such human ethical constructs, and ethics is now seen 
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as ‘entailing a judgement about man as we know him—even about moral man as 
we know him.’
291  
The problem of ethics not only reveals the sickness which afflicts humanity, but 
shows  that  it  is  a  ‘sickness  unto  death.’
292  That  the  pre-war  generation  could 
approach  the  ethical  question  with  such  apparent  ease  was  due  in  part  to  a 
theological reductionism in which the theological metaphysics of scripture and the 
church fathers were considered superfluous and rejected in favour of a simpler 
gospel ‘reduced to a few religious and moral categories  like trust in God and 
brotherly  love.’
293  Barth,  revealing  a  little  of  his  developing  theological 
perspective, now suggests that they are faced with a reality in which ‘the difficult 
asseverations of the Christian dogma of the old style correspond far more closely 
to  the  actual  situation  than  does  our  predecessors’  confident  assertion  that 
“following Jesus” is a simple task.’
294 Accordingly, ‘the era of the old ethics is 
gone forever.…over against man’s confidence and belief in  himself, there  has 
been  written,  in  huge  proportions  and  with  utmost  clearness,  a  mene,  mene, 
tekel.’
295 
Barth concludes this section of his address with a plea to his audience not to use a 
false dialectic to resolve this difficulty and pre-empt the judgement under which 
humanity has fallen. By now the movement which had grown up around him had 
become  popular,  so  that  ‘everywhere  there  are  nooks  and  crannies  where, 
intelligently and unintelligently, it simply buzzes with Yes! and No!, dialectic, 
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resurrection, God is God, and all the other catchwords.’
296 Barth is concerned that 
some  will  view  his  lecture  as  a  language  game  requiring  a  logical  symmetry 
attainable by the mere positing of the Yes!, whereby the problem of ethics  is 
simply  transcended.  But  such  a  response  does  not  ‘correspond  with  reality.’ 
Although ‘the problem of ethics may sometime paradoxically resolve itself into 
justification and new possibility,’ says Barth, ‘to us it reveals more clearly the 
negative of life, the judgement upon humanity.’
297 
In the third, central section of the lecture which begins with a proposition that is 
then developed in two further subsections, Barth intensifies his interrogation of 
modern Protestant ethics. The proposition is simply put: ‘I say that the problem of 
ethics is a responsibility that cannot be borne: a deadly aggression against man.’
298 
In the first subsection Barth unpacks his understanding of this aggression in terms 
of the asking subject, and in conversation with the ethics of Kant. Barth rejects 
Kant’s  conception  of  the  autonomous  moral  personality  whose  will  is  strictly 
desirous  only  of  ultimate  goals  and  is  grounded  in  the  ‘intelligible  world  of 
freedom’ on the basis that such a moral subjectivity is impossible: ‘we know that 
no such moral personality has ever stepped into our world over the threshold of 
the world of freedom. No such man has ever lived or will ever live.…There is no 
such  thing  in  time  or  space  as  a  human  will  determined  by  pure  practical 
reason.’
299 Further, Kant’s insistence that the human agent is claimed by such an 
impossible demand requires a correspondingly impossible act of faith with the 
following assumptions: first, that God is the guarantor of this moral order which 
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contradicts the lived experience of humanity. Second, that the human agent has 
the  capacity  to  make  this  impossible  demand  their  own,  and  finally,  that  the 
human agent may then approach its actual fulfilment in the concrete experience of 
their lives.
300  
Underlying Barth’s criticism of Kant’s theory of the autonomous moral subject 
are two anthropological concerns. First, Kant, and the tradition which followed 
him are far too sanguine concerning the moral capacities of humanity, and have 
failed to give adequate recognition to the reality and pervasiveness of sin as the 
determinative factor of human existence since the Fall. The tradition has assumed 
an unwarranted degree of human freedom.
301 Second, Barth rejects the notion of 
moral  autonomy  as  ‘a  kind  of  absolutizing  of  the  self  and  its  reflective 
consciousness.…it is precisely this—the image of moral reason as a secure centre 
of  value,  omnicompetent  in  its  judgements—that  the  ethical  question 
interrogates.’
302  
For Barth, then, the problem of ethics is a deadly aggression against the moral 
subject as understood in modern Protestantism, because it confronts the moral 
subject with an impossible demand. Rather than establishing the ethical agent, the 
ethics deriving from Kant function only as a criticism of all ethics, and shows that 
such an account of moral agency is impossible.
303 Barth has taken Kantian ethics 
on its own terms and subverted one of its central tenets. 
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In the second subsection Barth considers the same issue, this time with regard to 
the ethical objective. The ethical question not only raises the difficulty concerning 
the  human agent, but also the goal towards which human conduct is directed. 
Barth has already noted Kant’s contention that ethics is concerned with ultimate 
rather than secondary objectives, and indeed, accepts this contention although he 
insists that the ultimate objective with which ethics is concerned be interpreted 
eschatologically.  Thus,  he  is  adamant  that  ‘ethics  can  no  more  exist  without 
millenarianism, without at least some minute degree of it, than without the idea of 
a  moral  personality.’
304  Ethics  concerns  far  more  than  the  individual:  it  has 
corporate or communal dimensions and is concerned with the goal of history. The 
question of the good is only asked seriously when it is accompanied by some idea 
as to how the good is to be realised in history.
305 Nevertheless, in relation to the 
ultimate goal set before it, humanity is powerless to bring it to pass for 
there  is  nothing in  the  whole range  of  human  possibilities, from  popular 
indifference to mystical absorption in the All, which is capable of realising 
the moral objective, the goal of history….Man cannot begin to answer the 
ethical question in actual life. He can only continue to recognise that he is 
wholly incapable of commanding an answer.
306  
Thus once again Barth attempts to subvert Kantian ethics, in this case the notion 
of the ultimate goal toward which ethical conduct is directed, and to demonstrate 
that  ethics  is  a  ‘deadly  aggression’  against  the  human  agent,  whereby  they 
stumble and are broken upon their own vision of the good. Those who ask the 
question about  the  good  condemn themselves  because  the  only  answer  to the 
question is that they are not good, and that from the standpoint of the good they 
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are  powerless.
307  Is  there  no  possibility,  then,  of  ethical  existence,  and  more 
specifically, of Christian and ecclesial existence? As so often in earlier works, so 
here: once Barth has cleared the field of opposing viewpoints, he sets forth the 
framework of his own more positive proposal. In view of the ‘dialectic of the 
thought of God’ the No inherent in the problem of ethics functions in service of 
the divine Yes.
308 
In the fourth section of the lecture, then, Barth begins by insisting that the purpose 
of the ‘all-inclusive critical negation under which we and our world exist’ is to 
provoke the crisis whereby ‘we understand the whole unbearable human situation, 
espouse it, take it upon ourselves. We are to bend before the doom revealed in the 
problem of ethics. It is through the unescapable severity of this doom that we 
come upon the reality of God.’
309 In the face of our utter inability to determine and 
form an adequate answer to the ethical question, we find ‘the answer to all our 
questions is God and God’s conduct toward us.’
310 Over against the presupposed 
autonomy of the moral agent of ethical idealism, Barth insists that ‘the meaning of 
our situation is that God does not leave us and that we cannot leave God. It is 
because God himself and God alone lends our life its possibility that it becomes so 
impossible  for  us  to  live.’
311  For  Barth,  humankind  lives  coram  Deo,  in 
inescapable relation  to God  even  as  sinners,  so  that there  is  no  possibility of 
inhabiting the objective seat of a spectator as an autonomous ethical subject, as 
though God were not the immediate Subject to whom humanity is responsible.  
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It  is precisely  by  bending  before this  doom, before  this  ‘wholly  negative  and 
annihilating  crisis’  that  the  human  agent  becomes  a  participant  in  ‘the 
justification, the promise, and the salutary meaning which are hidden there.’
312 As 
is the case in Romans II, however, so here—human participation in justification is 
strictly  by  means  of  promise:  ‘The  new  creation  of  man,  the  renewal  of  the 
unrenewable  old  man  is  a  justificatio  forensis,  justificatio  impii,  a  surpassing 
paradox; and so also is the positive relation of God’s will to man’s conduct.’
313 
The final phrase of this citation must not be overlooked for there is no diminishing 
of  the  distance  which  separates  human  activity  from  divine  righteousness:  all 
human  activity  continues  to  bear  the  imprint  of  the  fall,  so  that  there  is  no 
salvation  apart  from  the  continuing  grace  of  the  forgiveness  of  sins.
314 
Nevertheless, Barth is explicit in his avowal of this possibility:  
Since there is such a thing as forgiveness (which is always forgiveness of 
sin!), there is such a thing as human conduct which is justified. There is an 
obedience unto salvation which begins when we come down from our high 
places, from our High Place…and declare a thorough-going religious and 
moral disarmament. There is an effective brotherly love which provides a 
‘service’ different from the Christian charity with which we are familiar; it 
begins with our forgiving our debtors—with empty hands!—as we also are 
forgiven. And if there is forgiveness, there are worse and better goals: there 
is such a thing as conscious choice and the establishment of a definite habit 
for the better. There is such a thing as cooperation in the tasks of industry, 
science, art, politics, and even religion; civilisation possesses its own true 
dignity, not as the very order of creation made manifest but as a witness, a 
quite earthly reflection, of a lost and hidden order.…In brief there is such a 
thing  as  the  possibility—and  possibility  here  means  necessity—of  saying 
Yes  both  to  the  ethical  question  and  to  its  answers—and  in  a  way  not 
sicklied o’er with doubt and pessimism.
315 
Clearly Barth does not assail the concept of ethics in order to annul the possibility 
of  ethical  existence.  Nor  has  he  sought  to  reduce  the  ethical  subject  to  utter 
passivity, or to annihilate their agency. His intent is consistent with what has been 
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observed throughout this period of his career: to re-establish human agency on a 
new foundation. In this lecture as in the Römerbrief, the primary ethical activity 
consists in repentance.
316 From this primary response may then arise the kinds of 
responses indicated in the passage cited above. Noteworthy also is the pattern of 
human  ethical  activity,  which  is  reflective  of  and  witnesses  to  prior  divine 
activity. Although Barth does not use the term ‘correspondence’ to characterise 
the nature of human activity in relation to divine, it is evident that this form of 
conceptuality is present here. While it also remains evident that these activities as 
thoroughly  human  deeds  are  at  best  only  imperfect  reflections  of  the  divine 
activity, through the forgiveness of sins they are accepted before God.  
Clear also is Barth’s intent to form moral community. In a passage that anticipates 
his  later  development  of  the  doctrine  of  God,
317  Barth  portrays  the  Christian 
millennial hope as the cry to allow ‘freedom in love and love in freedom [as] the 
pure and direct motive of social life, and a community of righteousness its direct 
objective.’
318 He calls for an end to paternalism, exploitation and oppression, class 
differences,  national  boundaries,  war,  violence,  and  the  use  and  abuse  of 
unrestrained power. He calls for a ‘civilisation of the spirit [to] take the place of a 
civilisation of things, human values [in] the place of property values, brotherhood 
[in] the place of hostility.’
319 While this is certainly a vision of the ultimate—
millennial—goal, Barth anticipates that it will find some measure of expression as 
the community struggles for relative ends in the ‘humdrum purposes of every 
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day.’
320 An ethics of grace grounded in the forgiveness of sins has no place for ‘a 
cheap quietism,’ for ‘forgiveness is found only in God, and God found only in the 
sense of need into which the problem of ethics plunges us, and the salutary sense 
of need only in the midst of real struggle.’
321 
Barth  concludes this  section of  his lecture with another defence of his use of 
dialectical  language,  a  protest  against  those  who  accuse  him  of  empty 
intellectualism, and a warning that the resolution of the dialectic does not lie in 
human hands, but in God’s. The truthfulness of the possibility of grace, of ‘a life 
justified in its sanctity and obedience’
322 does not lodge in the dialectical manner 
in which Barth has set them forth. It is not true just because he or anyone else 
states that it is so. Its truthfulness is lodged in the freedom of God’s election, and 
the human agent, like a shipwrecked sailor, can only ever and again ‘cling to the 
rocks which would have wrecked him.’
323  
Barth thus opens his conclusion with the wry statement that his audience could 
hardly expect  him  now to add a ‘happy ending,’ for ‘there is  none  for me to 
add.’
324 The ‘circle’ of his survey of the problem of ethics has reached its limit. 
Just  at  this  point,  however,  something  new  remains  to be  said:  a  new  circle, 
external to the present circle intersects the circle of the problem of ethics. This is 
the circle of faith and revelation which might also be termed Jesus Christ. He is 
the turn of the dialectic from No to Yes, from doom to grace and from death to 
life.
325  For  Barth,  Jesus  Christ  is  the  solution  to  the  ethical  dilemma,  not  as 
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religious withdrawal from the arena of ethics and engagement with the world, but 
as the eschatological promise and reality of redemption of the world, and as the 
present  justification  even  of  our  own  imperfect  and  terribly  limited  ethical 
activity. Paul and the Reformers, says Barth, preached Jesus Christ as the solution 
to the ethical problem: 
Solution is certain because salvation is certain.…Salvation is certain because 
the new man is present from above, bringing the new heaven and the new 
earth,  the  kingdom  of  God.…This  is  the  reason  they  preached  the 
forgiveness of sins as the fundamental answer to the ethical question. But 
note  that  forgiveness always takes  the  way  from  God to  man  and  never 
otherwise.
326 
In another hint of his development Barth also insists that Jesus Christ is to be 
understood not in terms of theological idealism, but dogmatically, in accordance 
with the traditional creeds of the church, in accordance with the reality that he and 
he alone is the divine act of redemption for humanity and the world. The answer 
to  the  problem  of  ethics  is  grounded  in  God’s action  understood  in  terms  of 
resurrection from the dead and new creation. But while human activity can never 
achieve the comprehensive renewal of all things, it may and indeed must take 
relative and limited steps in that direction.  
In this important lecture, then, we again find that Barth has a definite place for 
human ethical action, and envisages the church as a particular community with a 
particular ethos. We also find a possible reason for the largely formal character of 
his ethics.  In  an  interesting aside Barth affirms the need for a comprehensive 
vision of the future such as is found in the socialist idealism of Ragaz: 
As a matter of fact, many of Ragaz’ critics have an ideal for the future which 
differs from his only in that their field of vision, being perceptibly shortened, 
has a somewhat different colouring. If they find satisfaction in believing, for 
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instance, in the future of Germany or the church or missions, may they not, 
must they  not,  go  on to draw the  circle  of their  hopes with a somewhat 
longer radius or from a slightly different centre?…All ideas as to the goal of 
history are ‘imaginative’ and so are all of today’s ideas as to the next steps 
which might lead thither. The essential elements in both the near and the 
distant goals, so far as they are ethical, must be very much the same.
327 
Barth argues that the means, methods and journey toward the ultimate goal may 
differ from group to group. What is important is that the community move toward 
this goal and that the elements of the goal are present within the movement as 
they progress toward it. It is also apparent that Barth purposely avoids ethical 
prescription,  allowing  the  individual  and  community  freedom  to  answer  the 
ethical  question  in  accordance  with  their  uniqueness,
328  which  also  is  in  part, 
predicated upon their particular vision of the future. Curiously, then, Barth gives 
place to moral imagination in the process of ethical discernment. Perhaps it is this 
freedom of the individual and community which lies behind Barth’s reticence to 
propound a specific material content in his ethical programme. By providing a 
description of the moral space  in which the  agents  and community  have their 
existence, and of the ultimate goal toward which their existence is directed; by 
indicating the lines and patterns of the divine activity toward and on behalf of 
humanity; by humbling human pride and releasing them from the presumption of 
responsibility  for  the  establishing  of  the  new  creation,  Barth  has  freed  the 
individual and the community for responsible though relative ethical action that 
bears witness to the divine activity and to the coming world, in accordance with 
their sense of a specific call, emerging and encountering them as they wait upon 
and  seek  God  in  worship,  prayer,  reflection  and  discernment  in  their  own 
particular time and location. 
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   355 
FORMING MORAL COMMUNITY:  
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS 
The ethical problem has nowhere been left out of account. The questions, 
‘What shall we do?’—’How are we to live?’ have nowhere been excluded. 
We  have  not  been  searching  out  hidden  things  for  the  mere  joy  of  so 
doing.…the  whole  concrete  situation—this  has  always  been  our  starting 
point.…The need of making decisions of will, the need for action, the world 
as it is—this it is which has compelled us to consider what the world is, how 
we are to live in it, and what we are to do in it.
1  
The purpose of this thesis has been to demonstrate that Karl Barth’s theology was 
always  a  theology  in  service  of  ethics,  specifically,  an  ecclesial  ethics  which 
sought to shape the actual life and conduct of the church. From his dispute with 
the theological liberalism of his training occasioned by the ethical failure of his 
mentors, to the explicit assertions of Romans II, the ethical problem was, in fact, 
the stimulus and starting point for all his theological reflection. Certainly with 
regard to his own audience, Barth preached, lectured and wrote with a view to 
helping  his  hearers  and  readers  discern  the  patterns  and  pathways  of  faithful 
response to God in ethical matters of immediate relevance and consequence. To 
that extent at least, Barth’s theology and ethics were a contextual theology and 
ethics. 
This  thesis  has  further  suggested  that  Barth’s  work, at  least in  part, might be 
regarded as a work of meta-ethics rather than ethics proper, in that his primary 
concern is to describe the moral field in which ethical existence occurs, rather 
than to prescribe a range of normative behaviours, virtues, decisions or habits. 
This feature of Barth’s ethical programme has long proved problematic for some 
of his interpreters, many of whom seek more specific ethical guidance than Barth 
was willing to give. As we have seen in this thesis, however, Barth did, in fact, 
                                                
1 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. E. C. Hoskyns, 6th ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1933), 427.   356 
delineate the nature and direction of an ecclesial ethics, providing some quite rich 
descriptions of genuinely ethical existence. In the  first section of this chapter, 
then, I reiterate the nature of Barth’s ecclesial ethics by outlining the shape of his 
ethical  vision  with  regard  to  Christian  and  ecclesial  existence.  This  section 
highlights  six  central  features  that  characterise  Barth’s  ethical  vision  in  the 
Römerbrief period. The second section of the chapter extends and deepens this 
analysis by insisting that Barth’s ethics are necessarily an ecclesial ethics, and that 
this orientation is neither accidental nor incidental but an essential implication of 
his theological commitment to the work of the Holy Spirit. The second section 
also shows how Barth continued to utilise the motif of waiting, hastening and 
prayer  as  an  important  expression  of  ethical  existence  over  the  course  of  his 
career. Finally, as mentioned in the introduction to the thesis, I will briefly note 
how Barth’s ethics surveyed in this thesis, developed as they were in a pastoral 
context, may also prove helpful and provide guidance for those serving in pastoral 
settings in the early twenty-first century, the vastly different historical and social 
context notwithstanding. 
Karl Barth’s Ecclesio-Ethical Theology I: The Shape of his Vision 
This thesis has traced the development of Barth’s vision of Christian and ecclesial 
existence  in  broadly  chronological  terms  from  his  dispute  with  the  liberal 
theology of his heritage circa 1915, to the publication of his second commentary 
on Paul’s Epistle to the Romans in 1922. In what follows I will provide a more 
synthetic summary of the findings of this thesis rather than a simple reiteration of 
the conclusions of each chapter, and will show that Barth’s vision revolves around 
six central ideas.    357 
An Ethics of Grace 
The  first  central  idea  is  that  genuine  ethical  existence  is  predicated  on  the 
forgiveness of sins and is as such, an ethics of grace. While this theme received 
dramatic emphasis in Romans II and the lectures immediately prior to this work, it 
was nevertheless present as a primary feature even of his earlier works. Already in 
his sermon “The Righteousness of God,” God’s will is viewed as ‘wholly other’ 
and  his  righteousness  is  so  utterly  beyond  human  achievement  that  nothing 
remains for humanity in its fallen state other than ‘a re-creation and re-growth.’
2 
In this respect, Barth’s theology is an echo of Luther’s twenty-eighth thesis of the 
Heidelberg Disputation that ‘the love of God does not find, but creates, that which 
is pleasing to it.’
3  
Grace,  in  Barth’s  early  theology,  has  a  variety  of  nuances  as  we  have  seen 
throughout  the  thesis.  Grace  refers  variously  to  the  new  ontological  situation 
created in Jesus Christ, to the forgiveness of sins by which we are pardoned and 
stand before God in utter liberty, to the power of the resurrection at work within 
believers effecting the creation of a new subject, and to the mighty claim of God 
lodged against our lives. As such, grace is both indicative and imperative, pardon 
and empowerment. Grace means the effecting of a new relationship of human 
                                                
2 Karl Barth, “The Righteousness of God,” in The Word of God and the Word of Man (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1956), 24.  
3 See Martin Luther, “Heidelberg Disputation (1518),” in Luther’s Works Volume 31: The Career 
of the Reformer 1, ed. H. J. Grimm (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1957), 57. Note that Barth does not 
actually  cite  this  Disputation  in  any  of  the  works  examined  in  this  thesis.  Compare 
Wannenwetsch’s account of Luther’s ethical thought: ‘There is no single key to Luther’s moral 
theology.... If one should attempt to formulate a common rule in terms of a grammar that governs 
the various language games, it would perhaps be ideally expressed in what Luther himself called 
“vita passive” – a concept that could be rendered “living a receptive life.” Christian ethos and 
ethics should conceive of everything that is to be done and left undone as being shaped by God’s 
own activity: marked by a passivity that can be highly active, transcending the inherited antinomy 
between the active and contemplative lives’ (Bernd Wannenwetsch, “Luther’s Moral Theology,” 
in The Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther, ed. Donald K. McKim, Cambridge Companions 
to Religion (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 133-134).   358 
agents  with  God,  as  well  as  the  ontic  renewal  and  visible  sanctification  of 
individuals as the same grace presses for concretion in the power of the Holy 
Spirit. By grace God has bound his people to himself in order to make them free 
of  every  other power,  fate,  lordship  or bondage. It  is  this liberty  before  God 
exemplified in the forgiveness of sins which is the genesis of ethical existence. 
Because the establishing of God’s kingdom is God’s own work, a work of new 
creation in the midst of the old world, and because there is no possibility of any 
genuinely good human work apart from grace, Barth rejects every human attempt 
to develop a self-grounded ethics. Genuine ethical existence is wholly gratuitous, 
wholly a work of divine grace whereby we are freed to be what God has created 
and calls us to be: his children. 
A Responsive Ethics 
Second, Barth’s ethics are best understood as an ethics of divine initiative and 
human response. This thesis  has demonstrated that fears that Barth’s ethics of 
grace effectively annul legitimate human agency are unfounded. At every point of 
this thesis we have seen that Barth  finds place  for genuine  human action and 
agency. His construal of human agency, however, is markedly different from that 
of  modernity  deriving  from  Descartes  and  Kant.  For  Barth,  human  agency  is 
legitimate only to the extent that it is subordinate to and dependent upon the prior 
and greater agency of God. This distinctive ordering of divine and human agency 
does not abolish the latter but provides the only means by which it is truly freed 
from the enslaving consequences of sin and thus enabled to become genuinely 
human. This distinctive ordering of divine and human agency further means that 
Barth’s ethics have the character of response to the gracious initiative, call and 
command of God both at the inception of, and throughout the continuation of   359 
Christian life. Barth does not reject human agency per se, but models of human 
agency which set the moral agent in independence alongside, above or against 
God  and  which  are  thus  insufficiently  sensitive  to  the  theological  realities  of 
creation, fall and redemption as Barth understands them. 
Contrary, then, to some critics, Barth repudiates a quietist or sectarian ethics and 
insists that Christian and ecclesial existence presupposes an active life in response 
to the reality and command of God which is determinative of all existence. While 
Barth’s doctrine of the divine command is still under-developed in this phase of 
his career, it is evident that the later development of this theme in his theology is 
built upon foundations originally laid here.  
An Eschatological Ethics 
Third, Barth has developed an eschatological ethics oriented towards the coming 
world and in contradiction to the fallen nature of human existence in the present 
age. We have noted that Barth’s intention was always to insist that because God’s 
kingdom is God’s work alone, its presence or coming cannot be identified with, 
predicated  upon  or  instigated  by  any  human  activity,  including  especially  the 
activity of the church. Nevertheless, his model of eschatology in the years 1915-
1918 compromised this theological conviction so that the Holy Spirit’s activity 
resulted in the emerging enclave of God bearing a direct testimony to the presence 
of the kingdom. From 1919 on, however, his more stringent eschatology ensured 
that  such direct  identification between human activity and the presence of the 
kingdom  was  no  longer  possible.  In  both  periods,  however,  the  essential 
orientation of Christian and ecclesial existence was the same, and involved a vital 
waiting for the coming kingdom. Yet as this thesis has amply demonstrated, this   360 
waiting does not require a passive or quietist ethics. To the contrary, Barth learnt 
from Blumhardt that a genuine waiting for the eschatological kingdom must issue 
in  a  hastening  toward  that  kingdom.  In  addition,  such  hastening  exhibits  and 
reflects the duality of the divine No and Yes toward the world, incorporating both 
the element of protest against the nature and course of the present age, as well 
becoming a sign or foretaste of the coming world. While it is certainly true that in 
this period of his career Barth’s emphasis fell decidedly on the No, it is also true 
that the No functioned in service of an ultimate Yes, and as such his ethics are 
fundamentally  an  ethics  of  hope.  The  ground  of  this  hope  is,  of  course,  the 
resurrection of Jesus which is the genesis and presence of the new world.  
An Ethics of Witness 
Closely associated with eschatological ethics is Barth’s fourth central idea: his 
notion of ethical existence as witness to the kingdom of God. The community 
testifies to the coming kingdom by its existence as a contrast community to the 
greed,  injustice,  violence,  militarism  and  isolation  of  the  present  world.  In 
Romans I it is the enclave in which the power of God which appeared in Christ 
comes  to  expression  once  more  in  the  members  of  his  body,  so  that  the 
community lives and moves in contrast to the dominant cultural powers amongst 
which it has its existence. In Romans II witness is the primary category Barth uses 
to explicate the ethical posture of the community in its relation to the world and to 
the coming kingdom. The church does not possess or mediate divine grace, but 
exists as a sign pointing away from itself toward the true reality from which its 
existence  derives.  As  such,  the  church  can  never  be  more  than  the  witness 
exemplified by Grünewald’s John, and should it seek to be so, it actually forfeits 
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as ec-centric, an ever-renewed response to the ultimate external reality towards 
which it points.  
The witness of the Christian community is also cruciform and corresponds to the 
being  and  activity  of  God,  especially  as  he  revealed  himself  in  Jesus  Christ. 
Accordingly, the praxis of the community was of particular import for Barth, and 
indeed a cause of great concern for him. His early appreciation of socialism was 
predicated upon his belief that socialist praxis corresponded to the nature of the 
kingdom  as  expressed  in  the  life  of  Jesus  in  stark  contrast  to  the  culturally 
compromised  praxis  of  mainstream  religion.  Against  the  assimilation  of  the 
church to the nationalist and bourgeois presumptions of the prevailing culture, 
Barth calls the church to an alternative praxis which enters into solidarity with the 
poor and lowly in accordance with his vision of the eschatological kingdom of 
unity, freedom and equity. Against the pretensions of the revolutionary he calls 
the church to bear witness to the true revolution which comes from God alone, by 
practicing love towards enemies and by becoming a community of forgiveness 
and reconciliation. In both instances he calls the church to live in accordance with 
its own integrity as God’s people and with a praxis that corresponds to his activity 
and to the promise of the coming kingdom. In both instances he also envisages 
that the church forsakes reliance on earthly forms of power because it entrusts 
itself fully to the power and hope of the resurrection. 
A Communitarian Ethics 
The fifth central aspect of Barth’s moral vision is that his ethics is an ethics of 
community. Barth highlights the communal nature of Christian existence with his 
rejection of the individualism which characterised his cultural milieu, and more   362 
profoundly,  with  his  theological  depiction  of  the  other  as  the  locus  of  our 
encounter with God. He characterises the community as the enclave or vanguard 
of the new world, a proleptic witness of God’s intent for the entirety of human 
society.  
Throughout the thesis I noted the severe criticism of the church and religion in 
which Barth engages, and argued that Barth’s critique of the church is that of an 
insider.  Barth’s  polemic  against  the  cultural  assimilation  and  captivity  of  the 
contemporary church functioned in service of a positive goal, namely, to call the 
church to a new faithfulness as a distinct community which lives in accordance 
with  its  own  integrity  as  God’s  eschatological  people.  Barth  envisaged  the 
community not in terms of the institutional church, but as a Gemeinde awakened 
by the Spirit through the event of revelation, and gathered as a community of 
worship, prayer and discernment awaiting the command of the moment by which 
its  character  and  activity  might  be  formed  and  guided.  The  waiting  of  the 
community is not viewed as a formless or arbitrary waiting, for the community is 
also a community of exhortation and moral instruction as believers attend to the 
proclamation  of  Scripture,  as  well  as  to  careful  analysis  and  scrutiny  of 
contemporary  events  in  light of the eternal  and  ultimate  realities  arising from 
theological reflection. Barth’s great hope was that the life of the coming world 
and  genuine  sanctification  would  come  to  visible  expression  in  Christian 
communities  as  they  gave  themselves  to  God  in  prayerful,  penitent  hearing, 
reflection and waiting. It is also clear that Barth envisaged that the community 
would  in  some  sense  be  a  community  of  virtue  bearing  its  own  particular 
character in the world. This thesis has repeatedly noted the many occasions in 
these works when Barth identified particular characteristics he considered typical   363 
of genuine Christian and ecclesial existence. For example, Barth speaks of faith 
and faithful obedience, purity, goodness, brotherhood, courage, endurance, joy, 
hope, gratitude, open ears, contrition, humility and, of course, love, as virtues 
which will typically come to expression as the believer is encountered by God and 
responds in faith by the power of the Holy Spirit. 
A Universal Ethics 
Finally, Barth’s ethics are a universal ethics. This claim is almost counter-intuitive 
given the manner in which his ethics is decidedly an ecclesial ethics grounded in 
the gracious revelatory activity of the Holy Spirit, and strictly oriented toward 
God in prayer, worship and repentance. Nevertheless, it is the claim of this thesis 
that Barth’s ethics, while decidedly an ecclesial ethics, are also a universal ethics 
and  are  certainly  not  to  be  considered  as  sectarian.  Throughout  the  period 
examined in this thesis Barth rejected any kind of Pietist or monastic withdrawal 
from human society and to the contrary, demanded the church’s thorough-going 
solidarity with and engagement in the common life, and social and political affairs 
of the wider community. Further, while it is certainly true that this ethics can 
pertain only to those people for whom the indicative presuppositions of Romans 
chapters five to eight have become actual, because these presuppositions describe 
the true nature of ultimate reality and thus the moral field in which all human 
existence  actually  occurs,  the  ethics  arising  from  these  presuppositions  are 
universal and ‘absolute’ in their relevance.
4 The manner of life which is to come 
to expression in the Christian community is, therefore, that which is appropriate 
and  valid  for  all  humanity.  For  this  reason  Barth  can  confidently  exhort  his 
                                                
4 See the discussion on pages 333-335 above, for a discussion of how Barth’s absolutes Ethos 
characterise a normative way in which ethics proceeds, and the normative posture of the ethical 
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parishioners to live ‘the true life that men ought to live’ amidst the sham life of 
their compatriots and for their benefit.
5 
In sum, this thesis has shown that Barth developed his theology with a view to 
forming  moral community,  that  is,  with  a  specific  intention  to  shape  the  way 
Christians and Christian communities actually conduct their affairs in this world. 
His ethics are an ethics of grace in which human moral existence is grounded in 
the gratuitous activity of God on humanity’s behalf; a responsive ethics with a 
distinctive ordering of divine and human agency, in which the latter is always 
subsequent to and dependent upon the former; an eschatological ethics oriented to 
the coming kingdom of righteousness and freedom inaugurated by the resurrection 
of Jesus from the dead, which thus also protests the present course of human 
society as it exists in contradiction to the eschatological vision of the new world; 
an  ethics  of  witness  which  testifies  to  the  ultimate  reality  within  which  our 
existence occurs, and to the being and activity of God which alone can establish 
the  kingdom  in  its  fullness;  a  communitarian  ethics  in  which  the  Christian 
community, because it is bound to one Lord, is freed from all other dependencies 
to  exist  as  a  distinct  and  contrast  community  within  the  broader  society,  and 
finally, an universal ethics that purports to delineate the truly virtuous life because 
it is grounded in and responsive to the true nature of ultimate reality. Of these six 
central aspects of Barth’s vision of Christian and ecclesial existence in this period 
of his career, the first is primary. The attempt to adopt these central aspects as a 
programme to be applied for ethical existence is entirely to misconstrue Barth’s 
most fundamental insight: true ethical existence is a gift. It is not a programme of 
particular activities to be adopted or a form of life to be cultivated as though those 
                                                
5 Karl Barth, “The Individual (2 Corinthians 4:7-15),” in Come Holy Spirit (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1934), 243-244.   365 
activities or form of life were inherently moral. Rather, genuine Christian and 
ecclesial  existence  emerges  when  the  Holy  Spirit  graciously  encounters  and 
awakens the human agent to a new awareness of ultimate reality and in so doing 
empowers that person to respond in faithful and immediate obedience. In the next 
section I will show that it is this particular work of the Holy Spirit which renders 
Barth’s ethics a necessarily ecclesial ethics. I will also provide a brief indication 
of how these central aspects of Barth’s ecclesial ethics are drawn together in the 
pivotal activities of waiting, hastening and prayer. 
Karl Barth’s Ecclesio-Ethical Theology II: Why Barth’s Ethics are 
Necessarily an Ecclesial Ethics 
Chapter  one  of  this  thesis  argued  that  unless  Barth  is  read  carefully  and  in 
accordance  with  his  own  presuppositions  and  theological  commitments, 
misunderstandings of his theology are virtually inevitable. This is particularly the 
case when we seek to think with and after Barth in ethical matters. For example, 
we have noted that apart from his carefully nuanced theological ontology Barth’s 
ethics are simply incomprehensible, and that failure to read Barth’s ethics in light 
of  this  ontology  is  the  fault  which  has,  perhaps  more  than  any  other  factor, 
resulted in the many misinterpretations of Barth’s ethics that have arisen both 
during and after his lifetime.  
In this thesis we have continually been made aware of the primary aspects of 
Barth’s theological ontology, most particularly his emphasis on the sovereignty of 
God, and the eschatological structuring of the God-world relation. In fact, Barth’s 
characteristic  emphasis  on  divine  sovereignty,  which  emerged  with  great 
forcefulness in this period of his career, is the primary presupposition underlying   366 
the  entirety of  his theological  and  ethical  project.
6 God  is a  being  whole  and 
complete  in  himself  before,  beyond  and  over  against  humanity.  Only  as 
interpreters  are  willing  to  acknowledge  the  legitimacy  of  this  theological  and 
moral ontology will they make sense of Barth’s ethics. 
But this insistence on the divine aseity is not the only presupposition operative in 
Barth’s theology. Another fundamental presupposition that emerges in this period 
and which finds continual expression throughout the entirety of his career is his 
reliance upon the work of the Holy Spirit. In this section I deepen and extend the 
simple claim that Barth has developed an ecclesial ethics, by showing that the 
ecclesial orientation of his ethics is neither accidental nor incidental. Rather, the 
very structure of his theology, shaped as it is by a fundamental reliance on the 
work of the Holy Spirit, renders his ethics necessarily and essentially an ecclesial 
ethics.  
If Barth’s vision of Christian and ecclesial existence rests upon the crucial work 
of the Holy Spirit, it comes to primary expression in the responsive activities of 
waiting, hastening and prayer. These practices, already prominent in Barth’s early 
works examined in this thesis, continue to play a fundamental role in his ethical 
thought in later years. Thus this section also provides a brief indication of how 
Barth developed these motifs in his later career, and how they function as the 
                                                
6 John Webster has suggested that ‘The Church Dogmatics as a whole is one lengthy exposition of 
the  statement  which  in  a  very  particular  way  is  “at  once  the  basis  and  the  content  of  all  the 
rest”…that “God is.” One of the ways in which the Dogmatics can be construed is as a massively 
ramified reassertion of the aseity of  God’ (see John Webster, Barth’s Ethics of Reconciliation 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1995), 2-3, citing Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics II/1: The Doctrine of God, ed. 
G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance, trans. W. B. Johnston, T. H. L. Parker, H. Knight & J. L. M. 
Haire (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), 257-259). Webster is careful, however, to make a crucial 
qualification: Barth’s construal of the aseity of God is only correctly understood in relation to 
Jesus Christ and the covenant established between God and humanity in him. As such, ‘the Church 
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nexus  of  the  various  central  elements  of  his  ecclesial  ethics  surveyed  in  the 
previous section. 
The Work of the Holy Spirit 
Just  as  Barth’s  ethics  are  unintelligible  apart  from  an  apprehension  of  his 
theological and moral ontology, so they are often misunderstood as a result of the 
failure to see that his ethics are predicated on the crucial work of the Holy Spirit. 
As  I  noted  in  the  conclusion  of  the  preceding  section,  genuine  Christian  and 
ecclesial  existence  emerges  when  the  Holy  Spirit  graciously  encounters  and 
awakens the human agent to a new awareness of ultimate reality and in so doing 
empowers that person to respond in  faithful and immediate obedience. In this 
thesis we have noted this crucial activity at a number of points. For example, in 
his sermon “The Strange New World in the Bible” we saw that it is the work of 
the Holy Spirit to make visible the newness of the kingdom of God here in the 
present world. So too in Romans I the Holy Spirit is the immanent power of the 
coming kingdom vigorously bringing forth the life of the kingdom here and now. 
In Romans II the agent of the divine-human encounter who establishes human 
agents in faith and obedience is the Holy Spirit. He is the miraculous factor in 
faith. He it is who touches our world and our lives in the moment of revelation 
and creates the new subject who stands upright in the presence of God. It is his 
work to bring forth the impossible possibility of genuine love in human relations 
which is the climax of ethics and the fulfilling of the law. 
This emphasis on the crucial work of the Holy Spirit continues as a fundamental 
presupposition of Barth’s theology throughout his career, and as such exercises a 
determinative function in regard to his ethics. Barth’s understanding of the Spirit’s   368 
activity in connection with ethics and Christian life receives substantial treatment 
prior to the Dogmatics in his Münster Ethics of 1928-29, as well as an important 
though more compact treatment in his 1929 lectures published under the title Zur 
Lehre vom  Heiligen Geist.
7 In the  latter  work, for  example, Barth argues that 
Christian life is created life as the human person in their creaturely and individual 
existence is ‘opened, prepared and made fit by God for God.’
8 He argues further 
that it is the work of the Holy Spirit to grant us con-scientia (co-knowledge) with 
God, that we might genuinely apprehend the knowledge of the Father’s will. In 
the Holy Spirit we are granted the voice of conscience to speak to us, and as a 
result we speak and act and live.
9  
Again, in the Dogmatics when Barth seeks to detail the origins of Christian life 
and righteousness, he turns to exposition of the Holy Spirit’s activity: ‘The work 
of the Holy Spirit is that our blind eyes are opened and that thankfully and in 
thankful self-surrender we recognise and acknowledge that it is so.’
10 That this is a 
conviction that Barth held to the end of his life is clearly seen in his exposition of 
the ‘Baptism with the Holy Spirit’ in his final publication.
11 Here, time and again, 
Barth characterises the Christian  life under the nomenclature of ‘mystery’ and 
‘miracle,’  adopting  terms  previously  used  to  indicate  the  mystery  of  the 
incarnation of Christ, and the miracle of his virgin birth and human existence by 
means of the Holy Spirit.
12 Use of this terminology has the effect of situating the 
                                                
7 See Karl Barth, Ethics, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1981), and Karl Barth, 
The  Holy  Spirit  and  the  Christian  Life:  The  Theological  Basis  of Ethics,  trans.  R.  B.  Hoyle 
(Louisville, Kn: Westminster/John Knox, 1993).  
8 Barth, The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life, 6-7. 
9 Barth, The Holy Spirit and the Christian Life, 65.  
10 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2: The Doctrine of the Word of God, ed. G. W. Bromiley & T. 
F. Torrance, trans. G. T. Thompson & H. Knight (Edinburgh: T.& T. Clark, 1956), 239. 
11 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/4: The Doctrine of Reconciliation (Fragment), ed. G. W. 
Bromiley & T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1969). 
12 See, for example, Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/4, 3, 5, 17 etc. For Barth’s use of the terms   369 
reality of the Christian life under the purview of the Holy Spirit. In so doing Barth 
does not intend to restrict or diminish the reality of human agency and volition, 
but rather to insist that the divine irruption into human life is never predicated on 
anthropological or historical grounds, but remains always and ever the work of the 
Holy Spirit. In this sense, then, Christian life, like Christian theology generally, is 
as Barth insisted in Romans II, situated ‘in mid-air.’
13  
Is  this  not  precisely  the  problem,  critics  might  ask—that  Christian  life  and 
theology is thereby rendered irrational? It can be argued readily that recourse to 
the Holy Spirit simply introduces circularity into Barth’s argument, for who can 
testify  to  the divinity  of  the  work  of  the Holy  Spirit’s  witness save  the  Holy 
Spirit? Bruce McCormack acknowledges this difficulty: 
Because  the  reality  which  Christian  faith  presupposes  (as  it  undertakes 
theological reflection) is not disclosed to all but only to faith, there will still 
be a sense in which the credibility of Barth’s entire procedure rests upon the 
experienced reality of that internal testimony of the Holy Spirit which gives 
rise to faith in the Church and, therefore, upon an experience which is not 
universally  shared.  Subjectivism is a  danger;  make  no  mistake.  But it is 
Barth’s  view  that  the  only  adequate  safeguard  against  the  threat  of 
subjectivism will be found in the objectivity of a God who discloses Himself 
in such a way that He remains Lord of the epistemic relation.
14 
McCormack correctly  identifies  the  illuminating  work  of the  Holy  Spirit  as  a 
fundamental presupposition operative in Barth’s theology. He also recognises that 
the credibility of Barth’s entire programme rests upon this  notion, and further 
acknowledges  that  this  is  a  particular  rather  than  universal  experience. 
Dependence  upon  this  presupposition  does  not,  however,  render  Barth’s 
                                                                                                                                 
‘mystery’  and  ‘miracle’  to  refer  to  the  incarnation  and the  virgin  birth  of  Christ,  see  Barth’s 
discussion of “The Miracle of Christmas” in Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 172-173 and also Karl 
Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G. T. Thompson (London: SCM, 1949), 95-100. See also the 
parallelism established between the Spirit as the origin of both Jesus’ human existence and the 
existence of the Christian community in Karl Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, trans. 
G. Foley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963), 54-55. 
13 Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, 48-54. See also page 274 above.  
14 Bruce L. McCormack, “Barth in Context: A Response to Professor Gunton,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 49, no. 4 (1996): 497, emphasis added.   370 
programme  irrational.  What  it  does  indicate  is  that  Barth  is  operating  with  a 
different model of rationality than that of his critics.
15 McCormack thus continues: 
No doubt, David Friedrich Strauss was right when he said that the internal 
testimony of the Holy Spirit was the Achilles heel of Protestant theology. No 
human apologetic, not Pannenberg’s or anyone else’s, can strengthen us at 
this our point of greatest weakness. God alone can do that. ‘...there at its 
[Protestant theology’s] weakest point, where it can only acknowledge and 
confess, it has its indestructible strength’ (CD I/2: 537).
16 
This refusal of any presupposition other than the reality of God has a fundamental 
implication for Barth’s ethics: they are necessarily an ecclesial ethics, grounded in 
the activity of the Holy Spirit who in the act of creating faith also creates the 
church and calls forth the obedience which is characteristic of the people of God. 
Although  Barth  in  his  early  period  has  not  yet  developed  the  trinitarian 
underpinning of his theology, its essential orientation is here present, albeit in 
nascent form.
17 For Barth, our knowledge of and incorporation into the divine 
reality  is  not  a human  work,  but the work  of  God the  Holy  Spirit.  The  fact, 
however, that the Spirit is not limited to working solely within the realm of the 
church, and is ever pressing the church into a living solidarity with the world, 
shows that this ecclesial ethic is not to be construed in a sectarian sense.  
The Centrality of Prayer 
If Barth’s vision of Christian and ecclesial existence rests upon the crucial work 
of the Holy Spirit, it comes to primary expression in the responsive activities of 
waiting, hastening and prayer. As in the previous sub-section, I will show that 
Barth’s emphasis in this period on waiting, hastening and prayer finds continual 
                                                
15 For a discussion of the kind of rationality at work here, see Michael D. O’Neil, “Ethics and 
Epistemology: Ecclesial Existence in a Postmodern Era,” Journal of Religious Ethics 34, no. 1 
(2006): 21-40. 
16 McCormack, “Barth in Context,” 497. 
17 This is particularly evident at the climax of “The Strange New World Within the Bible.” See 
Karl Barth, “The Strange New World within the Bible,” in The Word of God and the Word of Man 
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expression throughout his career.
18 Barth’s use of the waiting and hastening motif 
surfaces at various places in the Church Dogmatics, generally in eschatological 
contexts as might be  expected.  For example, in his  discussion  of  the  time  of 
revelation, Barth insists that the entirety of Christian existence—including Word 
and  sacrament,  faith,  sanctification  and  justification,  Christian  identity,  the 
activity  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  much  more—can  only  be  understood  as 
eschatological  existence.  Because  of  this  reality  ‘the  Church  of  the  New 
Testament lives in this time-consciousness; that is, it is the Church of those who 
“wait” and “hasten.”’
19  In this context the waiting and hastening of the church 
refers  to  its  steadfast  endurance  of  the  present  as  it  awaits  the  fulfilment  of 
revelation, and to the thorough ordering of its present existence in light of the 
coming Judge.  
Barth’s most prominent discussion of this concept, however, occurs outside the 
Dogmatics,  in  the  Münster  Ethics  of  1928-29,  and  in  his  final  lectures  on 
dogmatics preserved in The Christian Life.
20 In the former series of lectures, Barth 
treats the concept under the rubric of ‘The Command of God the Redeemer,’ in 
association with the topics of hope and conscience.
21 Having carefully delineated 
what he intends when speaking of conscience, Barth says that ‘when conscience 
speaks to people, it involves a categorical command to wait.’ Similarly, ‘when 
                                                
18 The importance of this motif in Barth’s ethics is acknowledged in the title of Biggar’s treatment 
of Barth’s ethics. See Nigel Biggar, The Hastening That Waits: Karl Barth’s Ethics, Revised ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).  
19 See Barth, Church Dogmatics I/2, 68-70. See also Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/2: The 
Doctrine  of  Reconciliation,  ed.  G.  W.  Bromiley  &  T.  F.  Torrance,  trans.  G.  W.  Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1958), 605-606, and especially, Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics IV/3.2: 
The Doctrine of Reconciliation, ed. G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1962), 939-942, where Barth speaks of the ‘prophetic character’ of 
Christian hope. 
20 In a sense, these two lecture series on theological ethics serve as bookends for the entirety of 
Barth’s ‘mature theology,’ that is, the Church Dogmatics. Although no more than an accident of 
history, it is nonetheless symbolic of the ethical orientation of the entirety of his work.  
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conscience speaks to people, it also involves a categorical command to hasten.’
22 
Against the criticism that this is contradictory Barth argues: 
Waiting  and  hastening,  says  scripture  (2  Pet.  3:12).  Even  the  fact  that 
scripture  uses two  words here indicates  already that for  our  ears the  one 
command splits into two.…All the more important is it for all of us, then, to 
realize that it is the one revolutionary voice of conscience, the voice of hope, 
which on two sides points and pushes those who hear it beyond things as 
they are in the kingdoms of nature and grace.
23 
As in the earlier works on Blumhardt, so here. Waiting and hastening is viewed as 
a  revolutionary  activity,  instigated  by  the  Holy  Spirit  who  grants  to  God’s 
children the reality of conscience, and who thus presses believers ‘beyond things 
as they are in the kingdoms of nature and grace.’ Indeed, Barth questions whether 
‘we have really heard the command of conscience if we are not really anointed 
with a single drop of enthusiastic oil, if what we do is only conservative and not 
also revolutionary.’
24 
Crucially, not only does Barth ground this notion in Scripture, but it is clear that 
he also intends a precise ordering of the two elements: the hastening is preceded 
by and arises out of the waiting. For Barth, only in this order, only when the 
command  to  wait, surrender  and  rest is  taken  seriously,  can the  hastening be 
considered genuine obedience. In these lectures waiting is carefully nuanced to 
mean an inner work which orients the entire person towards their future as it will 
be revealed in the person of the Redeemer and of the coming kingdom of glory, 
thus resulting in a fundamental questioning of the present form of the world. Barth 
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says ‘demolition  is required of me, for finally all this is inner work, work on 
myself, which makes the waiting into hastening.’
25  
We  have  to  breathe  in  the  atmosphere  of  the  redemption  hidden  in  the 
future. We have to act in the experience of the coming Redeemer. We are 
ordered to fight, to build, to work, to organise, to fashion things. The same 
conscience  which  drove  us  inside  relentlessly  drives  us  outside. 
Responsibility is responsibility that something should  happen. We  cannot 
build up the kingdom of God or bring it in by force. But when it comes we 
cannot be idle. We are summoned to go to meet it. Our waiting can take 
place only in our acting, our hastening.
26 
These  statements  find  remarkable  echoes  in  the  lectures  which  make  up  The 
Christian Life. In these final lectures on the ethics of reconciliation toward the end 
of his  life, Barth asserts that Christians are summoned by God’s command to 
revolt against the dehumanising disorder of the world, and therefore to entry into 
conflict.
27 The decisive action of their revolt consists in their calling upon God for 
the  establishing of his kingdom in  accordance with the second petition of the 
Lord’s Prayer. Nevertheless, this decisive—vertical—action, if it is genuine, will 
incorporate a host of other congruent horizontal actions.
28 Where such prayer is 
present, Barth claims,  
there the vitality and force of little hopes for the present of a person and of 
people will not be lacking.…what kind of waiting for the new heaven and 
the  new earth in which [righteousness] dwells, what kind  of praying that 
prayer [would it be], if we were not motivated thereby to do resolutely what 
we can here and now on this side in orientation and with a view to God’s 
side, to the great there and then of his kingdom, and to do this without claim 
or illusion, not trying to anticipate what only God could begin and only he 
can finish, but rising up to fight for human righteousness and order in the 
midst of disorder and in opposition to it.
29 
Later in the same series of lectures Barth will again address this notion of ‘little’ 
hopes.  Because  the  establishing  of  the  kingdom  for  which  Christians  pray  is 
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27  Karl  Barth,  The  Christian  Life:  Church  Dogmatics  IV/4 (Lecture  Fragments),  trans.  G.  W. 
Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1981), 206, 211. 
28 Barth, The Christian Life, 212. 
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properly  God’s  activity,  Christians  are  absolved  from  the  impossible 
responsibility  of  establishing  the  kingdom  and  its  righteousness  in  their  own 
power.  They  are  not,  however,  thereby  absolved  from  their  own  activity,  but 
rather with their prayer, Christians are ‘with great strictness required and with 
great kindness freed and empowered to do what they can do in the sphere of the 
relative possibilities assigned to them.…They may and can and should rise up and 
accept  responsibility  to  the  utmost  of  their  power  for  the  doing  of  the  little 
righteousness.’
30 In another important echo of the early work on Blumhardt, Barth 
says that to wait for the kingdom 
cannot possibly mean that they are commanded or even permitted to be idle 
in  the  meantime;…No,  they  wait  and  hasten  toward  the  dawn  of  God’s 
day.…They not only wait but also hasten. They wait by hastening. Their 
waiting takes place in the hastening. Aiming at God’s kingdom, established 
on its coming and not on the status quo, they do not just look toward it but 
run toward it as fast as their feet will carry them. This is inevitable if in their 
hearts and on their lips the petition ‘Thy kingdom come’ is not an indolent 
and despondent prayer but one that is zealous and brave.
31 
In these citations we see the close association that Barth intends between the motif 
of  waiting  and  hastening,  and  that  of  prayer.
32  In  his  article  on  Blumhardt’s 
devotions (Auf das Reich Gottes warten) Barth indicates a growing appreciation 
of the role of prayer when he suggests that ‘our cause, our hope, is at the moment 
served better with prayers than with treatises,’ and that pleading before God for 
the coming of his kingdom is the highest and most promising thing a believer 
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could undertake.
33 By the late twenties Barth can refer to prayer as ‘the primal and 
basic form of human action in which man looks and reaches beyond his reality as 
a creature and as a sinner saved by grace, in which he acts as e[nqeoς, i.e., as one 
who belongs to God.’
34 For Barth at this time, prayer is an eschatological act 
which gives to human existence ‘the character of openness: openness to what is 
ahead.’
35 Prayer, in fact, is the form of waiting in which we are encountered by the 
Spirit and granted the gift of conscience and the divine command, that we might 
hasten in a new obedience. Thus, Barth goes on to say that 
[i]n prayer—and not for nothing is ‘Come, Creator Spirit’ the prayer that 
includes within itself all prayer—we ask God not only that he would view us 
in a very different reality from merely that of his creatures and his sinners 
saved by grace, but also that he would give us this reality, the reality of 
people of the Spirit.…In the superabundance of this action we have concrete 
fellowship with God our Redeemer, we have a conscience.
36 
The emphasis on prayer is found also in the Dogmatics. In the exposition on the 
doctrine of election, for example, Barth identifies prayer—as it was exemplified 
in the life of Jesus—as the telos of election, and as the fulfilment of creaturely 
existence: 
God’s eternal will is the act of prayer (in which confidence in self gives way 
before confidence in God). This act is the birth of a genuine human self-
awareness, in which knowledge and action can and must be attempted; in 
which there drops away all fear of what is above or beside or below man, of 
what  might  assault  or  threaten  him;  in  which  man  becomes  heir  to  a 
legitimate and necessary and therefore an effective and triumphant claim; in 
which man may rule in that he is willing to serve.
37 
More  exalted  acclamation  regarding  the  priority  and  potency  of  prayer  could 
scarcely be found. Authentic human existence finds both its genesis and its apex 
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in the act of prayer. Prayer is an invitation from God for us to participate in the 
rule and reign of God’s kingdom, both now in this present age and in the life to 
come, but to do so in accordance with the creaturely limits which characterise 
humanity.
 38   
It is precisely this realisation that led Barth to situate invocation as the centre-
piece of human ethical activity in the ethics of reconciliation. Barth found in the 
notion of invocation (Anrufung) a material concept for Christian existence, which 
not  only  provided  shape  for  the  Christian  life,  but  did  so  in  a  way  which 
maintained  the  careful  delineation  and  ordering  between  divine  and  human 
agency, that is, ‘a moral ontology and a moral anthropology in which dependence 
is not diminishment and resolute action is not self-assertion.’
39 In invocation, says 
Barth, ‘man in his whole humanity takes his proper place over against God. In it 
he  does  the  central  thing  that  precedes,  accompanies,  and  follows  all  else  he 
does.’
40 Invocation, properly understood, says Barth, is an action which includes 
within itself all other actions.
41 Commenting once again on the second petition of 
the Lord’s Prayer, Barth says, 
When people turn bravely to God with this petition…their whole life and 
thought and word and deed are set in motion, oriented to the point to which 
they look with the petition.…Praying bravely…they therewith take part…in 
the  movement  that  characterises  the  being,  thought,  and  action  of  the 
apostles and their communities.…Praying the second petition bravely means 
following  this  movement  and turning,  having  no  other  choice  but  to run 
[toward] the coming kingdom of God—to run toward this with all one’s soul 
and all one’s powers.…The heart of the Christian ethos is that those who are 
freed  and  summoned  to  pray  ‘Thy  kingdom  come’  are  also  freed  and 
summoned to use their freedom to obey the command that is given therewith 
and to live for their part with a view to the coming kingdom.
42 
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In sum, in this motif of waiting, hastening and prayer which Barth learnt from 
Blumhardt in the early days of his career, we find the nexus that binds together the 
various primary aspects of Barth’s vision of Christian and ecclesial existence. The 
orientation of these practices which are  initiated by the  gracious action of the 
Holy Spirit  is  obviously  eschatological, and  thus  highlights  the  eschatological 
nature of Barth’s ethics. So too Barth’s distinctive ordering of divine and human 
agency finds its most complete expression in the act of invocation, in which the 
human agent not only acts, but does so in dependence upon and submission to the 
greater will of God. Such prayer, of course, must issue in activity which Barth 
characterises as the doing of the ‘little righteousness.’ In this way, believers bear 
witness to the activity of God and his coming kingdom in their imperfect attempts 
to foreshadow the nature and life of God’s kingdom. Finally, these activities are 
not  the  isolated  activities  of  the  individual,  but  rather  as  the  Paternoster 
presupposes,  they  are the common activity  of  the  gathered congregation  as  it 
seeks to hear and obey the command of God in its own particular time and locale. 
The Contemporary Relevance of Karl Barth’s Vision  
In the introduction to this thesis I noted my intention to conclude the work with a 
brief  reflection  on  the  practical  relevance  or  otherwise  of  Barth’s  vision  of 
Christian and ecclesial existence as evidenced in the early period of his career. 
This reflection is required on two fronts. First, I have a conviction that theology 
must serve the concrete community of God’s people in their daily attempt to be 
his people. This conviction arises from my own calling and work in a pastoral 
setting, and our attempt as a congregation to respond faithfully to the grace and 
faithfulness God has shown humanity in Christ Jesus. Second, my thesis requires 
it. Having argued that Barth developed his theology with an intention to form   378 
moral community, the question of relevance cannot be ignored. If his theology 
does not actually  function to assist concrete Christian communities establish a 
faithful praxis, his entire project is suspect.  
That we live in a dynamic era with respect to developments in ecclesiology and 
ecclesial  practice  is  unquestioned.  While  not  all  of  these  developments  are 
positive there are, nevertheless, many exciting developments which show promise 
for continuing progress and maturation in ecclesial reflection and practice. In the 
first chapter I highlighted the conversation that has arisen between Barth and the 
so-called ‘New Ecclesiology’ and its emphasis on specific ecclesial practices as 
the means by which the Holy Spirit instantiates his saving economy in the church. 
In this final  section of the thesis I will use materials  from missiologist David 
Bosch, and from ‘The Gospel and Our Culture Network’ to assess the primary 
features of Barth’s vision of Christian and ecclesial existence.  
Eminent  missiologist  David  J.  Bosch,  tracing  the  development  of  ecumenical 
missiology in the twentieth century, draws attention to the growing awareness of 
the missio Dei as constitutive of the missiones ecclesiae, before going on to refer 
to Barth’s ‘magnificent and consistent missionary ecclesiology,’ and noting that 
Barth  developed  his  entire  ecclesiology  in  terms  of  this  emerging  missionary 
paradigm.
43  Although  the  relation  between  a  missional  church  and  a  moral 
community  may  not  be  immediately  obvious,  Bosch  claims  that  a  missional 
church is not always and everywhere involved in ‘missionary’ projects. Rather, its 
entire activity is characterised by a ‘missionary’ dimension in which it is truly a 
worshipping community able to welcome outsiders and equip its members for the 
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exercise  of  their  particular  calling  as  it  necessarily,  intentionally  and  directly 
engages  in  society  while  taking  care  not  to  defend  the  privileges  of  a  select 
group.
44  He  rejects  views  of  ecclesial  existence  which  exhibit  a  lack  of 
soteriological depth and ethical thrust,
45 and further characterises the church as an 
ellipse gathered around two foci.  The first acknowledges the life-source of the 
church  where  the  emphasis  falls  on  prayer,  worship  and  the  identity  of  the 
community.  The  second  acknowledges  the  life-flow  of  the  church  where  the 
emphasis  falls  on  its  role  in  the  world,  understood  in  terms  of  involvement, 
service, challenge and mission. While neither focus should ever be at the expense 
of the other, it is nonetheless true that the first has a certain priority over the 
second  since the  involvement  and relevance of  the church  is sustained  by  its 
identity  nurtured  in  worship  and  prayer,  word  and  sacrament.
46  The  primary 
purpose of the missiones ecclesiae is not simply the planting of churches or the 
saving of souls. Rather, insists Bosch,  
it  has  to  be  the  service  to  the  missio  Dei,  representing  God  in  and  over 
against the world, pointing to God, holding up the God-child before the eyes 
of the world in a ceaseless celebration of the Feast of the Epiphany. In its 
mission, the church witnesses to the fullness of the promise of God’s reign 
and participates in the ongoing struggle between that reign and the powers of 
darkness and evil.
47  
Bosch’s portrayal of the church has been decisively influenced, at this point at 
least,  by  Barth’s  ecclesiology  and  echoes  a  number  of  the  priorities  Barth 
established in the early period of his career. Bosch grounds the identity of the 
church in the trinitarian depiction of God as Creator, Redeemer and Sanctifier, 
and emphasises the eschatological nature of ecclesial existence. His use of the 
‘ellipse analogy’ corresponds at the level of praxis with Barth’s motif of waiting 
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and  hastening,  and  also  functions  to  insist  that  the  church  can  never  become 
insular or withdrawn from the world, or focussed on purely ‘spiritual’ concerns, 
but exists in the world as witness to the promise and hope of God’s reign. In short, 
the church fulfils its mission by living in accordance with its own identity as the 
eschatological community called into being by God as the instrument and sign of 
God’s own mission of redemption in the world.  
Bosch affirms, therefore, the continuing theoretical relevance of Barth’s vision of 
Christian and  ecclesial  existence.  The  question remains,  however, whether the 
theory can be effectively translated into practice in the actual  life of concrete 
communities. An  approach  to  this question  may be  found in  the  work of the 
Gospel  and  Our  Culture  Network.
48  When  the  Network  published  their 
programmatic work Missional Church: A Vision for the Sending of the Church in 
North America, many correspondents requested living examples of this kind of 
church. As a result the Network conducted a series of carefully designed case 
studies  representing  a  broad  cross-section  of  theological,  denominational  and 
demographically diverse churches in North America.
49 Their study identified eight 
primary  patterns  characteristic  of  churches  committed  to  embodying  and 
proclaiming the reign of God in the world: 
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1.  Missional  Vocation:  The  congregation  is  discovering  together  the 
missional vocation of the church generally, and is seeking to discern 
God’s specific missional vocation for their community. 
2.  Biblical formation and discipleship: The members of the congregation 
are  actively  involved  in  learning  to  be  disciples  of  Jesus  in  their 
context. Scripture is normative in the church’s life. 
3.  Taking risks as a contrast community: The congregation is learning to 
take  risks  for  the  sake  of  the  gospel,  raising  questions  about  the 
church’s  cultural  captivity  and  grappling  with  the  ethical  and 
structural implications of its missional vocation. 
4.  Practices that demonstrate God’s intent for the world: The pattern of 
the  church’s  life  as  community  is  a  demonstration  of  what  God 
intends for the life of the whole world. The church embodies mutual 
care, hospitality, reconciliation and loving accountability. 
5.  Worship  as  public  witness:  Worship  is  central  to  community  life, 
celebrating God’s presence and promise and issuing in  vital public 
witness. 
6.  Dependence  on  the  Holy  Spirit:  The  community  confesses  its 
dependence  upon  the  Holy  Spirit  particularly  in  its  practice  of 
corporate prayer, and its obedience to the leading of the Spirit. 
7.  Pointing toward the reign of God: The missional church understands 
its calling as witness to the gospel of the in-breaking reign of God, and 
strives to be an instrument, agent and sign of that reign. As it makes 
its  witness  through  its  identity,  activity  and  communication,  it  is 
keenly aware of the provisional  nature  of all that it is and  does. It 
knows that the reign of God is something that God accomplishes, that 
its  own  response  is  ever  incomplete  and  its  own  conversion  a 
continuing necessity. 
8.  Missional Authority: The Holy Spirit gives the community a variety of 
persons  who  together  practice  the  missional  authority  required  to 
cultivate  the  discernment  of  missional  vocation  and  who  also  are 
intentional  about  the  practices  that  embed  the  vocation  in  the 
community’s life.
50 
The patterns described here bear more than a cursory similarity to the central 
aspects of Barth’s vision of Christian and ecclesial existence. They are deeply 
grounded  in  the  dynamics  of  the  gospel  as  revealed  in  Scripture,  and  the 
eschatological nature of God’s kingdom as both present and future. The notes of 
discernment, witness, prayer and worship which figure so prominently in Barth’s 
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work are present here. These communities exist as contrast communities, bearing 
specific witness to God’s reign in their locale in response to his particular call to 
them. Ethical reflection and formation feature prominently in these communities 
underlining  the  fact  that  missional  communities  are  necessarily  moral 
communities,  since  participation  in  the  mission  of  God  ineluctably  includes 
witness to the ethical claim of the kingdom of God as an inescapable aspect of 
discipleship to Jesus. Yet for all this they recognise the contingent status of their 
activity  and  recognise  their  continual  need  for  ongoing  conversion.  Certain 
practices which correspond to the activity of God in redemption are included here, 
as is the form of leadership which will lead the community in these patterns and 
embed them in the practices and ways of the kingdom.  
In these respects, the practices identified by the Network echo the kind of moral 
community envisaged by Barth, whose emphasis on the ethics of grace, response, 
the eschatological nature of the kingdom, the church as a community of witness 
and character, and the ethics of the kingdom as absolute all find a degree of echo 
here. Nevertheless there are also some differences. It seems clear, for example, 
that  while  the  Network  maintains  a  responsive  ordering of divine  and  human 
agency, it still portrays human activity in slightly more positive terms than Barth 
would be comfortable with. The Network appeals to the normativity of Scripture 
in a more unequivocal manner than does Barth with the result that its response is 
not limited to the immediate command of the moment, but it also responds more 
directly to Scripture itself. This allows the Network a greater scope for human 
initiative and supposed ethical certainty than Barth allows. This increased scope 
of initiative is balanced, however, with the awareness that all its activities are 
necessarily  partial  and  in  need  of  critical  reflection  and  ongoing  conversion.   383 
Conversely, while Barth insists on immediate obedience to the divine command, it 
is also apparent that he envisages the faith community practicing forms of moral 
reflection  and  exhortation  deeply  grounded  in  Scripture  as  a  preparation  for 
hearing  the  divine  command,  and  that  he  imagines  the  church  as  an  active 
community. Thus, from a strictly practical perspective, the distance between the 
two positions  is  not  great,  although both approaches  remain  vulnerable  to the 
subjective vagaries of sinful humanity. But given the human tendency to proclaim 
its  own  rightness  and  to  establish  a  ground  upon  which  it  might  stand 
independently of God, Barth prefers, as McCormack notes above, to entrust the 
community to the objectivity of the God who reveals himself and makes his will 
known in the presence and power of the Holy Spirit. 
A second example is seen in the eighth characteristic identified by the Network: 
the idea of missional authority and leadership. In this period of his career, Barth 
was somewhat ambivalent with regard to the roles of congregational leadership. In 
the one-sided rhetoric of Romans II he is particularly pessimistic: ‘Remaining in 
the community, he upholds the fellowship by taking it for granted. He leads by 
refusing all initiative. He breaks up the community by leaving everything as it is. 
He is a shining light by remaining altogether invisible.’
51 Such rhetoric, however, 
is  not  indicative  of  Barth’s  true  approach  to  Christian  leadership,  but  rather 
functions  as  a  polemic  against  the  kind  of  leadership  that  busily  engages  in 
religious  work  in  order  to  secure  an  advantage  for  itself.
52  A  more  balanced 
understanding of Barth’s approach to congregational leadership can be gained by 
observing  his  own  practice.  While  he  certainly  had  great  confidence  in  the 
efficacy  of  the  proclaimed  Word  to  renew  the  church,  his  own  activities  of 
                                                
51 Barth, Romans II, 507; cf. 334-336. 
52 See, for example, Barth, Romans II, 373.   384 
preaching,  lecturing,  writing,  preparing  confirmation  candidates,  social 
involvement and political activities all indicate that Barth practiced a greater level 
of pastoral and moral leadership than perhaps he allowed in theory. We have seen 
that he was also appreciative of the unusual character of Blumhardt’s leadership, 
and  further,  called  his  parishioners  to  offer  themselves  as  leaders  of  God’s 
vanguard  after  the  pattern  established  by  Paul.
53  We  have  also  noted  that  he 
provides  space  for  extensive  spiritual  and  moral  formation  via  ‘pastoral 
exhortation.’  Thus,  while  it  is  true  that  Barth’s  theory  of  spiritual  and  moral 
formation is under-developed, it is not altogether absent.
54 To sum up: the degree 
of correspondence that exists between Barth’s ethics and the eight characteristics 
identified by the Gospel and Culture Network indicates that Karl Barth’s theology 
can indeed function effectively toward the formation of moral community. 
Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated that Barth had a definite  vision of Christian and 
ecclesial  existence  in  1915-1922,  and  that  he  developed  his  theology  with  a 
specific intent to shape the way his listeners and readers actually lived. His vision 
portrays an eschatological community gathered by the proclamation of the gospel 
through  the  gracious  activity  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  watchfully  waiting  for  the 
command of the moment by giving attention to Scripture, prayer and worship, in 
order to faithfully obey the command it receives and so live in accordance with 
the coming kingdom and the pattern of life perceived in Jesus, in solidarity with, 
and for the sake of the world as a sign of God’s intention for all humanity. His 
                                                
53 See pages 241-244 above. 
54  Nigel  Biggar  makes  a  relevant  point:  ‘Whereas  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  an  exponent  of 
theological ethics to describe as closely as possible the universal features of the moral life that 
ensues from a right relationship with God, it would perhaps be less reasonable to expect him to 
make comparative practical judgements about the efficacy of particular means of moral education. 
Somewhere  the  brief  of  the  theologian  must  cease,  and  that  of  the  moral  educationalist  or 
psychologist begin’ (see Biggar, The Hastening that Waits, 144).    385 
eschatological ethics are an ethics of response to divine grace and initiative, which 
are necessarily ecclesial and thus a particular ethics, but which are also normative 
or universal in nature because they depict and bear witness to the true nature of 
reality and the manner of life which corresponds to the being and activity of God. 
While the work of Bosch and the Gospel and Our Culture Network do not provide 
direct evidence of the utility of Barth’s ethics, they do suggest that his work bears 
remarkable  similarity  to  contemporary  missional  ecclesiology  in  its  vision  of 
Christian and ecclesial existence, and that fruitful and faithful concrete Christian 
communities are indeed able to arise based on presuppositions similar to those 
found in Barth’s early theology. More direct evidence might be adduced, as Hays 
has suggested, by observing Barth’s own role in the church’s opposition to the 
Hitler regime:  
The Barmen declaration stands as an emblem of the practical consequences 
of a community formed by a Barthian hermeneutic, witnessing prophetically 
in the name of Jesus Christ against all earthly pretensions to authority.…In a 
time when the church is enervated by lukewarm indifference and conformity 
to  the  surrounding  culture,  Barth’s  theology  offers  it  a  potent  shot  of 
courage.…By adopting Barth’s  hermeneutical perspective, the  church can 
affirm its identity as a people whose vocation is above all obedience to the 
Word of God.
55 
                                                
55 Richard B. Hays, The Moral Vision of the New Testament: Community, Cross, New Creation; A 
Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1996), 239.   386 
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